

THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOLUME I



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SCALE OF MILES



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THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

A HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST
AND FIRST YEARS OF OCCUPATION
WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNT
OF THE SPANISH RULE

BY

JAMES A. LE ROY

*Late American Consul at Durango, Mexico. For two years connected
with the United States Philippine Commission during the estab-
lishment of civil government in the Philippines*

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

VOLUME I



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PREFACE

THE publication of the *Americans in the Philippines* was made possible by the tender sympathy and loving appreciation and loyalty of the author's friends. To the Honorable William H. Taft, for the Introduction; to Mr. Harry Coleman for the Biography, and to Mr. Hobart Hoyt and Mr. Robert Crouse, brothers in Delta Upsilon, without whose help the manuscript would not have been published, thanks are gratefully expressed.

MABEL POUND LEROY.

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NOTE. The colored map of the Philippines, used as frontispiece to the first volume, is from Atkinson's *Philippine Islands*, by permission of Ginn & Company. The portrait of James A. LeRoy, which faces page xiii, is from a photograph. The map of Manila Bay, facing page 148, is reproduced from a government map.

INTRODUCTION

MR. JAMES A. LEROY was a graduate of the University of Michigan. He and his wife were classmates at the same high school, and the friendship that they made under those conditions ripened into an engagement. They were married and spent their honeymoon on the trip with the second Philippine Commission which went to Manila to begin its labors. Mr. LeRoy was the secretary of Commissioner Worcester, the one of the commission who knew most about the islands, the most concerning their flora and fauna, — for he had twice made trips of scientific research through the islands, — and the most concerning the people, because he knew the Spanish language and had traveled the islands over, living with the people in their villages and with the priests in their *conventos*.

As confidential secretary and assistant of Mr. Worcester, Mr. LeRoy's attention was very early directed to a study of the whole situation there, and from his conversations with Mr. Worcester he received accurate impressions before he reached the islands. He had great facility in the study of language, and he became, before he left the islands, well versed in Castilian. He learned something, too, of the local dialects, especially of Tagalog. While he was in the Philippines, this desire to learn the languages and the dialects, and the acquaintances that he formed through Mr. Worcester, who knew a great many of the natives from former trips, led him to move in circles into which few Americans ever went. He studied the opinions of the native Filipinos of the different classes, and he became greatly interested in the early history of the islands. He had a judicial mind and a very great love of accurate research and investigation. I think he was possibly not free from

some prejudices, for those usually affect all men, but, on the whole, his intense love of the truth and his desire to be correct historically were so strong that his account and his view of what he learned from his investigations were likely to be as little colored as that of any historian.

While there is a good deal of material for history in the form of accounts written by various persons of the different centuries, it still is true that there is much inaccurate tradition about things in the history of the islands that needs careful modification and keen sifting. This, I think may be fairly said, Mr. LeRoy has supplied.

Mr. LeRoy remained in the islands some three years or more, but having contracted tuberculosis he felt it necessary to seek a country in which recovery was more likely than it could be in the moist climate of the Philippines. Through the recommendations of the commission, he was appointed as consul at Durango, a place in Mexico where the climate was such that it was hoped he might live down the disease which had positively established itself in his lungs. He longed for the opportunity to visit Seville and other places in Spain where there were records in manuscript of conditions in the Philippines transmitted by the friars of ancient day, who were the historians of that period, and by the reports of Spain's official representatives in her far-off colonies. This he was denied, and he was obliged to take at second hand the contents of the records. It was a great loss that his health prevented his making a life study of that which was nearest his heart. The dread disease from which he was suffering increased its ravages, and his condition aroused his anxious concern lest he might not live to finish the history that he had undertaken so that the proceeds from the copyright could support his wife and two children. Much of what he wrote was written as he looked death in the face. He had intended to bring his history down through the first five years of the Commission Government, but the pen dropped from his hand, and he was not permitted to com-

plete his narrative beyond the date when he first arrived in the islands.


In spite of his failure to round out the work, he has left a most valuable aid to the student of Philippine history in that which he did complete. It is very essential, in order to understand the problems that the American Government has had to meet and solve in those far-off Gems of the Pacific, to know what their history was under the Spanish régime. The influence of the theocracy which prevailed in the islands under the friars, the constant friction between the civil and the religious governmental influences, on the one hand, and the union of the two in control of the people, on the other, all make not only an interesting study, but one which throws great light on the present conditions in the islands.

Nowhere can a clearer and more judicial statement be found than in these chapters which Mr. LeRoy, who had really given up his life for the Philippines, was able to complete. There will be differences of opinion with Mr. LeRoy's conclusions, but what makes his work so valuable is that he states the evidence on both sides of controversial issues, and while he draws his own inferences, he adduces the sources of his information and states the evidence on both sides in such a way as to enable the reader to exercise his judgment, and affirm, or differ from, the conclusion of the author.

I sincerely hope that the work may have the circulation that it deserves as a real contribution to the history of a people whose fate is now so much bound up with that of the people of the United States.

WILLIAM H. TAFT.

August 1, 1913.



James A. LeRoy.

JAMES ALFRED LEROY

BY HARRY COLEMAN

Editor of the Pontiac (Mich.) Press Gazette

EMERSON has said that every commanding monument in the annals of the world is the triumph of enthusiasm. It follows that any life which leaves upon the progress of the world the mark of labor well performed must be sustained by unselfish enthusiasm of the kind that overcomes all obstacles, goes deeply into the fundamentals, and, thus, passes on to future generations and history something tangible and inspiring for others to follow. The true historian lives for generations. Time cannot erase what has been impartially written of the years that have passed, and he who has executed a true word-picture of the world's progress has made for himself a monument of truth that must take first rank by the side of other high arts.

When the President of the United States came to Pontiac, Michigan, in the fall of 1911, it was not to speak of the all-absorbing problems of the day. There was no word of the tariff or the currency question; there was no reference to any of the details of government. He had come to pay a tribute to the life and public services of Mr. James Alfred LeRoy and to lay a wreath upon his tomb: "Here near the school where he graduated," said President Taft, "I wish to pay a debt of gratitude to his memory in behalf of the people of this nation. He went to the Philippine Islands, learned the people and their history, and he finally gave up his life, as a soldier gives up his life on the field of battle, because he there became a victim of impaired health. His death did not occur, however, until after he had rendered a service to the Government of a most important character, and one which entitles him to the gratitude of all the people of the United States."

A great task calls for uninterrupted effort, even, it may be, to the extent of a lifetime; and it devolved upon Mr. LeRoy to crowd into the thirty-three years of his career a knowledge of Spanish and Philippine history that would ordinarily take the full span of a long life to acquire. This he did by applying himself to the subject with an abounding enthusiasm, with an unremitting effort directed into every avenue where knowledge was to be found, and by personal contact with the various phases of latter-day Philippine development. Once wholly engrossed in the task of securing a thorough understanding of the subject, there was no barrier too great for him to surmount. Exacting in nature and a foe to slipshod methods of research and in the determination of true facts, he spared no effort in the acquirement of the minutest bit of information which might enable him correctly to inform himself.

During the last four years of life his brilliant mind performed a feat which would have baffled any less determined individual. His health had been seriously impaired by tuberculosis contracted in the Philippines, and, with all his knowledge and grasp of the various phases of Oriental and Spanish history, he had thus to labor in his writing with the handicap of a weakened body. Striving to overcome the ravages of the disease by change of climate, he, nevertheless, pursued his interest in the subject of his deep concern with undaunted effort. Men of his will-power do not surrender even under the impending danger of the plague. Like the pathetic instance of Robert Louis Stevenson, stricken in like manner, his mind kept up its unceasing effort both to conquer the plague and at the same time give to the world what abundant preparation and inclination had prompted. His heart was in the new colonial experiment of raising the Filipinos to a position of ample educational and self-governing qualifications. He had seen the islands fall into our hands through the exigencies of war. It was not a question with him of the wisdom of their becoming a part of our possessions. They were already ours; therefore,

what was our duty toward them? His sense of justice frowned upon their exploitation by selfish seekers after treasure. His viewpoint carried only the thought that as a nation we had, by the Treaty of Paris, assumed an obligation which was to test our righteousness and exemplify the spirit of a democracy turned missionary. The fruitful interest and enthusiasm of a man of Mr. LeRoy's character, applied to so great a problem, meant much not only to this country, by way of informing the people here at home of the exact truth of the progress in the Far Eastern experiment, but to the Filipinos themselves, the confidence of whom he possessed to a marked degree.

He had gone to the Islands as secretary to Professor D. C. Worcester of the Second Commission appointed by President McKinley. A man of his ambition and attainments could not be confined to the details of this assignment. Like the industrial leader, who rises from the ranks by gaining each day additional and valuable experience from tasks not assigned but nevertheless taken up through enthusiastic desire, Mr. LeRoy faithfully did his routine task and then left no avenue closed against the completion of his fund of information. From early young manhood he had earned his way, and by combining practical newspaper work with his course in college he became not only a close student of contemporary events, but particularly well informed concerning the events which were finally to make up the history of the new possessions. His position with the commission placed him in close contact with the membership of that governing body. Being endowed with qualities that command attention, and manifesting an eager desire to go far beyond the requirements of his duties in the active work of establishing the new government, men of the highest rank soon gave him their confidence and began to seek his counsel. These men were not slow to observe his intense interest in the subject which was giving them much concern. That he had the faculty of turning off work of the most intricate and exacting nature, and with the dispatch of a

trained journalist, early came to the attention of the commission; that he possessed tremendous energy and intense love for his task was apparent within but few months; that he sought to coöperate and assume the fullest share of responsibility which his position made possible, were facts that pressed themselves upon the notice of his higher associates.

A trained secretary, one whose education has been of the practical kind, combined with mastery of fundamentals embracing a higher course in professional or literary attainment, soon demonstrates his true worth. Such a man is not a mere machine, but a trained diplomat and executive. He carries in large measure the burden of responsibility resting upon his superiors, and hence, if serving in the highest degree of efficiency, must take rank with those above him. Mr. LeRoy fulfilled these demands, and then on his own account began to delve into all past events leading up to the establishment of the Taft Commission. The task was a heavy one and, in many cases, such information as existed was fragmentary and colored by the viewpoint of partisanship. Within a short time, however, he had acquired the basis of a library covering early Spanish periods and leading on through the various stages of the insurrection against the rule of Spain. This library increased in size until it embraced practically everything written on the subject. Over this vast accumulation of print, every page of it in a foreign language, he went with painstaking care, and in the end was rewarded with a comprehensive view extending over the old Spanish régime.

Having literary connections with numerous publications in the United States, he turned the knowledge to account, his contributions appearing in the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *American Historical Review*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, and the *Independent*. In addition, a volume entitled *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (Putnam) appeared in 1905 and is now in its third edition. This work was designed only to set forth the Filipinos as they are, and was in no sense an ex-

position of any policy with regard to the "Philippine Question." A demand existed for a brief outline of native life which should picture the typical Filipino community, its activities, and the social and educational phases of the Islanders. In setting forth the status of the great majority, as differentiated from the traditional leaders and economic bosses of these masses, — the ignorant peasantry, rather than the somewhat distant and unsympathetic upper proprietary classes, — the author supplied a new picture of the situation, and removed, to an appreciable extent, the average reader's unfamiliarity with numerous tribes making up the population of the Philippine possessions. In this work, by way of introduction, he assumed an attitude frankly and cordially in sympathy with the aspirations of the Filipinos towards liberalism and modern life and progress. The best Filipinos, he argued, are optimistic as to their race and its future, and we ourselves can at least be decent enough to give them the benefit of the doubt, if not to encourage their optimism. He was, however, in much doubt as to how far we are justified in accepting the proportionately small class of natives possessing education and social position, as spokesmen and representatives of their people.

It was in his treatment of Filipino life that Mr. LeRoy accorded to Spain a full measure of credit for her aims and achievements in the line of colonization. He regretted the ignorant attitude inspired by race prejudice which would deny to the Spaniard an influence for good as applied to the Philippine subjects. That the Spanish rule resulted to a profound extent in an amelioration of conditions was freely stated by the author, and in particular did he lay stress upon their benevolent achievement and its net result. While condemning the backward and halting step, however, which at last turned the Filipinos against Spain's rule, it was Mr. LeRoy's belief that in order to put the Filipinos of to-day in their proper category, full justice should be done Spain's actual accomplishments, if not as ruler, at any rate as teacher and missionary. He fully

realized that Spain, in the Peninsula itself, had never yet entered into the nineteenth century, politically or intellectually. On this account, how much less, as he reasoned, was she able to guide a backward people of the Orient, themselves but awakening to contact with the world at large and but dimly aware of the goal toward which they feel it within them to strive. It was his opinion, as a conclusion to his allusion to this phase of the Philippine question, that dogmatize as one might about the racial and environmental inheritance of the Filipinos, as being of the Orient, the fact that they themselves rejected Spain, as an unsatisfactory mentor in Occidental civilization, is an indication of their fitness for further progress in that direction.

Through his numerous contributions to various publications, and by reason of the extended comment aroused in the press as they appeared, Mr. LeRoy soon became known, among those best able to judge, as an authority on subjects connected with the Philippines. His services were sought in many additional directions, but human minds and hands, even when backed by the store of energy which this man possessed, have their limits. He performed what has been conceded as the work of two men as secretary, and with it all he labored long into the evenings, many times until sunrise, in quest of stray bits of information which would enable him finally to attain the object of his vision: "A Review of the American Occupation of the Philippines."

As a preparation for this worthy ambition he had gained the knowledge and the place of a competent and unbiased observer. His research into Spanish history had been that of a close student; his contact with the various governmental activities, military and civil, in the Islands had enabled him to separate fictional and unreliable data, which always accompany a new situation, from the facts as history should record them. An omnivorous reader and one who kept an extensive daily record in his own handwriting of all events that might later become

the basis of misunderstanding or controversy, he launched into the introductory pages of what was to be his important life work.

Going to the Islands with athletic strength and possessed of stupendous energy, he, nevertheless, drew too heavily upon his physical resources. The uncertain and depressing climate, together with the unsanitary conditions then existing, produced a run-down condition that later made a place for the germ of tuberculosis. At the threshold of many a strong man's career there appears before him the threatening force of an ill fate. It comes creeping to the doorway and stands ready with uplifted hand to strike without warning or command; its clinched fist is raised in defiance of all that is good; its insidious nature knows neither the weak nor the strong, and its victims are not measured by the great usefulness that is in them. Mr. LeRoy had been met by the demon of disease. It was to drive him from the Islands and the people in whose interest the impulse of his brave and abiding heart had been directed toward a more satisfactory governmental and educational development.

Returning to the United States on the advice of a physician at Manila, he sought medical advice in San Francisco, and was informed that his case had reached a serious stage. Another physician, at Los Angeles, contradicted this diagnosis, and informed him that a change of climate was not necessary. Returning to his home state, Michigan, the advice of the first doctor was corroborated, and he was informed that his future depended upon his living in a dry climate. With all this conflicting professional advice of a disconcerting and disappointing nature, he was greatly perplexed; but a friend who owned a ranch in New Mexico persuaded him to make the trip there, and within a short time he accepted. Behind him he left his young wife and baby, to search in a far-off, rough country for health and strength with which to continue his work. In this new location he remained eleven months, and while there regained much of his lost weight. Filled with his characteristic spirit

to be busy, he could not be persuaded to take a complete rest, and within a short time was surrounded by piles of periodicals, Philippine bulletins, and Spanish publications. The habits of study and daily labor could not be broken, and he was soon engaged with his writing.

During a trip on horseback to Santa Fé he was thrown and sustained a fracture of his right arm. His daily letter to his wife, written in a cramped left hand, caused her to leave immediately for his side. She found him with his broken arm in a plaster cast, busily engaged with his left hand manipulating the keys of the typewriter. Within a short time husband and wife were located on a small fruit ranch near the Tesuque Reservation, just out of Santa Fé.

About this time the agitation against the so-called imperialistic tendencies of the Government were rife, and a strong party in the United States called for the independence of the Philippines. Mr. LeRoy, while favorable to the largest participation of the natives in their own government consistent with their qualifications, looked with grave concern upon any movement which had for its end the turning over of the Islands to complete native control. He traced much of the impulse under which many well-intentioned Americans were arguing for independence, to designing native politicians whose influence, if allowed to have recognition, would overturn the reconstructive work already accomplished. And it may be well to state here that up to the time of his death (1909) he had never changed his mind in this respect. It was his firm belief that until the great mass of Filipinos have been raised to a higher standard of citizenship, both from an educational standpoint and with a knowledge of stable governmental discipline, any efforts toward independence would tend to the creation of factional difficulties of a disrupting and demoralizing nature. To promise the Islanders any particular time when independence would be granted seemed likewise to him unadvisable, in that such promise would keep alive within the minds of certain leaders

a burning desire for power, and of a kind that was pregnant with bad results both to themselves and the people over whom they would expect to exercise direction. He desired that the rule of the home government should prevail, without giving promise of termination, so long as the best interests of the natives should be served, and he believed that such service must be rendered until the people had undergone a long process of education both in governmental principles and through contact with the better civilizing influences.

And thus it was from his temporary home in New Mexico, that the keen interest of Mr. LeRoy was aroused toward the "anti-imperialistic" propaganda being carried on, particularly in the Eastern States. He plunged into magazine and newspaper writing, allowing no argument in favor of Philippine independence to go unchallenged. Day after day, and week after week, his contributions appeared. In none of these was there any attempt at controversy other than properly to inform the people of the United States of the duty resting upon them, to the end that the Filipinos should not be cast adrift while undergoing a sane and unselfish process of amelioration. That his influence was greatly felt at this critical time is shown by the fact that very early the anti-imperialistic talk largely subsided and in its place was implanted a general belief, held even to-day by the best informed, that to turn the government of the Islands back to the natives would be a serious mistake, fraught with uncertainty as to their ultimate destiny.

After two months spent in putting the little fruit ranch into livable condition, a telegram came to Mr. LeRoy offering him the post of consul to Costa Rica. Inquiry as to climatic conditions satisfied him of the unsuitableness of the altitude; but later came an offer of similar services at Durango, Mexico, which he accepted. Ranch life was not to his liking, and while it had been resorted to for the outdoor life, he was without capital, and the call to become active once more in work that was congenial proved irresistible. A long, tedious trip to the City

of Mexico followed. The United States Ambassador was in the States, and it was four weeks before the formal details necessary to taking up the post at Durango had been completed. Once located in this quiet atmosphere, and having organized the consulate office, he proceeded in his endeavor to regain health in a dry climate, at the same time relinquishing little of his active concern in world affairs, and especially the Philippines. His consular reports were varied and of a nature to attract the commendation of the State Department. In fact, many of his suggestions for improvement of the service figured in the many reforms that came as a result of Secretary Root's efforts. All of his spare time, aside from the duties of the consulate, was applied to writing of the events leading up to the American occupation of the Philippines. The old city, with its quiet, easy-going life, offered abundant opportunity for delving into old and rare Spanish books. Day after day the book collectors brought everything to his door which they thought the taste of the new consul would fancy. The great majority of these tenders were, of course, useless, but there were a number of historical works that proved a valuable addition to his already extensive library. To the large amount of data in his possession was constantly added fresh and reliable information from friends in the Islands. Back and forth a chain of letters was passing which made new inquiries and further informed him of such facts as would prove of historical use. He could not touch in a light way the extensive subject which he had chosen to handle. There had been too much superficial literature written upon Philippine subjects, and as much misinformation as fact was already abroad to perplex him, but, at the same time, to stimulate his own thorough treatment of the questions involved. It was a most exacting duty, and yet a loved one for him. Through all the agony of his ill fate, and with a body succumbing gradually to the ravages of the disease, he, nevertheless, labored on. There was no complaint, no surrender, and through it all he maintained

the iron will and determination which were characteristic of him. Far from the associations of people from whom he was accustomed to receive inspiration, and with hopeful heart, he completed a page to-day and a page to-morrow of the manuscript that was to become the basis of his review. Of that review he wrote:—

I have said that the manuscript sent to you will comprise about one half of the work when completed,—I think it will,—one half, that is, of the text proper. It contains the Introductory Chapter on the Spanish régime and the four chapters¹ carrying through the history of 1898–1900 inclusive, the four longest and most difficult chapters of the book, I think; at any rate, I regard my work of composition as now more than half done, though there are eight more chapters as planned. Then, too, there will be bibliographical lists and notes at the end of each chapter, some four to six appendices (one consisting of some 30,000 words, the others relatively short), and, of course, a very comprehensive index, indispensable in a work which will be, like this, so largely a reference work merely.

The other chapters to come are: V, Progress in Pacification, recounting the events of 1901 to the latter part of the year, the collapse of the insurrection, and the establishment of civil government in part; VI, the Recrudescence in Rebellion, seen in the Batangas and Samar campaigns, this chapter dealing with the question of the relations between the American army and the Filipinos; VII, the Philippine Question in the United States, primarily a review of the “army cruelty” campaign and the enactment of the constitutional law of the Philippines in 1902, but also reviewing the history of anti-imperialism (strictly without taking sides, and to a considerable extent merely in a bibliographical way), and of the discussion of the Philippine question and legislation upon it in the United States, 1898–1905; VIII, describing the essential features of the new Philippine government and their practical workings, from 1901 on; IX, the various Philippine questions which are economical in character, notably Chinese labor, the question of tariffs, the development of agricultural, mining, and forestry resources, etc.; X, the friar and religious question, in its various phases; XI, the questions related with the government of the Moros and the pagan tribes, historically and bibliographically treated in the main; and, XII, the summing-up,

¹ For the convenience of the reader, the author's original five chapters have been subdivided in the printed book.

which I think I can make short, and in which I desire to review the salient things brought out in all the preceding chapters, historically speaking, showing plainly the things which may be regarded as established facts from 1898 on, and stating the main elements of the "Philippine problem" from the diverse points of view from which it is at present regarded.

This will, I think, set before you a very complete idea of the nature and comprehensiveness of what I am trying to do.

During the last year Mr. LeRoy was at Durango new developments had arisen in the Philippines and the State Department determined to send Secretary Taft to the scene. A congressional party was soon organized to accompany the former governor and to obtain full knowledge of the progress which had been made. Mr. LeRoy was made a member of the secretary's official staff. It was not until his death that his wife, in the reading of his diary, found a warning that had been sent him of the danger attending such an exertion, and that he had suffered a slight hemorrhage due, he recorded, to the cramped position assumed while at work on his typewriter. He chose to make the trip, however, inasmuch as it once more afforded him opportunity for contact with men of affairs. Aboard ship and with long trips to China and Japan, these months were a delight after the monotonous years of exile in Mexico. For this diversion he may have sacrificed a few weary days of life, but it was "worth the while," as he would say, to one whose tastes were for purely intellectual pursuits.

Directly upon his return to Durango he was tired and somewhat indifferent to completing his review. But the stout heart was not broken — the will-power still remained, and with resolute courage he went forward collecting the data for the later chapters. Upon his return from the Lake Mohonk Conference, in 1905, where he lectured on the Islands, the work of writing occupied five months, this being followed by a serious illness. He had put his whole soul into the effort. It was to be his life work; it was to be a heritage to his wife and

children. Upon its pages he had placed the image of his impartial mind; and whatever may become of the Islands, their true friend and adherent had, during his declining days, striven to give a faithful portrayal of the many events that went hand in hand with their governmental existence. He had rebuked an earlier fate, though his remaining days were numbered.

After his severe illness he resolved to seek out-of-door employment. Offers of a change of posts, among them that of consul-general to Madrid, had to be refused, and the telegram declining this place he never saw until three days after, being too ill to speak. When he arose he never referred to the incident, so keen was his disappointment at being obliged to forego a position of greater responsibility.

Coming north to Michigan, following the resignation of the post at Durango, he strove to interest capital in Mexican lands. While the negotiations were in progress he again suffered a relapse, after having started back to Durango, and, reaching the city, was carried to the old barracks, formerly occupied by the consulate. Here his faithful servant waited upon him for the following three months. All of this time hope did not relinquish its hold upon his mind, and, in spite of broken strength, he saw the possibility of help in the mountain air. Being obliged, however, to abandon any movement in this direction he asked for admittance to the military hospital at Fort Bayard, New Mexico. For a time he showed improvement, and the brave fight which he waged, that he might once more have with him his wife and three little children, excited the deepest sympathy and close personal concern of the officials of the hospital. Just when the dread disease appeared to be baffled and his courageous fight seemed won, the summons came, and a message to his family and friends at home announced his death.

James Alfred LeRoy was born at Pontiac, Michigan, December 9, 1875, the son of Edward and Jennie LeRoy. At twelve years of age he had demonstrated an extremely precocious mind and was far advanced in his studies. During vacation, at this period of life, he learned stenography while an instructor was engaged in teaching an older member of the family. At thirteen he had read Blackstone in a local law office, and at fourteen he accepted a temporary position as stenographer in the office of the Pontiac, Oxford & Northern Railway. At fifteen he busied himself outside of school hours by reporting for local newspapers, pursuing this activity until he graduated from the high school at the early age of seventeen. His work in the school attracted general comment among the teachers, inasmuch as he embraced in his studies all four of the courses offered, his diploma allowing him one year's credit at the University of Michigan.

Being thrown on his own resources he arranged, in connection with his university course, to supply a chain of newspapers with news of an athletic nature. Of robust body and possessed of a desire to show his full prowess, the records in high jumping, hurdling, and sprinting which he made during his freshman year served to honor him in Western collegiate circles. A new running broad jump record was soon established, and its equal was not found until many years after. His college course was marked by efficient accomplishment in languages, mathematics, and history, and with all this difficult classroom work went much writing in connection with a daily published and maintained by students. Every university has its leaders in various lines of student activity, and it would be difficult to separate many of these diversions from the man LeRoy, who was always doing his part in worthy collegiate enterprises. While in college he became a member of the Delta Upsilon Fraternity. He was graduated in 1896 from the University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts, his standing throughout his course entitling him to the highest honors.

Thirteen years after, when the Phi Beta Kappa Society, founded on scholarship, was organized, he was made a member, his high standing while in college making him eligible for membership.

Following his graduation he became, at twenty years of age, principal of the Pontiac High School, from which he had graduated only three years previously. Within a year the superintendent resigned, and the Board of Education was divided on the question of LeRoy's eligibility for the position. All admitted his educational qualifications, but some believed him too young to be entitled to the place. Resigning his position at the close of the term he entered the ranks of journalism, being successfully connected with the *Detroit Free Press* and *Evening News*, and occupying a responsible position as political reporter. New York being the goal of all starving newspaper men, he was soon in that city, where he made extensive connection with the best publications. Later he became Sunday editor of the *Baltimore Herald*. It was while on this newspaper that he had an assignment in Washington which placed him in touch with the members of the Philippine Commission only recently chosen by President McKinley. While only twenty-four years of age at this time, he was of mature mind, and his extensive experience gained him the responsible position of secretary to Commissioner Worcester. Only a few days remained before the commission was to leave for Manila, and at this juncture Mr. LeRoy did a characteristic act and one which showed him equal to any emergency. He was unmarried, and the young woman of his choice, Miss Mabel Pound, lived in Michigan. Immediately after accepting the call to the Islands he telegraphed her as follows: "Will you marry me Friday in Pontiac and go immediately to the Philippines?" The wedding was arranged and the bride and groom were soon on the way to San Francisco, joining the members of the Commission at Chicago.

Since his death the widow and her three children have

taken up their residence in Washington, where Mrs. LeRoy is the only person, outside of the President himself, who is authorized to sign his name to official papers. And now as the years go by, and three little children are left with the mother to make their way without the guidance and care of one who loved and labored for their future, it is good to know that they are fulfilling his every hope. The inspiration of his life will one day come to lead them to new visions of usefulness, for the world is wide and, in its struggles, calls for the same unselfish and ennobling service that their father rendered.

Beset with difficulties and ill fate on every hand, he had never shirked a duty nor overlooked the many little things of life that busy men are prone to forget. His active career was dedicated to expounding the truth and attempting to set the progress of the world one step farther toward the ideal. When disease and weakness were upon him, and the tremendous energy he was expending to combat the "anti-imperialistic" cry caused one of his friends in Washington to suggest that he enter outdoor business life and cease his writing, he recorded these words in his diary: "I wrote — that, if it came down squarely to a decision between a mere chase to add years to a life and also 'make a competence,' and the living of a life more after my own inclinations and doing something satisfying, even though shorter, I should prefer the latter."

Here was the measure of the man. He believed in the cause through which the United States was turned missionary to the Filipinos. He believed in the usefulness of the administration of their affairs by this country. Only one barrier could, he firmly believed, be erected against a successful ultimate result in the Islands, and that was an ill-timed and badly advised change. Such a devout adherent of the Filipino-American experiment could not in conscience relinquish his work. And he died fighting — fighting for the faith that was in him.

THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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CHAPTER I

THE SPANISH RÉGIME—A THREE-CENTURY PRELUDE

THE people of the Philippine Islands were, on the 1st day of May in 1898, the product of a mixed Asiatic ancestry, both of blood and of environment ; of more than three centuries of rule by mediæval Spanish ecclesiastics ; of commercial and political contact for that length of time with Spaniards of a more progressive type, and for a half-century back with the world in general ; and of a generation of strife and of evolution, on the part of their somewhat homogeneous civilized elements, toward a more independent existence and a dimly recognized ideal of nationality. That neither the statesmen nor the public of the United States knew the elements of this composite did not in the least lessen the fact of its complexity. And since the ignorance was reciprocal, and the Filipinos knew, in fact, even less of the history, the national characteristics, and the aims and ideals of the "North Americans," the events that brought these two peoples close together at the end of the nineteenth century were invested with something of awe and mystery, blinding them both at the time to the real trend of enlightened self-interest and leaving the issue of their contact, both for themselves and the outside world, very much in doubt. If the time has not yet come to dispel that doubt, at least there is much to be gained by a sober, careful, and critical weighing of the events and the facts revealed by their relationships for the more than half a decade that has since passed.

The first requisite to such a review is a knowledge of the facts. Not only have these often been obscured in the heat of partisan discussion in the United States, but the very mass of accumulated data is a hindrance to that clarity of understanding which ought to prevail under government by the people. And if, in the fury of our scribbling, our debating and our resolving, we have confused the very events happening under our eyes, less creditable yet to us of the greater and more responsible side of this partnership is it that we still plan and resolve, discuss and legislate, in careless ignorance of the antecedent data of our "new problem," untroubled and almost contemptuous as to the history of those whose welfare we have, with or without their consent, assumed to control. It is not less necessary now, in attempting to review the events of these six years, than it was in the early days of 1898, to go back and consult previous Philippine history for enlightenment as to our course.

Because we of a favored continental expanse had never before 1898 turned our attention to the Philippines, they were not necessarily bound to disclose themselves an El Dorado of riches to our magic touch. Because as a nation we had grown to bearded manhood in ignorance of the existence of the Filipinos, it was not perforce to be assumed that they were undiscovered children of free nature, to be catalogued and classified after their kind and to be governed from an ethnological textbook. If this had been the case, much of the advice which was so generously lavished upon us by our British guides, counselors, and friends, and by their imitators in some of our new collegiate "colonial laboratories" at home, would have been more pertinent. But the Filipinos had developed, or, at any rate, had acquired, some degree of civilization before the Spanish friars and arquebusiers came upon them, and the plain truth of their history since teaches him who will consult it that glib phrases about the "degenerate influence of corrupt

Spain" do not sound well upon the lips of those who are proud to call themselves Anglo-Saxons.

A. THE PRE-HISTORIC FILIPINOS

An investigation of the careless and contemptuous way in which the Spanish conquerors, lay and ecclesiastical, almost uniformly dealt with the characteristics and institutions of the sixteenth-century Filipinos, as well as of the more advanced Mexicans, and sought to sweep them away as wholly evil, and of the equally intolerant and unscientific way in which their Spanish successors have treated these more or less primitive communities in their writing of history, might well have preached modesty to us. An excellent piece of scientific work lies open to him who shall first reconstruct for us the communities of the pre-conquest Filipinos. Of late years, in Spain and the Philippines, the heat of bitter partisan controversy has tended more and more to obscure the facts, already so unsatisfactorily brought out in earlier writings. What may be called the "friar party" has sought to paint the primitive Filipinos as savages pure and simple, and the tendency has been to heighten the colors of the picture as imaginations and passions were worse mixed. Two motives inspired this campaign, one the desire to enlarge the importance of the work wrought by the friars, and the other to combat the extension of liberal institutions to the Filipinos. On the other hand, certain superficial Filipinos and mentally exuberant Spanish Liberals have gone to as great extremes in painting the early Filipinos as models of virtue, intelligence, and social progress, and their society as one unique in Oceania, an antipodal civilization in the midst of a sea of ignorance and vices.

As stated, it is not yet possible to pronounce a critical judgment as to the status of the pre-conquest communities of lowland Filipinos, the Christianized population of to-day. Doubtless, much of interest will be brought to light when

careful studies are made of the still half-wild Malay communities of the hills of Luzon and of the Moro settlements of Mindanau ; it must be remembered, however, that there is a probability that the former are Malay immigrants to the Philippines of an earlier date than are the lowlanders, and that the Moros represent later migrations from Java and other islands, where they had, in part at least, acquired before coming the Mohammedan religion, and with it various social institutions, modified since by communication not only with other Mohammedan communities of similar institutions, but also to some extent with the world in general. Of the early Spanish writings, most of which are unsatisfactory for the reasons stated, the best and more informative are a treatise on the customs of the natives written by Father Plasencia, a Franciscan friar, in 1589, and adopted by the Government for the use of its officials, and Dr. Antonio de Morga's work on the progress of affairs in the Philippines up to 1606, its author having been a member of the supreme court of the islands.¹ These works and others that supplement them go to show that the Filipinos of the central islands and Luzon's western coasts were somewhat past the clan stage, and had a political organization under local chiefs which virtually amounted to a mild feudalism, their so-called slavery and their land tenure fitting better into such a conception of their society ; that they had a system of laws or customs, administered by the councils of old men ; that their religious ideas, undeveloped and imbued with superstitions as they were, included, nevertheless, the recognition of a Supreme Being — the contest between Mohammedanism and Christianity among these Malays in the sixteenth century, with their readiness to accept either, being significant and illustrative ; that they had a system of writing, based on a phonetic alphabet, probably derived ultimately from the same source as that from which ours came in the dawn of history, and that some in each community could read

¹ See Bibliography.

and write; that they had long since passed the nomadic state — probably long before the Malay migrations to the Philippines.

Discarding exaggerations and matters in doubt, we know that polygamy was then practiced by Filipinos of sufficient status to maintain more than one wife; that the morality of the women left much to be desired, under the standard then obtaining, publicly at least, in European society; that gambling was by no means learned from the Spaniards, although new ways of gambling were; that the petty chiefs were frequently at strife with each other, these tribal wars not contributing to the progress or the happiness of the people; that agriculture and such arts as weaving, ceramics, etc., were in a primitive state (as, indeed, they still are). The natives had iron implements of warfare and various articles of other metals; but contact with the continent of Asia explains these. They were in regular intercourse with China and with Japan, Borneo, and other islands some centuries before Spanish discovery. In the little-known work of Chao-Yu-Kua, a Chinese geographer of the thirteenth century, is a chapter on the Philippine trade.¹ The Chinese then obtained from the Filipinos not only such raw materials as yellow wax, cotton, pearls, tortoise-shells, betel-nuts, cocoanuts, and vegetables, but also jute fabrics (probably those woven from *abaka*, Manila hemp, as to-day), other woven goods (of cotton, Blumentritt suggests),² and fine mats. The Filipinos took in exchange porce-

¹ Chapter XI is devoted to the Philippines. For the data herein derived from this interesting work, the only reference available to the writer has been a Spanish version of the chapter in question, printed in *La Alborada*, organ of the Manila Lyceum (a secondary school), on November 9, 1901. This translation was sent to José Rizal by his intimate friend and co-worker in Philippina, Dr. Ferdinand Blumentritt, in 1894. The letter of transmission and the translation are in the collection of Mr. Clemente J. Zulueta, of Manila, who was, prior to his decease in 1904, official bibliographer of the Philippine Government. Blumentritt states in his letter to Rizal that a poor version of this chapter had been published in Madrid the year before, but he had since carefully compared his Spanish version with the English version of Dr. Hirth.

² Father Pedro Chirino, in his *Relación de las Islas Filipinas* (Rome, 1604),

lain, gold, iron, needles, vases for perfumes, lance-heads, articles of lead, silk parasols, black damask, and other silks. Chao-Yu-Kua tells of their settlements, some of a thousand families each, their houses of cane being clustered on high places. This was nearly three centuries before Magellan.

B. SPANISH CONQUEST AND MISSIONARY LABORS

The history of the Spanish conquest is by no means comprised in the events of the four expeditions from the gloriously disastrous one of Magellan, which discovered the islands in 1521, to the successful one of Legaspi, which planted the city of Sebú in 1565 and that of Manila in 1572. Roughly outlined, the conquest period lasted until 1700. By that time the islands were almost as fully occupied by the outposts of Spanish power and Spanish Christianity as they were two hundred years later. Spasmodic attempts were made thereafter to bring into the fold of the Church the wild communities of the mountains which form the spine of every large island in the group, but in the main these communities were only crowded farther back by the growth of the lowland population and the extension of its quasi-civilization. In the eighteenth and again in the nineteenth century, there were sustained efforts, only partially successful, for the subjection and settlement of the Moro country in the south (as there had already been in the seventeenth century). But by 1700 the Spanish flag had been raised and Spanish churches built over practically all the territory which, upon the transfer of sovereignty to the United States, could be said to have been effectively subjected to the mixed civil and ecclesiastical dominance of Spain. Progress thereafter was mainly in the growth of population within these limits, leading to the formation of

speaks of the natives weaving cotton into fabrics for clothing, which was worn by the women in long robes reaching the ankles. See the English translation of this work in *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898* (cited in the Bibliography at the end of volume II), vol. XII, pp. 187, 206; also pp. 187 *et seq.*, for references to the prehistoric trade with Japan.

new *pueblos* and new parishes out of places that were at the end of the conquest period outlying districts of the older Church centers. Even the island of Negros, which lay for the most part undeveloped until the nineteenth century, when it became the chief sugar-producing center of the Bisayan Islands, forms, strictly speaking, no exception to this general statement.

Certain features of the conquest period detach themselves as significant to the student of recent Philippine history. First of all, it need not be said, at least to one who has read even slightly in the history of Spanish colonization, that the conquerors considered it a work of necessity and also of beneficence to stifle all manifestations of the life of former times and to supplant all the social institutions of the new-found peoples. Yet they went to work to do so in a fairly tolerant sort of fashion, in a way, indeed, that was destined in large part to render their efforts unavailing. It is a trite remark that the Christian religion was in Mexico merely grafted on existing beliefs and rites, which fact, coupled with certain superstitions connected with the coming of the white men, made the apparently marvelous acceptance of a new faith by some millions of considerably civilized people really only the following of the line of least resistance.¹ Any one who comes in contact to-day with the Pueblo Indians of our Southwest, whom the Spanish friars ostensibly Christianized three hundred years ago, will readily observe how they have preserved all the intricate mass of superstitions, poetic imagery, and nature-worship which formed their primitive creed under a very thin veil of the outward forms of the Roman Catholic Church; their very *fiestas* are the same as of old, cloaked under the name of some more modern saint. Without entering into a comparison of the civilization of the primitive Filipinos with that of the Aztecs or of

¹ Humboldt more than once paused to wonder at this invariable result of Spanish colonization in Central and South America, then to demolish with his clear analyses all the miraculous features claimed for it.

the Pueblos, it is perfectly apparent that much the same thing took place in the islands discovered by Magellan. The early missionaries had just as little tolerance here as elsewhere for the customs of the natives, — “ways of the devil” all, — and scarcely ever turned aside even carelessly to record or comment upon them. Yet ingrained ways of living and doing were not lightly to be suppressed, had the new régime been much more rigid than it was, and perhaps we may even suspect that the institutions and habits which have survived are quite commonly those of a less desirable sort. Where the main stress was laid upon the outward forms of the new life, religious or political, vices and superstitions had great opportunity to flourish underneath. If we may not say that this is what happened with the Filipinos, at least this is the most charitable and sympathetic way of passing judgment upon those islanders to-day.

Recent writers have developed rather unwarrantable generalizations from the survival of the *barangay*, in which they see a primitive Filipino institution.¹ It was the survival of a name (and the name itself transformed from the Malay form of *balāñgay*) rather than of an institution, and has of recent years been made conspicuous both because of the almost total disappearance of Malay names for social or political ideas and also because certain Spanish and *mestizo* writers laid great stress upon it in the campaign for “assimilation” which preceded the municipal reform of 1893. As already seen, we must

¹ The name means a sort of small boat in Tagalog and other dialects. It was applied also to a family group or clan, under the leadership of a petty chief, some conjecture, because of the way in which the Malays migrated to the Philippines in groups. The name survived to the close of the Spanish régime, the *cabeza de barangáy* being the lieutenant charged with tax collection in the *barrios* (outlying groups) of a *pueblo*. See the Philippine history of Father Rodrigo de Agánduru Moriz, reproduced in volume 78 of *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España* (Madrid, 1882), p. 515. See also *Crónicas de la Apostólica Provincia de San Gregorio de Religiosos Descalzos de N. S. P. San Francisco en las Islas Filipinas*, etc., by Father Juan Francisco de San Antonio (Sampalok, 1738-44), part 1, book 1, chapter XLIV. This institution is also dealt with in Pedro A. Paterno's *El Barangay* (Madrid, 1892), a pamphlet only slightly less fanciful and more unscientific than the other writings of this Filipino.

reject the claim so often reiterated of late years that the early missionaries found nomadic or half-fixed clans and taught them the ways of village life. Village life there was already, to some extent, and it was upon this that the friars built. Doubtless they modified it greatly, until in time it approached in most ways as closely to European village life as might be expected in tropical islands whose agricultural resources are not as yet well developed. From the first there would be a tendency to greater concentration about the churches,¹ beginning with the rude structures of cane and thatch, which were replaced before 1700 in all the older settlements by edifices of stone, frequently massive and imposing, especially so as they tower over the acres of bamboo huts about them, from the inmates of which have come the forced labor which built them. From the first, too, it was to the interest of the Spanish conquerors, lay and priestly, to improve the methods of communication between the communities which formed their centers of conversion or of exploration and collection of tribute. Yet to represent either the friars or the soldiers as great pathfinders and reconstructors of wilderness is the work of ignorance. When Legaspi's grandson, Juan de Salcedo, made his memorable marches through northern Luzon, bringing vast acres under the dominion of Spain with a mere handful of soldiers, he found the modern Bigan a settlement of several thousand people; his successors in the conquest of the Upper Kagayan Valley, one of the most backward portions of the archipelago to-day, reported a population of forty thousand in the region lying around the modern Tugagau, and so it was quite commonly everywhere on the seacoasts and on the largest rivers. Some very crude deductions have been made as to the conquest period by writers of recent years who assume that the natives were at the beginning mere bands of wandering savages, and that all the improvements

¹ How the missionaries in some of the central islands gathered the scattered clusters of native huts into one town may be seen in Chirino (*The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, vols. XII and XIII, especially vol. XIII, pp. 90-91).

visible in their external existence to-day were brought about in these early years. It was in the decade 1830-40, under Governor-General Enrile and the soldier administrator Peñaranda, his chief assistant, that the Philippines first felt a real stimulus to road- and bridge-building and internal improvements generally; since that time the growth of external commerce, with the resultant better cultivation of some of the provinces, such as Batangas and Pampanga, has led to great improvement in the ways of communication in these places, due both to the civil authorities and to some degree of initiative on the part of the *mestizo* plantation-owners. In the main, however, the Philippines are even now a country without roads.

There is no detracting from the really great accomplishments of the conquest period in the statement of facts. But constantly, in a discussion of the merits and demerits of the early conquerors, we are seemingly drawn into the modern friar controversy. This is so, simply because the early friar chroniclers claimed everything for the missionaries in general and for their respective orders in particular; and their more modern imitators have gone far beyond them, in the heat of controversy, until even the barest recital in a nonpartisan way of the general features of early Philippine history inevitably involves more or less of a categorical denial of the false statements upon which recent exaggerations are based. The friar missionaries did not bring about the first settlements and conquests under Legaspi; they did not blaze the way in wildernesses and plant the flag of Spain in outlying posts long in advance of the soldiers, the latter profiting by their moral-suasion conquests to annex great territories for their own plunder; they did not find bloodthirsty savages, wholly sunk in degradation, and in the twinkling of an eye convert them to Christianity, sobriety, and decency, solely by some magical influence of their sacred garb and holy mission; they did not teach wandering bands of huntsmen or fishermen how to live peacefully in orderly settlements, how to cultivate the soil,

erect buildings (except the stone churches), and did not bind these villages together by the sort of roads and bridges which we have to-day, though they had considerable share in this work, especially in later times; they did not find a squalid population of 400,000 to 750,000 in the archipelago, and wholly by the revolution wrought by them in ways of life make it possible for that population to increase by ten or twenty times in three centuries.

The soldier conquerors at the outset preceded the missionaries into practically every corner of the archipelago, and this continued to be true up to the very close of Spanish domination, with regard to the Moros and hill-tribes. If the military conquest of these divided Malay settlements proved to be as easy as their religious conversion by the wholesale, whenever their more or less absolute petty rulers led the way, we may dispense with the plea of the miraculous and reasonably conclude that Spain's way was made easy by the Malay lack of cohesiveness on one side and by native docility on the other. That men of peace, who came in the garb of charity and in the name of a new and better religion, were more important in such a conquest than rough soldiers with arms in their hands, is beyond dispute. And justice to the aims of Spain in this conquest demands a recognition of the fact that always and everywhere, in official plans and proclamations, the conversion of the natives was put in the foreground as the work of prime necessity and to which everything else and everybody else should be subordinated.¹ Spain always aimed at a peaceful conquest, after the early adventures in Mexico and Peru,

¹ See *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*, book VI, title X, law I (repeating the will left by Isabella the Catholic as to the treatment of the Indians); book II, title II, law VIII, and book I, title I (entire). In general, careless writers who have been wont to pass harsh criticisms upon the Spanish colonial régime, both as to aims and methods from first to last, would do well to read this ponderous collection of laws designed to safeguard the rights of the natives. Their counterpart is not to be found in the records of the British Parliament nor in the Revised Statutes of the United States, except in detached provisions here and there. That the laws of the Indies were not enforced is, indeed, as true as it is unfortunate.

and, in the main, she achieved it; in the Philippines her task was rendered easy by the condition and the characteristics of the inhabitants. And yet, both because of a lack of missionaries and because of the eagerness of those who had been sent to Manila to leave those islands for the more alluring and adventuresome fields in Japan and China, we find the soldiers and tribute collectors outstripping the friars in most parts of Luzon, in Leite, Sámar, Bohol, Negros, Mindanau, and other islands, in portions of Sebú (the first island occupied) and Panai, as well as in the smaller populated islands, by from one year to a quarter-century.¹ The first Bishop, a Dominican friar, was complaining bitterly, in 1594, that the *encomenderos*² had in some places been collecting tribute for twenty years of natives who had as yet heard no word of the Christian religion nor seen a frocked Spaniard. It is precisely for this reason that the earliest baptismal and parish records of the Church do not afford a very reliable index of the size of the population at the time of the conquest, whereas by 1700 they do. We may place the pre-conquest population of the whole archipelago anywhere from one million to two and a half millions, though perhaps nearer the former than the latter figure.

Quite enough was accomplished by the early friars, as well as by some few civilian administrators and soldiers (who were often seriously handicapped in their efforts by the opposition

¹ See documents in vols. VII, VIII, and IX of *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, edited by Blair and Robertson. This important series of translations of Philippine historical documents is more fully mentioned in the Bibliography. The volumes here cited also contain much information bearing upon the question of the number of inhabitants at the time of the conquest.

² *Encomenderos*, lay conquerors, who were, in consequence of services in the extension of Spanish rule, given an *encomienda*, or "charge," of territory, with power to collect tribute from the natives dwelling therein, turning the royal portion into the treasury and retaining the rest, out of which they were required by law, though this was frequently a dead letter, to provide for the religious instruction of the natives. The system led to great abuses, was in fact a wretched piece of "spoils politics," on a par with the early colonial monopolies on the economic side; it survived the conquest period, but was eventually merged into a civil organization of government.

of the ecclesiastics in high position to everything which they could interpret as interfering with their very wide prerogatives), to excuse even Spanish boastfulness. By 1700 about three fourths of a million souls were baptized and settled in orderly communities, clothed in a modified European style, familiarized with the catechism and with various religious exercises printed for them in their native dialects, and were attending mass and hearing sermons in those dialects in stone structures wherein Europe seems for the moment to be transplanted into the Far East. The principles of that great body of law with which the name of Justinian is identified only as a sort of intermediary landmark, had in some degree been put into practice in this detached portion of the non-individualistic Orient. Some few ways of commerce had been marked out; navigation between the islands had become a common thing and was conducted in the then modern boats, while Manila was a great depot for the European and American trade with China and the "spice islands" which was beginning to draw the Oriental out of his shell. Ways of agriculture were being improved, and new plants brought from Mexico and elsewhere, with some resultant diversification of products. Charity and education (though the latter was confined mainly to religious matters) were works which went hand in hand from the first; Manila had its hospitals (though established primarily for Spaniards) nearly half a century before the Pilgrims came to Plymouth, and there had been a college founded there at the very opening of the seventeenth century.¹ The first printing-press in the Philippines was at work before the founding of Jamestown, and little pamphlets of religious instruction in the dialects, as well as more weighty publications in Spanish,

¹ Both this foundation of the Jesuits and the college opened soon after by the Dominicans and made a "Royal University" in 1645 (the University of St. Thomas of Manila), were at first for the education of Spanish or half-caste boys; but the Government had aided with lands and money, and it compelled the opening of their doors to natives before 1700. See Montero y Vidal, *Historia de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1887), vol. I.

were multiplied during the succeeding century ; we cannot to-day call these works of the friars scholarly, but, considering their times and their purposes, they are not the less notable. Woman occupies a higher position in the Philippines than she ever did in any other Oriental country, and, indeed, there are few places in the world where she plays a more prominent and independent part, not only in the affairs of the family, but also in the life of the community, and even in many instances in business ; a glance at the Moro and pagan communities and at the other peoples of the Orient compels the belief that this is due to the introduction of Christianity into this segregated portion of the East.¹ Yet it would not do to overlook the signs of ability, capacity, and initiative in the Filipino women themselves. In similar manner, we may give due credit to the early missionaries for a general improvement in the morals of the Filipinos along with the betterment of their material condition, without going to the extreme of claiming that their habits were completely revolutionized. If the natives have been, by force of teaching and influence, made so conspicuously temperate as they are to-day, a grave responsibility rests upon their mentors for not having similarly reformed them as regards the very serious habit of gambling, their passion for which amounts to a vice. Failure to reform them in this particular makes us suspect that there has been exaggeration of the drunkenness and licentiousness ascribed to them at the time of the conquest, that their abuse of appetite could not have been so bad as painted.

Enough of good there was about this period of conquest and settlement to justify its being called the "golden age," the glorious era of missionary work (wherein, however, the comparatively few Spanish laymen in the islands, aside from

¹ In matters of religion, woman is the great conservative as well as the great zealot ; inevitably, it has been through her that the friars achieved their greatest results, as well as through her that they longest retained their hold upon the people.

the direct representatives of the Crown and its generally beneficent intentions, played a rôle often only less ignoble than their fellow-adventurers on the continent of America, and, moreover, the natives were sometimes abused and exploited by the friars themselves). But already before we enter upon the eighteenth century, not only had the scepter of power passed from Spain, but with it also preëminence in exploration and her claim to leadership in civilization. The new economic régime was not yet fully outlined, but the European peoples farther north who were eventually to be identified with it had already come into control in the councils of the nations and on the ways of that world-commerce which of itself was to prove a civilizer superior to dogma and ritual. The remaining two centuries might well be called one long prelude to the final crash. Patriotic, sometimes also intelligent, efforts were made to avert it, and the nineteenth century in particular was in Spain a drawn-out wrestling bout between the blind power of the old giant of mediævalism and reaction and the spasmodic and nervous exertions of the young man of Spanish Liberalism, re-aroused at intervals to the movements of scientific and political progress in the outside world. Generous in disposition, democratic of manner if not of government, but proud and self-contained and sensitive, Spain was unable to free herself from the iron bands which bound her stationary to a past in whose glories she came more and more to live. How much less was she able sympathetically to interpret or intelligently to direct a never less than alien and an Oriental people (whose eyes she had herself first turned toward Occidentalism), bringing them into a fuller understanding and a closer contact with that developing civilization itself!

C. THE OLD RÉGIME IN ITS TYPICAL PERIOD

It is difficult to recognize any general trend in the events of the eighteenth century in the Philippine Islands. There were, however, certain events and movements of general sig-

nificance. The perennial strife between civil and ecclesiastical authorities saw various new and some exciting phases. This was due in great measure to the arrival from time to time, as during the first century and a half of occupation also, of more vigorous and capable governor-generals. The post had too often been held by civilians who were merely figureheads, also for intervals by the Archbishop of Manila; and the religious orders, which had grown to look upon the archipelago as really their private territory¹ under the division which they had before 1700 made of the various provinces, regarded any action taken by the civil authorities in matters of general policy, without their advice or against their consent, as constituting a sort of infringement upon vested rights. Having accomplished in large part their work of baptism and their organization of the parishes, they refused to give way to secular priests; in fact, their original willingness to see Spanish secular priests sent out to occupy cathedral offices or minister to purely Spanish parishes, in Manila, for instance, disappeared as a campaign for secularization gradually outlined itself and was pushed at intervals in Spain or in the islands themselves. It was in part this jealous watchfulness of their own interests which led them to adopt a policy adverse to the ordination in numbers of native priests, who might in time, as in other countries, be expected to supplant the missionary priests; it made them desirous of keeping within their own ranks the appointments to the bishoprics, metropolitan and suffragan;²

¹ This was wholly natural, in view of the declared aims of the Spanish kings in taking and holding the territory (especially after Philip III was persuaded, early in the seventeenth century, not to abandon his then costly possessions in the Orient, partly through the arguments of the friars that he should hold them as a trust upon the royal conscience, his predecessors having undertaken to Christianize them), and in view of the labor already expended by the orders in the islands. The four orders of friars which had taken part in the missionary work (Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Recollects) and the Jesuits, also early on the scene, had divided the provinces among themselves, and considered themselves to have the right of appointment to all curacies within their respective territories.

² The bishopric of Manila was created in 1578, and was raised to a metropolitan see in 1595, when the dioceses of Nueva Segovia and Nueva Cáceres in Luzon and

made them oppose the attempts of certain bishops coming from the secular clergy to enforce episcopal visitation and inspection of parishes, on the ground that members of the regular clergy could be held subject only to the superiors of their own orders, that the parishes should be held to be preferences of the orders themselves and the nominations and transfers of their curates made only by the said superiors; and it made them also insistent upon retaining in their own hands the control of all means of education. Thus the "friar controversy," which has to so large an extent made up the history of the islands, beginning in the earlier years chiefly in the friction between the rival civil and ecclesiastical aspirants for power, gradually broadened to include also a Philippine phase of the world-wide contest within the Roman Catholic Church between the regular and the secular clergy, between the regulars and the ordinary jurisdiction.¹

The organization of a seminary to train natives for the priesthood was decreed in 1702, but the Philippine ecclesi-

that of Sebu in the Bisayas were also created. The last was divided and the additional diocese of Jaro created in 1865. This is the ecclesiastical organization as it exists to-day. In 1902, Pope Leo XIII, in his bull on the Philippine Church (*Quæ mari sinico*), provided for the division of the archipelago into seven dioceses, but this plan, with the promise of the appointment of one or more native priests as bishops, seems to have been abandoned.

¹ For some evidence of the importance assumed at times by this contest in the Philippines even before the eighteenth century, see Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, chaps. XIII, XV, XXIII, XXV, XXVII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXIII. The first bishop to attempt to visit and inspect the curacies of the friars was Serrano, in 1621; and, when they refused him entrance and threatened to abandon their parishes, he yielded, and the question was submitted to Rome and Madrid. (The Spanish archives are heavy with the controversial documents submitted at this time, but the question was to live for a century and a half yet.) In 1653, Archbishop Poblete tried to carry out Urban VIII's bull regarding secularization, but failed; and in 1697, Archbishop Camacho revived the question of episcopal visitation. The contests of Governor-General Corcuera with the clergy (1635-40); the sending of Governor-General Salcedo to Mexico in chains for trial before the Inquisition as a heretic, he cheating his ecclesiastical enemies by dying on the way (1669); and the stormy scenes centering around the exile of Archbishop Pardo (1683) and his subsequent return to power and excommunication of the Audiencia judges, are simply the most striking phases of the perennial strife between the civil and ecclesiastical states, episodes which lessen our surprise at the assassination of a governor-general in the eighteenth century.

astical authorities prevented the opening of the institution until 1772, when Governor-General Anda and Archbishop Santa Justa y Rufina were in accord on it.¹ The King decreed in 1714 a secular university, beginning with courses in law and theology; and in 1719, Manuel de Bustamante, the governor-general charged with carrying out this plan, was, as a result of various strifes with the orders, slain in the governmental palace in Manila by mutineers organized and led by the friars and Jesuits, the palace guard fleeing before the crucifixes of the fathers.²

Highly significant also were the agrarian disturbances in the neighborhood of the friar estates, in large degree prototypes of the revolts of 1872 and 1896. In 1743, the people around Balayan, Batangas, in protest against what they considered to be usurpation of their lands by the Jesuits, who then had an estate there, led a revolt which spread over a large part of Batangas and cost the Spanish army (mostly natives from Pampanga) a number of lives.³ At the same time, there were repeated and serious disturbances about those Tagalog towns in Cavite, Manila, and Bulakán provinces, where the principal friar estates lay until their recent purchase by the American Government. The royal commissioner appointed to investigate and pacify the people seems to have found much evidence of the truth of their charges that their own land had been usurped, that their liberties to fish, cut wood, and pasture their animals had been wrongly curtailed, and that there had been fraudulent extension of the boundaries of the friar estates through the collusion of a high official of the Government. The latter was suspended and heavily fined, and the old boundaries were ordered restored.⁴

¹ The friars had already trained natives to serve as coadjutors to some extent in their early monastery schools; some few (or, at any rate, *mestizos*) seem to have been admitted to the orders, and several of the bishops of the seventeenth century are said to have had native blood in their veins.

² Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 413. The Spanish archives are literally burdened with material about this episode.

³ *Ut supra*, p. 478.

⁴ The royal cedula of November 7, 1751, which summarizes this whole investiga-

Perhaps the most striking events of the eighteenth century center about the English occupation of Manila in 1762-63 and the figure of Simon de Anda, the vigorous lawyer-soldier, who, anathematized by the archbishop-governor and deserted by most of the Spanish elements in the islands, yet succeeded, with the aid of his loyal Pampangan soldiers, in confining the invaders to Manila, and thus probably saved the archipelago for Spain at the making of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The city was surrendered practically without defense by Archbishop Rojo (thereafter, no archbishop served as governor-general).¹ The Jesuits in pursuit of their general policy, promptly raised the English flag over their monastery and went bodily over to the supposed new sovereignty.² To some extent the other orders

tion and recites the decision may be found in *La Democracia*, Manila, November 25, 1901. This same controversy had arisen a half-century before under Archbishop Camacho. When he arrived in Manila in 1697, a royal official appointed to settle titles to land had demanded that the friars show their titles to the estates they held; they had refused, and the Audiencia had embargoed the estates. Camacho at first sided with the friars and denied the jurisdiction of the lay court; but he himself found the orders in rebellion against him when he undertook to visit and inspect the parishes, and he thereupon made common cause with the Audiencia. For some of the data of this resounding controversy, which dragged along through years, to end with the friars remaining where they were, see T. H. Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca Filipina* (Washington, 1903), pp. 77-78, under the heading "Camacho"; also Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, chap. xxxi.

¹ To untangle the various conflicting accounts of the capture and occupation of Manila by the English, especially those of religious writers, will be the work of the future historian of the Philippines. Some data regarding the "siege" of twelve days and the entrance of the English through a breach in the walls may be obtained from a monograph on the "Walls of Manila and its Capture by the English," prepared by Major J. C. Bush and Captain A. C. Macomb for Major-General A. W. Davis (*Reports of War Department, 1903*, vol. III, appendix IX). For a review of many important documents bearing on this period (as also upon Anda's career), see Sinibaldo de Mas, *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842* (Madrid, 1843), vol. I, first section, pp. 122-201.

² This was one reason assigned for their expulsion in 1768, though that followed the general order of 1767 for their expulsion from all Spanish dominions, one phase of the campaign at that time conducted against them in Catholic Europe. Any of the collections of Spanish legislation which contains the decrees of Charles III and Charles IV may be consulted for the numerous provisions designed to carry this order into effect, as well as also to restrict to a considerable extent the activities and the very extensive powers that had been secured by monastic organizations in general. All the provisions regarding the Jesuits were published in a work of five parts at Madrid in 1769-90 entitled *Colección general de las providencias . . . sobre el*

in the city furnished Anda with financial assistance, and the friars outside aided him in other ways, but there was much division of loyalty among them, since he had proclaimed himself the representative of Spanish authority in the islands and was denounced as a usurper by the archbishop. The antipathy engendered by this and other causes was cherished by Anda when later he became governor-general, and he aroused bitter opposition from the Augustinians and Dominicans, especially by his support of the efforts of Archbishop Santa Justa y Rufina to visit and inspect the friars' parishes and to install secular priests.¹

Santa Justa y Rufina was one of the comparatively few secular clergymen who have served as Archbishop of Manila. One of the foremost assistants of Charles III in enforcing the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain, he was sent to the Philippines for the purpose of checking the regulars in their usurpation of absolute ecclesiastical control. Not unnaturally, when Anda followed him out there as governor-general, the two lent each other mutual support. The opening of the seminary for native priests has already been remarked. Anda also urged on the home Government the secularization of all educational in-

extrañamiento de los regulares de la Compania, etc. A recent contribution to history covering this same ground is: F. Rousseau, *Expulsion des Jésuites en Espagne. Démarches de Charles III pour leur Sécularisation* (*Revue des Questions Historiques*, January, 1904).

¹ The falsehoods that have been printed and reprinted about the episodes of Anda's career in the Philippines are almost inextricably interwoven with the truth about those times. Anda himself was far from being meek and without spite. The fairest account from the friar standpoint, also nearly contemporary, is that of Father Joaquín Martínez de Zúñiga, an Augustinian, who wrote his *Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas* (published by Retana, Madrid, 1893) from 1803 to 1806. Anda's own statement of his ideas about the friars is one of the most interesting documents of all Philippine history, yet one will search for it in vain in the histories which pretend to be complete. It is contained in a memorial to Charles III written in 1768, while he was in Madrid, before his appointment as governor-general. It details "thirty-seven abuses or disorders that have grown up in the Philippine Islands under the cloak of religion and at the expense of the royal treasury." This memorial was published with notes by Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera at Manila in 1899. See also a translation into English in Blair and Robertson's *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*.

stitutions, beginning with the Dominican university and secondary school. The archbishop promulgated a schedule of fees to be charged for baptisms, weddings, funerals, etc.¹ The storm raged principally, however, about his efforts to enforce episcopal visitation and inspection of the parishes in his diocese. Anda at times used troops to aid him, and the Augustinians had been forcibly removed from Pampanga and their provincial deported to Spain before the orders yielded, the Dominicans leading the way. The contest was too violent and acrimonious not to be attended by extreme and reckless measures on both sides. In his haste to secularize the clergy and his zeal for the advancement of the natives, the archbishop caused Filipino priests, too often fitted neither by general education nor by ecclesiastical training, to be hurriedly ordained and put in the places of many of the friars. Quite naturally, most, though not all, failed to come up to the mark; and the archbishop later was compelled sadly and reluctantly to admit that he had made a mistake. He and Anda were both ahead of their times in liberal measures. Without discussing the merits and demerits of the Filipino priesthood, it is certain that this overhasty attempt to install it resulted in a reaction which enabled the friars to strengthen themselves in control of the parishes for years to come.²

Not less vigorous, but less pugnacious, than Anda, Governor-General Basco y Vargas strove to rouse the country from

¹ That this was afterwards generally disregarded, formed one of the complaints of the revolutionists of 1896. That there were already abuses in this respect in 1591 is set forth in a statement by the Jesuits on the question of the tributes, translated in volume VII of Blair and Robertson's *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, p. 317.

² Quite full bibliographical data on the busy times of Archbishop Santa Justa y Rufina are given under his name in Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca Filipina*, pp. 383-88. In *ibid.*, pp. 110, 140, and 208, are listed documents on these questions republished in 1863 and brought down to date in the anti-friar campaign beginning in that year. See also Mas's *Informe*, vol. II, section on *Estado eclesiástico* and Retana's *Archivo del bibliófilo filipino*, vol. I, *Papeles interesantes para los regulares*, etc., for a résumé of the official measures regarding secularization in the eighteenth century, and an indication of how Santa Justa's efforts were nullified between 1785 and 1825. Anda himself became less zealous for secularization, as some of the archbishop's failures became apparent.

its lethargy and state of industrial unprogressiveness. He in large part deserves the credit for the foundation in 1781 of the "Economic Society of Friends of the Country," composed of Government officials, merchants, and owners of estates. The society had a spasmodic existence until 1890 (most of the time slumbering in quietude), and a catalogue of the things it tried to do is enlightening. It sought to promote the cultivation of cotton (not so widely grown then as at the time of the conquest, owing to the greater importation of Chinese fabrics, and to-day virtually confined to two or three provinces), of the cinnamon tree (native of Mindanau, found there by Magellan, but never developed), of pepper and silkworms; and to improve dyestuffs and methods of dyeing; it published the first periodical of commerce; it became patron of the first course of agriculture in the friar schools of Manila in 1821, and established a school of design; studied unsuccessfully to destroy the ravaging locusts; labored for the removal of the export duties on rice; preached improvement of the breed of horses, etc. In the main, however, not only did such an organization have to struggle with the lethargy or active opposition of Government officials and of the propertied classes, pure Spanish, half-caste or native, who might have been expected to coöperate vigorously, but also, and more important, it could make little headway against the retroactive economic policy which prevailed in the mother-country during most of the time when these distant possessions were not left in careless abandonment. The informing spirit of this policy is revealed in the following argument before the Council of State of Spain in 1607:—

The preservation of the Indies consists in this, that, through their need of articles which are not produced there, they may always depend upon this country; and it would be the means of losing them if their wants could be supplied elsewhere.

The restrictive measures by which Philippine trade was hedged about during the early part of the eighteenth century

were nothing new; the controversy waged then between the conflicting interests was simply noisier than it had ever been before, because of the greater power of the silk manufacturers and some of the trading societies of Spain, and because of the extraordinary riches being reaped for the time from the trade through Manila, "the Pearl of the Orient," this trade and the commercial importance of Manila being then at its height. To save the trade of the Americas in the main for the manufactures of Spain; to prevent too great an outflow of the silver of Mexico and South America to the Orient, where it was then, as it still is, in great measure mysteriously swallowed up; and to limit the trade of Manila to an amount the imposts on which would merely yield the cost of maintaining the Spanish establishment in the archipelago, without bringing too much of the cheaper goods of the Orient into competition with those of Spain, seem to have been the main motives of Spain's economic policy. But it is difficult at times to recognize any policy at all in the measures adopted, and the hand of paternalism was laid so heavily over every circumstance bearing either directly or indirectly upon commerce that private enterprise was throttled on one side while monopoly and privilege were fostered on the other, and the trammels devised were sometimes futile of anything but the accomplishment of evil.¹

¹ Both documentary and printed material on the economic measures of Spain abound in the Spanish language, coming down to the closing hours of that nation's colonial rule. Judging by the published volumes and the prospectus, the Blair and Robertson historical series already cited will contain a quite complete array of material regarding trade monopolies, tariff restrictions, shipping regulations, etc. See also the bibliography of the Library of Congress entitled *Books on the Philippine Islands* (Washington, 1903). For the controversy of the early eighteenth century over Philippine trade, see the résumé with some bibliographical data, also the description of the galleons and their voyages, in Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, chap. XXXVIII (erroneously numbered XXVIII in the text of the volume). A review of the Spanish colonial system is contained in the chapter under that head in Wilhelm Roseher's *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung* (3d ed., Leipzig, 1885), an English translation of which has been issued in pamphlet form by Edward G. Bourne, under the title *The Spanish Colonial System* (New York, 1904). It is especially valuable on economic measures, though very incomplete; for the rest, the author has relied too much upon musty authorities, and the chapter smells of the library more than of real Spanish colonial life. It is scarcely

Maintaining a Government monopoly of shipping and means of communication with the Philippine Islands during the first two centuries when that trade was most remunerative (indeed, retaining a virtual monopoly of shipping until the second decade of the nineteenth century), Spain did not then turn to free and unrestricted shipping as the remedy for her waning commerce and for a remaking of her colonial trade along the new lines which private competition in shipping over the world in general had laid down; instead, she sought for some years to bolster up a private shipping monopoly under her authority, an enterprise which, born toward the close of the eighteenth century, dragged its name and its threat of stifling private enterprise (under a many-headed charter of privilege) well into the nineteenth century. The Government had more or less effectually monopolized various articles of commerce from the earliest years; and, though the tobacco monopoly was not formed until 1781, when comprehensive measures for raising revenue had to be undertaken, it survived until 1884. Those who find a praiseworthy institution in the former culture system of Java may make out a fair case for the old "company systems" as stimulating in early times the agricultural development of tropical Eastern countries; certain it is that the rich valley of the Kagayan in northern Luzon lies to-day a one-crop and wretchedly undeveloped area, while the mass of the people in it are perhaps the nearest to ignorant serfdom of all the Christian populations of the archipelago.¹

Yet it should be said that the shipping monopoly of the "Company of the Philippines," which virtually came to naught, the tobacco monopoly and the other measures of Charles III

necessary to remark that Spain was not, especially in the earlier periods, the sole offender among the colonial powers in the matter of trade restrictions.

¹ A good deal of careless information has been given out with regard to the working of the culture system in Java, much of it originating with those interested in the continuance of the system. A new book, which all but demolishes these arguments, is Professor Clive Day's *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (London, 1904).

coincided with the formation of the economic society above described, and were intended, all together, to stimulate the development of the archipelago. But it remained for the first Cortes (1811) to abolish the voyages of the time-honored galleons between Manila and Acapulco, and to pave the way for private, though afterward subsidized, shipping. Thus the Philippines were released from dependency as a province upon the viceroyalty of Mexico (at the moment engaged in the struggle for her independence). Direct communication with Spain by the passage of sailing vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, begun in the preceding century, was continued until the cutting of the Suez Canal almost coincided with the opening of a new era for the Philippines.

Spain had herself been engaged from the very opening of the nineteenth century in domestic and foreign wars, in every step of which there was involved, in one way or another, the contest between liberalism and reaction. It is not strange that the various phases of the contest — now Spanish nationality against the Napoleonic invasion, now the new-found constitutionalism against the old-fashioned absolutism, again Spanish liberalism against the outside dictation of the Holy Alliance, or constitutional monarchy against Carlist-clerical attempts to restore the old régime — should awaken from time to time some echo in the Philippine Islands. The strange thing is that those islands, governed in rapid succession by men first of one Spanish faction and then of another, and which had been much less closely in touch with Spain than with Spanish-America — now in the throes of the contest going on in the home country, a contest which on American soil soon became a struggle for complete independence — should have remained so quiet. There were some few uprisings in the Philippines, which might be called mere mutinies, not popular rebellions; there were bitter partisan contests, but mostly over office and the use of the powers of office. In the main, the significant thing is that,

practically throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Philippines were, if not oblivious to what was going on elsewhere under the Spanish flag, at least surprisingly little disturbed or moved by it. They were on the other side of the world from Spain, and were reached only by slow-going sailing vessels, while the quarrel over the trading monopoly of the "Company of the Philippines" was still under way, and the result of the contradictory provisions made about it by the rival governments in Spain was that neither did the company itself take steps to make good its privileges nor did other Spanish shippers come forward to stimulate it by competition. The old trade in silks, etc., from China, artificially diverted through the Philippines and hemmed about by restrictions, had dwindled considerably before connection with Mexico was severed. The Government tobacco monopoly was developing very slowly a new trade with the home country, though probably it would have developed more rapidly if left to follow its natural course. Neither *abaca* nor sugar had become as yet articles of foreign commerce worthy of mention, nor were to do so until Spain should let down the bars whereby she kept outside of her possessions foreigners who wished to come to develop their resources or to engage in commerce in them. Virtually, the islands had no foreign trade, except as Manila still served as a depot for the exchange of Chinese and Indian goods for silver, at the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹ There were during the first half of this century only from 2000 to 5000 Spaniards in the islands, and scarcely any other Europeans at all. The *mestizo* population was to some extent identified with the European element in aims and interests. The great mass of the people, however, slumbered in what the friars of to-day assert was an Arcadia, "nurtured and protected by fatherly religious mentors and paternal laws, undisturbed by dreams

¹ According to Sinibaldo de Mas (*op. cit.*, vol. II, section on *Comercio exterior*, p. 2): "During the years 1780 and immediately following, the exportation of sugar, the only article of exportation of any importance at that time, did not exceed 30,000 piculs [about 2000 tons]."

of imaginary rights, unvexed by the duties imposed upon them later by laws they did not understand, leading simple and contented lives and ready to get out of the road respectfully whenever they met a white face."

To be sure, the Philippines were represented in the Cortes of 1810-14 and again in those of 1820-23, and were at first expected to send representatives to the Cortes when it reassembled in 1836. This representation, however, was more nominal than real, and was brought about not by any demand from the islands, but by the sentimental attempt of the always visionary Spanish liberals to realize a great "representative empire," wherein all the lands under the Spanish flag should gather for a proportionate share in the work of constitutional reconstruction. In order to realize this dream, which, as events proved, was altogether impracticable as applied to the Spanish-American countries, and which was necessarily still more impracticable as regards the more distant and much less advanced Philippines, they appointed "substitute deputies" at the opening of these Cortes for the distant provinces which had not been able to elect. In 1811, however, a Spaniard arrived from Manila as that city's elected representative in the Cortes. He himself it was who, in 1812, when it was proposed to extend the provisions of the constitution in their full force to the Philippine Islands, pointed out to his fellow-deputies that the people of those islands were not prepared to enjoy the full privileges nor to assume the duties of citizens under such a constitution, being in the vast majority uneducated and distant six thousand leagues by sea from the home country. He reminded them that, at the ratio of one deputy to every 70,000 inhabitants, the Philippine Islands would have to elect over twenty-five representatives to the Cortes, and that expense alone forbade this.¹ Besides discussing this question, the first Cortes gave very little attention to the Philippine Islands. When

¹ See *Diario de las Cortes* (official edition, royal press, Cadiz, 1812), vol. XIII, pp. 264-67.

they reassembled in 1820, two "substitute deputies" were religiously named in Spain to represent the Philippines, and later four representatives were duly elected in Manila; but again the subject of their credentials was about all that was ever discussed. In 1836, the question of elections to the Cortes to be held in the Philippines was again threshed over, but in the following year it seems to have dawned upon these amateur legislators that the assimilation of this archipelago of the Extreme East to a not yet well-established constitutional legislative régime was not practicable, and the right of representation was withdrawn from the Philippines and the Spanish Antilles, and it was decided that they should be ruled by special laws.¹ From the very first, reform movements in Spain have gone so by action and reaction that there has rarely been any statesmanlike adjustment of liberal measures to the actual conditions to be met in the Philippines. Instead of making a place in the new national legislature for one to four delegates from the Philippines who might on occasion speak for the interests of the islands and represent them before committees, the early Spanish Liberals botched the whole matter of administering colonies under their sort of a constitutional government by attempting to make the Cortes a real "imperial legislature"; and, failing in that, as they were bound to do under the conditions, they abandoned in disgust the attempt to introduce a liberal colonial régime, even abdicating to the executive department of the colonies which was later introduced into the government that measure of control over the laws for the foreign possessions of Spain which they should have retained for themselves. So we find, even to the close of Spanish rule, despite the reassumption by the Cortes of considerable power after the revolution of 1868, that laws for the Philippines were promulgated by the Minister for the Colonies in the form of royal decrees.

The Filipinos themselves seem to have given their Spanish

¹ See Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 563-69.

rulers less trouble during the first part of the nineteenth century than during any preceding period since the conquest. As already noted, conquest itself was accomplished almost with ridiculous ease. There was, however, hardly a decade for over two centuries during which the conqueror's authority was not more or less vigorously disputed in some small or large area of the archipelago—speaking now of the Christianized population, and not of the Moros and hill-pagans. If conquest was easier in the early days, collection of tribute sometimes became difficult, owing primarily, there is plenty of evidence to show, to the abuses of the Spanish *encomenderos*. In the seventeenth century, we find that quite frequently the friars, too, are included in the list of those proscribed by the native rebels, because they were most actively identified with the use of forced labor for building ships and equipping their crews for expeditions against the Moro pirates, as well as for putting up churches and parish-houses. One such revolt, which began in Sámar in 1649 with the murder of a Jesuit who was not such a shepherd as he should have been,¹ spread over the central islands and to Luzon and Mindanau. There was a similar rising against a Jesuit in Bohol in 1750,² and that island was for some years thereafter abandoned ground for the missionaries. The nearly coincident uprisings near Manila have already been remarked as agrarian in character, and it is to be said that all the revolts of the Tagalog provinces have been primarily of that sort. Spanish authority was so shattered after the withdrawal of the English in 1763 that Pangasinan, the Ilokan provinces, and the people of the Kagayan Valley gave more or less constant trouble for the rest of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century. In the latter revolts, it was plain that the Ilokans were fighting against the arbitrary restrictions of the Government tobacco monopoly, requiring each family to plant so much, consume only so much, and

¹ See F. Jagor, *Reisen in den Philippinen* (Berlin, 1873), p. 188.

² Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 478.

sell at official prices, the betel-nut and other plants being also for a time included in the Government control. It is claimed that nearly three hundred thousand natives were killed during these successive risings in the Ilokan provinces.

In the main, however, the disturbances of the first half of the nineteenth century are not to be traced, as were those which preceded them, to dissatisfaction among the Filipino masses. There was considerable excitement worked up around Manila relative to the taking oath to the Constitution of 1812, which, it was reported, was to exempt the masses from the payment of tribute; and there was a corresponding disturbance when, shortly afterward, it was revoked, but nothing noteworthy occurred. In 1820, the foreigners, including the Chinese, in Manila were mobbed and some killed by the lower classes of the city, it being rumored about that the epidemic of cholera then raging had been caused by the foreigners poisoning the water.¹ In 1823, when constitutional government was revoked by Ferdinand VII, a rather formidable conspiracy among the troops in Manila developed into mutiny on the part of some eight hundred of them, led by Captain Novales and other Spanish-Americans, who were in sympathy with "the Reform." So again, a decade and a half later, the Spanish Liberals in Manila, claiming to believe that Governor Salazar was in league with the Carlists at home and would not proclaim the Constitution of 1837, threatened an uprising, which was headed off by the governor's conciliatory attitude, and which seems to have been more a scheming for office than

¹ Much confusion reigns in the accounts of this affair. Some of the historians charge Governor-General Folgueras with lack of energy in putting down the mob before it became dangerous, sacking all the business section of Binondo as it did. The governor-general himself, in a proclamation to the people, virtually accuses the friar priests of having not merely consented to the story that the foreigners were poisoning the water, but also of having spread it among their ignorant parishioners. The entire document is reproduced in Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca Filipina*, pp. 45-47. M. Th. Aube, an officer of the French marines, writing about Manila in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for May 1, 1848, declares that this was one way which the friars took to get rid of the foreigners then beginning to come to the islands. Montero y Vidal (*op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 96-97) indignantly denies this as a calumny.

anything else. Plainly, such movements as these did not touch the masses, and cannot be said to have significance from the Filipino point of view. The great bulk of the population must be somewhat shaken out of its shell of indifference, and the provinces must begin to acquire some interests in common, before either the Liberal campaign then going on in Spain could affect the sympathies of more than a few *mestizos*, or the various tribes could unite in anything more than a merely local outburst of banditry or outlawry in protest against the abuses of their rulers. Such fanatic religious movements as that which upset the entire province of Tayabas and part of Batangas in 1841, when hordes of people took up bolos and followed a self-proclaimed "God," have been and still are common occurrences, on a smaller scale, in the Philippines, and are mainly significant as showing the ignorant condition of the masses.

Two facts of general application have been made more or less clear by the foregoing outline of events and conditions up to about 1860, facts which have also a direct bearing upon the more strenuous period succeeding 1860. First, it seems fairly evident that Liberalism in Spain had as yet neither the power as a movement nor the ability within its ranks to reconstruct on new and progressive lines this old monarchy's colonial system. Neither before nor since then, indeed, has it been able to establish effectually in the mother country itself modern ideas in government, in education, in land-tenure, or in political and religious tolerance in their full scope. Second, had it been possible to keep the archipelago forever as commercially *incomunicado* as it was up to forty years ago, the religious and political disturbances of Spain would not have disrupted the peace of the Philippines, so soon seriously to be threatened by a real clamor for modern ideas and modern institutions. The friars and their defenders of to-day who lament the old régime as really the happier should bring the indictment for breaking up their Arcadia not so much against the Liberals of Spain

as against all the forces which modern commerce and modern science represent, which brought to the islands in so rapid sequence foreigners keen for the development of their idle resources, a direct pathway to Europe by the Suez Canal, modern steamships, ocean cables, the telegraph, and all the things that in a short span of years were to alter in no inconsiderable degree the life of the people in quite a number of provinces. Feodor Jagor, the keen-eyed German who traveled through the islands just before 1860, found much to praise in the old paternal régime of the friars, and added : —

The old situation is no longer possible of maintenance, with the social change which the times have brought. The colony cannot longer be excluded from the general concert of peoples. Every facility in communications opens a breach in the ancient system and establishes a motive for reforms of a liberal character. The more that foreign brains penetrate there, the more they increase prosperity, education and self-esteem, making the existing evils the more intolerable.¹

¹ F. Jagor, *op. cit.*, p. 287. Of the French, English, and German travelers, scientists, business men, and soldiers, who have given us an insight into the conditions in the islands from 1775 to 1860, Jagor, the last of the list, was the keenest observer and has left the most valuable book. He it was who clearly foresaw the inevitable loss of the Philippines to Spain, and, with prophetic insight into the expansion of the Pacific commerce of the United States, predicted almost in so many words the occupation of the Philippines by the United States. He closed his book with these paragraphs : —

“The influence of North America in the Spanish provinces beyond the seas will make itself felt, and especially in the Philippines, as the commerce of its western coast develops. The Americans seem to have the mission of reviving the germ of the Spanish seed. As conquerors of the modern age, as representatives of positivism in opposition to the romanticism of cavalierly enterprises, they follow their way with the axe and the plow of the colonist, just as the Spaniards went bearing the cross and flashing the sword.

“A great part of Spanish America already belongs to the United States, and has already attained since the change an importance it had not even suspected it possessed while under the rule of Spain, and less still in the anarchic period that followed its emancipation.

“The Spanish system, in the long run, cannot prevail against the American. While the former exploits the colonies directly in benefit of privileged classes, the latter draws from the metropolis its best forces to sustain them. In spite of its population being so scanty, America attracts the most advantageous elements of all the countries, which, there set free from embarrassing subjections and handicaps, progress with unceasing activity, extending continually their power and their influence. The Philippines will not be able to evade the influence of the two great

D. AWAKENING TO MODERN LIFE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

There had been an English house established in Manila in 1809 by special permission. This privilege was extended to all foreigners at the time of the general European peace in 1814, and most of the foreigners killed in the cholera riots of 1820 were Frenchmen; but these were only trading representatives whose activities were confined to the capital and who were looked upon with no little displeasure by the Spaniards themselves. We find an earlier edict of the insular Government repeated in 1828 and again in 1840, forbidding foreigners, in much the same way as the Chinese were specifically "regulated," to sell at retail or to enter the provinces to carry on business of any kind.¹ In 1842 there were in Manila thirty-nine Spanish shipping and commercial houses, and about a dozen foreign houses, of which seven or eight were English, two were American, one was French, and another Danish, while consuls of France, the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium resided there.² Jagor gives credit to these two American houses

neighboring powers, so much the less since neither in the islands themselves nor in their metropolis is there a situation of stability and equilibrium.

"It is to be hoped, for the sake of the natives, that the preceding hypotheses be not speedily converted into facts, for their present education has not prepared them sufficiently to sustain the strife with those peoples [the British and American], tireless creators and little given to humanitarian considerations."

Compare with this remarkable prediction of 1873 a somewhat similar warning that Spain would not be able to retain the Philippines, made by Sinibaldo de Mas, Minister of Spain to China, in 1843, in a third part of his *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842*, this part being privately published and seen only by a few friends, only a few copies of it being now in existence. In this secret expression of opinion, Mas advised the creation of a legislative assembly in the Philippines at as early a date in the future as the status of the inhabitants would permit, this and other concessions of a character tending toward self-government being made with a view to granting to the Filipinos, eventually, their independence; otherwise, thought Mas, they are sure to grow out of the ancient moulds in which they have been kept, and Spain will make herself their enemy, instead of a perpetual friend, if she endeavors to check this development. See the reproduction of a portion of this secret memorial in the final number of *La Política de España en Filipinas* (Madrid, fortnightly), vol. VIII, no. 187 (December, 1898).

¹ Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 31.

² This statement is made on the authority of the *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico, histórico de las Islas Filipinas*, of Manuel Buzeta and Felipe Bravo (Madrid,

for the development of the *abaka* into an important article of export, in spite of the fact that the natives were using the fiber for the weaving of their common cloths when the Spaniards came. These American houses in the first years sunk large sums of money in advance loans, and were only able to get the business on a paying basis when, in 1863, they were permitted to establish warehouses and presses in the provinces at the principal points where the crop was produced, and to deal directly with the producers. The situation that had in general previously prevailed is thus described by Jagor:—

All former attempts were foiled by the opposition of the Spaniards of the Peninsula and of the Philippines, because the latter consider the inter-island commerce and shipping as belonging exclusively to them. They are very envious of the interference of the foreigners, "who enrich themselves at their cost." If it were left to these fellows, they would compel all foreigners to leave the country and only keep the Chinese as coolies.¹

It was this sort of jealous opposition which caused seven new ports opened in 1830 to be closed a year afterward, so that the two Bisayan ports, Iloilo and Sebú, now date respectively from 1855 to 1863.² Even after these latter years the

1850–51), a book useful for reference for a period about which data are not easy to find, though its priestly compilers borrowed most recklessly from the works of others, especially of foreigners, and gave no credit.

¹ Jagor, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–52.

² The port of Manila had for the first time been opened to foreign vessels in 1789 (though Europeans had conducted some clandestine traffic there, under cover of the permission to Chinese and Moros to enter and trade), but they were long held under hampering restrictions. In 1841, despite paying as a rule double port and customs dues, ships under other flags than the Spanish were doing four fifths of the external carrying-trade of the Philippines, among them being many "tramp vessels" from the United States plying between China and the Philippines. See S. de Mas, *op. cit.*, section on *Comercio exterior*, especially pp. 3–4 *et seq.*, for tables showing exports and imports, entries and clearances, 1835–41, as compared with 1810 and 1816. Mas gives great credit to the foreign business men and ships for the rapid increase in trade during this period, and argues for the removal of the restrictions upon them. His tables show how the prophecies of those interested in the old galleon-route between Acapulco and Manila, that the abolition of this business would ruin the Philippines, had been belied. Mas says the exportation of products of the Philippines had increased by seven times between 1816, the date of the return of the last galleon from Acapulco, and 1842.

Spaniards would rather have seen them closed than invaded by the English and other merchants, whose operations speedily developed sugar into an article of export worth considering.¹ When the foreigners could acquire land in the country, they settled themselves still more solidly. Around their shipping operations, with steamers of light and medium draft, around their hemp- and sugar-buying operations in southern Luzon and the central islands, around their sugar- and rice-mills, and later still the small line of railroad to Dagupan, there gradually began to be developed a class of more independent and capable natives, something approaching, indeed, a Filipino middle class. This was much more noticeable in Manila and its environs, the center of the new commerce, both because it was the commercial center and because it had been socially the most advanced part of the archipelago when the Spaniards came and had naturally not lost that preëminence afterward.

But if, anticipating the events of the last part of the nineteenth century, we interpret the partial awakening to self-consciousness of the Filipino people as being the result primarily of the entrance of foreign commerce, we must still not overlook the fact that there was progress made by Spain in her dealings with the colony. In 1863 the Minister for the Colonies (Ultramar) first took his seat in the Cabinet, after the

His figures for 1810 show a total of entrances and clearances from Manila of 11,025,000 pesos, of which 5,400,000 were silver, gold, and other metals and currency trans-shipped between America and China and India through Manila, and nearly 4,000,000 were goods of China and India trans-shipped through Manila to America and thence Europe. Of all the foreign goods entered in 1810, the Philippines had taken only 900,000 pesos for their own consumption, and in return had sold less than 500,000 pesos in sugar, tobacco, and other products. Says Mas: "The gains from that traffic, for which Manila was only a port of exchange, were divided between the merchants who had the monopoly of the galleon, but the colony in general received but small advantages from it." By comparison with 1810, he shows that in 1839 the Philippines exported 2,675,000 pesos of their own products and imported 2,150,000 pesos of foreign goods (apparently exclusive of currency).

¹ Jagor says (p. 242) that in 1857 there was not a single iron sugar-mill in the islands, and that the archaic wooden affairs lost 30 per cent and upward of the juice in the cane, as in many places in the Philippines the crude sugar-mills in use still do.

semi-constitutional government of those times had blundered about for over ten years with various cumbersome substitutes for the old Council of the Indies, which had dealt with the affairs of the colonies in previous centuries.¹ Projects of colonial reform, with majority and minority reports, multiplied until they became confusion worse confounded in the years which followed, particularly as no government either in Madrid or in Manila was ever stable or lasting enough really to give any one of them a fair trial. Nevertheless, in the years from 1863 to 1896, there was some net progress. That progress we can here trace only in outline.

The Peninsula itself was in the throes of educational reform (a reform to-day woefully incomplete there), and it was proposed to apply the system of primary education there adopted to the Philippine communities. A decree of 1863 provided for the same course of study as in Spain, and for secular school-teachers drawn from a competitive list, which was in time to be supplied by normal schools for both sexes. These normal schools were put under the Jesuits.² The new system was, however, left under the *supervision* of the friars: the curate of each town was to be local inspector, and to have full direction of the instruction in religion, which in practice commonly resulted in reducing the school boards, then first created, to nonentities; the superior friar official of each province was to be on the provincial board; and the rector of St. Thomas University was, except during brief intervals, a sort of superintendent of public instruction for the islands, though

¹ For a summary of the different methods of administering the colonies under "constitutional government" and the transitional governments in Spain from 1814 to 1863, see *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VI (for the year 1896), p. 133.

² The Jesuits had returned to the Philippines in 1859, and thereafter devoted themselves to education and to mission work among the Moros and pagan tribes. They have been responsible for the introduction of more modern methods — notably, scientific laboratories — and for much of the educational progress since 1863. The Dominicans did not relish seeing the palm taken from them in a matter in which they had so long held almost undisputed supremacy. The normal schools later opened for women were managed by Sisters of Charity and Augustine nuns.

having no direct intervention in primary schools. Prior to 1863, primary education began and ended with daily lessons in the catechism and other books of religious exercises, and there was usually very little else in the middle. The teachers were village natives, who could write and cipher to a limited extent, but who commonly knew little or no Spanish. They were paid whatever the friar curate, who supervised or personally conducted the work with the catechism, felt that he could allow, and often eked out their living in the fields.¹ After 1863, and up to the American conquest, the catechism still remained the chief feature of daily work in the primary school, often relegating all else to an insignificant place — much depending on the preparation, at best a scanty one, of the teacher. The badly printed and cheap 250-page pocket-size textbook prescribed by the Government for the schools (the same as used in Spain) was reader, writer, speller, arithmetic, geography, history of Spain and the world (Spain overshadowing), Spanish grammar (often not taught, because the teacher knew little or nothing of it, or the friar-priest objected), and handbook of religious and moral precepts (many pages). A glance at this book will reveal how pitifully inadequate was the ordinary Filipino child's schooling at the best; for often not even this textbook was in use, no copies being available or the teacher using only the dialect. Even those of the teachers who had been trained in the normal schools were scarcely as thoroughly equipped in the elementary branches as an American child at the sixth grade.²

¹ This was the system in general, as described by various contemporary witnesses; but conditions were better in some parishes, particularly in good-sized towns. The schools were just as good or just as poor as the friar-curate made them, since everything was left to him.

² The textbook referred to, *El Monitor de los Niños*, devotes ten lines of its geography section to the United States. On the cover-page of the Philippine edition there is what purports to be a résumé of Philippine history, which concludes thus: "The education, richness, and culture of the Philippine population, especially of Luzon, increase in a notable manner, thanks to the assimilation it enjoys in all branches of public administration with the laws and institutions ruling in Spain. The statistics of primary education need not envy those of the most ad-

In the "Maura law" of municipal reform in 1893 the newly created "municipal councils" (which were not really representative bodies) were in theory made also local school boards. By creating these quasi-councils, this law was supposed to confer upon the towns a hitherto unprecedented measure of autonomy. Yet the *padre* was an ex-officio member whose *visé* was required for almost everything; and in promulgating the law, Governor-General Blanco took pains to explain that his school-inspecting powers were not lessened, at least as regards religious instruction, which could easily be stretched to include everything. Moreover, it was significant that he instructed the municipal councils to employ "the most practical means for the diffusion of the Spanish language." A decree of 1863 had provided that, after fifteen years, the two principal town offices should be held only by those who could speak, read, and write Spanish, and that after thirty years no one not possessing these qualifications should be exempted from forced labor on public works, i.e., be one of the *principalía*. For the matter of that, if one cared to trace the history of unfulfilled laws of this sort, he might go back to 1550, when the first decree commanding the teaching of Spanish to the Filipinos was promulgated, and make a long list of them.¹

vanced nations of Europe." Many children never got beyond the little paper pamphlets containing the alphabet, a few simple syllables, the multiplication-table, the "explanation of Christian doctrine," miracle-tales, etc. The miracles in one of these (*Silabario ó Catón Cristiano para Uso de las Escuelas*) are such as the following: "St. Roman the Martyr, lacerating his flesh, said to the tyrant Asclepiades: 'If you do not believe what I say, ask the innocent child, who, as he does not know how to talk, does not know how to lie.' It was a babe of a few months, at its Christian mother's breast, in the midst of the crowd. Upon the instant, taking its mouth from the breast, the tender infant turned its face to the tyrant and in a clear voice said: 'Jesus Christ is the true God.' And being asked, 'Who has told you that?' with a thousand graces the child replied: 'To me my mother told it, and to her God told it.' The Church which tells us this is our mother, and to her God has told all that she teaches us."

¹ See *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias* for those of early years; the one of 1550 is *libro VI, título I, ley XVIII*. Legislative collections covering the Philippines will show many provisions on this subject for the years succeeding 1860, during which the question was repeatedly brought to the front. Even under the reactionary administrations, such provisions were adopted as that all books in the native dia-

The friars maintained quite complete control of secondary and higher instruction till 1898.¹ A reaction from the Liberal programmes of 1863 to 1870 was stimulated by the appearance of a radical party in the Philippines and by an insurrectionary movement in Cavite in 1872. The friar party declared these to be the natural consequences of "reform," and before King Amadeo's short reign was over they had successfully called halt to the onward party at home. The short-lived republic scarcely had its existence proclaimed in the Philippines, and the net result of Minister Moret's decree of 1870 for the secularization of St. Joseph's College (which had come to be administered by the Dominicans since the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1768) and of St. Thomas University was that in 1875 not only was the decree formally revoked (never having really been put into effect), but the Dominicans also emerged from the fight with

lect designed for general circulation should also include a Spanish version of their contents. Friar writers take various positions on the subject. A common inconsistency in their attitude is that betrayed in Father Eladio Zamora's *Las Corporaciones Religiosas en las Islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1901), wherein the author first asserts that the friars always did their best to spread the Spanish language among the Filipinos, then sets out to demonstrate that such effort is both foolish and certain of failure. Friar Miguel Bustamante published in 1885 a fair-sized book in Tagalog for the purpose of showing the Tagalogs that they ought not to learn Spanish nor seek to adopt European civilization, that in ignorance lay the happiness of the "Indian." The friars later withdrew this book from circulation and disowned it. (See Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca Filipina*, p. 74.) The Filipino petition against the friars in 1888 (Marcelo del Pilar's *Soberania monacal*, p. 59), charging the friars with refusing to have Spanish generally taught in order to retain their position of mental supremacy, says a pamphlet regarding the confessional, published in Tagalog, changes the Spanish phraseology, "And you, father, I beg to pray to God for me. Amen," into this language in its Tagalog translation: "And you, father, since you are the substitute of God on earth, free me from my sins and chastise me. Amen, Jesus."

¹ Strictly speaking, of course, the Jesuits' schools could not be called those of "the friars"; however, they were, in the sense here implied under Church control. Moreover, the Rector of St. Thomas University had theoretical supervision of the Jesuits' secondary school. Much has been said by certain Filipinos of private schools for higher education. Some few of these were started in the more advanced provinces after the extension of the Spanish civil code to the Philippines in 1889 gave tacit authority for their organization; but they led a precarious existence, in the face of the reactionary campaign for the withdrawal of the right to organize such associations, and for other reasons exercised very little influence upon the educational situation prior to 1898.

more complete control of the valuable estate of St. Joseph's College.¹ They promised to devote the income of this endowment to courses in medicine and pharmacy, never before taught in the islands. This is the medical college in which bacteriology has been introduced since American occupation and is taught without microscopes, which has no library worth the name, and uses textbooks long antiquated, which has a farcical course in dissection, and few graduates of which have ever attended a case of confinement or seen a laparotomy. In St. Thomas University prior to 1863, besides canon law and a fairly good course in civil law (with lay professors), there were three courses in Latin grammar, three in philosophy, and six in theology, taught in the scholastic manner with the textbooks of Spain's friar convents. A Government committee of 1863 added to the curriculum these subjects, some of which were never taught: mathematics, lineal drawing, chemistry, universal history, Spanish history, geography, Greek, Hebrew, French, English, and bookkeeping. Shortly thereafter an English chemist was hired to coach the new "professor of chemistry," a friar unacquainted with his branch.² When the Jesuits began to introduce something like laboratories into their secondary school at Manila, governmental and popular pressure forced modern science upon St. Thomas's. In 1863

¹ This is the property now in litigation in the Philippine Supreme Court between the Philippine Government and the metropolitan see of the Philippines, the latter claiming it as Church property, the former maintaining that its original donor gave it to the Spanish Government, which merely permitted the Jesuits and then the Dominicans to administer it in trust. For the arguments in the case and the act of the Philippine Commission conferring special jurisdiction on the Philippine Supreme Court to decide it, see Act No. 69 of said body, with the resolutions of January 5, 1901, reciting the reason for said act and these pamphlets, printed at Manila in 1900: by Felipe G. Calderon, *El Colegio de San José, Alegato presentado á la Comisión*, etc., and *Refutación de las pretenciones alegadas . . . por el Sr. Delegado de S. S. y el Sr. Arzobispo de Manila*; also the "Statements" to the Commission by Archbishop Nozaleda and Apostolic Delegate Chapelle.

² So Pardo de Tavera (*Biblioteca Filipina*, p. 281), in listing some addresses of Friar Miguel Narro, says he began teaching English in St. Thomas University without knowing it, simply repeating to his pupils each day the lesson taught him previously in his cell by a Portuguese.

its rector had offered to establish "a brief medical course, suited to the limited intelligence of the natives."¹ A short time before a predecessor had said: "Medicine and the natural sciences are materialistic and impious studies." A Filipino student of the sixties who proposed a thesis on economic reasoning was gravely warned that political economy was a "science of the Devil." And again in 1901, the friar professor who delivered the address opening St. Thomas's college year paid his respects to modern science in general and to English and German anthropology and biology in particular, wiping Darwin, Haeckel, and other such men off the slate with quotations from the Bible and the saints of the Church. That same year, when young Filipinos began coming to the technical schools of the United States, the rector of St. Thomas's announced a course of "engineering, taught by an English professor" — without laboratory and without mechanical equipment.

Technical education also got little beyond the decree stage in the Philippines prior to American occupation. A nautical school, for some years successfully opposed by the friars, it is claimed because it involved the teaching of higher mathematics, and a military school had come to play honorable rôles. The trade school opened in Manila with such a flourish of governmental trumpets in the sixties soon found its way into the hands of the Augustinians; it had no great achievements to catalogue. The same is true of the so-called "model farms" and the central agricultural school, a pet idea of the spasmodically flourishing Liberal ministries of Spain, which inspired some reams of official reports. The trade school was in 1891 reopened as a Government institution, and the following year the old school of drawing, painting, and sculpture was revived.²

¹ See Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. III, for this and other references to this period.

² For a review of educational institutions as they existed at the time of the American occupation, see *Rept. Phil. Comm. 1900*, vol. I. part III, also vol. II, exhibit VI.

CHAPTER II

MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION

MUNICIPAL reorganization was more or less united with educational reform, as will have been seen by the references to the governmental measures of 1893. In the interim, there had been various minor reforms, especially in 1886, in the direction of making civil administration of provincial and municipal affairs more complete; all the more important political divisions of Luzon, except Cavite, to the number of nineteen, had been made civil provinces, though all the political divisions of the central islands remained "politico-military," the supreme provincial official in each case being a Spanish army officer.

In 1889, Minister Becerra had declared the municipal measure of which he was patron to be a step of preparation for the Philippine towns in time to "exercise complete intervention in local affairs"; it was, however, only a decree conferring upon a few of the larger towns (viz., Sebú, Iloilo, Bigan, Albay, Batangas, and Nueva Cáceres) the right to organize an *ayuntamiento* like those of the municipalities of Spain, though the Filipinos were not given the right to elect the members of this municipal corporation. The other towns of the islands remained under the *gobernadorcillos* and *cabezas de barangay*, the former being a sort of honorary chief and figurehead for the execution of the directions of the village priest and of the Spanish officer of the local garrison of "carbineers" or "rural guards," and being assisted by lieutenants and "judges" of the planted fields, of police and of cattle. The heads of the *barangays* or *barrios* were charged chiefly with the collection of the taxes in their immediate districts. All the offices were

compulsory, since the *cabezas* were pecuniarily responsible for whatever part of their district's quota of taxes remained uncollected, a feature which resulted not infrequently in the mulcting of a well-to-do native and made the office unpopular in many places. The elections were held under the direction of the chief provincial officer and the local priest, who assembled the *principalía* (men belonging to the caste which held these local offices), selected from them six *ex-gobernadorcillos* and six *ex-cabezas de barangay* by lot, these twelve being the delegates who chose the officers for the ensuing year by ballot. In practice, of course, the Spanish officials, especially the priest, dictated the selections.¹

The Maura law of 1893 extended the *principalía* to include also the principal taxpayers; renamed the local offices, and made their duties and powers somewhat more clear and comprehensive; provided for elections by ballot, though the *principalía* were to choose twelve delegates and these delegates in turn the five town officers; made a sort of municipal council (called the Tribunal) of the five officers, with whom on most important questions the twelve delegates must also sit, while the parish priest retained the right to intervene on all questions and his *visé* was necessary in most matters of importance. The heads of *barangay* were to be selected by the provincial governor from a list proposed by the municipal council, were given slightly wider powers, and also a larger share of the taxes they collected as their personal perquisites. The decree indulged in more or less vague provisions as to the new municipal governments having greater control of local finances, and, to the end that they might undertake improvements, gave them the power to impose for the first time a tax on rural real estate.

Governor-General Blanco does not seem to have deemed the times ripe for the innovation, and the regulations he pro-

¹ For the description of an election in a village of Sámar in 1859, see Jagor, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

mulgated in December, 1893, for putting the new law into effect virtually left these clauses a dead letter. For the matter of that, the entire municipal reform of 1893, greeted by such a blare of trumpets as it was at the time, remained very much a dead letter. For lack of time, ostensibly at least, Blanco nominated all the new officers who were to take seats January 1, 1894, and inaugurate the new law; and long before the four years came around when there should be quasi-elections under the law, it had been set aside by Blanco himself, under the exigencies of rebellion, while still more rigid provisions of martial law than he invoked were in force under his successors. Much the same fate befell the provincial boards which were, by the Maura law, created to supervise the new municipal governments and advise the provincial governor, they being made up mainly of Spanish civil and ecclesiastical authorities of the province, serving *ex officio*, and of four residents of the capital, chosen for six years by the presidents of all the towns in the province. Nor, when the troubles of 1896 came on, had anything practical been realized from the provision of the 1893 law that divided Luzon and the Bisayas into three districts each, the provincial boards of these districts to choose, in turn of provinces, one citizen from each of these districts to act as an adviser to the Council of Administration of the central government at Manila. The Maura law remained, like too many other reforms of Spain, mostly promise.¹

Other notable administrative reforms were, in 1884, the re-

¹ For a résumé of the whole governmental system of Spain in the Philippine Islands, see *Rept. Phil. Comm. 1900*, vol. I, part IV. The reader is, however, in danger of being misled if he does not understand that the organization as there outlined was, in considerable degree, only a *paper* organization, showing the governmental scheme as modified by recent laws, some of which had not at all, or had but lately, taken effect. A more adequate idea of the old Spanish system of internal administration is afforded by the appendix to volume XVII of *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, in the translations from Mas's *Informe* of 1843 and Montero y Vidal's *Archipiélago filipino* of 1886. A comprehensive manual on the Maura law reform, with the texts of the decrees, regulations made by Blanco, municipal blank forms, etc., is *Comentarios al Reglamento Provisional de las Juntas Provinciales*, by Felix M. Roxas (Manila, 1894).

duction from forty to fifteen of the number of days' labor on public works that each native must contribute without pay, and the suppression of the old "tribute," or head-tax (established under Legaspi), as such, with the substitution for it of the *cédula personal*, virtually a poll-tax, though ostensibly a fee for a document of identification. The *principalía* and all whites had always been exempted from forced labor (*prestación personal*), but under the new law all became theoretically subject to it; actually, all European residents paid for the *cédula* of a class high enough to exempt them from labor, while natives who paid for one of the lower grades of *cédulas* and wished to commute their labor-tax in money could do so at a certain rate. The mass of the people paid from one to three dollars Mexican for a *cédula*, including both men and women between twenty-five and sixty, where only the men had formerly paid the tribute of one peso to one peso and a half. The reduction in the number of days of forced labor was a great relief to the masses, but the system itself had been subject to abuse from the days of the conquest and remained so to the end. It was one of the ways in which the slavery of the masses to their "caciques," existent as a system upon the arrival of the Spaniards, has continued to this day. Instead of taxing the propertied classes for public improvements, and paying the workmen their daily wage, the Spanish system was to put the burden on the poor. And even then, except for the churches and convents, the improvements that were needed, especially roads, remained in most provinces unmade; the Spanish officials or native "caciques" hired out the public labor to private parties and pocketed the proceeds.¹

In economic administration, the most notable thing of re-

¹ See Retana's edition of Father Zúñiga's *Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1893), Appendix H, *Polistas*. For a keen observer's testimony as to the abuses of the *polista* system fifty years before, see Mas's *Informe*, sections on *Estado eclesiástico* and *Contribuciones*. In former times, each tributary paid also an extra real (one eighth of a dollar) which was supposed to go into the village treasury for use on local improvements.

cent years was the abolition of the Government monopoly of tobacco, which was decreed in 1881 but not fully effected till 1884. This monopoly had been instituted in 1781, and had been followed by monopolies on other products throughout the archipelago, soon giving a revenue of half a million pesos; for some years before the final abandonment of the system, it had been limited to tobacco alone and to the valley of the Kagayan River in Luzon, but nevertheless produced the Government from four to six millions annually.¹ An attempt was made during the seventies and eighties to put the archipelago on the gold standard; it was persisted in with admirable intentions, and with the Spaniard's full confidence in the powers of royal decrees, but scarcely with good judgment, since the promoters of the plan continued to fly in the face of the workings of the "Gresham Law."² Similarly, the attempts to regulate the immigration, the habitat, and the occupation of the Chinese were not any more successful during the last generation than during the preceding years of Spanish rule; when

¹ Monopolies of a minor character, on playing-cards, etc., had existed from the early years of Spanish rule, in accordance with general colonial legislation. Under Basco y Vargas, the example already set in the Spanish Antilles of a monopoly on tobacco was followed in the Philippines, and similar revenue projects were soon after extended to alcoholic products, powder, etc. (the betel-nut having previously been monopolized to a certain degree). See Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. II. pp. 295, 314, 316. The Library of Congress Bibliography and Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca* cite various sources on Philippine monopolies, especially tobacco, but there is no work comprehensively covering the subject. Mas's *Informe* (vol. II, section on *Contribuciones*) shows that the receipts from the tobacco monopoly had increased by steady growth to 1,280,000 pesos, and that the gross revenues from the monopoly on native wine and liquor (*vino* and *nipa*) were 690,000 pesos in 1835. Jagor says, *op. cit.*, p. 267: "During my stay there, the state factories could not manufacture as many cigars as there was demand for, the strange case arising of higher prices being paid for large quantities than what they bought at retail in the depositories. To prevent dealers making their purchases in the depositories, a maximum was fixed and an odious and expensive police surveillance set up to watch the sales and prevent a single person making various purchases in different agencies. The penalty was confiscation of all the purchaser had. Any one could buy cigars at the depository for his own consumption, but not dispose of a single box to another person, even at the same price he himself had paid."

² See the contributions on the subject in *La Política de España en Filipinas* for the years 1893 to 1896, evincing most amazing ignorance of fundamental economic principles on the part of official projectors as well as unofficial contributors.

the laws and restrictions became *too* troublesome to avoid or disregard, the Chinese "saw" the officers in charge.

The Laws of the Indies provided that, in so far as practicable, the rights and duties of the laws of Spain should be made applicable to her colonial subjects. Special exemptions were, however, gradually given to them, whereby (the intent was) their prosecution in the courts was to be simplified and their financial responsibility before the law was quite narrowly limited. It was inevitable that, in the hands of bad or careless administrators, these very exemptions, designed for protection, should become instruments of oppression. Moreover, in the nineteenth century, as the Filipinos came more in touch with the outside world, their more prominent individuals were bound to clamor for full equality before the law. Hence, we find that the penal code of Spain was finally extended to the Philippine Islands in 1887, and the civil code and the law of commerce in 1889. Important exceptions were speedily introduced into the decrees establishing the civil code; these were the provisions retaining the old censorship of the press and withdrawing from the Philippines civil marriage and registration, after a bitter contest waged by the religious orders. The reform of judicial procedure to a considerable extent either preceded or accompanied the alteration of the organic law. Justice of the peace courts, presided over by natives, were introduced in 1886. Before that, the simpler old form of provincial administration, whereby the Spanish *alcalde* discharged both the functions of civil governor and judge,¹ and justice in minor cases was adminis-

¹ It was not till 1844 that the provincial *alcaldes*, who were at once governors and judges, were forbidden to engage also in trade in their provinces; and abuses of this sort were common thereafter. See Mas's *Informe* (vol. II, section on *Administración de justicia*) for a good picture of the early régime in the provinces, when the Laws of the Indies, the antiquated *Siete Partidas*, etc., still governed, and could be twisted to suit the administrator-judge's desires. Mas recommends special codes for the Philippines, and that the *alcaldes-mayores* be themselves lawyers, be forbidden to trade, and receive better salaries. He also quotes Tomás de Comyn (*Estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1810*, Madrid, 1820, another of the few really invaluable Philippine works, of which an English edition was published in London in 1821), who described the same abuses as existing in 1810, namely, the

tered in the towns by the local executive chiefs, had been done away with by the separation of the executive and judiciary in the provinces.¹ A great amount of really judicial power remained vested in the person of the governor-general, and in actual practice the archipelago was only too readily converted at his will into territory subject to martial law, its inhabitants at the summary disposition of the very comprehensive military tribunals which he could call into being.

The Philippine archipelago has an area of approximately 75,000,000 acres, comprised mostly in some thirty islands of size and importance. Of the total area, not 6,000,000 acres have ever been brought under cultivation.² Perhaps 25,000,000 acres, owing to rocky character, climate, nature of the forest, etc., will never, or only in the very remote future, be cultivated. Even under this estimate, less than one eighth of the land area that is susceptible to agriculture has yet been

alcaldes making 40,000 pesos or more per year in trade; money at a high rate of interest, with internal commerce thus officially monopolized; the offices of *alcalde* lacking the prestige they should have; leniency and slackness in the administration of official duties, resulting in ladronism, even in Manila's outskirts; the *alcaldes* manipulating the *gobernadorcillos* to their own ends, and the latter the people, thus riveting the evils of caciquism even more firmly upon the masses, who were kept enslaved by debt.

¹ This pretended separation of the executive and judicial branches of the government was, however, even then by no means complete. The Bisayan provinces remained under military government till the close of Spanish rule, and their administrators possessed not only executive and judicial authority, but also quite arbitrary military powers. Until 1861, the governor-general of the islands was president of the Audiencia, and he afterward retained particularly through the courts of special jurisdiction (these courts being military, "contentious," etc., as well as ecclesiastical), virtually judicial powers. No better résumé of the law in force in the Philippines to 1898 and of the rather intricate system of courts can be found than in a monograph on the subject by Cayetano S. Arellano, now Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, which monograph is Appendix J to *Report of Taft Philippine Commission, 1900*. The forthcoming Philippine census reports will contain a more elaborate review of the subject by Florentino Torres, a judge of the Philippine Supreme Court.

² A. de la Cavada, *Historia Geográfica, Geológica y Estadística de Filipinas* (Manila, 1876), vol. II, pp. 391 and 398, gives 2,280,421 hectares (5,700,000 acres) under cultivation, and approximately 52,000,000 acres as tropical forest. More recent estimates of the area under cultivation have generally been smaller than Cavada's figures.

redeemed from forest or morass. And perhaps 1,000,000 acres of the area now cultivated are occupied by squatters, owing to the defective registry system of Spain. By the Treaty of Paris, therefore, the United States secured title over 90 per cent of all the land in the islands, including practically all the timber land, most of the area of mineral deposits, and perhaps 15,000,000 acres of land which comparatively soon can be redeemed for agriculture. These figures themselves afford the most graphic comment that can be made upon the record of Spanish rule as regards the development of the resources of the archipelago. In recent years, when commerce, as we have seen, began pressing on the outside for the development of those resources, there were efforts, more or less sustained and intelligent, to throw open the great area of waste land to occupation and improvement, as well as to lead the settlers on improved land to perfect their titles. Foreigners were, after 1870, as already noted, allowed to acquire real estate. Beginning with 1880, there was promulgated a series of comprehensive royal decrees aimed to make it easier for occupants of land to perfect their titles; the administrative machinery provided was, however, so complicated and unwieldy that only a fair proportion of the large proprietors and very few squatters on small tracts availed themselves of the privileges extended in that year and by the subsequent decrees of 1883, 1884, 1888, and 1894. By the decree of 1894, foreign corporations were expressly denied the privilege of acquiring Philippine land.¹ There were also some intelligent efforts made on the part of a few of the more progressive Spanish officials and of other Spanish laymen to study and display not only to the commercial but also to the scientific world the wealth of the virgin material which had remained almost unexplored for three centuries. Prior to these years, what little had really been accomplished in these lines was

¹ See the War Department document, *Spanish Public Land Laws in the Philippine Islands and their History to August 13, 1898*, compiled by Ahern and Basa (Washington, 1901).

owing notably to the inexperienced and generally unscientific labors of a few diligent friars. And in spite of the newly kindled interest in the Philippines of recent years, it remains true that, for the scientific world, they are to this day almost an unexplored field. In botany, there is the monumental, though not strictly reliable, work of the Augustinian, Father Manuel Blanco,¹ and some monographs of the Spanish forestry officials of late years, notably of Sebastian Vidal y Soler. In geology, three Spanish officials, Abella y Casariego, Centeno, and Jordana, published treatises of value. The work of the Jesuits in meteorology since 1865 is authoritative, and to a small degree their work in other scientific lines is acceptable. In general, however, the student who desires to know about the Philippines in any field of science will find, first, that scarcely more than the preliminary investigations have been made, and, second, that he can very speedily exhaust the works of importance in Spanish and must turn to German, English, and French works.²

As may be inferred from even this hasty summary of governmental measures of the latter half of the nineteenth century, Spain was unquestionably making progress in the Philippine Islands. It is not at all difficult, indeed, for apologetic Spanish writers of recent years to make out a very excellent defense for their Government — on paper. But if we dismiss from consideration altogether the rising wave of Filipino opposition to the persistence in their villages of frocked ecclesiastical masters, we shall still find several important obstacles to giv-

¹ *Flora de Filipinas*, Manila, 1877-80, first published in an inadequate form forty years earlier.

² Perhaps in no other line does Spanish incompetence and lack of interest come out so clearly as in that of ethnology. In general, anything that a Spanish writer says about Philippine ethnology is *ipso facto* suspicious, and very often ridiculous. Thus far one must depend mainly upon German writers upon Philippine ethnology. Of these, Blumentritt is the one who has written by far the most voluminously, and, on the whole, most informatively. Yet Blumentritt was never in the Philippine Islands at all! Mistakes, of a comprehensive character as well as of detail, abound in his treatises.

ing the Spanish lay government in the islands a clean record. In the first place, the constant political changes in Spain itself interfered seriously with the movement in the islands toward a freer economic régime and a more liberal political administration. Back in 1873 we find the much-quoted Jagor saying as to the tobacco monopoly: "The circumstance which in a country economically well administered would have great influence in favor of setting this industry free, but which with Spain, on the contrary, tends to preserve the monopoly, is the number of employees which it requires. Every ministry needs to dispose of those places to content its numberless claimants, and it cannot lose the opportunity of giving fat jobs to its creatures, nor that of sending in honor to the antipodes the persons who are in its way in Spain. The cost of the trip is at the expense of the Philippine treasury. Those who go are so numerous that at times it is necessary to create posts in which to place the newcomers."¹ He goes on to point out that

¹ Jagor, *op. cit.*, p. 267. Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 490, charges this "counterdandance of employees, which has made thousands and thousands of Spaniards pass through the Philippines as trains pass through a tunnel," upon the Liberals, who resorted to it after the revolution and dethronement of Isabella II in 1868. He fails to take into account that it was a practice of long standing and that the Liberals simply returned to it in upsetting the imperfect rules of 1866 for a civil service based on merit, though perhaps they made a cleaner sweep of subordinate employees than was ever made before and thus set the example followed until 1898. An idea of the confusion and expense incident to changes of government and of plans is afforded in *ibid.*, p. 478, where Montero y Vidal speaks of the "hall of accounts" for the colonies established in Madrid in 1867, and says: "Later . . . the courts of accounts in the colonies themselves were reestablished, and once again they were suppressed and the [bureaus at Madrid] restored, and yet, with all the coming and going of boats laden with accounts, no other result has been obtained than the expending of thousands of good dollars, while the accounts are still waiting for some pious soul to examine them." Evidence of the continuance of such evils to the close of the Spanish rule may be found in recommendations like these, made by Governor-General Primo de Rivera to the Madrid Government in July, 1897: "At least a reasonable degree of stability [for Government employees] and a rate of pay not so inadequate are conditions absolutely necessary in order to require work, competency, and morality. . . . So long as there come to the colonies, for no other purpose but to make money, the wild youth, the ruined nobleman, the cacique who has spent his property in politics, etc., . . . the administration will not be bettered nor can territories like this be peacefully governed, especially after convulsions such as has just been experienced."

from December, 1853, to November, 1854, the Philippines had four governor-generals, two regularly appointed and two acting temporarily; and tells a story of a judge of the Audiencia who arrived in Manila in 1850 with his family, having gone out by the way of Good Hope, only to find himself out of a place and his successor already on the ground, arrived by the way of the Isthmus of Suez. It is worth remarking that, from 1834 to 1862, Spain had 4 constitutions, 28 parliaments, 47 presidents of the Council of Ministers, and 529 ministers with portfolios, and during the next twenty years, with other revolutions and a republic, the changes came more frequently still. From 1835 to 1897 inclusive, the Philippines had fifty governor-generals, each serving an average of one year and three months. That a civil service under such conditions would be inefficient, if not corrupt, might be deemed a foregone conclusion; and corruption was doubly assured, one almost feels like saying, by the low scale of salaries paid, a scale that practically became lower in recent years, as it was based on silver and silver was steadily falling. That there were honest, conscientious men in the Spanish civil administration, is somewhat worthy of note; but there was very much about the whole situation to lend plausibility to the friars' claim that it was this horde of civilians fattening on the Filipinos which roused them against the mother country. It remains only to be added that the corruption notoriously extended on occasions to the governor-generals themselves; certain there were of them who paid well for their appointments, and saw to it that the bargain was not a losing one for themselves.

Moreover, there are vital objections to be urged against the

(See Primo de Rivera, *Memoria al Senado*, Madrid, 1898, p. 161.) The same point is insisted upon in connection with his complaint that the already over-powerful governor-generals "have little or no share in the making of the laws," when he says (*ibid.*, p. 9): "There is imposed upon them a personnel in all the branches of administration in the choice of which no other consideration or guaranties have governed than favoritism, intrigue, and, sometimes, even lower motives." (Some well-posted critics consider that Primo de Rivera was well qualified to speak on corruption in the Philippine Government.)

Spanish governmental system in the islands as a system, even with the reform patchwork of recent years upon it. Both economically and politically, it remained to the last paternalistic; paternalism is still highly necessary in those islands, but a paternalistic régime to be successful must be untiring and energetic, and Spain's paternalism remained to the end nine parts plan and promise and one part fulfillment. When all other defects of her administration have been discounted, it must still be said that she milked into her central treasury the comparatively mild taxes she laid upon her subjects, this being done ostensibly for the better administration and more intelligent expenditure of the fiscal resources, but actually to the detriment of local and general improvements. The insular budget for 1894-95 shows a total expenditure of \$13,280,139.41:¹ of this sum, \$6,495,237.51 went for the army and navy; \$2,220,120.98 for internal administration; \$1,687,108.88 for the church and the courts, \$460,315.24 being spent on the courts, while \$1,045,540 of the amount spent for ecclesiastical maintenance went for salaries to the bishops and priests and for supplies for the parish churches; \$1,360,506.53 on general standing expenses of Spain charged against this colony, among them over \$60,000 for the maintenance of Spain's diplomatic and consular service in the Orient, \$118,000 on the colonial department at Madrid, \$70,000 on the colony of Fernando Po on the African coast, and \$718,000 on pensions and retiring allowances; \$823,261.95 on the fiscal administration, centralized for the archipelago, of which sum nearly \$450,000 went for salaries; and lastly, \$628,752.46 for special educational institutions and public works, *over 60 per cent of the \$110,000 spent for what might be called public improvements going for salaries.*

The estimated revenue for the same year was \$13,579,000, as

¹ These sums, as all sums of money for the closing years of Spanish rule, are given in the value of the Philippine peso, which may, for practical purposes, be considered the equivalent of the Mexican dollar.

follows : from the direct taxes, \$6,659,450, this item including \$4,586,250 from *cedulas*, \$482,800 from the special head-tax on the Chinese, \$1,323,000 from the industrial tax, \$110,000 from the tax on urban property, and \$155,000 from surtaxes on various of the industrial and urban taxes; from customs, \$4,565,000 including \$430,000 in export duties; from the opium monopoly, \$602,300; from the Government lottery, \$873,000; from internal revenue stamps and stamped paper, \$510,500; from Government dues on timber cut, \$122,000; from sale of public lands, \$45,000; the rest, miscellaneous.¹

Under this system, the burdens of government rested to an extraordinary degree on the shoulders of the poor. The *cedula* tax, to be sure, could not be called excessive; but there is obviously something wrong about a governmental system which derives its chief source of income not from an impost upon *property* but upon *heads*. Of the indirect tax, the export duties on tobacco, sugar, copra, and indigo and the import duty on rice bore eventually upon the masses, and less

¹ An analysis of the budget for 1894-95 will be found in the *Rept. Phil. Comm.* 1900, vol. I, pp. 79-81. The budget for 1896-97, the last complete year, is contained in *Senate Document* 62, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 409-11, and in the appendix to F. H. Sawyer's *The Inhabitants of the Philippines* (London and New York, 1900). A detailed summary of the actual receipts of the Philippine Government, 1890 to 1897 inclusive, drawn up under American military government, is furnished on pp. 32-34 of the *Report of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands on Civil Affairs, 1900* (*Rept. War Dept. 1900*, vol. I, part 10; also Manila edition of MacArthur's report of 1900, vol. II, appendix AA, exhibit A). It shows the actual receipts from direct and indirect taxes for 1894 and 1895 to have exceeded the estimates above. Receipts and expenditures were by 1896 over \$17,000,000 silver each. It should be noted that they had been steadily growing since the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the tobacco monopoly was established, prior to which time they were in the neighborhood of half a million each. They increased most rapidly after the abolition of the monopoly and the adoption of more comprehensive schemes of taxation in the early eighties. Customs receipts grew from \$800,000 in 1865 steadily to their average of over \$4,000,000 from 1890-95. For the budgets of 1889-90 and 1893-94, and also for the figures on revenues and expenditures in earlier years in general, see Retana's edition of Zúñiga's *Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas*, appendix H, *Rentas é Impuestos del Estado*; chapter XIV of *The Philippine Islands*, by John Foreman (London and New York, 1899); and various documents on this subject presented in the important series already frequently cited, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*.

plainly they were also handicapped by the whole system of import duties, which were proportionately light on luxuries and heavy on provisions, etc., while the system was preferential for Spain. The industrial tax bore most heavily upon the proprietors of small retail enterprises and upon salaried employees; under it, the proprietor of a sugar estate, for example, paid a small tax on his mill, while he went scot-free upon his acres of tilled land. The nearest approach to a real-estate impost was the urban tax, imposed in 1879, which levied five per cent on the rental actually received from dwellings in the towns, with deductions for those of lighter materials; and, as seen, this tax on the rental value produced in the entire archipelago hardly more than \$100,000. It is to be remembered that this budget included not only receipts and expenditures for the general insular government, but for the provincial and departmental government as well; for the fiscal administration was entirely centralized, even down to the smallest *barrio*. As for the municipalities, there was left to them what meager revenue they might derive from the sale of privileges for fisheries, amusements, markets, ferries, from public pounds, fines, transfers of cattle, taxes on lights, a surtax of ten per cent on the urban tax (the numerous surtaxes being not the least vexatious and cumbersome features of the Spanish customs and internal revenue assessments), and the fifteen days' personal-labor tax. Up to the very last, too, the towns continued to lay imposts, in the old Spanish fashion, on products brought to their markets from other towns.¹ In the average Philippine town, the revenue was eaten up principally by the police force that it was required by insular regulations to keep. There were no funds for salaries to the officers, much less for

¹ This old system of *alcabalas*, or of "protective" checks upon internal trade, between province and province, town and town, survived in Spain itself until recent years. It was not abolished in Mexico until 1896, and in his *exposé* of the currency reform inaugurated in the latter country in November, 1904, Finance Minister Limantour assigned to this abolition of the *alcabalas* chief place as influencing the development of internal trade and progress generally.

the sadly needed improvements, such as good schoolhouses, cleaner streets, better roads and bridges, and hygienic appliances and regulations.

That the Filipino people, and in particular the humble Filipino, had legitimate grievances against the Spanish administration, would appear to be evident from the foregoing recital. Even leaving out of consideration the small degree of participation in the management of their own affairs that was allowed to the Filipinos, it disposes of the paper showing of Spanish political apologists. But far from being able to argue therefrom that it was the blunders of Spain's civil administration which cost her the sympathies of her Philippine subjects and made them ripe for active revolution when the chance came to throw off the yoke, we must, in any fair accounting, find that that administration was really making progress toward a better régime. How explain, then, that coincidentally with this faltering progress, the Filipinos themselves grew steadily, during the last thirty years, more restless and assertive? The story is not told if we pause here and simply bring a general indictment against the Filipinos as acting the part of ingrates toward their benefactors. At Madrid, during those years of Filipino *renaissance*, the religious orders which had such extensive landed and parochial and educational interests in the islands were fighting at every step, with secret political power, with the superstitious hold their ecclesiastical position gave them upon the Spanish people, and with the most up-to-date resources of a political party (with newspapers, candidates, propaganda, etc.), against every encroachment upon the old régime by the Liberal party of Spain. In the Philippine Islands the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the heads of the same orders were using all the power of their intrenched position, all their prestige and authority, religious and official, and not infrequently all the baser weapons at their disposal, to bend the administration of the islands to their will. In almost every town of size in those islands, there was a friar, ready to assert the ancient preroga-

tive of fatherly direction, ready to use in the interests of his régime all the manifold rights of intervention in local affairs which the law gave him, ready to place the heavy hand of superstition or of paternalism upon the head of every parishioner who showed a tendency to think or to do for himself, eager and earnest in his determination to maintain the intellectual *status quo*. That the friars were honest and sincere in this attitude of horror toward modern progress in general, toward Liberalism, toward scientific education, did not render it any less certain that they were bound eventually to lose in their fight to keep the Filipinos in the Middle Ages. For a whole generation, the catastrophe was preparing; but it was inevitable, from the day when the Philippines were first aroused from their dreams of slumbering isolation.

What differentiated the Cavite revolt of 1872 from any of the previous mutinies of native troops was the fact that the Spanish authorities, rightly or wrongly, identified with it, and made chief victims for punishment, three native priests, one of them an old man almost in his dotage. If we accept the testimony of Filipinos more or less closely in touch with the incidents of that year, the evidence on which those priests were convicted, by a secret military tribunal, of instigating the mutiny, was manufactured at the prompting of the friars, because, encouraged by the anti-clerical campaign waged during the preceding decade in Spain, these Filipino priests, and particularly one of them, had been outspoken in asserting the rights of the native clergy to serve the parishes of their country and in charging the orders with limiting their education, keeping their number down, and generally reducing them to the position of servants of the friars. The official Spanish version of the affair is that these priests were the prime instigators of a mutiny in the Cavite arsenal, and that, if their plans had not been frustrated by the confession of a native woman to a friar, all whites in Cavite and Manila might have been put to the knife. The natives have never ceased to believe that there

was a cold-blooded plot on the part of the friars to get rid of the few independent native priests who refused to lick their hands in servility and spoke out boldly for their own priestly rights and their people. Under the circumstances, the action of the Spanish authorities in taking bloody vengeance without clearly and publicly proving their case must be deemed one of the most serious tactical blunders made during the troublous times of recent years.¹ Governor-General Izquierdo, who was

¹ The Filipino version of the affair was reflected in the dedication by José Rizal of his novel *El Filibusterismo* (Ghent, 1890) to Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora (executed on the field where Rizal himself was to fall nearly twenty-five years later) with the words: "The Church, by refusing to degrade you, has placed in doubt the crime imputed to you; the Government, by surrounding your case with mystery and shadows, justifies the belief that there was some error, committed in fatal moments; and the entire Philippine country, by worshipping your memory and calling you martyrs, admits your culpability in no respect. Inasmuch, therefore, as your participation in the Cavite disturbance is not clearly proved, and as you may have been patriots or not, may or may not have cherished aspirations for justice, aspirations for liberty, I have a right to dedicate my work to you as victims of the evil I seek to combat. And while we are waiting on Spain to rehabilitate you some day, and expect her to refuse the responsibility for your death, let these pages serve as a tardy crown of dried leaves placed upon your unknown tombs; and let every one who assails your memory without clear proofs stain his hands in your blood!"

A detailed Filipino version of the 1872 affair, which is cited not as a complete or wholly reliable account of the uprising, but as showing the sort of stories about it which have circulated among the people, is related in the unpublished appeal for intervention by the United States in the Philippine Islands made to the United States consul-general at Hongkong by certain Filipinos there in January, 1897. This document recites that the three condemned priests, Father José Burgos and Jacinto Zamora, of the chapter of the Manila Cathedral, and Father Mariano Gomez, the curate of Bakoor, Cavite, had vigorously opposed the taking of these prominent posts from them by Recollect friars, who had some time before left Mindanao in accordance with the agreement which restored the island to the Jesuits for missionary work; that special enmity was felt by these friars toward Father Burgos, because he had exposed in a newspaper of Spain the robbery of the rich jewels and the funds of the famous parish church of Antipolo by a Recollect who had been put in possession of that curacy; that the Recollect provincial summoned from Sambales a member of the order very similar to Father Burgos and had him unfrock himself and pretend to be Burgos in connection with his efforts to bribe the Cavite garrison to mutiny; that he accomplished this plan through two dissolute Spanish sergeants, who wanted money for gambling; that afterward the friars manipulated the torture of the prisoners taken in the mutiny, compelling another sergeant, named Saldua, to declare that the mutiny had been begun by Burgos's orders; that this sergeant made this declaration before the

so energetic in putting down this really insignificant mutiny, had been preceded by Governor-General de la Torre, who had inaugurated an era of sympathetic assimilation between Spaniards and Filipinos, a sort of "policy of attraction" for which his recalcitrant fellow-countrymen in the islands could not pardon him. The pendulum now swung far in the other direction and the two peoples drifted farther and farther apart. The policy of the "strong hand" was accepted as necessary even by the Liberals in Spain, receiving their information about the Philippines from interested sources, and, as already noted, Minister Moret's decree for the secularization of education was instead turned to the advantage of the friars, while other reform projects, some practicable and some not, were shelved for the time being.

The contest in behalf of the native priesthood and of the secularization of the parishes had, however, been revived.

military tribunal, only after the promise that he would be set free for making it, but that he was executed along with the three priests so as to have him out of the way; that his widow began to denounce the proceeding and to tell in public the promises made to her husband, when suddenly she and her children disappeared from their house and have never been seen since; finally, that "even in the minds of the most humble inhabitants of the Philippines there rests the conviction that the tragic end of those victims had been bought with gold." It is a fact that the Jesuit-Recollect arrangement had something to do with bringing on the trouble of 1872. The Recollect priests who had been replaced by Jesuits in Mindanau sought to oust the more prominent native priests from the best posts in and near Manila that were not already in the possession of friars, and the three priests executed were precisely those who had been most outspoken in behalf of their own rights and those of the native clergy in general. A contemporary French account of the Cavite mutiny may be found in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for May 15, 1877, written by E. Plauchut. This account has been vigorously disputed by Spanish writers, especially by Philippine friars. A contemporary account of the 1872 affair, the *Reseña* of Father Casimiro Herrero (see Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca* for this and other data on the revolt), in its chapter on the cause of the revolt (reproduced in *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. II, pp. 58-61), reveals the general character of all the friar writings on the subject in these remarks: "The Cavite insurrection has the same origin and is the result of the same causes as those of France, Italy, and Spain, or rather of Europe and America. They are all the fruit of the corruption of the intelligence and the heart. Tell man, You are free to think and to will, because reason recognizes no dependence and will follows reason, and you have put [into action] the principle of disorder and anarchy which so dominates society."

More and more every year it became an expression of the slowly rising Filipino nationality, a demand for priests from among the people, as other countries have. To that extent, at least, the friars' defenders are correct in saying that the opposition to the friars was opposition to them as Spaniards. The seminaries for native priests, though not closed, had fallen into decay after the reaction from the campaign for secularization of Bishop Santa Justa y Rufina in the eighteenth century. In the early sixties, the Paulist Fathers were put in charge of the seminaries at the seat of each of the bishoprics, except at Bigan, where the Augustinians presided over the seminary; there was also a second seminary at Manila, under the direction of the Jesuits. The Filipinos charge that the course of instruction and the number of natives ordained were purposely limited, that the orders might always present at Rome, as the conclusive argument against secularization of the parishes, the fact that there were not enough native priests, nor were they yet well enough equipped, to take over the parochial administration. In 1870, of the 792 Philippine parishes, excluding ten mission parishes of the Jesuits, the friars were in charge of 611, and secular priests, nearly all natives, of 181. The contention that in general only the poorer, less productive parishes were assigned to native priests is borne out by the fact that the average number of parishioners in their 181 parishes was 4500, while in the friars' parishes the average was well beyond 6000; the Augustinians, the first missionaries in the islands, who always held the greatest number of important parishes, had an average of nearly 10,000 souls to each of their 196 parishes.¹ The number of native priests,

¹ A. de la Cavada, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 402. Sinibaldo de Mas (*op. cit.*, vol. II, section on *Estado eclesiástico*, pp. 36-37) says there were 450 friars and 700 Filipino priests in 1842. One inclines to believe this an error or a misprint as regards the number of seculars, since the seminaries to train them were at the time, and had for some years been, neglected, and in 1898, thirty-five years after the reorganization of the seminaries, the number of ordained Filipino priests fell short of 700. Mas, at any rate, lists only 198 parishes in the four dioceses of that time as being in charge of seculars, while 288 were administered by friar-curates. Mas

coadjutors and all, was about 600 in 1898; but the number of their parishes did not increase, and they remained to the last mainly the coadjutors of the friar priests in the larger parishes.¹ Nor should they all be identified (at least actively, though quite commonly in sentiment) with the opposition to the friars; their very position as underlings made them, with the exception of the more independent spirits, bootlicks of their masters.

There are certain inconsistencies in the books, manifestoes, speeches, etc., made in defense of the friars in recent years, by themselves, their hirelings in literature, or their creatures in the political arena of Spain. They uniformly claim that the mass of the Filipinos love them, and that the opposition to them is voiced only by a few forward and conceited "Indians," put up to it by the Liberals ("freethinkers" and "Freemasons," they generally say) of Spain. They as uniformly dwell with great emphasis upon the labors of the orders as having in a short space of time converted communities of wandering savages into happy, peaceful, law-abiding Christian communities.² Then, in the bitterness of the campaign against the extension of new rights and liberties to the Filipinos, they

gives in this section an excellent presentation of the friars' side of the contention under the earlier régime and a picture of the friar priests as benevolent administrators and pastors, which coincides with that drawn by Tomás de Comyn still earlier in the nineteenth century. Both should be consulted.

¹ According to the *Études* of Élisée Reclus of July 5, 1898 (quoted in *Catholic World* for August, 1898), the spiritual charges of the regular and secular clergy in the Philippines were as follows: 1892, Augustinians, 2,082,131; 1892, Recollects, 1,175,156; 1892, Franciscans, 1,010,753; 1892, Dominicans, 699,851; 1895, Jesuits, 213,065; 1896, secular clergy, 967,294.

² They are able to quote the very just testimony of foreign travelers like Jagor, Mallat, and others, to the better conditions of the Filipinos, so far as regards the conditions of livelihood and association with the white rulers, than that of the Malays of Java or of the English possessions, where the natives were never Christianized. This testimony, however, like that of the competent Spanish observers, Comyn and Mas, dates back to the earlier portions of the nineteenth century or to other periods before new ideas and aspirations had begun to enter the Philippines, and does not take into account the fact that the Spaniards had introduced their subjects to the possibilities of a "divine discontent" and must satisfy that discontent or reckon with it in years to come.

give such depressing estimates of the natives' ability and launch such invectives against the natives' character as belie their claims to having done wonders in transforming them. The real missionary spirit of earlier years had, in a great measure, been lost before ever the eighteenth century began; but it was not until after 1863 that the campaign of depreciation of the native became so bitter, was so openly conducted before his face and so absolutely regardless of truth or of charity and reckless of consequences. Such incidents as the reciting by a Philippine official distinguished for his defense of the friars, at public literary exercises of the University of St. Thomas, of verses representing the natives, two thousand of whom were there as students, as mere animals, building their homes like the birds of the air and living like the lowest beasts, became more and more common. It was of these verses that a friar very prominent in one of the orders said, in an open letter to Minister Moret in 1897:—

They brilliantly set forth the savage instincts and the bestial inclinations of those faithful imitators of apes. . . . As neither Spain nor the friars can change the ethnological character of the race, so inferior to ours, it will be idle to desire to apply to them the same laws as to us. . . . The only liberty the Indians want is the liberty of savages. Leave them to their cock-fighting and their indolence, and they will thank you more than if you load them down with old and new rights.¹

The Dominican newspaper of Manila not infrequently refers to the people as *chongos* (Philippine colloquial for "monkeys"). If there is a spark of spirit or of independence in a people at all, they will rise against that sort of treatment, even when

¹ The whole letter and discussion connected therewith may be found in *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VII, pp. 35-37. A typical book in defense of the friars is *Las Corporaciones Religiosas en Filipinas*, by Father Eladio Zamora (Madrid, 1901). Father Zamora was a Philippine Augustinian. The book presents the side of the friars in the Philippines very well, but its author is as reckless of facts and ignorant of Philippine history as some of the less ambitious pamphleteers among his fellows. His book forms the basis of the alleged history contained in Stephen Bonsal's article on "The Friars in the Philippines" in the *North American Review* for October, 1902, though Mr. Bonsal failed to give credit.

the masters who so depreciate them govern them with absolute justice. If the defense of the record of the friars is to be consistent, it must either elect to regard the Filipinos as in the mass hopeless of complete regeneration, or it must cease to harp on the wonders wrought by the friars. If the Filipinos are to-day totally incapable, the tradition of miracles having been wrought by the missionaries must be abandoned; if they have been raised to a state approaching in some degree that of European peoples, they cannot legitimately be denied the opportunity to advance the rest of the way.

THE FILIPINO REFORM PROPAGANDA

The real question here involved is, Did the Filipinos themselves demand such an opportunity? The best answer to that question is not found in the incidents of the so-called Revolution of 1896, actively participated in only by sections of the archipelago, and by certain classes to the very considerable exclusion of others, inspired, moreover, by various mixed motives, among which were not wanting the baser ones of personal revenge and race hatred. The best proof of the rising Filipino sentiment of nationality is found in the campaign carried on in the eighties and nineties by the more progressive element of young Filipinos, a two-sided campaign, waged in Spain for the extension to the Philippines of freer governmental institutions, for an honest administration, and for the speedy replacement of the friars by Filipino priests, and waged in the islands themselves for the improvement of educational facilities, a removal of the espionage upon the press and public opinion, and, above all, for an awakening of the lethargic masses. There were only a chosen few who comprehended in their campaign this full breadth of purpose, and there were actively laboring with them, in partial comprehension of the far-reaching scope of what they were trying to do, comparatively but a handful of less capable proselyters; but they had made their influence felt in every little village where their

educated compatriots dwelt, and even the consciousness of the docile masses had perhaps been touched with something like an ideal of progress.

This campaign was, first of all, a foreign propaganda, because it was stimulated into activity by the deportations of prominent Filipinos following the Cavite mutiny of 1872. They gradually found their way from the criminal colonies of Spain to Hongkong and Singapore in the Orient, but more particularly to Paris and London, and, as their real or supposed offenses were blurred by time, to Madrid itself. For the succeeding twenty years, deportations were more or less common at intervals, depending upon whether the régime at Manila was representative of Liberals or Clerical-Conservatives in Spain. The friars, who were becoming all the time more and more anxious to repress all the new tendencies of the Philippine times and more and more rabid against the natives, played no small part in urging forward this policy of deporting every man who became too independent, or, as they called it, too anti-Spanish, in his local community. Eventually, no doubt, they got credit for more deportations than were really inspired by them. Nevertheless, they cannot complain that their reputation in this respect was not fairly earned. Their recommendations were quite commonly final in all local affairs, and, in most of these cases, if they did not actually set the machinery of denunciation going for the removal of a troublesome man, a word from them would at least have left him in peaceful possession of his property and the enjoyment of his family and home. The whole policy of deportations was at least of questionable value. But, if indorsed as a policy, the way in which it came to be carried out made it not only ineffectual as a means for the repression of plotting, but a very potent instrument for widening the breach between Spaniards and Filipinos. Secret service denunciations, with full discretion to act upon them vested in the governor-general,¹ who only in

¹ Marcelo del Pilar (*La Soberania monacal*, p. 9) says this discretionary power of

very conspicuous cases seemed to feel called upon to bring even the summary proceedings of a military court to bear, were plainly open to great abuse; and business or personal jealousies played no small part in bringing about deportations. The speedy result was the creation in most of the towns of a well-defined class of sycophants of the friars or other Spanish authorities, most of them Spanish half-castes, who, through fear, religious superstition, personal animosities, or because born with that nature, became a set of despicable spies upon their more independent fellows. Spain was, therefore, rapidly losing the affections and sympathies of the better sort among its educated, property-holding subjects, and was in many provinces allying herself, through the village priests, through the local and military representatives, or through the higher provincial officers, with the least desirable element of the population, the fellows who wished not to consider themselves Filipinos but Spaniards, and who would lick the boots of the white man to be accorded a halfway recognition by him. Meanwhile, wider trade and commerce and the new industrial and agricultural institutions, mostly the work of foreigners, were, as has been shown, calling into existence the beginnings of a "middle class." At first, only the wealthy and educated men had been marked for deportation. Later, rumors of local discontent were enough to bring the officers of the law down upon the less conspicuous natives, even sometimes upon the humble workmen of the lower classes; these were mostly removed to some other part of the archipelago, generally upon the fringes of the Moro country.¹

the governor-general was based upon a decree of 1588 (*Leyes de Indias*, lib. III, tit. IV, ley VII), and points out that the chapter in which it appears deals with matters of war, hence, aside from its antiquity, is not properly applicable to ordinary peaceful times.

¹ An instance of personal knowledge is that of a bright, self-educated machinist of Pampanga, who, with only a village-school education, had mastered many of the principles of mechanics in the sugar- and rice-mills of an English firm, who had pursued the subject with books and with the foreigners' help, who had ceased to kiss the local friar's hand because of the intellectual self-esteem thus aroused,

All this record of deportations might indicate an active campaign against Spain in the islands, and that is what the officers who ordered them and the friar writers would have us believe was going on. If it was, however, these authorities have lost the moral argument they might have employed by failing to produce in public the proofs of it. There was, undoubtedly, an undercurrent of opposition to Spain, directed particularly against the friars, and, very naturally under the circumstances, it steadily became stronger. But it had no chance for public expression, even in the intervals of freer speech under Liberal administrations, and not much chance for secret propaganda until the closing years of Spanish rule. The propaganda naturally began abroad, first because of the *déportés* who began to form colonies in various places, and next because the Filipinos of position who were in sympathy with the yet undefined movement were sending their sons abroad in greater numbers every year, and these young men almost inevitably became, with their expanded opportunities and broadened vision, advocates of the new régime.

The campaign did not outline itself clearly until the latter part of the eighties. It is significant that the young men who finally gave form and force to this movement were representatives for the most part of the rising middle class in the islands, so far as such a class was being created by wider educational facilities. This is a comment on how things had progressed in the Philippines, a comment that should be completed by the further significant remark that the radicals of eight and ten years later, the men who forced the issue for revolution in 1896, came in turn from the lower classes of the population. The whole movement began with the more independent *mestizos*; but it grew too rapidly for the most of them to keep up with it, and eventually became, to a notable degree, a movement from below. It was Graciano Lopez Jaena, a pure-blooded

and who was deported as a dangerous citizen shortly after the friar found that he was a subscriber to the *Scientific American*.

Bisayan from the Kapis province of Panai (which province to-day feels and shows the influence of his semi-socialistic preachings among its notable element of middle-class natives of some degree of education), who founded in Barcelona in 1888 the first organ of the propaganda, "La Solidaridad." Marcelo del Pilar, a Tagalog from Bulakán, without social prominence, but who had obtained a legal training in Manila and who had started a Tagalog daily there to instruct the masses, went to Spain the next year virtually as the agent of Filipinos of means at home, who proposed through him to conduct a propaganda, and he acquired this publication as one of his first steps. Next to José Rizal, he was its most notable Filipino collaborator; the Bohemian teacher and friend of Rizal, Ferdinand Blumentritt, and various Spanish Liberals were also regular contributors. Its circulation was of course principally in the Philippines, where it had to be introduced surreptitiously. Already in 1887 Rizal's first political novel, "Noli Me Tangere," had begun to be read in the Philippines; printed in Berlin, copies were introduced into the islands in one way or another, and were read behind closed windows. Rizal himself was the son of parents of pure Tagalog ancestry, in moderate circumstances, residents of Kalamba, Laguna province, and occupants of land claimed as belonging to one of the largest and oldest friar estates, and he had been schooled in boyhood by a very capable Filipino priest. For lack of a real understanding on the part of outsiders, especially Americans, of the events of the Filipino campaign for freedom, and through his own people's tendency to carry hero-worship to the point of religious frenzy, he has been canonized as a sort of Filipino miracle, the one genius the Malay race has produced; he is in many respects their greatest man, but he is really a thoroughly typical product of his times and of his exceptional opportunities.¹

¹ Sir Hugh Clifford has carried this view of Rizal as an abnormal Malay to the extreme in his appreciative article upon him in *Blackwood's Magazine* for November, 1902. What almost invariably vitiates for us the well-meant advice of Englishmen who have been colonial administrators in the Orient is that they proceed

There coöperated with this circle of, so to speak, "young men of the people," almost the entire colony of Filipinos abroad; composed for the most part, of course, of the sons of the wealthy *mestizos*. In the main, however, the more capable among the scions of the propertied families of the Philippines were moved to be cautious about their expressions in public, for fear of involving their families at home, however freely they might join with these propagandists in secret. Moreover, a very large element of these *mestizos* were of a class which can only be described by dubbing them "Superficials." Filipinos of this sort have been so numerous, and have made themselves so prominent as self-elected spokesmen for their people, both before and since 1898, that it has been easy for the opponents of a more liberal régime in the Philippines to cast ridicule upon the whole movement, and hard at times for outside sympathizers to feel that the whole campaign was not hopeless, or at least premature. It is this class which carried the talk about "assimilation" (of the Philippines with Spain) to ridiculous extremes; which, when a very proper effort was begun to point out the failure of Philippine history as gen-

upon the assumption that an Oriental is essentially, if not utterly, different from the white man, and never seem to understand that Spain converted the Filipinos to a sort of Christianity and started them part way toward European life and European ideals, and that, to that extent at least, we have a different problem from theirs in dealing with Mohammedan peoples whose ways of life and thought have not been more or less arbitrarily changed in the mass. The best discussion of Rizal's personality, written by an intimate friend, is that of Ferdinand Blumentritt in the *Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie* (Bd. x, Heft II), a translated abstract of which appeared in the *Popular Science Monthly* for July, 1902. The significant features of his career to bear in mind are that, having drained dry the founts of education at Manila when scarcely past twenty, he found the means to go to Europe for medical study; that he almost immediately broke loose from the backward scientific school of Spain, and made his way to Paris and then to Germany, studying at Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Berlin. What it meant, that this full-blooded Malay of undoubted native ability was thus brought into contact with modern science (political as well as physical), as taught by some of the masters of the "research method," may readily be guessed. Had he, like Mabini, been confined by circumstances to the Philippine Islands, and forced to whet his appetite for broader culture and a wider knowledge of the outside world with stray books and pamphlets of the old school of French socialists, he would very likely have become what Mabini became, a socialist-idealist and dreamer of the school of 1789.

erally written to deal fairly and scientifically with the primitive natives and their descendants, well-nigh made a laughing-stock of every Filipino or Spaniard who identified himself with this effort by burdening Spanish presses with asinine treatises designed to show that the pre-conquest Filipinos had a religion equal or superior to Christianity and lived in a sort of elysium of patriarchal justice and of fraternal love; this class, in short, which, bred up in the narrow and scholastic training of the friars' schools at Manila, and continuing in the same grooves of education in Spain, was only blindly aware of the real nature of the aims of such a young prophet as Rizal, yet insisted on floundering around after him and producing imitations of modern scientific treatises.¹

There was exaggeration enough about the campaign of the more intelligent, sensible Filipinos. Their clamor for assimilation with the home Government of Spain, with an organization like that of any one of the provinces of Spain, was a clamor for something impracticable and undesirable either for the Philippines or for Spain.² It was mostly sentimental and never well reasoned out. Back of it were the real and the reasonable aspirations of the Philippine Liberals, namely, for representation in the Cortes of Spain, for some share, that is, in the government which ought to pass upon only their more general interests; and for a much greater measure of home rule, together with the liberties of press and of association. This second and more far-reaching aspiration carried with it as a log-

¹ It would be profitless, besides consuming space, to attempt a catalogue of this class of Filipinos; they have made themselves conspicuous enough so that any one who studies the literature of their country's recent history will meet with them only too frequently. The people of the United States have had some experience with them within their own borders since 1898.

² The Federal Party's plank declaring for statehood in the American Union, put forth in 1900, but virtually dropped in 1903, was a revival of the "assimilation campaign," adapted to the conditions of the new sovereignty. Both because of the state of culture of their inhabitants and because of their geographical location, the Philippines need, from every standpoint, a government on the spot and a government especially adapted to them.

ical consequence the removal of the friar priests; in fact, it began with and grew from that demand.

The significant thing after all, even when we have restated in more reasonable and practical form, as well as more accurately, what were the real aspirations of the Filipino reform party, is that the campaign stopped short of being a separatist campaign. This statement impugns the reiterated charge of the friars and of their Spanish supporters that, from the very outset, the opposition to them was due only to a desire to oust Spain from the islands. It is nevertheless the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the whole record of the propaganda of 1886 to 1896. Before setting out for Spain in 1888, Marcelo del Pilar, one of the bitterest critics of the existing régime, wrote in the prologue to the Spanish-Tagalog dictionary of a schoolmaster friend: "His aspirations will be fully realized, and our satisfaction immense, if the work should contribute to the diffusion of Castilian speech in this archipelago, which, being a piece of Spain, ought to be Spanish in its language, Spanish in its religion, in its sentiments, in its habits and in its aspirations."¹ It would be easy to multiply such quotations. It is also easy to present apparent proof that independence was the real aim from the first by assorting quotations from "La Solidaridad,"

¹ Prologue to Pedro Serrano Laktaw's *Diccionario Hispano-Tagalog* (Manila, 1889). And, after reaching Spain, Del Pilar said, in his first pamphlet published under the guarantee of liberty of the press in the home country (*La Soberania monacal*, Barcelona, 1888; Manila edition, 1898, p. 11): "There is no serious evidence of a proposal on the part of the Philippines to separate from Spain. . . . The little disturbances that have occurred in Luzon have never been popular in character . . . they have always been put down by these same sons of Spain themselves [the Filipinos in the Spanish army]. To emancipate itself from Spain is to go counter to the rising progress of the Filipino people. The archipelago being spread out in numerous islands, it needs a bond of union to fortify all the elements of its prosperity and welfare; without such a bond, division is imminent; from division to internal warfare, and from such strife to international strife is only a step. The Filipinos are by no means ignorant of this. Surrounded by countries with which they have not the least community of principles, and exposed constantly to foreign avarice, . . . to think of their emancipation under such circumstances would be suicidal." This is almost the same language as that of the Manila petition of 1888 for the expulsion of the friars (to be mentioned below); Del Pilar and Doroteo Cortes were its authors.

and particularly from Rizal's writings. Feeling ran high on both sides, and the truth is not to be obtained from detached selections, but from a careful survey of the whole literature of the times. We find Rizal in 1891 calmly weighing the possibilities of the Philippines being seized by any foreign power in case they should ever achieve their independence from Spain.¹ His first novel, "Noli Me Tangere," published in 1886, was the passionate cry of a Malay, who felt himself the equal of any white man, had so proved himself in the halls of learning, and was so received by the scholars whom he met in Germany, for a fair chance for his race. It was, as he said, an attempt to expose to the world the ills of his people, as the ancients "exposed on the steps of the temple their sick, that everyone who came to invoke the Divinity might propose them a remedy." What wonder, then, that indignation at the abuses his people suffered, when he had compared their backward state with that of other peoples, made this young crusader (then only twenty-five years old) set forth the Spaniards, friars, military men, and all, with somewhat of the bitterness of the zealot? Even then, "Noli Me Tangere" is most notable for its photographic reproductions of one phase after another of the life of the Filipinos, shown with all their weaknesses and their vices as well as from more agreeable viewpoints; in the same

¹ It is significant, however, that the article, which appeared in *La Solidaridad* for September 30, 1891, was entitled "The Philippines Within a Hundred Years." It may be of interest to know that, after presenting reasons why the colonizing nations of Europe would be fully occupied with Africa and would leave the Philippines to go their own course, he weighs the possibility of the United States interfering, and says: "Perhaps the great American Republic, whose interests are in the Pacific [Rizal had recently returned from a visit to the Philippines, going back to Europe via Japan and the United States], and which has no share in the spoils of Africa, may sometime think of possessions beyond the seas. It is not impossible, for the example is contagious, covetousness and ambition are vices of the strong, and Harrison showed something of this disposition during the Samoan question. But the Panama Canal is not opened, nor have the States a plethora of inhabitants in their own territory; and, supposing they should openly make the attempt, the European powers, knowing well that the appetite is stimulated by the first mouthfuls, would not leave them free to pursue this course. North America would be a too troublesome rival, if it once took up the career. Besides, it is against her traditions."

prologue, he had said : " I will lift part of the veil that covers the sore, sacrificing everything to truth, even self-love itself, for, as a son of thine, I suffer also from thy defects and weaknesses." ¹ And " *El Filibusterismo*," published in Ghent in 1891 (written in Biarritz, Paris, Brussels, and Ghent), much the stronger of his two novels as a piece of political writing, though not equal to " *Noli Me Tangere* " as a piece of literature, is less vindictive against Spanish institutions, and shows the maturer judgment of the author as to the necessity for his people to remain yet awhile in leading-strings. This is, in fact, the theme of the story. And in general, in everything that Rizal wrote there stands out preëminently the preacher to his people, seeking to arouse them to an appreciation of their shortcomings and defects. He saw that there must be self-reliance on the part of the individual before there could be independence for the nation. Again and again do such thoughts as these come out : " The Filipinos seem not to know that triumph is born of strife, that happiness is the flower of many sufferings and privations, and that every redemption presupposes martyrdom and sacrifices ; they think that, with lamenting, with folding the arms and letting things take their course, they have fulfilled their duty. . . . As for the fatherland, every Filipino thinks: Let it take care of itself, let it save itself, let it protest, let it strive ; I do not have to trouble myself, it does not depend on me to arrange affairs ; I have enough to do with my own interests, my passions and my caprices ; let others pull the chestnut out of the fire, then it will be time for us all to eat it." ²

¹ The title *Noli Me Tangere*, translated from the Latin as " Don't touch me," has been given various meanings in the United States, generally being supposed to refer to the attitude of the friars. In Spanish, however, *nolimetangere*, written as one word, signifies a malignant ulcer ; this meaning, taken together with the above quotation from its prologue, shows that Rizal had in mind his own people's condition as the subject about which his book was primarily written.

² An " adaptation " of *Noli Me Tangere*, reduced to more than half, probably translated from the French version (which, apparently, is all Sir Hugh Clifford ever saw), and with even the name changed to *The Eagle's Flight*, was brought out in New York in 1901. Its garbling of this exposition of the Filipino cause

It was late in the history of the propaganda before it was actively carried on in the Philippines. Everything published in Spain or elsewhere reached the islands and circulated secretly, but many things that could be said or printed in Spain would not have been tolerated in the islands. In 1888, during an interregnum in government before the arrival of Weyler, and while José Centeno, the Liberal official whose work in geology has been noted, was acting civil governor of Manila, there was a public demonstration against the friars, an indiscriminate gathering of natives marching to Centeno's residence and presenting a petition addressed to the governor-general and asking the removal of the friars and the secularization of the curacies, also attacking directly Archbishop Pedro Paya, who had recently clashed with the Liberals then in the chief executive posts on several matters of administration. Some eight hundred signers were obtained, nearly all obscure or ignorant persons; the men of standing and education who were back of it were afraid to affix their names for fear of proscription, and the very man who wrote most of it, a wealthy *mestizo*, afterward deported under an order also confiscating his property, did not sign it. The hue and cry raised over this incident, and the scandal that was made of it by the friars, show how rare and dangerous a thing it was felt to be.¹

almost amounts to sacrilege. Still stronger words are to be used about a "translation" of the novel put forth under the name of Henry Gannett in 1900. Reprints of these novels in the Spanish, the first, by the way, ever issued in the Philippines, were brought out in Manila after American occupation began, *Noli Me Tangere* in 1899 and *El Filibusterismo* in 1900. Several editions of the former have appeared in Spain. Miscellaneous poetical, political, historical, and scientific writings of Rizal, some of them still in manuscript, have yet to be collected and published together. Nearly everything he wrote is worthy of reproduction to-day.

¹ This petition (possibly with some changes) was printed in a pamphlet entitled "Long live Spain! Long live the Queen! Long live the Army! Away with the friars!" brought out by the propagandists at Hongkong the same year (see nos. 1597 and 2807 of Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca Filipina*). The document as printed in that pamphlet is reproduced in Marcelo del Pilar's *Soberanía monacal* (Manila edition, pp. 54-63), which pamphlet is made up mostly of the various episodes occurring just prior to Del Pilar's removal to Spain and leading up to the petition and public demonstration. These were, principally: an earlier protest of various Filipino local officials against Archbishop Paya for failing to attend the funeral

In 1891, differences having arisen among the propagandists, the factions grouping more particularly about Del Pilar and Rizal, — the weakness of every Filipino movement, good or services for Alfonso XII, presumably on account of their being organized by the Liberal officials; the archbishop's action in limiting the 1888 celebration of St. Andrew's Day (anniversary of the defeat of the Chinese pirate Li-Ma-Hong in 1574) to the Spanish walled town, connected also with the trouble over the celebration of *La fiesta naval* in Binondo and the manifestation by Filipino officers of certain *barrios* of Manila of hostility toward the friars; the refusal of the officers of certain Bulakán towns to submit to the dictation of the friar curates in matters of local administration; the demonstrations of Laguna tenants of the Dominicans against the raising of rents, etc. These almost unprecedented instances of defiance of the friars and the display of a new spirit of independence in some few of the Filipino communities were charged by the religious orders and their organs to the openly anti-friar attitude of Centeno, and particularly of his immediate superior, Quiroga Ballesteros, director-general of civil administration. It had all come to a head in the order of the latter forbidding the exposure of corpses in the churches (a prolific source of burial fees), ostensibly upon sanitary grounds alone. The archbishop, in a circular to the parish priests of October 28, 1887, virtually set at naught the order of the civil authorities, though in form pretending compliance with the instructions of Quiroga. Again, the latter took measures to have the proposed orphan asylum and trade school near Manila become a Government institution purely, the Augustinians rejecting the conditions imposed upon them for the trust. A speedy change of administration, bringing General Weyler as governor-general, resulted in the downfall of Quiroga, Centeno, and other officials *non gratos* to the friars. An analysis of the petition of 1888 and of its signers, with a diatribe against the whole anti-friar movement, comprises the second part of W. E. Retana's *Avisos y profecías* (Madrid, 1892). Retana was an industrious and fairly accurate Philippine bibliographer, but as a political writer he was, as a Filipino has put it, a "veritable calamity." Other Filipinos, and Spaniards as well, do not treat him so charitably, but openly charge him with having been a hireling of the friars, during the latter part of his stay in the Philippines (when he had special favors from the orders), during his term as deputy to the Cortes (as a representative of one of the districts of Cuba, under the administration of Weyler, to whose influence he owed his selection for this post, and whose defender and "press-agent" he was during the last few years prior to the war between the United States and Spain), and during his editorship of *La Política de España en Filipinas*, the organ of the *ancien régime*, published at Madrid from 1891 to 1898. Retana is now writing on another tack, is reported to have severed all connection with the orders, and seems to have lost his old sympathy for them. His chief associate on *La Política* was Pablo Feced, who under the pseudonym of "Quiquiap" wrote any amount of contributions to the press of Manila and Spain, and a number of pamphlets, during the closing years of Spanish rule in the Philippines, always treating the Filipinos as a race essentially and permanently inferior, and sometimes displaying great bitterness toward them. He, even more than Retana, deserves credit for having sowed the seeds of discord between the two peoples; yet his writings, mainly economical (and displaying great ignorance of economic principles, as well as of the things about which he wrote), and devoted especially to his chief hobby, the colonization of Mindanau by Spaniards, are entirely unimportant.

bad, lies in the jealousies that invariably arise between its leaders,—the latter set out for Hongkong, where he organized the first branch of his *Liga Filipina*, and projected a return to his home.¹ He seems to have had a fleeting notion of getting together a colony of family and friends and emigrating with them to English territory in North Borneo. The governor-general in Manila at the time, however, was Don Emilio Despujols, a military man of an old family, but with democratic tendencies and personally very popular with the Filipinos. Through the Spanish consul-general at Hongkong, he had replied in a friendly way to Rizal's letters offering his services in aid of the Spanish Government in the islands, as well as suggesting the colonization project; and Rizal decided to return to the islands in June, 1892. The troubles upon the Kalamba friar estate were then acute, and various of Rizal's relatives and friends had been deported, while his father and three sisters were under sentence of deportation; and the result of Rizal's first interview with Despujols was a pardon for them.² The mili-

¹ He had been home in 1887-88, but Weyler was just then coming into power and trouble was brewing on the friar estates where his parents and neighbors lived, so he was thought to be putting himself in jeopardy. It was then that he had gone to London, via Japan and America, and undertaken as his first work the editing of a new Spanish edition of Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, published in Mexico in 1609, of which an English edition had appeared in London in 1868 (Hakluyt Society, translation of Henry E. J. Stanley), but which was almost unknown to Spaniards and Filipinos. In annotating this work, Rizal himself went to extremes in virtually claiming that the Filipinos had under the Spanish rule *retrograded* from their state in Morga's times.

² For the protest of the Kalamba tenants of the Dominicans in 1887-88, see *La Soberania monacal*, pp. 64-66. These demonstrations of a more independent spirit in Kalamba were ascribed by the friars to Rizal's influence, just as Marcelo del Pilar was felt to have been chiefly instrumental in the similar manifestations of his neighbors of Malolos—doubtless correctly in both cases. For a one-sided account of the popular disturbances on the Kalamba friar estate in 1891 (for which Weyler deported twenty-five natives), see *La Política de España en Filipinas*, supplement to issue of February 16, 1892. A letter from Rizal to his parents, written from Hongkong on June 20, just before sailing for Manila, shows that he had no illusions as to the risk he was taking: "The love I have always had and professed for you was what led me to take this step, which only the future can say is or is not wise. . . . I know I have made you suffer much, but I do not repent of what I have done; if I had to begin over, I should do just what I have done; for it is my duty. I set out gladly to expose myself to danger, not as if in expiation of

tary police, the ostentatiously "patriotic" Spanish newspapers, and the friar circles of Manila had been in a turmoil of indignation from the moment it was announced that Rizal was to return ; and the enthusiastic greeting he received from his fellow-countrymen added fuel to the fire. A few days after arriving, Rizal assembled a large crowd of Filipinos of nearly all conditions of life at the house of a prominent Chinese half-caste merchant, for the purpose of organizing the *Liga Filipina* on native soil. No particular pains were taken to surround the meeting with secrecy, and the aims of the league, as presented in writing by Rizal, were to conduct a campaign, through papers, pamphlets, etc., for the advancement and increase in culture of the people, for more liberal political institutions and improved educational facilities, and, as one of the specific means to securing all these ends, to organize coöperative Filipino commercial associations, establish foundries, machine-shops, etc., and in general endeavor to capture for the native element a more respectable share in the increasing commerce and industry of the archipelago.¹ Governor-General Despujols,

my faults (as in this respect, I do not think I have committed any), but to crown my work and to testify with my example to what I have always preached. A man should die for his duty and his convictions. I sustain all the ideas I have expressed relative to the present state and the future of my country, and I will gladly die for it, and even more in order to obtain for you justice and tranquillity. . . . Who am I ? A man alone, almost without family, sufficiently undeceived as to life. I have suffered many deceptions, and the future is dark, and will be very dark, if not illumined by the light, the aurora of my native land, while there are many beings who, full of hopes and dreams, may perchance be allowed to live happily after my death ; for I expect that then my enemies will be satisfied and will no longer pursue so many innocent people. . . . If fate is adverse to me, know all that I shall die happy, feeling that with my death I am to obtain for them the cessation of all their bitternesses." A copy of this letter is in the writer's possession. This and other data as to Rizal's career may be obtained from the special numbers of the Manila newspapers *El Renacimiento* and *La Democracia* of December 30, 1901, the occasion of the first formal celebration in Manila of his death.

¹ The connection of the Chinese-Filipinos, who are almost the only element of native origin and associations which has successfully made a showing in the modern commercial expansion of the Philippines, was of course inevitable. The aims of the *Liga* have been made public almost exclusively by Spanish writers, officials or others, who desired to make it out as a direct assault upon the sovereignty of Spain. To this end the testimony taken from those charged with complicity in the

suspicious of Rizal from the first, through the Spaniard's exaggerated resentment toward any one who speaks in a way at all derogatory of his country, let his good faith be easily imposed upon by those who were interested in seeing Rizal removed, or else seized the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the Spanish element which had been so harshly criticizing his efforts at conciliation of the Filipinos as a "policy of weakness." On July 7, when Rizal had been in the city scarcely ten days, he ordered him and a dozen of his intimates deported to the southern islands, Rizal being sent to Dapitan, a scantily populated district of Bisayans on the northwest coast of Mindanau.¹

revolt of 1896 was directed so far as possible; the means employed involved sometimes the torture of the accused by the secret police, and sometimes, it is to be feared, manipulation of the records. Unquestionably, the aims above outlined looked for the fitting of the country for possible independence, and unquestionably many Filipinos cherished that ideal, not a few of them hoping to see it realized much earlier than did Rizal. But that the *Liga Filipina* was organized as a direct campaign for independence is a charge brought forward afterward, with a very definite purpose, by Rizal's enemies.

¹ The decree of deportation was published in the *Gaceta de Manila* (the official gazette) on July 7, 1892. See also *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. II, pp. 223-24, for the full text (and following pages for extracts from the contemporary press of Manila and Spain on the episode and accounts of Rizal's movements during his few days of liberty in the Philippines). Apparently, it was not desired to try the issue of Rizal's alleged violation of law in the civil courts, or even in a summary military court, and the governor-general resorted to his discretionary power. The charges made against Rizal in this decree are: (1) That his baggage on arrival was found to contain leaflets, entitled "Poor Friars," satirizing the humility of the Filipino and attacking the religious orders; (2) that his novel *El Filibusterismo*, just beginning to circulate, was dedicated to the priests executed in 1872, and that on the title-page he had made his own a statement by Blumentritt that there was no salvation for the Filipinos except in separation from Spain [this was an outright distortion of Blumentritt's meaning]; (3) that he had attacked the Pope and the friars, and was plainly seeking to rob the Filipinos of their traditional religion; (4) that he had, by his proceedings since arrival, shown ingratitude for the lenient treatment of his father and his sisters, and had, when accused of bringing in the leaflets, sought to throw the blame on his sister. The decree is significant, first, for its absolute identification of the Government, even under the freer régime of Despujols (who was *persona non grata* to the friars), with the cause of the religious orders, and, second, because it makes no mention of the organization of the *Liga Filipina*, which was the handle his enemies had used in getting him deported, and which was afterward alleged to be sole and sufficient cause. As for the leaflets in his baggage, they were, at most, only seditious if an attack on the friars was deemed sedition. Moreover, the whole matter pertaining to them is shrouded in much mystery. Despujols took pains to say, as very likely he was led

The *Liga Filipina* died almost at its birth, though revived secretly during the following year ; but the cause it represented could not be smothered in such fashion, and Rizal's exile only served to excite the Filipinos to greater bitterness. After a lingering existence in secret for a year, the *Liga* was formally dissolved, and prominent and wealthy natives, principally Chinese half-castes and Tagalogs, but also a few Ilokans, Pampangans, Bikols, and Bisayans, pledged themselves to make stated contributions to carry on the contest (the *Compromisarios*). Almost at the same time, the Filipino agitation entered upon a new phase with the organization of a new secret society, in many respects distinct in membership and methods, and to a considerable degree distinct in its aims, from anything that had preceded it. This was the Katipunan.

to believe, that these leaflets were found on Rizal's arrival. The charge, however, was not brought forward till some few days afterward ; some Spanish writers who were then officially connected with affairs, say they were found in his baggage as he was setting out for Dapitan. The Filipinos always have believed that these leaflets were put in his baggage at the instigation of the friars, in the same way they claim that evidence was forged against Father Burgos in 1872.

The additional clauses of Despujols' decree of deportation deserve citation. They are: "(2) There is prohibited, if this had not already been done, the introduction and circulation in the archipelago of the works of the said author, as well as every proclamation or leaflet in which directly or indirectly the Catholic religion or the national unity is attacked ; (3) There is conceded a period of three days, beginning with the publication of this decree, in the provinces of Manila, Batangas, Bulakán, Cavite, Laguna, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlak ; of eight days in the other provinces of Luzon, and of fifteen days in the remaining islands, within which persons who have in their possession said books or proclamations may deliver them up to the local authorities. After said period, every one in whose possession any copy is found will be considered as disaffected, and treated as such."

CHAPTER III

REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN : A RACE WAR

BEFORE discussing the Katipunan,¹ about which more ridiculous, exaggerated, and often willfully false things have been written than about any other feature even of Philippine history, it is necessary to go back a little. First, it should be said that the Katipunan was not a Masonic organization, while yet Freemasonry, of a modified Spanish sort, prepared the way in the Philippines for the Katipunan. The Spanish grand lodges of Freemasons had installed branches in the Philippines as far back as the sixties. For twenty-five years those lodges were few in number and were organized in the commercial centers, numbering only Spaniards and other Europeans, with here and there a Spanish *mestizo* of prominence. At about the time the assimilation propaganda hitherto described had become well outlined, pressure was brought to bear upon the grand lodges of Spain to permit the organization of distinctively native lodges of masons in the islands. There was already a very close connection between the Freemasons of Spain and the Filipino propaganda.² The membership of the Spanish-Philippine Association of Madrid and of Barcelona, and of the Filipino club which had headquarters where "La Solidaridad" was printed,

¹ The full name of this society was *Ang Kataastaasan Kagalanggálang Katipúnang nang mánga Anak nang Bayan*, represented by the initials K. K. K. N. M. A. N. B. and meaning "The Supreme Worshipful Association (or *Junta*) of the Sons of the People."

² No one at all familiar with the history of Freemasonry in France and Spain from the beginnings of the French Revolution, needs to be told that, if not anti-Catholic, it has at least steadily conducted a propaganda in opposition to the assertion of secular power on the part of the Papacy and in opposition to the monastic orders. Freemasonry has been in those countries consistently and aggressively "Liberal."

was practically identical with that of certain Masonic lodges. The Spaniard at the head of a grand lodge of Madrid called the *Oriente Español*, Miguel Morayta, a Spanish Liberal, succeeded Del Pilar as editor of "La Solidaridad." There can be little doubt that the propagandists, the Spanish law of associations not having been extended to the Philippines, deliberately adopted the system of Masonic secret lodges as a means of carrying on their work in the islands. A "Grand Regional Lodge" was organized in Manila, and its workers were authorized to create subordinate lodges throughout the archipelago. One of these workers claimed to have organized such lodges of Filipinos from the Kagayan Valley on the north to the Spanish town of Joló on the south. There were a number of lodges in the Bisayas, and they were scattered all over Luzon, though the two hundred or more organized between 1890 and 1896 were mostly in the Tagalog provinces.¹

¹ Viriato Diaz-Perez, the son of a Spanish Liberal (a Philippine office-holder, who wrote various contributions to the press of Spain combating the pretensions of the friars), in his pamphlet *Los frailes de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1904), pp. 18-21, defends Masonry from having had any connection with the separatist or revolutionary programme in Spain, producing figures to show that just prior to the outbreak of the trouble in the islands the Masonic lodges there numbered 1214 Spaniards and 32 other Europeans as against 890 Filipinos, mostly half-castes, and that among the Spaniards and half-castes were many officials of the army who fought against the revolutionists. The figures here given referred mainly to the lodges organized in the Philippines as tributary to the "Grand Lodge of Spain," taking very little account of the more recent labors of the so-called *Oriente Español* under Morayta and the Filipinos who coöperated with him in Spain and in the Philippines. Some published articles by Spanish Masons seem to indicate that the "Grand Lodge of Spain" claimed to have the only authority to represent in Spain and the Spanish possessions the Freemasonry of England and Scotland and that the other grand lodge was deemed spurious, perhaps an offshoot merely of French Masonry. Both these grand lodges had opened the way for the entrance of Filipinos into the lodges in the Philippine archipelago from 1884 on; but it was only the organization under the *Oriente Español* which had connection, indirectly at least, with the political propaganda from about 1890 to 1895. The statistics given by V. Diaz-Perez are taken from an article contributed by Nicolas Diaz-Perez, his father, to *La Época*, Madrid, August 15, 1896, and vigorously combated at the time by the friar press, which, however, afterward tacitly acknowledged the non-complicity of the Grand Lodge of Madrid with the political agitation in the Philippines. From the friar point of view, the final chapter of Friar Edouardo Navarro's *Filipinas: Estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad* (Madrid, 1897) presents an arraignment of Masonry for all the ills of Spain during the nineteenth century.

Only slight familiarity with Filipino character and history is needed to comprehend how such a secret organization, with its signs, symbols, mysteries of initiation, etc., would, even were its special aims not at the time constantly in the minds of the Filipino leaders, spread with exceeding facility. It called into play certain characteristics and propensities for secret, one might almost say backhanded, procedure in which the Filipinos sometimes seem to revel. It may as readily be seen how the Katipunan, organized on similar lines, would spread among the masses, hitherto but little reached by the propaganda, with as great facility as Masonry had spread among the *principalía*. If allowed to work unhindered with the instruments of secrecy, mystery, and superstition, any fanatic or impostor can to-day speedily enroll half a province under his banner and levy contributions upon them. When one adds that, in the communities where the Katipunan was chiefly organized, the masses of the people were intensely aroused over the assertion of the friar administrators' right to collect rent from them and over the constant abuses of the civil guard, it is easily understood that the idea of a *popular* secret society on similar lines, so far as many of its forms were concerned, to the Masonic organization, and in which the initiates were made to understand that in some way they were to achieve their rights in opposition to the Spaniards, and in particular to the friars, was, to say the least, a practicable one. Whether, judged by the results, this method of organizing the masses and working them up to the pitch of frenzy, is to be deemed wholly timely, hence commendable and patriotic, is not a question for consideration here.

The idea was primarily, it is said, that of Marcelo del Pilar, with whose plans Rizal had to some extent disagreed.¹ Of these

¹ It is asserted also that there was a falling-out at Madrid over the administration of the funds sent from the Philippines by the committee of propaganda first organized. Financial difficulties and charges of dishonesty in this respect have been a close second to personal jealousies in disrupting all, or nearly all, distinctively Filipino movements.

two men, Del Pilar was somewhat the older and more matter-of-fact, if less brilliant and enthusiastic, and in general less impetuous and radical of utterance. Yet in this case, whether or no their differences arose from personal jealousy, when, as the more sane and far-seeing of the active propagandists, they should naturally have worked together, Del Pilar virtually put himself with the more intemperate and reckless agitators in proposing a "popular society," partly at least in opposition to the conservative proposals of the *Liga Filipina*. The charge that the whole propaganda from the first was a separatist movement has been much strengthened by the sayings and writings of some of these men, who were perhaps somewhat jealous of the prestige Rizal had gained in Europe as well as at home, and some of whom could not resign themselves to going as slowly as he felt was necessary, could not sow the seed and patiently wait for it to germinate. The Supreme Council of the Katipunan was organized in Manila in 1892, some say on the very day Rizal was deported. Middle-class natives of the capital figured in it, and the first president was a brother-in-law of Del Pilar. From the first, however, the most energetic spirit in it was Andres Bonifacio, who was employed as porter of the warehouse of a German firm in the Binondo district, and who, with a little education and reading, had become a sort of socialist, with a vague understanding of European anarchists' methods of propaganda. He gradually undermined the first president, and, finding the man he had substituted also not energetic enough to suit him, he put himself at the head of the organization by a sort of dictator's *coup*. In 1894 and 1895 the society took on, under his leadership, greatly renewed activity, and there are indications that its plans were altered to suit his more radical inclinations; at any rate, it was not, as a society, merely carried along by the current which was now bearing the Filipinos to a crisis. It is difficult to be precise as to the original aims of the Katipunan. The published writings on it, and the testimony before the

Spanish courts-martial of 1896, are to be viewed with great suspicion. It is perhaps safe to say that, as originally organized, the Katipunan was to carry on much the same sort of propaganda among the masses as the *Liga Filipina* had intended to conduct among the more intelligent classes. That the very condition of the Tagalog friar-hating masses, aroused by an agrarian grievance, was bound to lead such a society to more radical means and measures, even without a Bonifacio, is evident. And this is what had happened by 1895, aside from the fact that the upper classes of Filipinos, too, had by then been organized long enough to feel an impatience for definite accomplishments and a straining toward more radical action. It is charged, by rabid Spaniards, that the Katipunan was organized at the outset to stir the masses up to exterminate all whites in the islands, and that Rizal and such men as he were in sympathy with this programme, if not the inspirers of it. The latter accusation needs no refutation. There are stray bits of evidence that *extermination* had by 1895 come to be the preaching of the more bloodthirsty leaders like Bonifacio, imbued with the notion of repeating the scenes of the French Commune and achieving "liberty" at one stroke. With a populace like that which they set out to work upon, the more responsible leaders might have foreseen such an outcome from the start.

Rizal had at first lent his support to the organization, the prestige of his name in association with it as a silent sympathizer contributing to its extension, while letters from him and circulars over his *nom de plume* were secretly distributed in its behalf, though, so far as has appeared, there was nothing which indicated his having any direct connection with the society. But when Bonifacio sent an emissary to Dapitan to obtain his formal sanction to the idea of armed revolt, Rizal promptly stated that he could have nothing to do with any such project, that such a movement was premature; in short, that the path to follow, for the present at least, was that of evolution, not of revolution. Bonifacio was so enraged at this

direct blow to his plans that he suppressed Rizal's reply, and even represented him as being heart and soul with the idea of revolt.¹

¹ Pio Valenzuela, a tool of Bonifacio in various enterprises, was sent to Dapitan with two women ostensibly in need of Rizal's professional advice as an oculist. Though the Manila secret police got most anything out of him they desired to have him say in their various examinations he underwent after his arrest for complicity in the revolt of 1896, he declared, in one of the first of these examinations, that Rizal opposed the idea of Bonifacio to raise the people in revolt "so tenaciously, with so ill humor and with words so indicative of displeasure" that he came back to Manila the following day, instead of remaining in Dapitan a month as intended (this in May, 1896). In a later examination, one of the objects of which apparently was to get evidence against Rizal, Valenzuela's testimony was that Rizal replied when he had broached the plan: "No, no, no, a thousand times no!" citing some "philosophic principle to show him that what it was proposed to do was not advisable, for it would result to the prejudice of the Filipino people, with other reasons upon which he based his negative." (See Retana's *Archivo del bibliófilo filipino*, vol. III, pp. 226, 349.) It is said that steps were even taken by the plotters to secure a steamer at Singapore, to steal Rizal from Dapitan and carry him to Japan, where various Filipino propagandists had established themselves after Japan's defeat of China, partly in the hope of inducing Japan, as the rising representative of Oriental independence, to take up their cause. (Marcelo del Pilar was on the point of leaving Spain and going to join the committee in Yokohama when he died at Barcelona in 1896, just as premature death was claiming in another part of Spain Graciano Lopez Jaena, the chief Bisayan representative among the propagandists.) From Japan some few arms were secretly introduced into the Philippines in early 1896. The Filipinos in Japan claimed, in letters to their companions in Manila, to have obtained audiences with high officials of the Mikado's Empire; but there is not a scrap of evidence worthy of serious consideration going to show that the Japanese Government violated its obligations of neutrality toward Spain, or even indulged the thought of doing so. The excitement worked up over the matter in Spain, just following Japan's emergence into view as a naval power to be reckoned with, and again when the irresponsible talk of some of the more reckless Filipino plotters became known, seems ridiculous, when the stories sift down to a casual meeting in a Japanese bazaar in Manila between several officers of a Japanese cruiser and a few almost unknown Filipinos, who were later courteously thanked by the Japanese for the present of a few melons. It recalls the previous stories that the Germans were preparing to seize the Philippine archipelago, based on the troubles over Protestant missionaries in the Caroline Islands in 1885 and on the further fact that Rizal and other Filipinos had found a congenial atmosphere and friends in Germany; one finds also talk of the same sort as in 1904 about the "yellow peril" involved in Japan's career of martial history. The organ of the Katipunan, *Ang Kalayaan* (Tagalog for "liberty"), which printed one or perhaps two numbers in Tagalog at the beginning of 1896, bore on its date-line the address Yokohama, but was probably printed secretly in Manila. Part of the contents of the first number, translated into Spanish, are reproduced in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 134-48. The announcement of the editors contains the plain statement that the day for the "assimilation campaign" is past, is openly anti-Spanish in fact: "The expression 'Mother Spain' is no longer anything but

Unquestionably some of the more responsible and intelligent leaders of the propaganda were by this time imbued with the idea that the hour had come to rouse the people. Though this class had practically no active share in the management of the Katipunan organization, yet there were many wealthy half-castes, especially Chinese-Filipinos, who were contributing to the funds, aside from the real (one eighth of a peso) which each member of the popular branches was supposed to give. The number of lodges virtually corresponded with the number of towns in the Tagalog provinces of Manila, Morong, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Bulakán, and Nueva Écija, and in addition there were in some of the more populous *barrios* of towns in the environs of Manila lodges in which the male population of these *barrios* was mostly enrolled (also some few female lodges of "coadjutors," just as a few female Masonic lodges had formerly been organized). In the city of Manila itself, the native districts of Tondo, Trozo, Binondo, Kiapo, Santa Cruz, and Malate were quite effectively organized. The Katipunan itself remained throughout Spanish rule quite purely Tagalog, and may have numbered anywhere from 100,000 to 400,000 members, though probably nearer the former than the latter figure. Its organization was not yet completed in 1896, nor had its initiates in the mass been really enlightened as to just what their association was for, except perhaps in the older and more carefully established lodges, mostly inside the city of Manila or near it. Naturally, all sorts of rumors prevailed among these initiates, and, even had torture and threats not been resorted to, it would probably have been just as easy to elicit proofs of one sort and another that these ignorant members expected massacre, or supposed that when the signal was given, they

a bit of adulation . . . there is no such mother, and no such son; there is only a race that robs, a people that fattens on what is not its own . . .; there is hope in nothing but our own forces and the defense of ourselves." Yet the manifesto of "Dimas-alang" (Rizal), though presenting in allegory the awakening of his people by "Liberty," preaches mainly the need for an independence of spirit and a self-reliance on the part of the people themselves, and must be distorted to find anything countenancing immediate revolt.

were to cut the throats of every friar and of every Spaniard, man, woman, or child. Herein lay precisely the danger of such an organization, and it is small wonder if Spaniards in Manila and outlying towns, as rumors began to multiply of plots against them (the friars being busy at work extracting them from the women in the confessional), became uneasy and anxious, and the wildest sort of tales were afloat.¹

Rumors there were in plenty during all of 1896 up to the final *coup* in August. At one time they centered in Batangas province, where there were well-defined tales of secret gatherings and of cargoes of rifles to be landed from Yokohama and Hongkong.² Blanco, whom the friar organs excitedly accused of being a Mason, and who undoubtedly sympathized to some extent with the legitimate Filipino demands for reform, hesitated to take the harsh measures that were urged upon him; and he might well do so, for many of the Spanish military and other officials about him were not only as bloodthirsty as the

¹ The initiation rites of the Katipunan were various, but in all forms were calculated to be thoroughly awe-inspiring to the ordinary ignorant laborer. An invariable feature was the *pacto de sangre*, or blood-pact, wherein the blood was drawn from the initiate's arm and a certain scar made upon it. It was a revival of the old Malay custom, which Magellan had honored on arriving at Sebú, of two chiefs establishing a friendship by drawing blood from each other's arms, mixing it and drinking it. The initiation into the *Liga Filipina* had included the kissing of a skull as a part of the oath-ceremony. The oath of the Katipunan, it is to be noted, like the various other similar forms of it which have come to light both earlier and later, gives considerable weight to the accusation that the Katipunan was primarily an assassination-society. Its history shows that it unquestionably lent itself at times to such purposes. But the fact that the oath, which was in every sense calculated to bind the humble Filipino to awestruck obedience, provided for assassination, if required as a test of loyalty, does not necessarily prove that such was the prime purpose of the organization, nor does it authorize the charge that the society was bent on the extermination of Spaniards. We must judge the Katipunan, both when used against the Spaniards and against the Americans, by its deeds. They are bad enough, but do not warrant the sweeping charges that have been made against it.

² Governor-General Blanco ordered the deportation of some of the leading men of Batangas in April, 1896. Felipe Agoncillo, afterward representative of the Filipino revolutionary government in the United States, was one of them, but had friends in power in Manila, who gave him telegraphic warning in cipher, and he escaped to Japan, hidden, it is said, in the coal bunk of a Japanese steamer, and carrying 80,000 pesos collected in Batangas for the propaganda.

worst Katipuneros whom their imaginings depicted, but they were also in a state of nervousness and excitement which lent itself to denunciations upon the nearest rumor or upon imaginings. Some of the friars were not behind them in this respect, and seemed to think their chief function at the time was to depopulate their respective towns of about all the prominent and respected individuals of native blood who were in them. In the main, the principal activities of this sort were, for obvious reasons, in the environs of Manila;¹ but there were friar denunciations among the Bikols of Nueva Cáceres, the Ilokans of Union and North and South Ilokos provinces, the Pampangans, and in Sebú, Leite, Negros, Iloilo, Kapis and elsewhere in the Bisayas.² There were gross abuses in this connection, while at the same time it is not to be doubted that the old Masonic organizations in all these provinces were to some extent in touch with the new Katipunan organization in the Tagalog

¹ Malolos in Bulakán (Del Pilar's old home) continued to hold its place as a storm-center, the open independence with which the leading native residents defied the friar curates sent there between 1887 and 1896 being something new in Philippine history. In the fall of 1895, Blanco had been induced to deport to Mindanao its principal citizens, including the entire municipal council. He had done the same thing with the councilmen of Taal, Batangas, early in 1896. See Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda's *Defensa obligada* (Madrid, 1904), appendices 5, 6, and 7 for denunciations of the "work of Masonry" in Bulakán, Batangas, and Pampanga, addressed by the archbishop to Blanco between March, 1895, and April, 1896, and appendix 8 for a denunciation of the Katipunan propaganda in Manila's outskirts by one of his priests in June, 1896. The archbishop claims that the fact that the Roman Catholic is the established church in the Philippines requires the suppression of the "Masonic" propaganda, also insinuates that Blanco is a Mason.

² In the Ilokan provinces, the trouble was almost purely over the friar question; certain independent-minded native priests of that district were obnoxious to the bishop and the friars, and they were quite ready to believe them filibusters or anything else, only so they could get rid of them and of the wealthier natives who sympathized and worked with them. In Nueva Cáceres the most conspicuous native of the Camarines was dragged into jail, later on, charged with plotting to introduce arms there, the principal evidence against him being a confession by a fellow-conspirator alleged to have been made on board the steamer that bore prisoners from the Camarines to Manila, taken in irregular form before the vessel's crew, and under other suspicious circumstances (see no. 42 of *Documentos políticos de actualidad* in Retana's *Archivo*, vol. III); it is significant that he had refused to knuckle to the friars in small ways, and that one of the Spaniards who denounced him got himself appointed administrator of his estate after he was shot, and, it is said, enriched himself from it.

provinces. When it is estimated that the deportations under Blanco before the actual revolt began in August were in the neighborhood of four hundred, it may be imagined how busy the friars would have kept such a man as Weyler.

Whatever might have been the outcome, had things been allowed to drift longer in Manila, it is certain that the more radical of the Katipunan leaders were preparing to break the peace simultaneously at different points, when more arms had been obtained. Just how far they had planned out the future, in case of success, it is very difficult to say; though some among them had drawn up the list of men who were to form the "Ministry of the Philippine Republic." There was some indefinite talk of being able to obtain a protectorate from Japan, or even from Spain; but these half-formed projects only served to bring out the confused state of Filipino aspirations at the time. The Tagalog masses were imbued with the notion of getting rid of the friars, whereupon some sort of millennium might be expected to succeed, how it mattered not. Their legitimate leaders were divided in a dozen camps, some listening to the voice of caution that dictated doing nothing to endanger their personal safety, some over-consumed with ambition and ready to let the radicals of lower social status but with popular influence stir up the embers of conflagration, some merely waiting like the pure opportunists they were by instinct and training, some few urging patience and the necessity for the development of the people, while most of the distinctive conservatives among the Filipinos were not well aware of what was actually going on.

Conservative and radical alike were, however, soon to find themselves in the midst of the turmoil which followed upon the publication of the Katipunan plot discovered by Father Mariano Gil, the Augustinian curate of the Tondo parish of Manila. Working in conjunction with the civil guard of that district, the friar had been bringing the favorite instrument of the confessional to bear since early in August, with the result

that on the 19th he came out with the confession of one of Bonifacio's humbler co-workers, and with a most bloodthirsty tale of assassinations soon to have been perpetrated.¹ This was just when Blanco was being urged by the secret police and friars to take more active and radical measures of repression in Batangas. The case worked up by Father Gil was so substantiated by particulars that, although Blanco seems to have believed, both before and after this, that the proper way to deal with the critical situation was to minimize it, and that to take radical measures would unify the people, he felt himself obliged to yield to the pressure upon him. He telegraphed the home Government on August 21:—

Vast organization secret societies discovered, with anti-national tendencies. Twenty-two persons apprehended, including the Grand Orient. . . . Special judge will be designated for greater activity in proceedings.²

The last sentence contains a hint of the summary methods that were to be adopted in running down and dealing with the conspirators, through extraordinary military courts. These were organized immediately after the issuance of Blanco's decree of August 30 declaring a state of war to exist in Manila, Bulakán, Pampanga, Nueva Écija, Tarlak, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas provinces. Still, the governor-general coupled this declaration with the concession of forty-eight hours during

¹ The clue was said to have been obtained through the sister of this workman, a pupil at the time in one of the sisterhood schools. With her help, all the forces of religious superstition (and it may be forces of a more material sort) were brought to bear for several days to make the workman tell on his fellows and save himself. He was an employee in one of the Spanish printing-offices of Manila, where was found the lithographing-stone used to print Katipunan receipts, concealed by the workmen who were in the organization. It was claimed that many valuable and incriminating documents were found here and in the warehouse where Bonifacio worked, as well as in the private houses searched. If so, few of them have ever been made public. See the affidavit of Father Gil in December, 1896, no. 24, of *Documentos políticos de actualidad* (*Archivo del bibliófilo filipino*, vol. III). See also *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VI, pp. 275-308.

² For this and the subsequent messages and reports of Blanco and his successors throughout the revolution, also Spanish press dispatches and comments, see *La Política de España en Filipinas*, September 15, 1896, and succeeding numbers of 1896 and 1897.

which rebels who presented themselves to the authorities might secure a free pardon, except the chiefs, who should have a lesser degree of punishment in consequence of surrender. This decree shows how rapidly events had moved. Warned by friends, the Katipunan leaders had fled from Manila to the suburb of Kalookan (Bulakán province) early on August 22. In spite of the premature disclosure of their plans, Bonifacio insisted on armed resistance to the authorities, although some pointed out the folly of such an attempt with the few firearms they had yet obtained. He carried his point, it is said, in an assemblage of some hundreds in a *barrio* of Kalookan, and here, on the morning of August 26, was sounded the "cry of Balintawak," and a little band of native troops of the civil guard, under a Spanish lieutenant and two Spanish noncommissioned officers, were nearly captured by the masses of natives who surrounded them, armed almost exclusively with bolos.¹ It was late in the day before the little band, which had expended the last cartridge, had forced its way into Kalookan. The revolution was on. Word had been sent out by the leaders to raise the people simultaneously in the Tagalog provinces on August 30. In the mean time, a number of the hated Chinese were waylaid in the outskirts of Manila and assassinated. On the 30th, there were disturbances all around Manila. The waterworks were captured, but abandoned; an attempt was made to force entrance into the Sampalok suburb of Manila, but was frustrated by a detachment of the civil guard; on the south side of the river, the suburb of Pandakan rose almost *en masse*, and, the forces at the disposal of the authorities in the city being scanty, there was rioting there all day; across from Pandakan, on the north side, in a stubborn contest near San Juan del Monte about one hundred Filipinos were killed, and in hand-to-hand fighting twice that many prisoners were taken,

¹ According to the later testimony of one of Bonifacio's companions, they had only four revolvers and two disabled shotguns, to which they added later ten revolvers (*Archivo*, vol. III, p. 206).

of whom four leaders were summarily tried and condemned to be shot, fifty-three of their followers being executed with them the following day. The bands around Manila worked their way up the Pasig, and two thousand bolomen, with some few rifles among them, nearly captured the civil guard and Spanish authorities of the town of Pasig, besieging them in the tower of the church. Nearly all the towns of Cavite province rose on August 31, and, after more or less resistance, and with the more or less speedy desertion of the native troops of the civil guard's detachments, the petty officers of these detachments, the friars and the other Spaniards resident in the towns were in the hands of the rebels, everywhere outside the port of Cavite and its immediate environs. The Nueva Écija rising began on September 3, when the important town of San Isidro was attacked and besieged, its little garrison of native troops and the Spaniards therein being nearly captured before help arrived from Pampanga. Lesser disturbances happened in the towns of Laguna and Batangas, and the authorities asked themselves where next there would be call for troops.

It soon became evident, however, that, while there might be much sympathy with the revolutionary idea, also some active plotting, outside of the Tagalog provinces, there was nowhere else either the arms or the organization to make much trouble. Much was later to be made of the alleged plot to slaughter all Spaniards in the Camarines, but it was certainly magnified by the desires of the friars in Nueva Cáceres to get rid of several independent native priests and of other Spaniards to get rid of troublesome native rivals in business. The reign of terror and torture inaugurated in some of the Ilokan provinces, and the sending of leading men of Bigan to Manila in chains in November, had a good deal of the same element of ecclesiastical and business jealousy about it; the headquarters of tortures in Bigan was the seminary of the native priests, in charge of the Augustinians. Great alarm was caused in September by an outbreak in Passi, near Iloilo,

which was, however, put down by a small garrison of the civil guard. Nevertheless, Filipinos made prisoners under friar or military denunciation arrived at Manila at intervals during the next three months from Panai, Sebú, and Leite, and even from backward Bohol and Sámar. A small garrison of native troops in Mindanau and another in Joló, where a Katipunán lodge had been installed among the Tagalog *déportés* and troops, mutinied; but these were detached incidents.¹ It soon became evident that Cavite, whither Bonifacio had gone early in the campaign, and where several determined and energetic leaders like Aguinaldo had the people well organized, was the head and front of the rebellion. To the north of Manila, another energetic leader, Mariano Llanera, operating from Nueva Écija, kept the mountainous district where that province corners on Pampanga and Bulakán in his possession, and was capable of stirring up the towns far and wide whenever an opportunity presented itself. Farther east and on the north side of the Pasig, the difficult mountainous country of Morong and Manila provinces afforded excellent retreats for the small bands recruited from the towns of Manila's neighborhood, whose people were almost unanimously with the rebels. The masses had not been so well prepared in Laguna and Batangas, and geographical conditions gave them less opportunity for concerted action than they had in Cavite. Still, this whole country needed thorough policing, and many more troops, and some of the towns bordering on Cavite were in the insurgents' possession. Tayabas, also Tagalog, though somewhat removed, was disposed to revolt, and it was later found necessary to disarm the civil guard of the whole province. Bataan and Sambales, the former pure Tagalog, the latter partly so, were keen against the friars, and might pro-

¹ The troubles in Panai and Negros from October, 1896, to March, 1897, are reviewed in a pamphlet (*Comandancia general de Panay y Negros. Alteraciones de órden público*, etc.) published at Iloilo in 1897 by General Ricardo Monet, the Spanish officer in command there at the time. He magnifies their seriousness so as to enhance his own importance.

voke trouble at any time. Pampanga was, except in the north-east, quiet, and Tarlak, though ripe for trouble, was a little too far away from active operations to begin it alone.

Everywhere natives of position hastened to assure the Spanish authorities of their loyalty, this being almost as true in the Tagalog towns outside of Cavite as elsewhere in the islands. Some of these were mere sycophants, some (particularly in Pangasinan, Pampanga, Union, North Ilokos, and the Kagayan Valley) really meant it, and all without exception felt such a step to be necessary for their own safety, even where, in some few cases, the civil provincial governors were deservedly popular men. And, while it is beyond question that there was a general and a natural race-feeling of sympathy for the insurgents, it is also true that there was a very general feeling on the part of the more conservative and capable Filipinos, of practically all the educated men who ought in any national movement to be the leaders, that the revolt was wholly premature.¹

¹ Apolinario Mabini was, by disposition and the training of circumstances, as well as by his self-education, anything but a conservative. He was one of those arrested in the Manila police "reign of terror," being known to have been a *Liga Filipina* officer, and was avowedly spared deportation only on account of his paralysis. Yet Mabini wrote in his posthumously published memoirs: "I never had sufficient valor to disturb my countrymen so long as they preferred to live in tranquillity. I was an enthusiastic worker by the side of Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar, and others, who, after having opposed the evils which a discretionary and arbitrary administration imposed upon the Filipinos, asked of the Spanish Government that the Filipinos be made politically the same as a province of the Spanish Peninsula, for the very purpose of preventing it coming to pass that many Filipinos should seek in separation the remedy for those evils, through the organization of such a society as the Katipunan and an uprising like that in 1896. Knowing the calamities and miseries which always arise from the disturbance of public order, I was not a member of the Katipunan nor did I take part in the uprising. But when in 1898 I observed everywhere the unrest and indignation produced by the blind obstinacy of the Spanish Government and the cruelties with which it repaid the services of those who had shown it the dangers of bad administration of the Philippines and had offered plans for doing away with these, I saw the popular will clearly manifested and deemed it my duty to take up the revolutionary cause. . . ." The last sentence is significant as to the effect upon Filipinos of even the abortive revolt of 1896-97; it carried them far beyond any former position. The above is taken from a portion of the posthumous manuscript of Mabini, published after his death by *El Comercio*, Manila, July 29 and 30, 1903.

Whether Blanco's "policy of attraction" might have succeeded in consolidating the conservative and the cautious sufficiently to confine the revolt to certain well-defined places, then end it therein, as previous mutinies had been disposed of, or whether the time had gone by for unifying the Filipinos under Spain, can never be known of a certainty. Even had the Government not recalled him, the rabid savagery of the Spanish "patriots" in the islands, especially at Manila, where they controlled the newspaper press, and where the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the religious orders were heart and soul with them in the clamor against Blanco, would have frustrated his efforts. A few days after the revolt broke out, he asked for a thousand more troops from Spain. The Government sent two thousand, and, at the constant cry from the islands that Blanco underrated the gravity of the situation, it kept sending troops for four months.¹ When the trouble broke out, there were in Manila only about three hundred Spanish soldiers (artillerymen) and about 2500 native troops, whose loyalty was under suspicion from the outset. There were in all the

As for the unfortunately too small element of really capable and patriotic conservatives (men aspiring, as a rule, to eventual independence), it need not be said that, however much they might sympathize with their fellow-countrymen, they did not believe in the rebellion. The attitude of such men is well indicated in this extract from the personal letter of one of the most mature-minded and capable Filipinos, occupying one of the foremost positions, and who, it is to be said, has no personal grievance against the Spanish administration, which recognized and honored him: "I know and confess the many defects from which we Filipinos suffer, the effect in part of the wretched social education we have received. We have vegetated in a medium hardly propitious for the development of men of character and sincerity. . . . The remarkable thing is that, surrounded by an atmosphere both negative and lethal, some have succeeded in emerging with a decided aspiration to progress and culture, demonstrating in a certain degree that the race is susceptible of education and advancement." And even this Filipino, conservative and careful of speech, says of the friars that they "covered themselves with discredit and shame by their infamous and criminal acts, saving rare exceptions, and were the principal cause of the Filipinos rebelling against Spanish power, being hated and rejected by the immense majority of the country."

¹ When the first news of the outbreak came to Madrid, the "Spanish-Philippine Circle" was closed and its papers seized. Morayta and other Spaniards were for a time under arrest, but there was no case against them as instigators of rebellion in the islands.

archipelago hardly more than 1500 Spanish troops, several hundred being within comparatively easy reach of Manila, while the others were at posts in the Moro country and at the military government headquarters in the Bisayas. By January of 1897, about 26,000 troops, officers and men, most of the latter being stripling volunteers, enrolled as scouts, had been sent out from Spain.¹ There were upon the outbreak of the trouble about 14,000 native troops, regularly officered and incorporated into the army establishment of Spain; and there were over 4000 natives in the civil guard, the constabulary force, scattered throughout the provinces. The latter deserted or remained loyal, according to the stand taken by their communities; the early suspicion as to the loyalty of the native regiments was for a time laid at rest by their quite general steadfastness, and especially by the bravery of the 73d and 74th Regiments,² which bore the brunt of the fighting in Cavite. Blanco's request to organize Spanish volunteers in Manila had been favorably answered at the outset, and he was urged to follow it up elsewhere. The Makabebes of Pampanga were among the first provincial volunteers. The civil governors of the provinces in which martial law had been established were soon vying with each other as to which could send the largest contingent of half-caste and native volunteers, of contributions to purchase medical supplies, etc., and of horses to mount the "guerrillas," as they were called. Of course, this opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to Spain and relieve themselves of fear was hurriedly accepted by well-to-do natives everywhere, while

¹ See *La Política*, etc., vol. VI, p. 307 (figures from *El Imparcial*, Madrid, August 25, 1896), and vol. VII, p. 26 (figures from *La revista técnica de Infantería y Caballería* of December 15, 1896), the latter citation showing some 1500 Spaniards out of a total force of 19,000, including the civil guard, under arms at the time of the outbreak. Spain's military resources were at the time strained almost to their limit by the demands upon them from Cuba, and the raw recruits sent out to the distant Philippines were certainly no better equipped nor supplied, especially as regards medical and hospital facilities, than those sent to Cuba.

² During the "assimilation" campaign the native regiments of the Philippines were renumbered to correspond with their theoretical incorporation into the Peninsular army.

also there is no doubt that the provincial governors abused the chance circumstances gave them to wring contributions from the unwilling. Volunteers were supplied eventually from the Kagayan, the Ilokan, the Pangasinan, the Pampangan, and the Bikol provinces of Luzon. They principally guarded the lines around Manila, while the Spanish guerrillas of Manila, mounted on native ponies that were donated, made scouts into the outlying districts and policed the suburbs of Manila. No one might question the patriotism of these Spaniards, many of them of prominent position; but their organizations did a great deal of harm by their untempered zeal, their arrests and their vicious treatment of the natives, right and left. When the first troops arrived from Spain in October, their reception was literally delirious; and each subsequent expedition was given the extravagant sort of greeting in which Spanish patriotism revels, the ecclesiastics, from the archbishop down, taking a prominent part. One who saw how little was actually being accomplished outside, in spite of all this turmoil inside the city, might readily have assumed that the Spaniards proposed to frighten the Tagalogs to death with their street parades, pompous drills, banquets and bloodthirsty speeches.¹ The religious orders vied with each other and with the Spanish Casino and newspapers in feasting each succeeding consignment of troops in a way that must have seemed cruelty to them later, during the ill-fed days of their actual campaigning in the tropics.

Blanco sought to curtail Spanish excesses as well as to check the propaganda the Cavite leaders were continually conducting on the outside. The latter had circulated the report that the *cedula* tax was to be greatly increased and other burdens laid on the Filipino masses, and Blanco enjoined the provincial

¹ Blanco himself, like every Spaniard in high official position, had the manifesto habit. For the rabid speech of Rafael Comenge, president of the Spanish Casino, in which he called on the newly arrived troops to "Destroy! Kill! No pardon! . . . Wild beasts should be exterminated; weeds should be exterminated!" — see Foreman's *The Philippine Islands*, p. 549.

officials in a special circular to take pains to publish the falsehood of these charges, assuring the people that Spain would continue "her noble conduct of treating with affection her loyal sons." In another circular of October 11, he outlined his "policy of attraction." He considered the insurrection entirely localized, and that measures of rigor should give way to moderation in order to calm the disturbed people. Hence, he said to the provincial governors, "you will take care particularly not to order imprisonments unless they are justified by serious complication in the events now taking place or may lead to bringing out the causes of these events," in order to impress upon the people Spain's desire to be just and lenient with all not "actively or seriously implicated in the rebellion," and will employ all means possible to restore normal conditions and tranquillity.¹ Blanco's close friend, General Aquirre, was sent with newly arrived troops through the towns of Laguna and Batangas, not only to reassert Spanish authority in them, but to hold a series of banquets and balls, in which sentiments of friendship and accord were exchanged between Spaniards and Filipinos. The press censor made the Manila newspapers call the insurgents "bandits," and several "patriotic" demonstrations started by the press, including one for Father Gil, were suppressed. The feeling against Blanco waxed the stronger for these efforts at restraint.² It was complained that, instead

¹ This circular may be found in the *Archivo*, vol. III, pp. 367-69, and on p. 117 of *La Insurrección en Filipinas y Guerra Hispano-Americana* (Madrid, 1901), by Manuel Sastrón, for some years a subordinate official of Spain in the islands. This book is the most complete record of the insurrection and the war with the United States in the Philippines that has yet been issued in Spanish. It is, however, a mere string of chronicles excerpted from the newspapers of the time, together with various personal recollections of the garrulous author, who wastes many pages in supposedly patriotic outbursts and pro-friar screeds.

² Blanco refers to his critics when he says (*Memoria . . . dirigida al Senado acerca de los últimos sucesos ocurridos en la isla de Luzon*, Madrid, 1897, p. 68): "For certain people, the proofs of character and energy are afforded by executions to right and left, to the taste of the public, which is generally aroused by passion, when exactly the contrary is true: energy is shown by opposing all sorts of impositions and that one above all others. It is easy to order men shot; the difficult thing is to refrain from it."

of allowing the full penalty of confiscation of the property of rebels, as written into the Spanish civil law, to prevail, he had only ordered the property of those under condemnation by the military court to be seized and held by the Government and merely the *revenues* of such property to be confiscated. He had done this by military orders of embargo in September, organizing a board of administration of the property so seized.¹ High officials of the central Government were connected with this board, and not a few scandals were bruited about afterward with relation to the profits some of them derived from their position. So also very definite tales were told about this or that provincial official, or court-martial officer, who enriched himself during the pursuit that was conducted of nearly all the prominent wealthy half-castes. The scandal connected with the shooting of one of two brothers, prominent *mestizos* of Manila, while the other brother, who had been arrested first and had been repeatedly charged by those conducting the secret police investigations with having been back of the Katipunan plot to introduce arms, managed to get his release from Manila to go to Spain (leaving the boat at Singapore on the way), and was afterward warmly defended in the Cortes at Madrid.

From the moment it was announced in October that General Polavieja was coming out to assume command of the troops, it was assumed in the islands that, owing to Polavieja's high rank in the army, this meant Blanco's recall from the governor-generalship. That the latter did not really check the denunciations and deportations may be judged from the fact that nearly 1000 natives had, before he left, been shipped away to the Marianne Islands, and to the Spanish penal colonies near Africa, as many as 300 going in one boatload. A contingent sent to the Marianne Islands mutinied, and 100 of

¹ See T. H. Pardo de Tavera's bibliographic note on the decrees relative to embargo of property in his *Biblioteca Filipina*, p. 129. The property of fifty-two Filipinos had been embargoed up to November 25 (*La Politica*, vol. VII, pp. 36-37).

them were shot down in cold blood. The military prisons of Manila were crowded to suffocation, at one time over 4000 prisoners being held for trial as conspirators. In the mediæval dungeons of Fort Santiago and in other dungeons under the walls, into which the filthy water of the moat was brought by the tides, men died and were borne away almost by the cart-loads. There came a time in Manila, shortly after Polavieja took charge, when executions on the Luneta had grown so numerous and were felt, even by Polavieja, to be so demoralizing (though he assigned as his reason the desirability of having suspects tried in the provinces where the offenses were said to have been committed), that he put forth a special decree authorizing courts-martial under the brigade commanders. Before the military courts had got under way in Manila in September, thirteen men had been summarily arraigned, condemned, and executed in the town of Cavite (mostly middle-class natives, though two were wealthy proprietors), primarily upon the testimony furnished to the wife of the provincial governor by a Tagalog woman serving in her kitchen. Besides the 57 men captured in revolt and summarily executed on August 31, fully 500 arrests were made in Manila and its suburbs alone, following upon the denunciations of Father Gil.¹

It becomes important to know how far this retaliation by a

¹ This statement is found in an official report to the governor-general in October, 1898, by Olegario Diaz, a captain of the civil guard of Manila, having charge of the secret police investigations. This document is an interesting, though frequently inaccurate, statement of the whole history of Filipino propaganda down to the discovery of the Katipunan. It is reproduced in the *Archivo*, vol. III, pp. 412-41. An English version may be found in a cheap little pamphlet published in Manila in 1902, entitled *The Katipunan, or the Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*. It purports to be by one Arthur St. Clair; if such a person really exists, he is apparently one of the Englishmen and Americans of uncertain antecedents who have since 1898 been employed by the Spanish friars in Manila to conduct a propaganda in their behalf among the American colony and to present their version of Philippine history. "St. Clair" employs 275 out of the 335 pages of his pamphlet in abuse of the Filipinos and misinformation as to recent history; his so-called "annotations from Spanish state documents" are interesting mainly as showing how cheap an estimate the friars have put upon the intellect and judgment of the American people, when they seek to influence them by such balderdash.

supposedly highly civilized people upon a people whom they called downright savages was justified, if it could be justified at all, by Filipino barbarism. As stated, the first revelations as to the Katipunan plot in Manila had charged that it was a plot to assassinate all Spaniards, regardless of sex. Much testimony to support this charge was brought out during the military trials. The torture of witnesses and the whole conduct of these trials would, however, place under suspicion all evidence brought out therein. Probably it is fair to say that, for reasons hitherto outlined, a great many of the Katipunan rank and file had come to believe that the purpose of the organization was extermination of Spaniards, and it would seem that a few of the more radical leaders were at least willing to have this idea disseminated. It is also to be said for the Spaniards in the islands that, almost without exception, they believed that themselves, their wives and children, as well as the friars, had been marked for slaughter with more or less barbarous and outrageous accompaniments. But, as time went by, and after the supposed plot for extermination was frustrated and the revolt assumed the form of a half-organized rebellion within fairly well-defined limits, both justice and common sense demanded that it be judged by its deeds rather than by rumors about its plans. Even then, there was enough about it to keep the Spaniards on their guard and to subject the so-called popular movement to the very severe censure of civilized men.

Aside from the repeated bits of testimony extracted during the trials to the effect that indiscriminate slaughter was planned, various documents are quoted to the same effect. The most quoted, and by far the most significant, if it is to be accepted as valid, is an alleged order of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, dated June 12, 1896, from which this clause is taken: "When once the signal of H. 2 Sep. is given, every brother will fulfill the duty which this Grand Regional Lodge [G. R. Log.] has imposed upon him, assassinating all the Spaniards, their wives and sons, without considerations of any

sort, whether relationship, friendship, gratitude, etc." Other clauses prescribe that, following the attack first upon the governor-general and others, the convents will be assaulted and their inmates beheaded, but the wealth in them is to be respected and taken charge of by committees; the following day the bodies are to be heaped up and buried in Bagumbayan field, and a monument in memory of independence will later be raised over them; the bodies of the friars shall not, however, be given sepulture, but shall be burned for their felonies; those who shrink from the tasks laid upon them "already know the tremendous punishment they will incur for disobedience and disloyalty." This document purports to be signed on the date stated, "in the first year of the much-desired independence of the Philippines," by Bolivar, President of the Executive Committee; Giordano Bruno, Grand Master, Adj.; and Galileo, the Grand Secretary. The very wording of this document is suspiciously like that of one that might be made up at the time to prod a court-martial, if not the Government at home, to severity. It has continually been cited in official documents and in private writings, but nowhere have its source and authority been given.¹

In general, the record of the revolutionists hardly bears out the declaration that, had not the plot been discovered in time, they would have sought to kill every Spaniard, if not every white, in Manila. The record is bad enough, to be sure. The

¹ It is given in full in Nozalea's *Defensa obligada*, appendix 9, as being taken "from newspapers," and in *Archivo*, vol. III, no. 19, of *Documentos políticos de actualidad*. (Other suspicious documents of this collection are nos. 16, 17, and 18, the source of which Retana does not give, as he does for other documents. Such a postscript as this reads as if inserted by some Spanish military prosecutor: "Be extremely careful, and, in case of surprise, make a thousand protests of loyalty to Spain: supreme hypocrisy, a great thing in these affairs.") It is given in part by M. Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 54; also in English, as an appendix to the pamphlet on *The Katipunan*, above cited, the author apparently obtaining this version from *El Katipunan ó el Filibusterismo en Filipinas*, by José M. del Castillo y Jimenez (Madrid, 1897), a book which, though much quoted as authority, contains no significant data not found elsewhere, and is virtually worthless because of its inaccuracies and Spanish rabidity.

Chinese, against whom a traditional hatred was directed, were slaughtered by several mobs in Bulakán. Here, too, in the first days of the revolt, several Europeans, including an Englishman who innocently strolled out to take photographs, were slaughtered in cold blood by the irresponsible and almost leaderless crowds. Again, during the first outbreaks in Cavite, the wrath of the bolo-bearing mobs was directed against the friar priests rather than against the subordinate officers of the civil guard who were captured by them, although there were two or three cases of massacre or outrage of lay Spaniards, men and women. Thirteen Recollects, seven of whom were lay-brothers managing the order's estates near Imus, were made away with; four of the number were parish priests who took refuge on the estate, which was the center of the popular outbreak in that part of Cavite, and there were two also who were killed at their posts in other parts of Cavite. Torture and barbarous treatment probably accompanied their deaths,¹ as also later the death of a Dominican, Father Piernavieja, who had a very bad record in Bulakán before he was transferred to Cavite to quiet the scandal, and who was forced by the rebels to set himself up as a mock-bishop of the revolution, but was afterward executed, charged with having communicated with Manila. Later on, when the Bataan mob was aroused, two priests were massacred there as the first actual sign of outbreak, and one was slain at the altar in Morong in December. Undoubtedly, a number of friars in Sambales only saved their lives by opportune flight. In the main, mistreatment of other Spaniards was confined to minor outrages, and in most cases they were simply detained as prisoners and forced to work on

¹ But the statement of Foreman, *op. cit.*, p. 419, that they were cut up piecemeal, burned or spitted in oil, etc., is not authenticated. These stories, and the reports of Father Piernavieja's death tied to a post, bareheaded, in the sun, and of the cutting off of Father David's head in Bataan province (see *La Política*, vol. VII, pp. 70-71) were rehearsed in great detail in the Manila correspondence of various newspapers of Spain. Later, they were admitted to have been exaggerations or falsehoods, Retana himself retracting them, along with his charge that a certain wealthy Filipino was president of the Katipunan (*ut supra*, pp. 280-84).

roads, trenches, etc., in the sun, a proceeding which highly delighted the sense of humor of the Tagalog masses (for reasons not altogether unapparent, in connection with the old forced-labor tax). As the rebel camps in Cavite approached more nearly something of an organized form, there was, so far at least as some of the leaders, and notably Aguinaldo, were concerned, a definite policy enjoined of treating the captured Spaniards more nearly as prisoners of war would be treated by a civilized power. On the whole, considering the feeling of the Tagalogs as to past grievances and the reports that came to them of the tortures and executions in Manila and of the indiscriminate slaughters and the abuses of the volunteer Spanish troops on their scouting trips, the record they made, except at the outset, in the treatment of their prisoners was rather better than it might have been expected to be. Their treatment of their own fellow-citizens, coercing the peaceful into revolt, forcing from them contributions far in excess of what they had ever paid to Spain, and condemning them to death right and left on the charge of treason, upon the sentences of summary military courts set up in imitation of the Spanish methods, was far more to be criticized, considering the aims which they alleged were theirs.

The military record of the Spaniards up to the time of Blanco's departure is neither extended nor notable. He had only troops enough to quell the first outbreaks around Manila and to the northward, and thereafter for several months to indulge in forays against the little guerrilla bands which kept the mountainous districts of Bulakán and Morong stirred up, besides dealing with more or less disorder in other Tagalog provinces. Cavite was, from the outset, lost to the Spaniards, except for the narrow peninsula on which lay the town of Cavite and the naval arsenal; on either side of this neck of ground, the rebels held territory well within the range of the navy's guns, including the home of the Aguinaldo family (Kawit, as the Tagalogs called it, Old Cavite, in Spanish

phraseology). Five expeditions, with 6000 troops, had arrived before November 7, on which day Blanco went in person to Cavite, to direct a double-column assault on the nearest rebel positions, whence they threatened the garrison in Cavite itself. The objective points were Binakayan to the east and Noveleta to the west of Old Cavite, both near the shore of the bay and approached from opposite sides of the Cavite peninsula. The column directed against Binakayan was composed of 1600 men, half of them natives, and, after the little navy gunboats had played at shelling the insurgent trenches, not dislodging the hordes hidden within them, a frontal attack was made. Spanish troops cannot be accused of lack of bravery, but this was poor warfare, and the taking of these trenches against hardly more than 100 riflemen and an indefinite number of bolomen cost the attacking army 70 officers and men. The mountain-guns supposed to have been ordered were not there, and the one old antiquated piece of artillery was almost as ridiculous as the native's bamboo cannon. The next day's advance on Old Cavite was a failure. The Filipinos are said to have shot nails, wire, etc., when they lacked proper ammunition for their miscellaneous arms. All the officers of the attacking column (which again went direct upon the intrenchments) and two thirds of one company of native troops were killed. Before the close of the day the Spaniards had to retreat in confusion upon Binakayan. Meanwhile, the movement on Noveleta had resulted even more ingloriously. Here more troops than at Binakayan, under the command of no less than a general of infantry and a colonel of marines, went in frontal attack against trenches flanked on one side by a deep creek, their approach proceeding up a narrow alley lined by impassable mangrove swamps and filled with pitfalls, when they might have flanked the rebel positions by marching or being ferried along the sandy beach. They lost 100 men in the ambushade and were out of ammunition by ten in the morning, losing another 100 men during their forced retreat to the

peninsula. The Spanish reports give the casualties in these two engagements as more than 500, which is probably a very considerable underestimate. Greater than the military effect of the failure to take Old Cavite and render the hold of the Spaniards upon the peninsula more secure was the moral effect of such a real victory upon the revolutionary masses. The young Aguinaldo, once merely a local Katipunan organizer, who had been steadily gaining in prestige since the outbreak in Cavite because of his activity as a local leader, was henceforth of wider reputation as the "great Tagalog general."¹

Camilo G. de Polavieja, a lieutenant-general of long standing in the Spanish army, who, besides military service in the Peninsula and in Africa, had put down the uprising in Cuba in 1890, arrived at the beginning of December. The Government expected Blanco to take the hint and resign, and a few days later it "authorized" him to return to Spain. He would not resign in the face of the enemy, and, after the bitter criticism to which he had been subjected, he undoubtedly desired to end the revolt on his own lines. But on December 9 the Queen Regent herself sent a cablegram saying: "I have just ap-

¹ Aguinaldo was, in 1896, but 27 years of age, fairly to be regarded as belonging to the small middle class which has been conspicuous for independent ideas in the Tagalog provinces. His father, a pure-blood Tagalog, had acquired some little real property, had been many times *gobernadorcillo* of Old Cavite, and seems, as far back as 1872, to have fallen under suspicion of the friars for his ideas, being under arrest then for a time. The mother of Aguinaldo is said to have some Chinese blood. There were four sons and several daughters. The family patrimony was not sufficient to keep Aguinaldo in the Jesuits' secondary school in Manila more than a short time, and to this day his writing of Spanish is very defective and his speech in it not easy. He had been chosen municipal captain of Old Cavite under the Maura law at a very early age, as such offices usually went in the Philippine towns. He was active in the Katipunan organization from the first, though not outside of his immediate locality. The civil guard were already under way to make arrests of suspects in Cavite, when, on August 31, 1896, he hastily gathered his followers, armed only with bolos, and captured and disarmed a little detachment of the native guards, in command of a Spanish sergeant. As in most cases in Cavite, probably the followers of the sergeant were ready to desert him; but the news that a native had "defeated and captured a Spanish officer" traveled far and rapidly in the province.

pointed you chief of my military household.”¹ Before he left on the 20th, he was given the pompous ceremonials of banquets, processions, etc., in which the Spaniard delights; but he departed a disappointed man, and left behind him an unsettled country, its jangling elements apprehensive of what was to come. Manila was like a huge Inquisition. Blanco had vowed the jeweled sword given him by the Ayuntamiento of Manila for his victories in the Moro regions of Mindanau in 1895 to the famous shrine of the Virgin of Peace and Good Voyage at Antipolo, a little town in the hills of Morong, less than ten miles from the town of Pasig on the river above Manila; but he could not at the time safely carry it there himself, and left it in the capital. Only a short time before Llanera’s men had derailed a train bearing Spanish troops on the railroad twenty miles north of Manila.

Polavieja had taken charge on December 13, with the customary “allocutions,” in this case stern addresses to the army and the people, in which he frankly identified himself with the religious orders. He promptly introduced the Cuban idea of reconcentration in the seven provinces surrounding the city of Manila, including Bataan (Bataan and Sambales had been put under martial law by Blanco before he left). In all the provinces under martial law, elections to fill the third part of the municipal councils under the Maura law were suspended, and the civil governors were instructed to appoint to the vacancies, “upon the recommendation of the parish priests.”

A. SPAIN STRANGLES THE APOSTLE OF FILIPINO PROGRESS

The one step that did more to alienate the Filipinos forever from Spain than perhaps all other circumstances united was to

¹ The active part taken by the religious orders in the agitation, both in Spain and the Philippines, for the removal of Blanco, is shown in this cablegram sent to Madrid for publication: “Hongkong, October 31. — Dominicans, Madrid: situation grows more grave. Revolt is spreading. Apathy of Blanco inexplicable. To remove the danger, an urgent necessity is the appointment of a chief. Opinion unanimous. — The Archbishop and Provincials.” (*La Política*, vol. VI, p. 430.)

mark the very beginning of Polavieja's command. José Rizal, who had started for Cuba to serve as a volunteer surgeon in the Spanish army, and who had been returned from Barcelona as a prisoner, upon the urgent representations of the military prosecutors, reached Manila on November 3, and had remained in prison since. Blanco was on record in a declaration of Rizal's innocence of complicity in the revolt, and could not consistently have pushed the charge of conspiracy against him, even had he been so disposed.¹ Under Polavieja, a military

¹ Data as to Blanco's relations with Rizal were contained in the special number of the Filipino newspaper *La Independencia* of December 30, 1898, in honor of Rizal, in the form of two letters from Rizal to Blumentritt, who sent copies of them to the *Malolos* journal. In the first, Rizal states that the idea of offering his services as a surgeon in Cuba had been suggested to him by a letter from Blumentritt himself, received at Dapitan in 1895, stating that there was a great lack of surgeons in Cuba; that he at once offered his services, but that months passed with no reply, and he had made other plans for work on a little hospital at Dapitan, when on July 30, 1896, he received a letter from General Blanco, which he quotes, and which states that the Government at Madrid "found no objection to his lending his services to the army" as a surgeon, and that, if he still desired to do so, the authorities at Dapitan were to give him a pass to Manila. He decided at once to change all his plans and go, "fearing they might attribute my refusal to another cause." (One wonders if, having been told of the plans of the Katipunan leaders for a rebellion, and understanding well its futility and inopportune-ness, Rizal had not found in this knowledge an additional reason for desiring to demonstrate to the Spanish Government his opposition to armed rebellion and for wishing to leave the Philippines at this time.) He arrived at Manila the 6th of August, just before the outbreak, and when things were much stirred up and the secret police busy. He says that, as the monthly mail-steamer had just left for Spain, he sent word to Blanco that he desired to isolate himself on board the steamer on which he came and to see only his family. Blanco sent him on the cruiser *Castilla*, off Cavite, where he was *incomunicado* when the outbreak came. His words are worth quoting:

"At this moment there occur the serious disturbances in Manila, disturbances which I lament, but which serve to demonstrate that I am not the one who is upsetting things, for my absolute innocence has been shown, as is seen in the two letters the general has given me for the Ministers of War and the Colonies, . . . as well as in the one to me."

The letters written by Blanco to Rizal and to Minister Azcárraga are quoted also by Foreman, *op. cit.*, p. 533. In the letter to Azcárraga, a duplicate of the one to the Minister to the Colonies, Blanco says: "His conduct during the four years he has been a déporté at Dapitan has been exemplary; and he is, in my judgment, so much the more worthy of pardon and benevolent treatment, in that he is in no way complicated in the attempt which we are just now deploring, neither in conspiracy nor in any of the secret societies that they have been getting up."

So, Rizal continues, he left Manila on September 3 "to win a name and put an

court was quickly convened on December 26 for the final hearing in the trial of Rizal on the charges of "rebellion, sedition, and illicit associations," the trial having thus far been conducted in secret, according to Spanish methods. The proceedings of this court, which was in session but a few hours, have never been promulgated, with the reasons of its members for the decision reached. The argument of the military advocate for the prosecution was the principal feature of the session. Spanish law does not provide for the confrontation of an accused with the witnesses against him, with opportunity for cross-examination, etc.; hence, allowing for the summary methods of every military court, Rizal may be said to have been tried in due legal form, though the manner of his conviction must be repugnant to the sense of justice of every American, accustomed to public trials, with a procedure open to objection and contest on the part of the accused at every stage. The nearest approach to verbal testimony in open court was when Rizal was allowed to say a few words in his own behalf. The prosecutor had put upon the records of the court a declaration taken according to Spanish legal requirements from Rizal himself, in the course of the *sumario*, or summary procedure preliminary to his arraignment on a formal charge; like all other bits of testimony in this and the other military trials, it was not a verbatim report, question and answer, but the examiner's minutes of the declaration of the prisoner, with the corresponding amount of garbling which such evidence regularly got in these trials. Rizal had denied forming the *Liga Filipina* for the

end to calumnies." The steamer stopped at several English ports en route, and he might have escaped, at least at Singapore. Before it had passed Suez, the elements in the Philippines which were determined on having his blood seem to have reached the authorities at Madrid, and the people on the boat knew that he was to be arrested on arrival at Barcelona, for Rizal states, writing to Blumentritt in the Mediterranean on September 28, that a passenger has told him so. In a burst of indignation, he thinks Blanco deceived him, and applies an epithet to the general, saying: "I am innocent and have no participation in the disorders, and I can swear it; and now, in pay, they send me to prison. . . . I cannot believe it; Spain cannot bear herself so infamously; but so they assure me on board."

purpose of achieving separation from Spain ; it was, he said, originally designed as a society to promote Filipino development, social and economical. From the time of his deportation in 1892, he declared, he had had nothing to do with this organization, nor had he been connected with the Katipunan, nor in any way coöperated with labors looking toward separation from Spain. To combat this declaration of Rizal's, itself stated in the most unfavorable way for the prisoner, the prosecutor produced the minutes of other declarations, made by prisoners directly implicated in the August revolt. Even taking these at their face value, they do not prove, at the worst, more than an assumed acquiescence by Rizal in the revolutionary propaganda subsequently to 1892, while they only point to the belief on the part of some witnesses that the *Liga Filipina* had been from its inception a revolutionary organization, not directly proving (at least, according to proper rules of evidences) that it was in fact a revolutionary organization. But, as has already been hinted, there are good reasons for not accepting such declarations, taken secretly in prison, almost certainly under threat of torture or after its actual application. In every case, too, the declarations of real significance as "proof" (according to Spanish legal requirements) were obtained from ignorant or pliable witnesses, willing to stretch a point here and there, perhaps, if there seemed a chance of saving their own lives or mitigating their punishments.¹ In

¹ Any impartial judge, reading these declarations, without the least knowledge as to the circumstances under which they were taken, would hesitate over accepting a single line of them. The possibility that these records were doctored in order to make the Katipunan's plans appear more barbarous even than they were, is one of which, as already seen, we may well have suspicions. There is also apparent, running through all those declarations that have been published, a persistent effort on the part of the military officers conducting the examinations to involve Rizal with the propaganda subsequent to 1892 and to implicate certain wealthy Filipinos whose property was under embargo with the Katipunan. Note especially, among *Documentos políticos de actualidad*, in the *Archivo*, vols. III and IV, the declarations of Villaruel, the tailor (no. 25) ; of a Spanish secret-police officer, allowed to testify, though he could not know it of his own knowledge, that the object of the Katipunan was to "assassinate all Spaniards" ; of a Filipino who at first denied all knowledge of the conspiracy, but two days later, being "better counseled,"

this manner, it was "proved" that the *Liga Filipina* had as its chief object the gathering of money to buy arms for a rebellion to secure independence; that the Katipunan was only an offshoot of the League, a means whereby the educated men of the League prepared the masses for rebellion; and that the aim of the Katipunan, which was thus held to be only one phase of a unified secret-society campaign, was to "assassinate all Spaniards" and proclaim independence. The links of clouded evidence and purely hearsay testimony were bound together by insinuations of the prosecutor — insinuations that were apparently given the full weight of established facts — into a chain of proof that Rizal had been a consistent rebel against Spain from the time of reading his first schoolboy's poem about a Filipino "fatherland" in literary exercises in the Jesuit academy of Manila until the day of the Katipunan outbreak, which was pictured as the result of his advice and his labors. The statement of one witness to the effect that Rizal had written from Hongkong in 1892 that the League was to "raise the arts and commerce, because the people, when rich and united, might obtain its liberty and even its independence," — hearsay evidence at most, and, under any fair interpretation, corroborating Rizal's own declaration — was held to prove the insincerity of his aims as avowed. More flagrant yet was the distortion of Rizal's position at Dapitan in counseling against Bonifacio's plan of revolt; that he had discouraged revolt was not admitted to his credit at all, his culpability being held to be increased by his having said that the Filipinos were not ready and had not the resources for a successful rebellion.¹ So

said a certain wealthy Filipino was to equip the rebels with arms, "according to what a woman in Ermita had told him" (no. 27); and the later declarations of Valenzuela, who had been a weakminded tool of Bonifacio.

¹ See the *Archivo*, vol. iv, pp. 226–27 (Document no. 92). Rizal's testimony, as presented in the words of the Spanish inquisitor, was that he told Bonifacio's emissary that "The time was not propitious, because the various elements of the Philippines were not united, and they had not arms, ships, money, education, and the elements essential for resistance; and that they ought to study the example of Cuba, where, notwithstanding that the insurgents had great means and the support of a

also, the very proclamation which he had written and offered to publish just as Polavieja came into power, strongly condemning the rebellion then under way and asking his fellow-countrymen in the Tagalog provinces to lay down their arms, was turned against him. Polavieja had pigeonholed it, upon the advice of a Spanish official of unpleasant memory in the Philippines, because it did not condemn for all future time the idea of independence from Spain; similarly, its phrases were twisted before the trial court into a declaration to the people: "Wait; be quiet now; and, when the time comes, I myself will lead you against Spain."¹ A great deal was made

great power, and were veterans in war, they were going to accomplish nothing." The prosecutor used this, it would appear from the Spanish press reports, as an argument aggravating Rizal's offense, because he had not protested against even the *idea* of revolt, but merely against revolt at that time as inopportune. In other words, in the case of a man on trial for the specific offense of inciting to rebellion, he was held not to be exculpated at all for having, as was admitted, advised strongly against this particular rebellion, but on the contrary to be additionally culpable for not having discountenanced the idea of revolt and of independence for all future time. This is a sufficient commentary upon Spanish fair play, and illustrates how the frankness and outspokenness of a man who did not hide his aims were turned against him. Rizal was really condemned for having dared to think and talk of a time, even in the indefinite future, when his countrymen might have an independent nationality.

¹ See *Archivo*, vol. iv, pp. 266-69 (Document no. 102) for this proclamation, signed by Rizal in his prison on December 15, 1897, and for Auditor Peña's recommendation adverse to its publication. Rizal said:—

Manifesto to Certain Filipinos.

COUNTRYMEN:—Upon my return from Spain, I have come to know that my name had been used among some who were in arms as a battle-cry. The news came to me as an unhappy surprise; but, thinking everything already over, I kept silent before a circumstance I regarded as impossible of setting right. Now I hear rumors that the disturbances continue; and, in case there are some who still continue to employ my name, either in bad or good faith, in order to remedy this abuse and undeceive the unwary I hasten to address you these lines, that the truth may be known. From the first that I had news of what was being planned, I opposed it, I fought against it, and I showed its absolute impossibility. This is the truth, and there still live the witnesses to what I say. I was convinced that the idea was in the highest degree absurd, and, what is worse, disastrous for us. I did more. When later on, in spite of my advice, the outbreak occurred, I spontaneously offered, not only my services, but my life, and my name as well, to be used in the manner they thought best for the purpose of stifling the rebellion; for, convinced of the evils that it was going to bring upon us, I considered myself fortunate if by means of any sort of sacrifice I might prevent such useless misfortunes. This also stands proved.

of the fact, as connecting Rizal in a guilty way with the Katipunan, that his portrait had been given the place of honor in its halls. The officer appointed military advocate for Rizal went through the forms of Spanish oratory in his behalf, but this speech did neither any good nor any harm, and probably was not intended to have any great effect. Nor, in the language of a Spanish correspondent, did the words of Rizal himself (who spoke with perfect composure, his arms still tied, as if the authorities obtained some childish pleasure from presenting him manacled) "have any effect whatever." He pointed out that the letters of his which had been presented were all prior to 1892; that he had planned a colonization of territory near Dapitan by his family and friends; that he might easily have escaped from Dapitan, or later from the steamer at Singapore, when on his way to Spain; cited his efforts to serve as a volunteer with the Spanish army in Cuba, and his attempts to employ his influence to prevent, and later to quell, the uprising in the Philippines; suggested the unwisdom of applying the same

Countrymen: — I have given proof, as much as has any, of desiring liberties for our country, and I continue to desire them. But I set down as the premise the education of the people, so that, through instruction and labor, it might come to possess its own personality, and might be worthy of those liberties. In my writings I have recommended study, and the civic virtues, without which there is no redemption. I have also written (and my words have been repeated) that reforms, to be fruitful, must come from *above*, and that those coming from *below* were only to be obtained in a manner such as would make them irregular and uncertain. Nourished upon these ideas, I cannot less than condemn, and I do condemn, that absurd and savage outbreak, plotted behind my back, which dishonors us Filipinos and discredits those who may speak in our behalf. I abominate its criminal proceedings, and I disown any sort of participation in it, deploring with all the sorrow of my heart the ignorant victims of deception. Return, then, to your houses, and may God pardon those who have acted in bad faith.

In the indorsement of Auditor Peña it is said: "With Rizal, the question is one of opportuneness, not of principles nor of purposes. His manifesto might be condensed into these words: 'In the face of the evidences of your defeat, lay down your arms, countrymen; afterward, I will lead you to the promised land.' It is of no benefit in behalf of peace, and it might nourish in future the spirit of rebellion; and on that account its publication is to be advised against. Instead, it might be well to forbid its publication and to send these records to the judge-advocate of the case being prosecuted against Rizal, to be added to those proceedings."

harsh treatment to those who desire to preserve Spanish sovereignty in the islands, though with administrative reforms, as to those who are out-and-out separatists; explicitly denied being guilty of any of the charges against him, or of having conspired against the Spanish Government; but recognized that the verdict was made up, and the die had been cast against him, when he said: "A victim is sought, and I am the one who is chosen to receive the whole blame." The members of the court reached their verdict in an hour and a half.¹

Word soon went about the city that Rizal was to die. The Jesuits, who had been his early teachers, and for whose efforts in behalf of education in the Philippines he had given them much praise in his writings, went to see him, finally induced him to have the sacraments administered, and, under the influence of the hour, obtained from him a statement which has been announced to be a retraction of all that he ever wrote.² He was shot at seven o'clock

¹ The more important of the Spanish press reports of the trial, reports badly garbled as well as abbreviated, are reproduced in the *Archivo*, vol. IV, pp. 218-47. Documents 90 to 105 inclusive are all Rizal documents, covering also the incidents connected with his execution, with several articles from friar-inspired sources on his life.

² This document, as subsequently given to the public, reads: "I declare myself Catholic, and in this Religion, in which I was born and reared, I wish to live and die. I retract with all my heart whatsoever there has been in my words, writings, publications, and conduct contrary to my quality as a son of the Catholic Church. I believe and profess what it teaches, and submit to what it commands. I abominate Masonry, as hostile to the Church and a society prohibited by the Church. The diocesan prelate, as the superior ecclesiastical authority, may make public this voluntary statement of mine, to repair the scandal my deeds may have caused, and that God and men may pardon me." (See *Archivo*, vol. IV, p. 342.) The document is really a revelation of how strong a hold the teachings and influence of childhood, more than ever in a land like the Philippines, have even upon a man with the mentality and the experience in life of Rizal, rather than a reliable indication that Rizal repented the general tendency of his writings as a whole. Unquestionably, too, as he grew older he felt that he had been unduly rabid in his youth, and became stronger in the belief that evolution, not revolution, was the proper pathway for his people. His letter to the archbishop in connection with this retraction (Nozaleda's *Defensa obligada*, appendix 12) shows that there was no real retraction of his maturer sentiments, on political matters, at least. The Jesuit fathers had surrounded him from the moment of his death sentence, working with him all through the night and into the following day, also running back and forth between the prison and the palace of the archbishop. For other retractions, especially those of the Luna brothers, see the *Archivo*, vol. IV, Documents nos. 106 to 116, and No-

on the morning of December 30, 1896, on the large field next the Luneta, before a gay crowd of Spanish army officers and civilians and their wives, and, not least conspicuous of all, of chattering, laughing friars. The night before, he had been married to his Irish sweetheart, had composed a poem of farewell in his cell, and had written thus to his "dearest friend," Ferdinand Blumentritt: "I am innocent of the crime of rebellion. I am going to die with a tranquil conscience."

This was not the first nor the last of such executions, but it was the beginning of the end of Spanish rule in the islands. Rizal represented all the poetry and imagination in the dawning national aspirations of a poetical people of the imaginative Orient. He was, besides, chief spokesman of the sterner judgment of the saner element among the people; and, variously as his ideas and aims were distorted among the masses, often to suit the purposes of leaders of a very different type, his name was a fetish among them. The shots, which he insisted upon meeting upon his feet, not kneeling, reverberated around the archipelago. Spain had almost unified the people against herself, and she would sooner or later have had to reckon with a very different sort of rebellion than the localized affair of 1896.

B. THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF 1897

Polavieja's plan at the outset of 1897 was first to quiet the insurgents in the Bulakán-Nueva Écija border on the north and the Laguna-Batangas mountains on the south, before opening directly on Cavite. His frequent movements against Llanera only succeeded in driving the northern rebels farther into the mountains, but surrenders in the Bulakán towns were frequent

zaleda, *op. cit.*, appendix 11, for Antonio Luna's letter to the archbishop. In view of the subsequent revolutionary record of Antonio Luna, as well as his declarations on political and religious matters both before and after this period of imprisonment, his attitude of abjectness and the plain hypocrisy of his retraction, with a view to pardon, which he and his brother secured, are of considerable interest in a personal way.

and Llanera felt called upon to threaten with the pain of death all who thus presented themselves. Aguinaldo, however, had himself taken the field on the east border of Cavite, and the 4000 men with him were only prevented by active work on the part of General Galbis from effecting a junction with Llanera, who simultaneously sought to capture Pasig, burning part of it; this effort, if successful, would promptly have raised the lake region against Spain, while the insurgents could have closed the river route above Manila. A group from Cavite also succeeded in arousing Sambales in February.

Early in February, Polavieja reorganized his troops. A division of three brigades under General Lachambre covered Laguna and Batangas and the borders of Cavite, with an independent brigade under Galbis scouting on the south of the river Pasig. General Zappino had a brigade, mostly of natives, constantly working over the mountains of Manila and Morong to the north and east of the city, to deal with Llanera and Torres. Polavieja himself took the field the middle of the month, initiating the campaign from the borders of the lake southwestward to Cavite, while Jaramillo, in command of the brigade to the southeast, was at work thence from Batangas into Cavite. The Spanish forces met with stubborn resistance. By this time the insurgents had north and east Cavite dug up with intrenchments as gophers burrow an alfalfa field. Primo de Rivera subsequently declared their intrenchments to be badly constructed, though well placed;¹ but at any rate they served to check the Spaniards more than once, when defended by a handful of rifles, though by mobs of men and boys. Time after time, the Spanish troops were sent against these series of trenches without any effort being made to reconnoiter or to flank them, until it seemed as if they had abandoned the most elemental principles of warfare to show contempt for

¹ They had been constructed in large part under the direction of a *mestizo* named Evangelista, who had studied engineering in Belgium and was called "General of Engineers."

their opponents. Polavieja's campaign was, however, much better conducted than the short and disastrous one of Blanco. His troops sometimes did flank, and they had, and used to more or less effect, a few pieces of artillery, mostly defective and cumbersome.¹ Lachambre directed in person the advance on the chief insurgent positions, beginning with Silang, where five hundred natives were slain. Aguinaldo himself opposed the Spanish general at the coveted post of Dasmariñas, with 5000 men under him.² Meanwhile, the troops from the lake and river southwestward had met really desperate resistance in obtaining control of the whole east bank of the Sapote River down to Manila Bay, having three captains and over 40 soldiers killed in one little engagement, which became a hand-to-hand fight. After he took Dasmariñas, reinforcements were brought up to Lachambre, and with some 15,000 men at his disposal, over half of them natives and volunteers, he captured the insurgents' chief stronghold, Imus, losing 100 men killed at the first set of trenches taken by the bayonet, and 150 in the

¹ Much of the Spaniards' cannonading, including that from the little gunboats used to batter the towns on the north shore of Cavite, was as ineffective (if not as noisy) as that of the mock guns the insurgents had made from iron pipes, and even from large pieces of bamboo wound with wire or iron bands.

² It is to be borne in mind, when insurgent numbers are given, that only a small fraction of them had practical firearms, most of them being armed with bolos, while ten men were ready to take up the rifle of one who fell. Primo de Rivera afterward declared that the total number of portable firearms they possessed had at no time exceeded 1500. This was an underestimate, as Primo de Rivera continually depreciated the insurrection in his reports to the home Government; but at any rate, Foreman's estimate of 7000 rifles is a great exaggeration, for that total could not be reached, if parlor rifles, shotguns, revolvers, and nondescript arms of all sorts were taken into account. Moreover, comparatively few new rifles were obtained from Japan or Hongkong before the insurrection began or during its continuance. *La Independencia*, November 16, 1898, contains a story about a shipment of rifles from Japan being landed at Naik in October, 1896. The Katipunan leaders, to encourage the Cavite masses to rise, circulated a proclamation that 40,000 arms had just been obtained. The Spanish in Manila, where the steamer crew were tried, thought that there were 3000 so landed. Most of the arms of the insurgents were at first in Cavite, and were obtained in large part by the desertions and captures of natives of the civil guard. The assortment thus obtained was nondescript, was patched out everywhere by the defective and archaic guns and revolvers which had been from time beyond reckoning in the hands of the ladrones who infested all the mountainous regions, and the ammunition was in large part home-made.

series of trenches just beyond, where 400 dead insurgents were left, among them Crispulo Aguinaldo, a brother of Emilio and a high officer in the insurgent organization. The town itself and its powder magazine were then fired by the insurgents and deserted. Lachambre sent men around to the west of the peninsula to take Noveleta, intending to move from both sides on Old Cavite. Bakoor was taken after a skirmish, but the troops on the left had some warm work around Santa Cruz and Noveleta. The latter taken, Old Cavite and Binakayan were occupied without resistance. The north line of the province was in Spanish possession, as well as the east, and, after seven months' rule from the military headquarters of Imus and Old Cavite, Aguinaldo had been ousted. He and nearly all the members of the Katipunan cabinet¹ had withdrawn to the southward to San Francisco de Malabon; but this place was already threatened by the advanced Spanish position and fell on April 6, after a brief but vigorous resistance in the last well-intrenched insurgent stronghold, the Spanish troops slaughtering 300 or 400 natives, most of them in cold blood with the bayonet. The remaining towns near by were promptly occupied without opposition.

General Polavieja had been cabling the Government for more soldiers to use in garrisoning thoroughly the disturbed country, desiring, it is said, as many as 15,000 fresh troops. The Government was fully engaged in Cuba, and had to refuse; and almost immediately thereafter Polavieja's request to come home because of a tropical liver (which had compelled his return from the field to Manila some time before), supported by the diagnoses of physicians, was granted. He left on April 15, and, during the ten days before the arrival of his successor, General Lachambre was governor-general.² In the four months of

¹ Paciano Rizal, brother of José, and the latter's wife, the former Miss Bracken, were also in the rebel camp, having worked through the Spanish lines shortly after the execution of José, and served to stimulate the masses.

² Lachambre is the one Spanish officer of rank who emerged from the Philippine campaign with credit. The campaign under him has been described by F. de

Polavieja's rule, the Spanish forces had lost in killed 20 officers (including one general) and over 300 soldiers, and in wounded 80 officers and 1200 men. Apparently, with the loss of its chief positions in Cavite, the insurrection was all but over; but Polavieja's demand for more troops, to supply the losses by sickness, etc., and to garrison the points widely separated, indicated that he regarded the attitude of the populace as still more than suspicious. With the taking of Imus, he had extended amnesty for a short space; and in Bulakán, Batangas, Laguna, and the occupied parts of Cavite the presentations soon mounted to 25,000. Scare-stories about uprisings in Manila ceased to circulate, though as late as February 25 there had been a mutiny of carabineers near the Bridge of Spain. The people around Kalibo, on the north coast of Panai, had recently effected an organization similar to the Katipunan, and had given the neighboring commands of the civil guard some trouble to suppress them; but this seemed to be a detached incident.

There were evidences from the outside that the insurrection had entered upon an agonic period. Bonifacio had, before the outbreak, shown himself to be a rule-or-ruin leader. As Aguinaldo's prestige and influence increased, Bonifacio's jealousy of him became that of a spoiled child. It was not lessened by his own failures as a military man, while Aguinaldo for some time seemed, to the uncritical populace, to be achieving wonders. Bonifacio, too, might well have found legiti-

Monteverde y Sedeno in *La División Lachambre* (Madrid, 1898). This is a record of the Polavieja régime in general, rather more to be relied upon than the personal records by Blanco and Primo de Rivera (in each case a *Memoria*, addressed to the Senate of Spain, published in Madrid in 1897 and 1898 respectively). In Major-General G. W. Davis's report on the division of the Philippines (*Reports of the War Department, 1903, vol. III*) is the only reasonably satisfactory abstract there is in English of the military operations of the Philippine insurrection during 1896-98, prepared by Major John S. Mallory. He depended to some extent on Monteverde y Sedeno, but principally on Sastrón, and had not seen the *memorias* of Blanco and Primo de Rivera; his errors are the errors of the Spanish writers, above all in their exaggeration of insurgent resources in order to excuse the Spanish blunders and incompetency.

mate cause for complaint in Aguinaldo's always noticeable disposition to put his own relatives and friends to the front.¹ Until some of the active participants come forward to tell the story accurately and fairly, it is impossible to say just what was the organization of the insurrection after the Katipunan headquarters were set up in Cavite in September, 1896. It was, at any rate, only a piece of provisional patchwork. Very soon, the Katipunan seems to have had two headquarters whence it issued commands of a military nature and also orders having to do with the civil organization of the towns occupied in Cavite. The Sangunian Magdalo had its seat at Imus, where Aguinaldo was supreme, and the Magdiwang at San Francisco de Malabon, where Bonifacio established himself. Part of the time each seems to have had a more or less complete cabinet. Cavite was divided into five military "zones" and the more distant parts of the province were recognized as practically under the dictatorship of appointed leaders, while Llanera and Torres operated quite independently to the north of Manila, though recognizing the authority of the Cavite councils.² Gradually, the military side of the organization became the stronger, as was inevitable under the circumstances. Aguinaldo came, almost by common consent, to be recognized as supreme in this respect, under the title of "Generalissimo." The jealousies between him and Bonifacio became more than ever acute when defeat followed defeat in March and April of 1897. At Aguinaldo's instigation, Bonifacio was seized, and

¹ The tax administration and three of the leading military positions in Cavite were at one time in the hands of the Aguinaldo family, aside from the position of "Generalissimo" itself and the other posts held by close friends and supporters of Aguinaldo.

² The chiefs of the rather cumbersome civil organization, so called, which was made up somewhat in imitation of the central government at Manila, were virtually figure-heads, especially when the military organization came to be better defined. They were, practically without exception, as were the military leaders, from the rising middle class which was being created by educational and commercial opportunities. The information about the insurgent organization of 1896-97 contained in Sawyer, Foreman, and the Spanish writers on the period is unreliable and incomplete.

later seems to have been tried and sentenced to death by one of the summary military courts he himself had been fond of employing. He disappeared on April 23, when the insurgents still remaining in ranks were seeking to strengthen themselves in southern Cavite.¹

The new governor-general, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte, Marqués de Estella, arrived on April 25, 1897. He was received with the usual great parade, the *Te Deum* in the cathedral, and the other stately formalities, coming down from mediæval times, which survived to the last in Manila. One of his first acts was the revival of Polavieja's amnesty, extending it to May 17, the King's birthday. He was afterwards to be harshly criticized both for underestimating the rebellion's strength and for undue leniency. The rebels also claimed later to have placed their hopes for reform upon his assumed attitude as well as his more or less definite promises. What his attitude really was, he himself has said, in his cable message to the Government at Madrid on November 27, 1897:

... There must be much thought given to the political and economic reforms, which should tend to assure the well-being of the native, or to guarantee him against abuses and clerical exactions, but at the same time to separate him from modern currents and principles, which, if they are the essential life of European societies, are the virus

¹ More or less mystery has surrounded his death, from the unwillingness of those who know the circumstances to talk about it, precisely as was the case in 1899, when Aguinaldo's rival in the opposition to the United States was assassinated. The Spanish version given by Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 274, is that Aguinaldo arrested Bonifacio in the midst of the personal rivalries between them, and, after he attempted to escape, organized a council of war to try him on various charges, one being his having executed on his own responsibility the friars Piernavieja (the whilom "bishop") and three Recollects, one of whom had been on very friendly terms with Aguinaldo. The manner of Bonifacio's death is also in doubt; some say he was thrown over a cliff. Apolinario Mabini, who was intimate with Aguinaldo's disposition and conduct, in 1898 and 1899 at least, wrote these words in the chapter of his posthumous memoirs which deals with Aguinaldo and Luna: "The death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly revealed the existence in Aguinaldo of an unrestrained ambition for power, and the personal enemies of Luna, by means of artful intrigues, exploited this weakness to ruin him [Luna]." (*El Comercio*, Manila, July 23, 1903.)

that is inoculated in colonies for the growth of ideas of separatism and ambition which revolutions originate.¹

The new captain-general (the *ex-officio* rank held in the Spanish army by the Philippine governor-general) took the field in person the first of May. He claims the credit of originating an "envolving" campaign which was to surround and crush the insurgents; but Polavieja had, before his departure, reorganized the army in separate brigades, with the apparent purpose of hemming in the enemy in the south and center of Cavite. At any rate, the plan was not a complete success. The insurgents fought briefly, then melted from sight, most of them returning to their homes under instructions to take advantage of the amnesty, the better-armed taking to more inaccessible regions. With the coöperation of the gunboats, the start was made at Naik, near the coast of West Cavite, where Aguinaldo himself put up a vigorous resistance, and most of the 400 insurgents killed were bayoneted.² The troops operating from the east were rapidly taking the southern towns of Cavite, meeting with considerable resistance at Indang. The troops immediately under the captain-general suffered nearly 150 casualties in taking Maragondon in a hand-to-hand fight with Aguinaldo and his men. But thereafter the insurgents promptly abandoned the three minor towns they still held, and the opposition seemed to have faded from sight. Primo de Rivera returned to Manila, and on May 17 extended the amnesty, which was producing surrenders in Cavite. Most of the garrisons in Cavite were abandoned almost as soon as established, and a few military centers were set up. It was the plan

¹ Quoted in his *Memoria dirigida al Senado* (Madrid, 1898), p. 87. He was then speaking to the Liberal Ministry, which had succeeded the Conservative Government under which he was sent out. The agreement of Biak-na-bató, to negotiate which the new ministry had asked him to remain, was about to be concluded.

² The 73d Regiment of natives was, as quite commonly, in the forefront of the Spanish attack. Primo de Rivera, *op. cit.*, p. 50, says: "This body has taken a most important part in all the combats during the war. In many, it has decided the result. They go into danger happily, as if death were not threatening; and when it arrives, they see it come without uttering a complaint, however great the sufferings that torment them."

to leave but a few soldiers from the Peninsula in the province, and the rest were being drawn rapidly to Manila. Circumstances combined to start an epidemic of desertions among the native regiments, which had fought so bravely, but were dissatisfied with their scant recognition and with their treatment. The Spanish staff organization and supply was wretchedly defective. Chinese coolies and the native *polistas* (men working out the labor-tax) had been employed to bear the provisions, for lack of wagon- or pack-trains; and at one time over 1000 native soldiers had been disarmed and set to packing provisions on their backs over a rough trail. It was necessary, unless the army supply should break down completely, even with the reduced number of posts, to connect them with military roads, Cavite being in large part without highways or anything but poor trails. When the native soldiers were set at roadmaking, they promptly began to desert in small parties, taking with them their rifles, to insure them a welcome among the insurgent bands operating as guerrillas on the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna mountainous border.

Guerrilla bands were also quite active in various portions of the provinces to the north and west of Manila, and actions in them and on the south were not infrequent during May and June, the most notable being the retaking of Talisay in Batangas, which the insurgent Malvar had held. Before he left, Polavieja had said: "Cavite is the scandal, but Bulakán is the danger." Though hemmed in and a fugitive, Aguinaldo was now absolutely supreme in command, but must make some stroke to retain his prestige; he decided to effect a juncture with Llanera and transfer the center of operations to Bulakán. On June 10, he crossed the Pasig River, less than ten miles from the walled city and perhaps in sight of the suburbs, joining the rebel band on Purai Mountain, in Manila province, though not, as supposed, taking part in the fight here four days later.¹ This was an ill-concerted action initiated by sub-

¹ Primo de Rivera says Aguinaldo had but a half-dozen companions. The for-

ordinate Spanish officers, one column failing to support the other, which in consequence went directly against unflanked trenches up a mountain-side and was compelled to retreat with serious loss. Aguinaldo now began to be called "President of the Revolutionary Government," but was virtually dictator. He deposed three members of the former cabinet, and appointed his close associate, Mariano Trias, "Vice-President," with command south of the Pasig. The Katipunan was kept up, at least in form, wherever it could serve a useful purpose, and a native priest was made president of it.¹

Primo de Rivera apparently believed in May and June that the final collapse had come, and his telegrams gave this impression in Spain. He extended absolute pardon to all minor offenders on June 18. Many of the *déportés* were being brought back, and on July 15 the embargo on their property was removed. Criticism of these measures by the Spaniards in Manila was as open as it dared to be. Before this, however, Primo de Rivera had checked his optimism, noting, as he remarks in a sort of bewildered fashion, that men surrendered for a time in numbers, but never brought arms with them. On July 2, he issued a proclamation of sterner tenor, strictly limiting the amnesty to July 10, and reviving the old custom of passports between towns and *barrios*.² Only 4000 presented themselves during July, practically all in one district. The new revolutionary organization in Bulakán had pulled itself together, and was sending out orders right and left. The rainy season had come on, and the young Spanish recruits,

mer's critics published in Spain the charge that Aguinaldo had 2000 armed men with him. Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 280, says there were 500 followers. They were doubtless few, as the main force with rifles, which it was desired to transfer to Bulakán, marched around the lake through Laguna and Morong provinces.

¹ In Cavite, the year before, the insurrection had had its "Chaplain of Forces," and one native priest for a time bore the title of "Philippine Bishop," it is said. The native priests took a much more prominent part in the revolutionary organization of 1898-1900.

² Considerable annoyance was constantly caused to the native tillers of the soil outside the towns by this system, and minor officers in local authority very commonly took advantage of it to collect bribes for their issuance of passports.

who had long before begun to collapse from their poor nourishment and lack of proper care while campaigning under a tropical sun, were dropping out all the time and having to be sent home. The strain on Spain's resources in Cuba was most severe, and, upon the authorization of the Cortes, a royal decree of June 28 announced the issuance of bonds to the amount of 40,000,000 Philippine dollars, at six per cent interest, payable in forty years, "with the special guarantee of the Philippine customs and the general guarantee of the nation."¹

To meet the changed conditions to the north of Manila, the Spanish forces there were reorganized and somewhat reinforced. By October, Primo de Rivera was feeling quite seriously the need for more troops. After what he had reported to Spain, he could not consistently ask that they be sent from there. His repeated requests for authority to enlist more native troops, mixing them into the regiments with the Spaniards to hold them more loyal, had not been granted, partly owing to the changes of administration going on in Spain. Hence he resorted to a new enlistment of volunteers in all parts of the archipelago, so-called local volunteers being recruited for police duty in and about their towns, the design being to release more regular troops for operations, while the "mobilized volunteers" were recruited to serve as auxiliaries for such operations. There seemed to be little trouble in obtaining such volunteers; oftentimes they were most easily secured in the towns nearest the rebel operations, as the people were beginning to feel seriously the strain and losses of constant guerrilla warfare in their territory, since they had to support and pay both sides all the time and frequently lose their crops as well. Attacks on the towns or outlying *barrios* were frequent; three times San

¹ This was, strictly speaking, the first Philippine public debt. (An effort to negotiate a Philippine loan of \$850,000 thirty years before had failed.) It afterward figured in the discussions of the peace commissions which negotiated the Treaty of Paris, and had an influence in connection with the payment of \$20,000,000 by the United States to Spain which has been generally overlooked in the discussions of the matter in the former country.

Rafael, in Bulakán, was attacked desperately and once nearly captured with the small garrison in it, while Aliaga, an important town in Nueva Écija, was barely saved by the arrival of reinforcements, after some of the Spaniards there had been captured and the little force driven into the church and convent. Guerrilla operations extended on the south into Tayabas, and on the north and west into Nueva Écija, Pangasinan and Sambales. On September 10, another alleged plot for a rising in Manila was uncovered, and a heliograph with which it was said the insurgents inside were communicating with Biak-nabató was captured. As many as 1500 men were at times engaged in these attacks on towns. San Pablo, Batangas, was only saved to the Spaniards by hand-to-hand fighting in the streets, as was Nerzagaray, Bulakán. In September, too, the almost isolated town of Baler, on the Pacific coast of Luzon, rose in mutiny, and the Spaniards there were only saved by the coöperation of men from two gunboats, who relieved the garrisons besieged in the church. Still, the principal nucleus of insurgents in the corners of Bulakán, Pampanga, Nueva Écija, and Tarlak provinces was gradually being driven from post to post in the mountains and hemmed in where it must make a final stand. The troops under General Monet were overworked, but quite generally successful from October on, though there was occasional encouragement to the insurgents from such a fiasco as that of the assault on Mount Kamansí (in the corners of Pampanga, Nueva Écija, and Tarlak) on November 28. The Spaniards did not reconnoiter, one column abandoned its flanking movement, and the other attempted to capture trenches by frontal assaults up a steep trail. After six repulses with severe loss, they brought up some artillery the next day and took the position, a little force of Makabebe volunteers distinguishing themselves. The insurgents were now confined practically to the mountains of northern Bulakán. They were driven from Mount Minuyan, and Aguinaldo joined the main contingent now left in the "impregnable" position of

Biak-na-bató. This was their last mountain stronghold, and their desperate efforts of a few preceding months to store this and the other posts with supplies from raids on the chief grain depots of the agricultural valleys had not been very successful. Primo de Rivera was planning a *trocha*, another feature adopted from Cuban warfare, to hem them in completely before the final attacks were made; ¹ and Archbishop Nozaleda, bringing pressure to bear through the friar priests of the Bulakán towns, promised him 20,000 natives to act as bearers of provisions for the final operations, as it was believed, of the campaign. But the blockhouses were never built, and General Monet was, to his great bewilderment, ordered on December 13 to cease all active operations. A new phase of the revolution was about to develop itself — the much-discussed “Peace of Biak-na-bató.”

C. A TRUCE BOUGHT FROM GUERRILLAS

No end of contradictory statements have been made about this curious agreement, sometimes called the “Treaty of Biak-na-bató,” both in Spain and in the Philippines; but it is principally in the United States that unwarranted deductions have been made with regard to it, based upon equally unauthorized premises. Some mystery does, indeed, surround its negotiation and, in minor particulars, its actual terms; but data have been all the time quite readily accessible wherefrom the more important facts about it could be derived. In the first place, it is to be said that no “treaty” was ever signed, and indeed that so far as regarded the chief Spanish authority concerned in the negotiation, he scarcely signed anything besides the checks to be given to the insurgents. In the second place, this representative deliberately and definitely refused to negotiate at all upon the basis of the demands for governmental reforms which

¹ For Primo de Rivera’s proclamation of November, 1897, establishing a form of “reconcentration” in the Tagalog provinces, to begin from December 14, see *La Política*, vol. VIII, pp. 4–5.

were at first outlined by the insurgents, and they, or at any rate their representative, acquiesced in this. Finally, it is impossible to say how far Primo de Rivera, who allowed it to be written down that the insurgents "confidently expect" that "Spain will satisfy the desires of the Filipino people" may have given warrant for the belief that certain reforms would be adopted, and above all, it is impossible to say how far the negotiator, Pedro A. Paterno, may have encouraged this belief in his representations to the insurgents. We are not able, on evidence now available, to give the lie direct to Aguinaldo, when he states that he and his associates were promised reforms. What may be affirmed without possibility of doubt, however, is that no formal engagement to this end was ever made, as he and they must have known; and the probabilities are that the whole arrangement was simply for the payment of a large sum of money by Spain to secure the absence from the islands of the disturbing leaders and the surrender of their arms.¹

According to a letter of General Primo de Rivera to the then President of the Spanish Cabinet, Señor Cánovas on August 4, 1897, the idea of procuring peace and tranquillity in

¹ The data whereby the story of the Biak-na-bató affair may be constructed with some approach to completeness are to be found in the following documents: The *Memoria* of Primo de Rivera, already cited, pp. 121-58; Manuel Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas y Guerra Hispano-Americana*, edition already cited, chapters v and vi; captured documents of Aguinaldo relating to this agreement, now in the possession of the War Department at Washington, translation of which appeared in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 35, part 6, pp. 6092-94; a brief statement by Aguinaldo in his *Reseña verídica de la revolución filipina* (Nueva Cáceres, Philippines, 1899), a translated version of which appears in the *Congressional Record*, pp. 440-45 of the appendix to vol. 35; and *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VII., pp. 552-56, and vol. VIII., pp. 7, 21-23, 45-49, 101-02. Foreman, *op. cit.*, pp. 557-60, gives the ridiculous letter which Paterno afterward wrote to Primo de Rivera plaintively demanding his "compensation," but Foreman apparently had not taken the trouble to read the *Memoria* of Primo de Rivera, in which this document is given, or he would not have made so many mistakes about the whole affair. The document which he quotes on pages 546-47 as the text of the agreement signed was read in the Spanish Cortes in June, 1898, by critics of Primo de Rivera, but is not the agreement as to the surrender that was finally signed, nor are its terms correct as to the money payments.

the islands by paying the insurgent leaders a round sum to surrender their arms and depart for Japan or Chinese ports had just been broached to him by Paterno.¹ The latter spoke ostensibly for himself alone, but had apparently felt his way with the insurgents on the matter, and probably, besides his strong desire to "figure," was inspired by some discussion among the various wealthy half-caste natives, of the desirability of inducing the more irreconcilable native element to abandon a useless struggle and use this action as a lever to obtain reforms from Spain. Before this letter reached Spain, Cánovas had been slain by an assassin, and the provisional cabinet, during its month or so of existence, did not reply to Primo de Rivera's recommendation that this way of ending the rebellion offered great economic advantages to Spain in the saving of troops and military operations. Meanwhile, Paterno was going back and forth between Manila and the rebel camp in Bulakán. The first reply which he brought from the insurgents on August 13 was a very great increase in the amount of money Paterno had named as necessary to procure peace, and also contained specific clauses as to reforms; namely: Expulsion of the friars; representation in the Cortes; equal rights under the laws for natives with Peninsulars; a share for the native in higher administration; tax-reform in their behalf; in connection with the secularization of the parishes, recognition of the native priests; individual rights, the right of association and the liberty of the press being named.² Primo de Rivera states, and the docu-

¹ There had been some informal talk of peace negotiations under Polavieja. See *La Política*, vol. VII, pp. 326-28, and vol. VIII, pp. 43-44. First, the Franciscans broached the matter to Aguinaldo, then the superior of the Jesuits. Aguinaldo said later that Polavieja failed to send his emissary to the place agreed upon (*ibid.*, p. 47); it does not appear, however, that Polavieja was directly concerned in the matter.

² These are the clauses which it has been repeatedly affirmed in the United States constituted the terms of the "Treaty of Biak-na-bató." They may be found complete in translated form in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6093; they are there inclosed in brackets, to indicate where Paterno crossed them out at the direction of Primo de Rivera, Paterno also making other changes calculated to eliminate from the document everything that might lend support to the charge

ments bear him out, that he absolutely refused to consider these demands; that he declared that Spain could never admit anything "which might affect her honor or her sovereignty, or involve compromises for the future"; that they would have to trust to the magnanimity of the Government, and that he could only employ his good offices to indicate such reforms as he thought were needed. There ensued a lull in the negotiations, but Paterno was actively traveling about between the rebel headquarters and Manila, going also to Cavite to interview leaders there, and holding gatherings in his house in the capital. He finally came again to the governor-general, and, the latter says, stated that the terms of the previous document represented "an aspiration which the rebels wished the government to take into account; *that they understood that the country was not sufficiently prepared for the transformation they desired.*" Primo de Rivera continues: "Pardon for the masses, the chiefs to depart in safety, and money, are what they desired, as Paterno repeatedly stated, and in return the factions were all to surrender their arms."¹

On October 4, the provisional ministry was succeeded by a Liberal Cabinet, with Sagasta as President and Moret as Minister for the Colonies.² Primo de Rivera, who had tendered that its being received and discussed by the governor-general constituted to that extent an obligation upon his government. Primo de Rivera, *op cit.*, p. 130, gives a summary of the same demands.

¹ Primo de Rivera, *op. cit.*, p. 131. The italics are those of the text.

² This was the administration which it was for a time hoped would bring about a peaceful settlement of the issues in Cuba, and under which the well-known autonomy programme for the latter island was adopted at the outset of 1898. The Filipinos had especial reasons for hoping to obtain concessions through Moret, as he had been a pronounced Liberal, had associated considerably with a certain class of Filipino propagandists in Madrid, notably Isabelo de los Reyes and Pascual Poblete, whom he now gave posts under the Government. As already seen in this chapter, he had, as far back as 1870, projected the secularization of education in the Philippines. Primo de Rivera had earned the reputation of being liberally disposed toward the Filipinos, but he had obtained his appointment at the hands of the Conservative party, which at once implied that he would be turned out by the Liberals; moreover, he had been harshly criticized in speeches by Señor Sagasta. There is some evidence that the War Department documents relative to Biak-na-bató had somewhere been "doctored" to throw the entire onus of the Biak-na-bató agreement upon the Liberal Government. In the copy of Paterno's

his resignation on the 5th, cabled at length to the new Government on the 7th, announcing that a definite agreement for closing with the insurgents on a money basis had been obtained. He presented the advantages of the plan as being: The saving of money; the saving of lives (the annual loss through deaths and sickness being 40 per cent, or 10,000 men); and that it *would destroy the prestige of the chiefs who sold out and emigrated*. There was danger all the time, too, that the rebels would secure more arms by smuggling. On the other hand, he presented his plans for military conquest, which he was certain of obtaining, if he could be authorized to organize more volunteers, mixing the native troops with the Peninsular in battalions; and he urged a speedy resolution, as with December would come the dry season and the time for operating. He concluded: "To offer reforms to-day would be useless; they are fighting for independence; after conquering them in one way or another, there may be conceded or imposed the reforms that are suitable."¹ The new ministry, fully occupied with Cuba, seems to have seized upon his suggestions; and, after asking further details as to the manner of paying the money and as to what other officials indorsed the plan,² gave him authority to carry it out, only enjoining upon him to do it speedily.

first letter to Aguinaldo, there is a reference to Moret's succession to the Ministry for the Colonies as being calculated to insure reforms in the Philippines. The letter is dated August 9, 1897; and Moret did not become Minister for the Colonies until the following October. One of the first acts of the new Liberal Ministry was to cancel the so-called "decree of Philippine reform" adopted by the conservative provisional ministry on September 15, 1897. This decree virtually nullified the autonomy conceded by the Maura law, restored the rights of inspecting schools, intervening in local government, etc., to the friars, provided specifically against secret societies, and in general reintroduced the discretionary powers of the old régime and strengthened the power of the friars. See *La Política*, vol. VII, pp. 427-34, 465.

¹ Primo de Rivera, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-27.

² Primo de Rivera replied that the archbishop, the chief of staff, the auditor-general, the director of the Spanish-Philippine Bank, the *alcalde* of Manila, the secretary-general, and the civil governor of Manila province were the only ones taken into his confidence, and they enthusiastically approved the plan. (*Ibid.*, p. 128.)

New difficulties arose, however. Other chiefs had been coming to the front in the guerrilla operations outside of the immediate direction of the three or four leaders in Bulakán. They feared they would not be recognized in the transaction, and there was also a radical party among the insurgents and among the propagandists at Hongkong which opposed the surrender. This party seems to have imposed its will upon the assembly of revolutionists at Biak-na-bató during the last days of October. Aguinaldo's leadership was not seriously questioned, but he was in effect given notice that he and a chosen few intimates could not dictate the action of other chiefs unless they took consultation with them.¹ More potent, however, than personal ambitions and jealousies or the sentiment for continuing the warfare was, it is to be feared, the suspicion that there would not be a "fair deal" in the distribution of the largesse of Spain which Primo de Rivera was only waiting to bestow. There was more than a little anxiety about this in the guerrilla camps of Cavite and Batangas, in Manila and Hongkong, and even in the circles of the "Assembly" at Biak-na-bató. Meanwhile, Primo de Rivera was cabling the Government, after an examination of the provinces along the

¹ It is strange, indeed, to note that, at the very moment when the insurrection as an organized movement was well-nigh crushed, it made in some ways greater pretensions to a "national" organization than in the days of its greatest ascendancy in Cavite. The "Revolutionary Assembly" of the closing months in Bulakán seems, however, to have left control of affairs to the "Supreme Council," consisting of the President, Vice-President and secretaries of Foreign Affairs, War, Internal Government, and the Treasury. According to Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 315, the "Provisional Constitution," which was to last until the "Philippine Republic" should be established, gave to the "Supreme Council" the general control of government, and, among others, the special powers of levying and collecting taxes, contracting loans at home or abroad, *issuing paper money* and coining money, *intervening to bring about an agreement in suits at law*, making alliances, and of *harmonizing with Spain for the purpose of securing peace in the islands*. Sastrón dates this document November 1, 1896, which is a mistake for 1897. As given in full in *La Política*, vol. VIII, pp. 8-9, it proclaims definitely as the aim of the revolution a complete separation from Spain, and provides simply for a "treaty of peace." Tagalog is the declared "official language of the Republic," and universal suffrage is to be the method of electing representatives of the provinces in the "Assembly," which is only given the power to elect the officers.

railroad, that he could get volunteers enough to end the disorder very speedily. However, the industrious Paterno¹ had presented himself at Malakañang on November 15 with a new power of attorney from the insurgents, in which Baldomero Aguinaldo (cousin of the chief) appeared also as the more direct representative of Cavite interests. There was then drawn up a document which contained the bases that were accepted and signed by Primo de Rivera as one party and by Paterno on behalf of the insurgents.² These bases were: The three leaders who have empowered Paterno will surrender themselves and all the arms under them, and obligate themselves to secure the surrender of such commanders as actually follow them; a general and complete amnesty will be proclaimed, but Spaniards and other non-natives in the insurgent ranks will be expelled from the army and Filipino deserters from the Spanish army must return and serve out their time; bands not recognizing Aguinaldo's authority may surrender under these provisions, but, if they do not do so, will be treated simply as outlaws; the governor-general will negotiate only with Aguinaldo relative to providing "the means to support the lives" of those who surrender, this aid being given "in view of the desperate situation to which the war has reduced them." Lastly, Paterno is permitted to state, "in the name of those whom he represents," that they "confidently expect that, on account of the foresight of the Government of His Majesty, it will take into consideration and satisfy the desire of the Filipino people, in order to assure them the peace and well-

¹ In the famous letter already referred to (pp. 155-58 of Primo de Rivera's *Memoria*, and pp. 557-60 of Foreman), in which Paterno, who styles himself the "Maguino," or Prince, of Luzon and the "Arbiter of the Destinies" of the insurgents, modestly requests to be made a Spanish grandee of the first class, preferably a prince or a duke, with a right to represent his people in the Senate; he also claims that he spent his resources abundantly, including "values both pecuniary and of a non-material sort," to "win over the minds" of the insurgents to peace. (Primo de Rivera says this remarkable document was left unsigned on his desk.)

² Primo de Rivera had been given express authority from Madrid to sign a "contract." The document referred to is given in the *Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6094.

being which they deserve." The only other document officially signed was the contract of December 14, containing the stipulations as to how the surrender of arms and the payments of money were to be made.¹ The delay of one month in actually carrying out the agreement apparently reached on November 15 was caused by Primo de Rivera's objection to the small number of arms it was proposed to surrender, by the claim of Aguinaldo that he could not control more than a fraction of his reputed followers, by the demand of Aguinaldo to receive the full amount of money at once even though surrendering but a fraction of the arms that were being used against Spain, and by the activity which General Monet's campaign took on at the close of November. The insurrection had been driven from all sides upon Biak-na-bató and was well surrounded when, on December 12, the fifteen days Primo de Rivera had conceded for the surrender of arms expired. That day, a committee from the insurgent camp appeared, ready to surrender, as Primo de Rivera cabled Madrid, "without pretensions to reforms." He expressed his confidence of being able to capture Biak-na-bató at once, but was not sure the insurgent chiefs would fall into his hands. The Liberal Government had repeatedly urged him to close the negotiation on the money basis, and promptly gave the authority to sign the agreement of December 14 as to money payments.²

¹ See *Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6093.

² The money payments agreed upon were to be made thus : \$400,000 (Mexican) in a letter upon a Hongkong bank, to be given to Aguinaldo before his departure, payable upon telegraphic notification that the arms at Biak-na-bató had been surrendered in accordance with the inventory ; two checks for \$200,000 each to be delivered to Paterno as soon as the arms surrendered should amount to 700, to be payable after the *Te Deum* is sung and the general amnesty proclaimed. When he presented himself to Primo de Rivera in August, Paterno had estimated the amount necessary to buy peace as \$500,000. When he returned from Aguinaldo on August 13, he bore a demand for \$3,000,000, in addition to the reforms outlined above. Primo de Rivera "split the difference," asking and securing authority from the new ministry, at the outset of October, to pay \$1,700,000. When Paterno presented himself with the new power of attorney on November 15, he had written down \$800,000, explaining the difference by saying that the insurgents did not "renounce" the remaining \$900,000, but they were to "in-

Lieutenant-Colonel Primo de Rivera, a nephew of the governor-general, went in person to Biak-na-bató to secure the signing of the agreement; this was done by Aguinaldo only after the "Assembly" had ratified it and the "Supreme Council" had given its approval. Aguinaldo required that the general's nephew should accompany him to Hongkong, as security for the payment of the check, and that Generals Monet and Tejeiro, the latter the chief of staff, should not only preside at the surrender of the arms at Biak-na-bató but also remain there as hostages until he cabled to Artemio Ricarte that he had received payment of the \$400,000 for which he bore a check to Hongkong. On December 27, Aguinaldo and twenty-seven companions embarked for Hongkong at the port of Sual on the west coast of Luzon near Dagupan.¹ After the arms demnify the unarmed," hence did not figure in writing. Primo de Rivera (*op. cit.*, p. 134), says he "did not think it prudent" to make any further queries about the matter at the time.

¹ The scenes connected with the surrender at Biak-na-bató and the departure of the insurgent chiefs are described in letters and telegrams to the Spanish press, reproduced in *La Política*, vol. VII, pp. 552-56, and vol. VIII, pp. 21-23, 45-49. There were receptions, banquets, proclamations, and hurrahs from Biak-na-bató, through Bulakán, Pampanga, Tarlak, and Pangasinan, to Sual, Aguinaldo himself being everywhere prominent with "Vivas" and toasts to Spain. In his correspondence with Franciscan and Jesuit fathers early in 1897 regarding the possibility of peace (*ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. 326-28, and vol. VIII, pp. 43-44), Aguinaldo (whose letter to the Franciscan father is written in his own peculiar and bad Spanish) had declared separation from Spain to be the object, and had condemned the Spanish administration without appearing hostile to the friars. (There are, indeed, many reasons for thinking Aguinaldo was never so anti-friar as nearly all his revolutionary compatriots.) In the "Constitution of Biak-na-bató," as seen, separation from Spain had been pronounced to be the prime object of the insurrection. Yet in his interviews, proclamations, etc., before leaving for Hongkong, Aguinaldo appears as repudiating hostility to Spain itself or the idea of independence. Perhaps his oaths to "die before taking up arms against Spain," of being willing to fight for the "incomparable motherland," etc., may be ascribed in part to the Spanish correspondents taking some of his poor Spanish too enthusiastically. But, on leaving Biak-na-bató, he published over his own signature a proclamation (*ibid.*, vol. VIII, pp. 101-02) to the "Maniolos" (an idea borrowed, no doubt, from Paterno, who wished to connect the Filipinos with the people of some unknown island described by the ancient Egyptian geographer Ptolemy as "Maniolas"), in which he said: "I leave, because, behind the back of the personal immunity conceded to me by the laws, pledges and nobility of Spain, the exalted passion of hatred or some other outburst of oppressive policy may raise its suicidal hand and make victims, causing once more disturbances and interruptions in the life and progress of our

were secured at Biak-na-bató, the Spanish generals who had remained there were assisted in securing surrenders elsewhere by Baldomero Aguinaldo and Ricarte in Cavite, Paciano Rizal in Laguna, and Malvar in Batangas. Just how many were so surrendered, was never officially given forth. Aguinaldo claims¹ that they exceeded 1000. Even so, the Spanish authorities might well shrink from publishing the number of arms for which they had paid such a fat price; and it is probable that the number did not reach 1000. The insurgents had offered in November to surrender only 587, and the number stipulated in the agreement of December 14 to be surrendered at Biak-na-bató itself was 225, besides some 2000 cartridges and 20 pieces of ordnance (mostly bamboo cannon, wrapped with wire, etc).²

If there was disappointment in the Spanish headquarters at the number of arms secured, there was no less dissatisfaction among the insurgents as to the distribution of the money. Two days after Aguinaldo left, there was a gathering at Biak-na-bató, presided over by Secretary of the Interior Isabelo Artacho, which drew up a protest to Primo de Rivera against the rest of the money being sent to Aguinaldo, asking that at least half of the second payment, or \$100,000, be distributed among the "insurgents in most need."³ They apparently

land. Long live Spain! Long live the Philippines!" And Aguinaldo and all his companions signed this telegram to Primo de Rivera on leaving Sual: ". . . We all trust to Spain to grant reforms without blood or warfare, following the path of right and justice. . . . To the paternal policy of Your Excellency those who to-day loyally offer themselves to Spain entrust the true harmonization of liberties and rights. May God bless and make lasting this peace, for the glorious future of our loved home, the Philippines, and for the prosperity and greatness of the Spanish fatherland." See also *ibid.*, vol. VIII, nos. 180 and 186, for the doings of the insurgent colony in Hongkong between December, 1897, and March, 1898.

¹ *Reseña verídica de la revolución filipina.*

² On January 6, Primo de Rivera cabled to Madrid that 516 "firearms" had been surrendered at Biak-na-bató (*La Política*, vol. VIII, p. 7), but this might mean revolvers, shotguns, etc., as well as rifles.

³ This document reads: "The undersigned, principals of the Insurrection, who have stayed behind in Biak-na-bató for the express purpose of rendering effective the fulfillment of the bases established in the agreement of harmonization and pacification celebrated between the Government of Spain and the Provisional Gov-

had the same idea as to how the money was to have been used as did Primo de Rivera, who declares, though citing no document in which this appears, that it was "for the men in arms,

ernment of the Republic of the Philippines, represented respectively by the Most Excellent Señor Marquis of Estella, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte, and by the Most Excellent Señor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno as arbiter; being gathered by previous call on this date, the 29th of December, 1897, in the said place of Biak-na-bató, under the chairmanship of Don Isabelo Artacho as principal and first representative of the Supreme Council of the Government of the Republic, to deliberate with regard to the form or manner of executing the said obligation, the undersigned, the session begun, and after lengthy discussion, agreed unanimously: (1) That Don José Salvador Natividad be sent to Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, to set forth that the insurgents really injured in their persons, families and interests, who first of all should have been the object of consideration and attentions on the part of the Government of the Republic, in the way of alleviating, succoring or indemnifying them, at least in some degree, in their losses, are unfortunately those who least have enjoyed or will enjoy the benefits of the pacification, since up to the present there has not been designated for them any sum nor has anything at all been given them, because the small amount of money left behind in the Philippines in the possession of the Secretary of the Treasury, Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, of which sum the undersigned have no certain or official knowledge, scarcely suffices, according to said Secretary, to pay some of the military officers and other officials stationed in Biak-na-bató and Cavite; (2) that there exists a certain discontent on the part of various factions and principal officers, in consequence of this disregard of them, aside from the natural effects also of discontented feelings produced in the mind of many who, though having more right to the benefits of pacification, have nevertheless been left in complete abandonment in these Islands, while, on the contrary, others, of better fortune, though with less merit or fitness, have embarked for foreign ports whither they have been taken to be maintained with the so-called treasury of the Insurrection; (3) that, on account of the foregoing, the undersigned foresee certain obstacles to the carrying to complete fulfillment what has been agreed upon, unless there is some remedy for this desperate situation in which insurgents and officers disseminated about Luzon have been placed; (4) that, as an efficacious, just and equitable remedy, they propose that the amount of one-half of the second installment, or \$100,000 (one hundred thousand dollars), be distributed among the insurgents in most need, this sum to be given to Don José Salvador Natividad, who is formally delegated by these presents to effect the distribution. — Biak-na-bató, December 29, 1897. — (Signed) Isabelo Artacho. José Salvador Natividad. Artemio Ricarte Vibora. Pantaleon Garcia. Isidoro Torres. Francisco M. Soliman (Makabulos)."

[A seal with: "Republic of the Philippines. Presidency."] There follows a power of attorney from J. Salvador Natividad to Paciano Rizal, to act in the place of the former. This is probably the document presented by Rizal to Primo de Rivera in Manila, which the latter cites on p. 140 (*op. cit.*), similar in tenor to the foregoing. The original as above translated is taken from a copy in the possession of the late Clemente J. Zulueta, of Manila. A very poor translation of it, wherein also the entire \$400,000 yet to be paid was demanded by Artacho and his associates, is given in *Senate Document 208*, 56th Cong, 1st Sess., part 2, pp. 2-3.

and to aid the families which had been ruined by the war; for the widows; for those who suffered an embargo of property." Artacho afterward went to Hongkong and began suit against Aguinaldo for the division of the money, and it was in order to avoid attachment that the latter made a sudden trip to Singapore. This suit was afterward compromised, the sum paid to Artacho being, it is said, \$5000. There is nothing positive to disprove the assertion of Aguinaldo that the money was to be kept undivided and used to renew the war against Spain if the desired reforms were not granted. There are, however, some indications that Aguinaldo was planning to go to Europe when the war between Spain and the United States broke out; and his positive claim that the friars were to be expelled and political reforms granted, this being Primo de Rivera's verbal promise, "upon his honor as a gentleman and a soldier," is to be termed a deliberate misstatement, unless Paterno led Aguinaldo to believe this, in order to close the negotiations.¹ Some mystery seems to surround the question of how much money actually was paid over. Primo de Rivera says that he gave \$200,000 to Paterno and the chiefs who made the protest, and that the rest was turned over to his successor, General Augustin. Suit was brought in Hongkong on the claim that Aguinaldo had received all the money that was ever paid over. As one Filipino has wittily put it: "Some one has forgotten that he had \$200,000 in his pocket." The whole transaction was a demoralizing one, from beginning to end.

The Spanish jubilation was not less than as if some great triumph had been recorded. Regattas, horse-races, bicycle-races, open-air theatrical performances, fireworks, a great ball given by the city government, the formal presentation of a

¹ These statements are to be found at the beginning of the *Reseña verídica*, already cited. At the close of this document, Aguinaldo states that the truth thereof rests upon his word. It is not, however, written by him; and if there are not very many positive misstatements in it, there is certainly a great lack of candor in some of its representations.

flag blessed by the archbishop to the 73d Regiment of native troops, and similar celebrations, lasted for over a month. January 23 was the day of the official declaration of peace, and the singing of the *Te Deum* in the royal chapel in Madrid took place on February 24. Primo de Rivera, who complained that his repeated recommendation of his pet idea of mixed battalions of native and Peninsular troops had been answered by the ministry "with many words but no solution," at last received authority to proceed to carry out this plan, only he must treat natives and Peninsulars on an equal basis as to pay and rations. It was planned to send one of these mixed battalions to Spain in May. Primo de Rivera himself was decorated by Spain with the Grand Cross of St. Ferdinand, and a subscription was raised in Manila to buy him the cross. Another subscription was opened to present him with a "testimonial" before his departure for home, he having again presented his resignation. The amount raised was \$60,000; but, before General Augustin arrived to relieve him in April, he refused the sum, because of the criticisms made, and because, moreover, disorder was already breaking out in place after place.

D. A RECRUDESCENCE OF REBELLION

Bandit operations to the north of Manila had not stopped at any time, as, indeed, they had been a feature of the entire Spanish régime.¹ More serious and significant, however, were the disorders which began almost simultaneously in Sambales and southern Pangasinan. New chiefs had there taken up the fight, and almost of a sudden possessed themselves of several important towns, assassinating several friars, besides holding other Spaniards for some time as prisoners. The movement was really, however, rather anti-friar than anti-Spanish, as the events showed, and had originated in opposition to the

¹ Primo de Rivera's recommendations for the organization of a corps of native guides and for a better military information system were fully justified. Spain never had good maps of the provinces, and had never systematically gone to work to exterminate the bands of ladrones.

"Guards of Honor," which had been organized by some of the friar priests among their more fanatic and ignorant parishioners, partly in order to spy upon and combat the portion of the populace which was recalcitrant. The Sambales rebels seized the land telegraph line between Manila and Bolinau, the landing-place of the cable to Hongkong, and besieged the cable station, where for a week a sergeant was the only Spanish officer in the Philippines who could communicate with the Minister of the Colonies. Bulakán was again reorganized by Isidoro Torres, who claimed to have a nomination as provincial governor from the "Revolutionary Government." He had two encampments near Malolos. The Augustinian priest of the latter town was cut to pieces with bolos on his way to the railroad station. Makabulos was inaugurating operations again also in Pampanga, Tarlak, and Nueva Écija. At Guagua, in Pampanga, a Spanish physician and his wife were assassinated. On March 25, a thousand Ilokans of Unión and South Ilokos, provinces hitherto peaceful, seized the town of Kandon, on the west coast of Luzon, and, dragging three friars from their hiding-place in the church, bore them to the hills, where their bodies were afterwards found; a fourth friar they carried through the mountains into Lepanto, finally releasing him. A rising at Daet, in the Camarines, was quelled by the civil guard. The latter organization had inaugurated a reign of terror in Manila upon the first provocation. Raiding a house in Camba Street, where a Katipunan meeting was said to be in progress, they killed ten or more of the assembly outright, and the remaining threescore were imprisoned for summary trial.¹ Most

¹ The other sixty were shot the following morning, according to the report of United States Consul Oscar F. Williams, in a dispatch to the State Department dated March 27, 1898 (see *Senate Document 62*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 321). The information which precedes this, with regard to the desertion of the entire 74th Regiment of natives when ordered to proceed against insurgents in Cavite, after eight of their corporals had been shot for disobedience, is not authenticated, and the Spanish newspaper reports examined for this chapter do not confirm the consul's reports as to the shooting of the sixty men or in various other particulars. For Spanish press reports on the recrudescence of rebellion in early 1898, see *La Política*, vol. VIII, nos. 181 to 185, especially pp. 102-03, 121-22, 146-48, 155-60, for the Bolinau affair and the trouble in Pangasinan-Sambales.

of the number were Bisayan sailors, and their culpability has never been established. On April 3, Holy Thursday, 6000 or more natives suddenly rose in revolt in the city of Sebú. They had few firearms, but there were only 40 Spanish soldiers in the town, and they, with the friars, including Bishop Alcocer, and the Spanish residents, speedily shut themselves up in the little fort on the beach near where Magellan landed. The natives sacked the convents and burned portions of the business section. The revolt rapidly spread over the island, and eight friars were captured, of whom three were assassinated. Three Spaniards were also assassinated, one of them the husband of a native woman. A telegram brought marines and a gunboat from Iloilo, and troops immediately came down from Manila under General Tejero. They had to capture the principal towns of Sebú before Tejero returned to Manila on April 22, and also to send a little expedition to Bohol, where trouble threatened. The aspect of affairs on Panai became so alarming, particularly in the province of Antike, that all the friars and other Spaniards were concentrated in the provincial capitals. The new provincial governors for Luzon whom the Liberal Government had insisted on sending out, though Primo de Rivera urged the undesirability of making a change at such a critical time, arrived in March, but only a few were permitted to proceed to their provinces, on account of the danger to their lives.

On April 10, 1898, Lieutenant-General Basilio Augustin succeeded General Primo de Rivera in the post of governor-general. The latter had offered to remain if war was expected to take place between Spain and the United States; but he had been associated with the frantic preparations for such an event in Manila, and was well aware of the scanty resources for defense, hence was doubtless quite satisfied to turn the jumble of affairs over to the well-meaning, amiable, but rather dunderheaded old soldier whom the Liberals had sent out to take his place. In his farewell speech he lectured the Spanish residents for

their bitter attitude toward the natives. There was also plenty of suppressed sarcasm among this element over the "allocution" in which General Augustin frankly identified himself with the reformists.

War with the United States very speedily put a new aspect upon affairs in the Philippine Islands. Upon promulgation of the news, it was significant that there distinctly ensued a lull in the guerrilla operations that had been growing more and more active, and that various of the chiefs who had not gone to Hongkong, among them Trias, Ricarte, and Pio del Pilar, were announced as having offered their services to the Spanish Government in the islands. Great hopes were built upon this as to Spanish-Filipino coöperation in the defense of the archipelago; but subsequent events were to prove that the leaders did not consider that they had bartered away their liberty to act according to circumstances and that the masses, so far as they knew what was going on, were simply waiting for the word from above telling them what to do.

E. FILIPINO ATTITUDE AND AIMS IN MAY, 1898

It is fruitless to speculate upon what would have been the outcome had Dewey's fleet not been sent to Manila Bay. It is, however, of some importance to take into account the Philippine situation at the time, especially as to what were the Filipino aspirations and what means they were prepared to take to attain them. So many theoretical views as to the questions here involved, based upon the purest of *a priori* reasoning, have been and still are being promulgated that it is safest to confine ourselves to established facts or well-substantiated opinions. Very much as to the aims of the revolutionists will have been revealed in the preceding pages. There is no ground whatever for asserting that the idea of independence was never dreamed of prior to 1898. We have found it in the minds of the more intellectual propagandists as far back as 1890, and it was really older than that; yet the most gifted of these

leaders, José Rizal, was to grow steadily, until the last, stronger in the belief that *evolution* along the lines of education and commercial opportunity was to be the chosen route by which his people should reach their ultimate destiny, whether independence or a freer internal régime under the protection of the banner of Spain or of some other nation. We have seen that the more rabid leaders of the middle class forced the issue of revolt in certain provinces, and that they were aided in holding up their losing cause, with the tremendous sacrifices it imposed upon the masses, by the over-zealous — to put it no stronger — attitude of Spanish “patriots” in the islands, and by the abuses of the armed forces of Spain. We have seen the way in which the Spanish military courts proceeded from first to last upon the assumption that a deliberate campaign for the extermination of whites and for irresponsible independence was planned by the Katipunans, and we have seen with what injustice and gross misjudgment, to put it mildly, José Rizal was railroaded to his death without a real trial. The evidence to support the charge that extermination was planned, we have been unable to find, too many things pointing to the contrary. As for national independence, that was undoubtedly in the minds of many, but there is nowhere to be found even an approach to a well-defined programme for achieving it or for sustaining it when achieved; nothing, that is, beyond the half-blind resistance of the towns of certain provinces to Spanish force, and a crazy effort to win assistance from Japan (later also from the United States). The addition to the Cavite organization of such dependent subdivisions of territory as the “Viceroyalty of Silang,” and the putting forth by local officers of towns, temporarily in power without the friar at their right hand, of “royal decrees,” etc., have no significance, beyond showing how the insurgent “government” was not really organized but simply copied in the main the forms and methods used by Spain. Had the Spanish Government in the islands collapsed or disappeared by some miracle, we cannot imagine

the nondescript quasi-military organization of the insurgents of 1896-97 stepping quietly into its place and fulfilling its functions throughout the archipelago. And yet we must respect the facts and find that many among these (very generally) less educated leaders aspired, in some dim fashion, to independence.¹ And we must realize that a year and a half of serious resistance to Spain, in which she had been required to strain to the utmost her available resources, aside from the continual talk about Cuban success in attaining a freer administration, or about United States interference there, had caused the sentiment of downright opposition to grow and gain some degree of confidence. Beyond doubt, a great proportion, almost certainly the very great majority, of better-educated and propertied Filipinos sympathized with the revolution, not alone among the Tagalog communities, but very generally throughout the archipelago; but they had given no sign that they would actively take a hand in it. As for the great mass of the people, the American reader unfamiliar with the Philippines often assumes the existence of a public opinion such as that to which he is accustomed. The masses of the Philippines were, at the beginning of 1898, ready to be led by the nose by their traditional "caciques," or, in the absence temporarily of these, by any self-constituted military leader with shoulder-straps and a revolver. This was only less true among the rather more advanced Tagalog towns than elsewhere; among the other provinces of Luzon than among the generally docile, apparently stolid, Bisayans. Only in degree, as between different sections,

¹ Such documents as the "manifesto of Malabar [probably Malvar]," which Foreman cites (*op. cit.*, 542) as significant of insurgent aims in July, 1897, and which President Schurmann employed to bolster up his remarkable statement in the *Report of the Philippine Commission* that the idea of independence first arose in August, 1898, and Aguinaldo's manifesto (Foreman, p. 543), in which the word "independence" is rather carelessly used, are of small value when not considered in connection with the entire history of the anti-Spanish movement and with the subsequent conduct of the same leaders. Viewing the Biak-na-bató affair in the most favorable light for Aguinaldo, he was ready to treat on the basis of a very vague and indefinite prospect that certain reforms would be granted. Yet this does not exclude him from *aspiring* to independence, as did others.

should any exception be made to the statement that the masses were like driven sheep.

Reforms in the Philippine administration were expected at the opening of 1898, even by the recalcitrant Spaniards in the islands, and doubly so by the Filipinos of every class. The rumors about the Biak-na-bató negotiation, the half-known recommendations of Primo de Rivera, and the change to an outright Liberal administration in the islands, were sufficient basis for this expectation. Undoubtedly also, expectancy centered chiefly about the action to be taken with regard to the friar-régime in the islands. In February, a number of Filipinos in Madrid had signed a manifesto to the Liberal ministry, declaring that the revolt in the islands had in no sense been directed against the sovereignty of Spain, but against the dominance of the religious orders.¹ The action of the orders themselves showed that they appreciated the trend of affairs. Just before the outbreak of war with the United States, they addressed themselves to the Spanish Government with an offer of "all they possessed" for the purpose of conducting this war, if it should come on. They followed this patriotic demonstration almost immediately with a defiant cablegram, expressing their determination, with the consent of the Holy See, to abandon the Philippines entirely, if the Government should adopt a programme of secularization of the parishes and disentail of the friar lands. On April 21, the very day upon which war became a certainty, the provincials of the Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, and Recollects and the superior of the Jesuits

¹ As has been shown, this statement was not exactly candid, though in spirit it presented the truth. No mention has been made above of the episode, so much discussed in the after-fury of war talk in Spain, of the arrest of a Spanish editor in Manila and the suspension of his paper by Primo de Rivera in February, for publishing a demand for "autonomy." The incident has little if any significance, as revealing Filipino aspirations. The editor in question is a rather clever writer, now on this side, now on that, who has consistently since 1898 sought to nurture bad feeling between Americans and Filipinos. His demand for "autonomy" had reference to greater political initiative for Spaniards in the islands, rather than to political liberties for the Filipinos. For Primo de Rivera's version of the affair, see his *Memoria*, pp. 143-54.

signed in Manila a lengthy manifesto to the Minister of the Colonies, in which they set forth their view of the events which had been happening and of the programme which should in future be followed.¹ They declared their certainty that the masses of the people still loved them, and that the saner and more cultured leaders had held aloof from the movement against them; they proclaimed flatly that secularization of the parishes or discipline of the friars by the bishops would not be tolerated; and they declared plainly for a full return to the old régime in existence before any of the reform measures of modern times had been adopted. The defiant attitude of the orders, coupled with their well-known power in the political administration of Spain, and such incidents as the appointment of two more friars as bishops in the islands in early 1898, did not tend to quiet the apprehensions of those who hoped a new religious régime might now begin. Primo de Rivera, who, though associated with the conservative administration, recommended curbing very considerably the powers of the orders, had, while advising the new Liberal and supposedly anti-friar ministry that he did not believe the friars could be replaced, if they could be made to do "as they ought," yet recommended that full episcopal authority over them be asserted when they acted as parish priests, that all rights of interference in local administration be taken from them, that their abuses in the imposition of fees be curbed, and that the native priests should cease to be their servants, stating in conclusion "that the settlement of the problem of the friars carries with it the preservation or the loss of the country." He said, moreover, that the hatred for the friars had produced the hatred for other Spaniards in general, and that the Tagalog outbreak was due to the fact

¹ This document, of which only ten copies for each order were printed, scarcely ever saw the light of day. The succeeding events in Madrid and Manila buried it from sight. The orders had secured representatives to take up their cause in the Spanish Cortes in June, but, when advised of the resistance they would meet, they desisted. This manifesto is a complete and authoritative setting-forth of the friars' position, and at the same time well confirms the statements of their saner critics.

that there had been more abuses by the friars, and they had greater possessions of land, in the territory of the Tagalogs.¹

Here lay the real issue at the bottom of the whole mass of difficulties. Spain, even though in the midst of bitter disaster, had the good fortune to shove this problem, along with the minor matters complicating it, over upon the inexperienced Government of the United States, which was a long time discovering just what it had on its hands.

¹ These statements will be found in a letter of General Primo de Rivera to the Spanish Ministry in December, 1897, cited by him on pp. 169-76 of his *Memoria*. (It is also curious to note his recommendations, not only for reform in the Spanish personnel in the islands, but also, in connection with educational matters, the introduction of manual training and the bringing of school-teachers from Spain.) His statements about the friars as above given do not tally very well with the sentiments quoted as being his by Stephen Bonsal in his article on the friars in the *North American Review* for November, 1892, already referred to. Mr. Bonsal fell into the same trap in this case as in many others, where he takes his data blindly from *Las Ordenes Religiosas en las Islas Filipinas* by Father Zamora, the Augustinian. Father Zamora culled to suit himself from the reports of governors-general, and Mr. Bonsal sometimes made even Zamora's selections in favor of the friars a little stronger in translation. A very frank exposition of the real attitude of practically all the friars is that of Father Eduardo Navarro, procurator of the Augustinians in the Philippines, in his *Estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad*, already cited. He says (p. 276): "It is not only advisable, but absolutely and peremptorily necessary, to take a prudent and safe step backward, in the firm conviction that this will be to gain, not to lose, will mean advancement and progress."

CHAPTER IV

INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES

BOTH to foreigners and to Filipinos, the idea that the United States might be drawn westward from the Pacific to take some direct interest in affairs in the Philippines was not entirely a new thing in 1898. But neither Jagor's prediction of 1873 as to that country being destined in its commercial expansion to become the territorial successor of Spain,¹ nor Rizal's half-fearful notion of 1891 that it might follow on from Samoa to other Pacific islands,² would, if known to the American people, have excited anything but ridicule from them, absorbed as they were in the development of their own continent, no notion more remote from their minds than that of holding colonies. As the prospects for American intervention in Cuba became better, some of the Filipino propagandists, especially those in Hongkong, seem to have turned from their idle dream of Japanese recognition of their revolution, and to have sought to direct the attention of America to the Spanish colonies in the Orient also. Their offer, made through Consul-General Rounseville Wildman, of Hongkong, in November, 1897, of an "offensive and defensive alliance" in case of war with Spain, was, of course, promptly declined, and the consul-general was instructed to refuse to be the medium for any more such offers.³ Although there is no published record of it, a more elaborate appeal for the intervention and protection of the United States had been presented to Mr. Wildman's predecessor in January of the same year, signed by a committee of three Filipino *déportés* in Hongkong, but drawn and presented with the cognizance and approval of other Filipinos

¹ See footnote, pp. 32-33, above.

² See footnote, p. 71, above.

³ See *Senate Document 62*, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, pp. 333-34.

there and elsewhere.¹ There is nothing to show that this document ever reached Washington, or that the Government there ever gave any further thought to the Philippines or to the Filipinos prior to May, 1898, than to choose Commodore Dewey to take command of the Eastern squadron, assemble it and make it ready to destroy the naval equipment of Spain in the Orient, in case war should break out.

A. PREPARATIONS FOR A STRUGGLE IN PHILIPPINE WATERS

That the selection of Commodore Dewey was made because it was, in the fall of 1897, deemed wise to have a man "who could go into Manila if necessary," has been testified by the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt,² who, it is generally believed, had something to do with the choice of the man. Dewey, who took command at Yokohama in January, 1898, was that month given cable orders to keep all enlisted

¹ This document, which consists of some two thousand words, sets forth the grievances against the friars, of course, charging against them the deportations and the policy of confiscating property, and giving in detail the Filipino account of the execution of the native priests and the "revolution" of 1872. (See footnote 1, p. 58, above.) It is curious to note, however, how the phraseology and almost the entire contents of this appeal are based upon the Spanish, and in general the Continental, view of Americans, as being inspired only by "practical" motives. The principal accusations against Spain are, not only that she taxes the Filipinos for pensions to Columbus's descendants and others, for the support of penal colonies in Africa and of the diplomatic and consular corps in the Orient, but also that the Spaniards are well known to be "little given to work" and much given to office-holding, living off the Filipinos in consequence, and, above all, that they have done little to develop the mineral or agricultural interests of the country, while foreigners have done all that has been done in these lines and that of shipping. The bait is held out—one can imagine how cleverly these Filipinos felt it to be—that there are great riches remaining undeveloped. The Cuban example is referred to, and America is asked to extend the same aid that Emperor Napoleon (*sic*) gave to the American colonies in their struggle for independence. For the petitioners ask protection and recognition, "with the right to govern their own country" and help "in the expulsion of the Spaniards by means of force"; they will pay back the expenses incurred when independence is gained, and will grant franchises in further recompense. This document was signed by Doroteo Cortes, José Ma Basa, and A. G. Medina, prominent *déportés*, at Hongkong on January 29, 1897. A copy of one of the Spanish originals is in the possession of the writer, but the petition was presented in English.

² See his article in *McClure's Magazine* for October, 1899.



MANILA BAY AND VICINITY

sailors of the Asiatic squadron whose terms had expired. After the blowing-up of the *Maine* in February had come to strain still more seriously the relations between the United States and Spain, precautionary orders preparatory for war were more numerous. First there was the familiar order of February 25 cabled by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to Commodore Dewey, directing him to assemble the squadron at once at Hongkong and to "keep full of coal," as, in case of war, "your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands." Secretary Long the next day instructed Dewey, in common with all squadron commanders, to "keep full of coal, the best that can be had." It had been decided to keep on the Atlantic station the *Helena*, which had started for the Asiatic station by the eastern route in January; but the orders for the return to the United States of the cruiser *Olympia* were canceled in the above dispatch of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, and, on March 3, Secretary Long ordered the *Mohican* from San Francisco to Honolulu, to replace there the cruiser *Baltimore*, the latter proceeding at once to Hongkong with a supply of ammunition for the squadron. During April, Dewey was authorized by cable to stock up fully with provisions and to purchase two British steamers at Hongkong for supply- and coal-ships, and was told to land from his vessels all woodwork and stores not needed in operations; and he then secured five months' supplies in advance. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy on March 31, Commodore Dewey says that the five vessels of his squadron were all assembled at Hongkong by the first week in March, and that they "have been kept full of the best coal obtainable, provisioned and ready to move at twenty-four hours' notice."¹ The vessels referred

¹ See *Sen. Doc. 73*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. For a full record of the precautionary orders to Dewey and other commanders prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, see *Appendix to Report of Chief of Bureau of Navigation (Reports of Navy Department, 1898)*, pp. 21-26 and 65-66. This document forms vol. iv of *The Message of the President for 1898 and Accompanying Documents*, and was also issued separately

to, including the Baltimore, which reached Hongkong on April 22, were: The Olympia, flagship, 5870 tons; the Baltimore, 4413 tons; the Raleigh, 3213 tons, and the Boston, 3000 tons, all these being protected cruisers; and the Petrel, a gunboat of 892 tons. The revenue cutter McCulloch, being on a trip to the Orient, was detached for naval service and added to the squadron at Hongkong as a dispatch boat. The supply-ships purchased were the Nanshan and the Zafiro.

The information which the commodore had obtained with regard to the Spanish fleet and the defenses of Manila Bay, principally through his own private sources, was quite accurate, though not entirely complete. As this information is outlined in the letter just referred to, it shows an omission to take into account the Isla de Cuba (called a cruiser by the Spaniards, though really this and the Isla de Luzon were only first-class gunboats), or the Don Antonio de Ulloa and the Velasco, gunboats of over 1000 tons, while among the boats mentioned as "armed tugs and launches for river service" were several small gunboats, effectively built and armed with small guns for inter-island service. Dewey was perhaps aware, however, that the Ulloa was careened on its side for repairs, and the Velasco in dry dock, although he does not mention this nor the rumors of the times about torpedoes and about submarine mines at the entrance to the bay. He felt sufficiently sure of his own resources to say: "I believe I am not overconfident in stating that with the squadron now under my command the vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in a day"; and his information led him to believe that the state of opposition to Spain in the islands was such that the capture of Manila virtually meant that the whole archipelago would fall into the possession of the conquering power or of the insurgents.

as *House of Representatives Document 3*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Only cable instructions to Dewey are given therein; whatever verbal or mailed instructions, if any, he had with regard to engagements in the Orient, are not on record. (This *Appendix* will hereafter be cited simply under the title *Bureau of Navigation*.)

Had the American commander been fully cognizant of the real state of affairs, and of the confusion reigning at the headquarters of Spanish power in the Orient, he would probably have been still more confident of an easy victory. In the first "junta" of high authorities held at Manila to discuss plans for defense, in view of the telegram from Madrid on March 12 that war was imminent and of the reports to the governor-general and to Admiral Montojo from Hongkong that Dewey's fleet was preparing for a descent upon the Philippines, Admiral Montojo had made a comparison of the two fleets, showing that in case of a meeting between them, a Spanish defeat was fully to be expected.¹ Indeed, in Spanish official circles, defeat on the sea by the Americans seems to have been accepted from the first with a resignation that would appear more heroic had it not been accompanied by so many outward demonstrations of bravado and rhetoric, nor covered up by such a multiplicity of plans, "juntas" and paper-propositions for victory. The chief care from the first seems to have been directed to preventing a descent of insurgents upon the city of Manila, and the most intelligent efforts for defense were exerted toward this end. As for the preparations made to meet Dewey, one might think in reading them over that he was in some comic-opera kingdom of the sea, were it not evident how seriously the numerous actors took their parts, and were we not in the presence of a real tragedy for the once great empire of Spain. From first to last, in all the meetings, inspections, and reports which were spread so at large upon the records, the idea of the Spaniards seems to have been not so much how best to make use of their really wretched re-

¹ See Primo de Rivera's *Memoria* (cited in a preceding chapter), p. 181. He says that Montojo "set forth in detail the data regarding the boats of the two squadrons, it being shown that the American boats were superior in guns, in armor-protection and in speed, and therefore in very superior condition to ours, not only for accepting or not an attack in the place and manner they thought opportune, but also, when once this were begun, the logical result ought to be the defeat of our squadron. On this account, the idea of a fight to prevent the arrival at Manila of the American ships was abandoned."

sources for defense as how most convincingly to make it appear on paper, after the inevitable crash should come, that in each and every case the individual upon whom fell any responsibility for meeting the situation had done all that it was possible to do. Undoubtedly, the antiquated military code of Spain, under which defeat or surrender almost inevitably implies the court-martial even of a commander who has no other resource, had much to do in the Spanish-American War with the frequent cases of what looked to outsiders like a curious combination of incompetence and improvisation with boast and bravado.

Montejo claims to have asked reinforcements from Spain as far back as January. A board of Philippine naval officers had, a year before, recommended that all the vessels of the squadron be sent to Hongkong for a thorough overhauling in dry dock; no such authorization was received, and the little dry dock at Cavite was being used to clean up the smaller boats. The meeting of March 16 decided that the squadron should go to Subig Bay, endeavoring to fortify the island at its entrance and to close the narrow channel with torpedoes. For nearly forty years, plans for the fortification and defense of Manila and Subig Bays and the erection of a naval station in the latter bay had been pending. One elaborate plan drawn up under Primo de Rivera in 1881, during his first term as governor-general, was now hauled forth from the archives, and it was seriously proposed to follow it. In accordance with this plan, and also with recommendations of subordinate naval and engineer officers, the wider of the two mouths of Manila Bay (*Boca Grande*) was to be shut "if possible," and the means of defense centered upon the narrower entrance (*Boca Chica*) between Corregidor Island and Mariveles. This was subsequently modified to a double line of batteries to defend both mouths of the bay, with a central line of torpedoes.

On paper, this reads as if serious obstacles would be opposed to Dewey's entrance. But almost without exception, the guns

were old, and such newer guns as were taken from the disabled vessels for hasty mounting on Corregidor, or on the Cavite side of the entrance, were necessarily light pieces. The really humorous feature of the defense lay in the placing of the torpedo-mines. Fourteen or fifteen seem actually to have been dropped into the water at the entrance to the bay, without connected fuses and it may be also without charges to be set off had there been proper fuses. The same was the case with the equal number of torpedoes sent up to Subig Bay with the committee which first went up there to "study" a plan of defense. In private conversation, the members of this naval committee had stated that it was impossible to accomplish anything in the short time and with the scanty resources at their disposal. Nevertheless, they went busily about making their "report." The English ship which was laying the Philippine end of the Hongkong cable from Bolinau to Manila was requisitioned to supply insulated wire, etc., with which to connect the mines in Subig Bay, as the Spanish navy's equipment was old and useless. Five of the mines were actually thus placed, though without charges really expected to explode or fuses really expected to work!¹

The biggest guns available for coast defense (themselves hardly entitled to be called coast artillery) were four 24-centimeter Krupp rifles, placed in front of the walls at Manila, and not yet properly mounted to secure more than half the range they should have had. The guns on the walls and in the fort of Manila were nearly all antiquated smoothbores or muzzle-loading rifles. Nevertheless, it was decided to remove hastily to Subig Bay, for the purpose of fortifying its entrance, four Ordoñez rifles of 15-centimeter caliber, which, with the Krupp guns, offered to Manila itself its only practical means of de-

¹ For the torpedo and mine episode see Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-380, also Joseph L. Stickney's article in *Harper's Magazine*, February, 1899, p. 481. *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VIII, p. 180, says the Spanish naval authorities in the Philippines had destroyed all the gun-cotton they had, because it was old and there was danger of its exploding.

fense against naval vessels. When Admiral Montojo, upon receipt of the news that war had actually come, took his fleet up to Subig Bay on April 25, these guns lay useless on the sandy shore of Isla Grande, and the engineers who had undertaken to place them informed him that it would be twenty days before they could be properly mounted. It was then that Montojo (first being careful to hold a "junta" of officers to justify his action) decided at once to return and await the Americans off Cavite, rather than give battle in the deep waters of Subig Bay, where, if the vessels were sunk, their crews would be lost. The other two Ordoñez rifles, which had been lying at Manila unmounted, were set up on Point Sangle, Cavite.

Madrid kept cabling contradictory information as to the prospect of war. Before Primo de Rivera left, the circle of confidential advisers upon means of defense had been enlarged by the addition of a "junta" of civilians, composed of the archbishop, who was chairman, the mayor of Manila, the governor of Manila province and the secretary of the governor-general. This organization constantly clashed with the already existing "junta of authorities," a governmental advisory board. As the days of actual conflict approached, plans and manifestoes multiplied proportionately. When a cable message announcing the war was received on April 22, a newspaper and the governing body of the city organized a great demonstration which paraded before Governor-General Augustin's residence. He issued a decree pronouncing the service of arms compulsory upon all Peninsular Spaniards in the islands and upon all public functionaries under fifty years of age, and opening a volunteer enlistment to natives and also to foreigners, except Americans. The laws of war were also stiffened by the process of a decree, and treason was made to include "those who circulated news or tales tending to discourage the defenders of the country." But the real energy of the governor-general was put forth in the "allocution" which he addressed to his people in the "Official Gazette" of April 23, saying: —

The North American people, made up of all social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and have provoked a war by their perfidious machinations. . . . The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of victories will grant unto us one that is brilliant and complete, as reason and justice of our cause demand. . . . A fleet, manned by foreigners without instruction and discipline, is about to come to this archipelago, with the wild purpose of taking away from you all that implies life, honor, and liberty. . . . They appear to look upon, as a feasible enterprise, the substitution of the Catholic religion, which you possess, by that of Protestantism; . . . to possess themselves of your riches as if the right of ownership were unknown among you. . . . The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers; they shall not satisfy their impure passions at the cost of the honor of your wives and daughters; they shall not seize the property that your self-denial had accumulated to maintain your lives; . . . your valor and your patriotism suffice to frighten and overwhelm these people, who . . . have resorted to the extermination of the aborigines of North America without making the effort to bring them to civilization. . . .

Archbishop Nozaleda was not to be left behind in this effort to appeal to religious and race prejudice and to turn to advantage the ignorance of the Filipinos as to the people of the United States, at a time when the plans for obtaining Filipino volunteers were under way. He addressed his "beloved sons" to inform them that, if victorious, this "heterodox people, possessed by the blackest rancor and all the abject passions that heresy engenders," would raze their temples, profane the altars of the true God, rob them of their religion and treat them as slaves; he, however, assured them that God was with the Spaniard in the coming battle, and that the enemy would therefore find it of no avail to rest his assurance in his fleet.¹ With that blissful, half-religious optimism and that cheerful delight in

¹ For these allocutions and similar publications in the Manila newspapers of the time, see *Report of Philippine Commission*, 1901, part 1, pp. 168-72, especially the allocution of Nozaleda following the destruction of the Spanish fleet, wherein he elaborates to the Filipinos still more completely all the horrors that will come to them if they do not join with Spain in repelling the invaders. The same dreadful warnings, in even more rabid form, were preached to the people from the friar pulpits of Manila all during May, June, and July. For the Spanish text of Nozaleda's pastorals, see his *Defensa obligada*, appendices 3 and 4.

wild and improbable tales and prophecy to their own advantage which characterize the Spaniards in general, many of those in Manila who were not on confidential terms with the facts were exchanging expressions of commiseration for the poor Americans upon the wretched fate which awaited them, and were circulating stories that desertions at Hongkong were so numerous that Dewey was in danger of being left without men. Others, on the outskirts of official life or private citizens, but of saner judgment and better posted, had been hustling their families out of Manila (some refugees having gone to Spain on the boat which took Primo de Rivera, and others moving to the country along the railroad), and among this element there was whispered talk about the folly of the authorities in not separating the vessels of the fleet and scattering them among various out-of-the-way harbors of the archipelago. The naval officers could not object to this plan that it left Manila defenseless, for several plans put forward by them had done the same; but there was the very potent fact that not to stand and fight meant almost certain court-martial in Spain.

B. THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY

Commodore Dewey, awaiting final orders at Hongkong, on April 24 received this message from Secretary Long:—

War has commenced between United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.¹

Dewey, however, waited a few days for the arrival of Consul Williams from Manila, who was alleged to have information worth while, and in the mean time, at the request of the governor of Hongkong, that he leave the neutral waters of that British bay, he went to Mirs Bay on the China coast. On

¹ See *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 67. It has been humorously remarked on the floor of the United States Senate that "the Secretary of War was a humane man, and therefore gave Dewey an option as to what to do with the Spanish ships."

April 27, the consul appeared and Dewey's vessels at once set sail. He arrived off Cape Bolinau, western Luzon, on the morning of April 30, and early in the afternoon passed by the mouth of Subig Bay. The Boston and Concord had been sent ahead to reconnoiter it, but could see no signs of life, although the officers left with the guns of which Manila had been so uselessly deprived saw them and threw the breech-blocks of the guns into the water. For a week all the navigation lights on the coast had been out, by Spanish orders. For three nights, a big bonfire had been kindled by natives on little Karabau Island, close to the Cavite shore on the right of the wider entrance to the bay. Whether or no the pilot whom Dewey had on board the Olympia, who was perfectly familiar with the entrance to the bay and with its waters, used or needed to use this light, it was toward Karabau Island that the American ships were directly headed when the Spaniards, who had been on the lookout for them, caught sight of them just after 11 o'clock.¹ Suddenly changing her direction from southeast to east, the Olympia started for the center of the larger channel, passing between the little island El Fraile (The Friar) and Pulo Caballo (next to Corregidor), followed by the whole fleet in column formation, except the supply-ships, which passed through nearer to the Cavite shore. The vessels went in at a speed of eight knots, and, as a Spanish writer has put it, "as if they owned those waters." They were over a mile from the small guns on El Fraile and perhaps two miles from those on Pulo Caballo; and, as soon as it was well past the line between the two islets, each ship, following the Olympia's lead, swiftly turned to the northward, flanking the batteries. The Spaniards derived some satisfaction from saying that a shot from El Fraile passed four fingers' length above the head of the commander of the Raleigh (!). Three shots were fired as the Raleigh and the Petrel, fourth and fifth in line, came abreast of El Fraile, and were answered by those

¹ Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

two vessels and the Boston, and one of those shots passed over the Concord and between her masts.¹ The "torpedoes," for reasons which the reader will understand, but which were at the time entirely unknown to Commodore Dewey and his men, were not heard; but the American vessels used their searchlights energetically to sweep the waters and the islands and unmask possible batteries or obstacles of any sort. The nine vessels were all inside and out of the range of the guns by 2 A.M., and, forming anew, proceeded slowly across the bay in a northeasterly direction to where, in the gray and misty dawn of Sunday morning, May 1, they were seen, well off the mouth of the Pasig River, by the anxious watchers on the walls of Manila, and shortly afterward by their still more anxious countrymen who had in the night been called to quarters on the vessels off Cavite peninsula and in the arsenal of that place. Both sides had been ready for action, for some hours; the Americans since their arrival off the shores of Luzon (since they left Hongkong, in fact), the Spaniards since shortly after Montojo received telegraphic word at two in the morning of the entrance of the enemy's vessels unhurt.²

Admiral Montojo had brought his vessels limping back to Cavite on the afternoon of April 29, and had at once disposed them in the array in which they finally gave battle, in a line across the mouth of shallow Cañacao Bay, which lies between the two points of the Cavite peninsula. The Don Juan de Austria, a gunboat of 1159 tons, recently overhauled, was stationed farthest to the north and west, just off the little

¹ *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 75, 77, and 80. The little McCulloch, too, courageously set her guns to barking.

² Joseph L. Stickney, *op. cit.*, p. 477, thinks Dewey did not lay before his captains in the conference held on the Olympia at 5 P.M., after Subig Bay was found to be empty, the question of entering Manila Bay at night, but decided of himself to do so, because, he argued from a general knowledge of Spanish character, the Spaniards would not be looking for him to enter at night. This judgment was quite correct; Spanish officers and Spanish writers have exclaimed about the matter since, almost in a tone that would seem to say it was "very ungentlemanly" for the Americans to come in at night, when they were not expected.

shore battery on Point Sangley. Behind her, in the shallower water, still careened partly to one side in the process of cleaning her machinery, and anchored tight, was the gunboat Don Antonio de Ulloa, of 1160 tons, all but two of her guns of any size having been taken to strengthen the shore batteries. Next the Austria, up on the line of battle, was the Castilla, of 3260 tons, an unprotected cruiser with a wooden hull, which had made water so rapidly on the trip to Subig Bay that her engines were rendered useless, and she was towed back and anchored fast in twenty-seven feet of water, broadside on, partly full of water, and with a line of lighters filled with sand in front of her, so that her port batteries might be brought into use.¹ In the center of the line was the Reina Cristina, the flagship, an unprotected cruiser of old style, of 3520 tons displacement; and ranged to her right, closing the line some distance off the Cavite Arsenal, were the so-called protected cruisers, Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon, each of 1045 tons, the most modern boats under Montojo, having been finished in 1887. The gunboat Marqués del Duero was stationed behind the flagship as a dispatch-boat.

It was scarcely light enough for all his vessels to see the signal, when Dewey's flagship displayed the order, "Prepare for general action," and his ships turned southward toward Cavite, leaving on the port side Manila and the few foreign merchant vessels anchored in the bay (the inter-island steamers and small craft under the Spanish flag having crowded into the Pasig River and huddled up under Fort Santiago). The two 15-centimeter guns on Point Sangley opened fire first, just about five o'clock, and then the gunners behind the 24-centimeter guns on the Luneta followed suit; but the American vessels proceeded on their way unheeding, perfecting their battle formation as they went. The order established and maintained throughout the first engagement was: Olympia, Baltimore,

¹ See translation of portion of official report of Admiral Montojo, *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 89-90.

Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, the McCulloch keeping in call of the Olympia, and well within range of the shots that passed over the American ships, with a hawser ready to pull off any vessel that should ground in the shallow waters near Cavite. When they were 5000 yards from Point Sangley, the Olympia turned to the westward, and, in order named, the vessels countermarched back and forth in a line approximately parallel to the line of the Spanish fleet, three times to the westward and twice to the eastward, each turn bringing them closer in, the range of fire being most of the time from 3000 to 1800 yards. Captain Gridley of the Olympia did not receive until 5.41, when well within range, and after shells had passed over them, the order from Commodore Dewey: "You may fire when you are ready." The firing at once became general on the American side, and continued so for nearly two hours, the 5-inch rapid-fire guns on the Olympia and Raleigh, the 6-inch guns on these and the other boats, and the 8-inch guns on the Baltimore, Boston, and Olympia doing steady execution, while the smaller guns of the secondary batteries were served so rapidly that the American fire was pronounced by the Spaniards to be "truly horrible" and to have been sustained "with veritable craziness." Admiral Montojo himself has given a graphic description of it: —

There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fighting the Cristina, my flagship. A short time after the action commenced, one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant José Nuñez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the end of the fight. . . . The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7.30, one shell completely destroyed the steering-gear. I gave orders to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the mean time, another shell exploded on the poop. Another destroyed the mizzen-masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh

shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering-gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. Amidships, several shells of small caliber went through the smokestack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fire-room, putting out of action one master-gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the star-board bow gun. While the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck. The guns which were not disabled continued firing; only one gunner's mate and one able seaman were left on their feet to fire them as they were loaded by the men of the sailing crew, who had repeatedly been called on to substitute the men of the gun crews. The ship being out of control, the hull, smokestack and mast riddled with shot, and the cries of the wounded [adding to] the confusion; half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, at the same time signaling the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving the crew, which they did, aided by others from the Duero and the arsenal.¹

The fight had been on nearly two hours when the Spanish commander transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba. The Cristina received her worst punishment when, at 7 o'clock, she desperately pushed forward from the line of battle, as if with the intention of ramming the Baltimore or the Olympia. That was her final effort, and the work of destruction Montojo describes was speedily completed by the concentrated fire of the American ships, driving the Spanish flagship back almost upon the guns of the arsenal. Yet even if the result were not to be regarded as foregone from the moment the American ships swung into position and started for Cavite, the battle had been on but a short time before it was apparent, even to the distant watchers on the walls of Manila and on the roofs of Malate and Cavite, who would be the victor.²

¹ *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 91; the mistakes in translation have been corrected in the above quotation from Montojo's official report.

² Says Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 389: "Half an hour after the battle opened, we who

As the American ships came closer and their gunnery became more certain, effective opposition to them was less and less possible. The Castilla's guns (those that had been left on board her) were finally all rendered useless but one, and she was both afire and sinking when her crew were given orders to abandon her. The Austria had started to her aid, but had been driven back behind the secondary line and set on fire. Three guns on the Isla de Luzon were dismantled. Back on the secondary line, the disabled Ulloa was struck by a shell which opened her below the water-line, her commander and half her crew had been put out of action, and the rest had to escape to Point Sangley. The little Duero's engines and ineffective guns were disabled. As the commander of the Cristina, Luis Cadarso, was standing on board directing to the last the operations of removing the wounded to the hospital on shore, he was literally annihilated by a shell which struck him as if he had been its target. The Olympia had caught the Cristina as she swung about to limp back to her companions and raked her fore and aft with a 250-pound shell, which killed or disabled 60 men besides the commander.

This was the state of affairs when, at 7.35, a rumor that the ammunition for the rapid-fire guns of the Olympia was nearly exhausted caused Commodore Dewey to signal the fleet to withdraw into the bay for an examination and redistribution of ammunition. The actual state of destruction on board the Spanish boats was, of course, not known to him, but he must have felt quite sure of finishing his prey whenever he chose to do so. Hence it was that, finding the report of a shortage of ammunition on the flagship incorrect, he signaled the fleet on the way back into the bay to "let the people go to breakfast," while the commanding officers came aboard the Olympia to talk things over with him. Equally, it was a conscious were witnessing it, and from near or far were following anxiously its incidents, suffered the most mournful impression of seeing how the flames of a fire of immense proportions had already invaded the Cristina, and how the Castilla and Don Juan de Austria were also burning."

master of the situation who at this juncture sent word to the governor-general in Manila that the batteries at the mouth of the Pasig, on the Luneta, and at Malate, which had been keeping up a random and futile fire at his fleet, must cease their firing or the city would be shelled. These land batteries promptly became silent (as it proved, for all future time).¹

It was not only a beaten but an almost entirely abandoned fleet which awaited the finishing touches of destruction when, at 11.16, the American commander ordered the attack to be renewed. The *Cristina*, whose magazine had exploded shortly after the first engagement was over, and the water-logged *Castilla* had sunk, wrapped in flames, in their positions off the arsenal. The *Cuba*, *Luzon*, and *Austria* had moved around, at Montojo's orders, to where the small vessels had been sheltered behind the arsenal off Cavite, in Bakoor Bay. The instructions were that they were to be sunk and abandoned before they should be surrendered. The *Baltimore* had started toward the entrance to the bay to intercept what was at first thought to be a Spanish merchant vessel; but it proved to be flying a British flag, and she was recalled and, being nearest Cavite, headed the second attack. She proceeded first to silence the two-gun battery on Point Sangley, which had escaped attention in the first engagement. She and the other boats, then just coming up, devoted some shots to the *Ulloa* before it was discovered that they were battering an abandoned and sunken vessel. The circle of American ships then formed about the arsenal, behind which were the remaining Spanish vessels. The shots in reply were even fewer and more perfunctory than the wretched plight of the Spaniards might have given cause

¹ Joseph L. Stickney's account (*op. cit.*, pp. 476-77) makes it appear that Dewey was actually afraid he had run out of ammunition without materially damaging the Spanish ships. Hence, according to Stickney, the breakfast story was invented to cover the real reason for withdrawal. But Dewey had already plainly stated the reason to be a mistake about ammunition, in his official report of May 4. It is true that the real state of the destruction wrought among the Spanish ships did not become evident until, as the Americans were withdrawing into the bay, the *Cristina's* magazine exploded and the *Castilla* burst into flames.

for expecting. The Cuba, Luzon, and Duero were already being abandoned, their valves having been opened to the water and the breech-plugs of their guns taken before their crews retired to the arsenal. At 12.30, all firing had ceased on either side, the white flag having been raised above Cavite Arsenal, and Dewey withdrew his ships to the Manila side, leaving the Petrel behind to destroy the vessels in Bakoor Bay. A whaleboat's crew was sent to set fire to the Cuba, Luzon, Austria, and Duero, which had been in the fight, and also the disabled Lezo and the Velasco, gunboats which had taken no part in it. The little Manila and the small coast-survey vessel Argos were not burned where they lay aground with the rest, but were later hauled off and made captures. Two gunboats and three steam launches were towed off during the afternoon.¹ The Concord had meanwhile joined the Petrel in this work of unresisted destruction and capture, having completed the task assigned her by Dewey during the second engagement of destroying a large Spanish merchant vessel, the *Isla de Mindanau* of the Transatlantic Company (the subsidized colonial shipping-line of Spain), which had been hovering under the shelter of the Spanish fleet since it reached Manila on April 22, had gone with Montojo to Subig Bay, and, upon its return, had been beached off the coast near Las Piñas and its compartments flooded to render it useless if captured by the Americans. The Concord speedily set fire to it, and its crew barely escaped with their lives.²

¹ In a letter printed in the *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, E. P. Wood, commander of the Petrel, magnifies into heroism in the face of the enemy the burning of these ships. The letter is only worthy of note as cumulative evidence of the American failure fully to appreciate, even after it was all over, the demoralization of their opponents and the actually wretched state of the Spanish naval equipment.

² The Spaniards have never been able to forgive Dewey for this finishing touch to the day's destruction. Says Sastrón, *op. cit.* p. 394: "A most gloomy record will always be for the Petrel [a mistake in the boats], the inconceivable fury with which it cannonaded the sailors on the *Isla de Mindanau*, as well when they were rowing to gain the beach as when already disembarked on it, at which time they received five shots more from the American ship, although in spite of them they came out

The Spanish loss in killed and wounded, as given by Admiral Montojo, was 381 officers and men, of whom 167 were killed. Of these casualties (10 of which occurred in the arsenal), over one half were on the flagship *Cristina*, and, when the *Castilla* was abandoned, she had suffered a loss of 23 killed and 80 wounded.¹ When it was said that the casualties on the American side were but nine, two of whom were not admitted to the hospital, the only two serious cases being those of a man who slipped on the *Baltimore*'s deck and fractured his leg and of another sailor on the *Baltimore* with a wounded right foot,² the question occurs whether the Spanish gunners aimed at anything or simply fired to make a noise. Outside of the *Baltimore*, the American vessels suffered more damage from the concussion of their own guns than from the explosion of the Spanish shells, in the smashing of crockery, shaking loose of small boats, etc.³ Great comfort was derived in Spain by the belief that the 15-centimeter guns on *Point Sangley* disabled

unharméd." The crew was, of course, in line of the *Boston*'s fire, and her commander states (*Bureau of Navigation*, p. 77) that he continued firing after the *Mindanao* took fire, in obedience to orders. Dewey says (*ibid.*, p. 72) that the *Mindanao* "was armed and took part in the fight," but this is a mistake, at least if meant literally, though a small machine-gun on board may have fired some shots, quite uselessly, early in the first engagement.

¹ In Commodore Dewey's official report already cited, the killed on the *Cristina* were reported as numbering 150. The number as given by Montojo is 130, while she had 220 killed and wounded out of a total force of less than 400 men. (See *Notes on Spanish-American War*, *Office of Naval Intelligence*, part v, p. 13. These *Notes*, issued separately during 1898-1900, most of them being translations of Spanish documents, shed light upon the general state of unpreparedness of Spain in 1898.) The skeletons of some eighty men were found in the old hulk of the *Cristina*, when she was raised in April, 1903. It was easy to float the *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, and *Don Juan de Austria*, and they were added to the American navy in November, 1898.

² The detailed record of American casualties may be found in *Report of the Surgeon-General of Navy for 1898*, on pp. 1292 and 1302 of vol. II of *Message of the President and Accompanying Documents for 1898*.

³ The *Olympia* was hit half a dozen times, a hole was made in its frame by a 6-pound shot, a plate was dented, and its small boats damaged, but no men hurt; the *Boston* was hit four times, but suffered no damage, though one of her crew was bruised by a splinter; the *Raleigh* was hit once, a whaleboat sustaining the damage; the *Petrel* was struck once, with no damage; and the *Concord* was not struck at all.

the Baltimore and compelled her to withdraw, and the artillery lieutenant in command of them was hailed as a hero. The Baltimore was struck five times, the only projectile which did real damage disabling a 6-inch gun (which was easily repaired the next day), and exploding a box of ammunition, which wounded two officers and six men, none seriously. It was the Baltimore herself which in the second engagement silenced the Point Sangley guns. The Spanish fleet was unquestionably short of good gunners, but their ammunition was also old and defective, and many of their projectiles failed to explode at all, or, when they did at rare intervals strike the mark and explode, caused no damage worth mention.¹ What seemed to be two submarine mines exploded in front of Cavite at 5.06 in the morning, as the American vessels were starting in that direction; and Commodore Dewey reported that two launches put out from the arsenal during the first engagement and fire was concentrated upon them in the belief that they were attempting to use torpedoes on the Olympia. As has already been seen, the Spaniards probably had no torpedoes, or at least none that could have been expected to do damage.²

Not the victory itself, but the workmanlike manner in which it was achieved, and the wretched demoralization of the opposing foe, are the remarkable features of this day's events. Many differing comparisons have been made between the two fleets. The United States Court of Claims, in deciding the prize-money cases of Admiral Dewey and his men on February 26,

¹ Says Admiral Montojo (*Bureau of Navigation*, p. 92): "The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron; the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master-gunners and seaman-gunners; the ineptitude of some of the provisional machinists; the scarcity of rapid-fire guns; the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country and to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila. . . ."

² Joseph L. Stickney (*op. cit.*) and the narrative of the battle by George A. Loud (on the McCulloch), Charles P. Kindleberger (junior surgeon on the Olympia), and Joel C. Evans (gunner of the Boston), in the *Century Magazine*, August, 1898, make much of these incidents of the mines and torpedoes.

1900, after extended comparison of the opposing forces, reached some very remarkable conclusions, namely, that the number of men on board the Spanish vessels was 2973, as compared with 1836 on the American vessels (and that the number of men on board the vessels destroyed was 1914); and that, taking into consideration the shore batteries at the bay entrance and at Manila and Cavite, and the torpedoes and the mines, "the enemy's force was superior to the vessels of the United States," and, excluding shore batteries and submarine defenses, it was inferior. This may be good law as bearing on the question whether Dewey and his men were entitled to bounty at the rate for the victory over a superior force; but, for a practical comparison between the two forces, it must be disregarded. A fair comparison between the two naval forces must leave out of account, on the Spanish side, the gunboats which were under cover, either in dry dock with their engines out or grounded and abandoned, while the situation of the *Ulloa*, careened and anchored, and of the *Castilla*, moored fast with no steam up, must be borne in mind; and, on the American side, the supply-ships must be disregarded, and also the non-combatant *McCulloch* (as, for the same reason, the dispatch-boat *Duero*¹). Taking official figures, as far as available, we find that the six American warships had a total tonnage of 19,098, a total horse-power of 46,177, an average speed of 17.5 knots at their maximum, and had on board 1709 officers and men. The six vessels on the Spanish side (with the gun-boat *Ulloa*) had a total tonnage of 11,271, a total horse-power of 13,793 (4123 of this on the *Castilla* and *Ulloa*, without steam up), an average maximum speed of 14.15 knots (disregarding the *Castilla* and *Ulloa*), and a total force of 1875 men (as stated by Montojo, who probably meant this number to include all the men under him on all the vessels and in the arsenal). The difference in steaming power and speed is at once noted.

¹ The *Duero*, however, carried one 6.3-inch Pallisser rifle, which may have done some firing.

One other highly significant point of comparison remains to be made, which is as to the guns of the opposing forces. The American fleet had 129 or 130 guns, of which 34 were rapid-fire guns (20 of these being 5-inch guns), 10 were 8-inch and 23 were 6-inch breech-loading rifles. The Spanish ships had 76 guns (counting 2 on the *Ulloa*), of which 9 were rapid-fire guns of small caliber (7 of 2.24 inches and 2 of 1.65 inches), while 6 were 16-centimeter (6.3 inch), 4 were 13-centimeter (5.12 inch), and 16 were 12-centimeter (4.72 inch) breech-loading rifles. Put in another way, the six American ships engaged had in their main batteries 53 guns, of which 10 were 8-inch, 23 were 6-inch, and 20 were 5-inch; the six Spanish ships engaged had in their main batteries 26 guns, of which 6 were 6.3-inch and 20 were 5.1-inch or 4.7-inch; the Americans' secondary battery comprised 75 or 76 guns, ranging from 3-inch rifles down to machine guns or mitrailleuses, and the Spaniards' secondary battery comprised 50 guns ranging from 3.4-inch down. The Court of Claims allowed for the 17 guns of from 4- to 6-inch caliber that had been placed at the entrance to the bay, in range of 9 of which the American vessels sailed (though of this number 3 were old muzzle-loading guns); for the 6 guns in the Cavite shore batteries, of which only the two 15-centimeter rifles on Point Sangley and the single 12-centimeter rifle at the arsenal were modern breech-loading pieces; and for 53 guns on the Manila side, of which 41 were antique muzzle-loading pieces of 3 to 8.5 inches in caliber (a dozen or so incapable of being fired), while of the more modern guns only the 4 24-centimeter rifles on the Luneta and in front of the walls had really to be seriously feared from their position and range, and they, as seen, were so defectively mounted as not to possess their full range, even if well handled. These are all figures that must be taken into account in rendering any fair verdict upon the battle as a naval performance.¹

¹ Aside from the reports of the opposing commanders, as given in *Bureau of*

The American fleet had begun the work of a blockader even while the battle was on. From the first, the blockade was ef-

Navigation, for the above comparison fuller data have been obtained as to the American ships from *Report of Chief of Ordnance of the Navy*, 1898 (pp. 1180-83 and 1188-91 of vol. II of *Message of the President and Accompanying Documents for 1898*.) It is to be noted that five or six of the small machine-guns on the war-vessels had been mounted on the noncombatant McCulloch, Nanshan, and Zafiro. For the Court of Claims decision, see *Harper's History of the War in the Philippines*, pp. 29-37. It allowed \$191,400 as bounty (under an old law, repealed on March 3, 1899), or \$100 for each of the 1914 men "found" to have been on the vessels destroyed (barring the Cuba, Luzon, and Austria, which were raised and restored). Prize money was afterward recovered by Dewey and his men for the property captured (but not for the property on land, including the Cavite Arsenal, appraised at \$600,000 in *Report of Secretary of Navy*, Washington, 1902, pp. 240-45), under a decision of the District of Columbia Supreme Court of February 23, 1903, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court (reported in *Sen. Doc. 175*, 57th Cong., 2d Sess.). This amounted to \$828,677, of which, after deducting attorneys' fees, etc., the navy pension fund received one half, or \$370,366, and Dewey and his men received an equal amount. Dewey received 5 per cent of both bounty and prize money, or \$9570 and \$18,500 respectively. The captains of ships each received one tenth of his ship's total share, and the officers and men about two months' and five months' pay from the bounty and prize awards respectively. (See *New York Evening Post*, August 13, 1904.) For a comparison of the two fleets by the Chief Intelligence Officer of the United States Navy, see *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, pp. 5374-75. The figures therein given as to the Spanish ships are taken from *Estado General de la Armada de España* for 1898; these official figures should be checked by reference to Spanish sources of information as to the battle, which reveal in part the alterations in armament of some of their ships, remountings of guns on land, etc. Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 384, gives the equipment of the Spanish vessels engaged, as taken from Spanish official sources. Obviously, vessels in dry dock and unmanned, survey vessels, transports, etc., should not be taken into the comparison, as has been done, however, in all the American sources here cited. The full complement of men for the Spanish ships engaged would have been 1351. Montojo was short of men all around, and had enlisted merchantmen sailors and other volunteers, having more than the usual complement, though his recruits were of a rather nondescript sort; in his total of 1875 men, he undoubtedly meant to include all the men under him, at the arsenal and on board the fighting vessels, and after most of the crews of the beached gunboats had been added to his force (only about 40 men out of 96 being left on the Ulloa, for instance). Nevertheless, on his own statement, he had more men engaged than had Dewey; though, to reach its total of 2973, the Court of Claims counted some of his men two or three times. There were more than 53 guns in the fortifications of Manila, if one counts all the antique bronze pieces, the rusting iron mortars, some guns lying in ditches, and others rusting in obscure corners; a table drawn up from the Spanish plans after the city's capture lists 130 pieces in all (*Report of War Department*, 1903, vol. III, p. 444), but shows only 28 rifled cannon, of which only 8 were breech-loaders. Besides the magazine accounts of the battle that have been cited, the newspaper correspondence of John F. McCutcheon, correspondent of the *Chicago Record*, also an eyewitness, and the dispatches of J. L. Stickney to

fective, though carried out with considerable leniency.¹ The American fleet on May 2 definitely took up station in front of Cavite. The batteries on Sangley were destroyed by a landing party that day, and the next the arsenal of Cavite was occupied and the Raleigh and the Baltimore went to Corregidor to secure the surrender of the Spanish batteries at the bay's entrance, paroling the men garrisoned there and destroying the guns. In the interval that elapsed before American sailors replaced the Spaniards, a horde of Tagalogs sacked the arsenal, apparently leaderless, yet with discrimination enough to take everything they could find in the way of old firearms, swords, etc. Dewey's demand for surrender was also extended to cover the town of Cavite, just back of the arsenal on the peninsula, the seat of the provincial government, and in possession of the Spanish army under General García Peña. The Spaniards opposed the claim that the white flag on the arsenal covered also the "plaza," but yielded when the American ships covered their retreat across the peninsula, though instead of surrendering they hurriedly withdrew along the narrow peninsula and Peña took up his quarters in San Francisco de Malabon, a few miles inland. They were not molested during their not exactly calm and dignified retreat in plain sight. Neither did Dewey occupy the abandoned town, and almost immediately some hundreds of natives armed with rifles were busy sacking the Government buildings and the houses of Spaniards, from which

the New York *Herald*, are of especial interest. On the Spanish side, see also *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VIII (1898), nos. 184, 185, and 186, for the Spanish press dispatches of April and May regarding Dewey's coming to Manila, the battle, and the first stages of the siege of Manila. Sastrón, *op. cit.*, facing p. 388, gives a fairly accurate plan of the battle, especially as regards the positions of the Spanish vessels. The similar plan given by Foreman, *op. cit.*, p. 577, is entirely incorrect, as are many of the data given by this writer about the battle. A very fair defense of Montojo, as the victim of Spanish improvisation, is the pamphlet *Ante la opinión y ante la historia* (Madrid, 1900).

¹ The Spaniards seemed to feel rather aggrieved because Dewey did not indulge in proclamations and all the paraphernalia of a formal blockade on paper; they were quite ready to admit, however, that his blockade was effectively enforced.

only the money had been removed. The parish priest of Cavite was allowed to go in peace, but several other friars there found the crowd threatening and took refuge in the military hospital, pretending sickness. From here they were the next day transferred with the wounded soldiers to Manila (these men having in the mean time had the solicitous attention of the American surgeons). The natives were, for the time being, left in control of Cavite, the town not being formally occupied by the Americans until General Anderson arrived with troops; efforts were, however, made to keep the new possessors of the town within proper bounds and to have them maintain order, which in the main they did, after the first few hours of sacking and pillage.¹

The authorities and inhabitants of Manila were in momentary expectation of a bombardment. Their efforts to align the Filipinos upon the side of their old sovereign had been crowned with some apparent success, in the securing of volunteers and protestations of loyalty from numerous native chiefs. For the time being the principal thing was to get away from the American shells. Four thousand fugitives, among them the wife and children of Governor-General Augustin, had gone to

¹ The Spaniards were disposed to complain throughout of the lack of "formality" on the American side. They claim that the first commander who represented Dewey in the conference on shore at Cavite, asked for by them, made them understand that Dewey wished only to secure the destruction of the Spanish vessels and of the shore batteries at Cavite and the assurance that his vessels would not be molested at the entrance of the bay [if they went out again?]; but that, by subsequent modifications, these demands were enlarged as stated above. (Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-403.) The failure of the Americans to occupy and govern the town of Cavite seems to have had some influence later in leading the Spaniards to believe that, if Manila was captured or surrendered, the natives' armed forces would be left free to pillage and massacre. Dewey, of course, felt that his prime concern was with the state of affairs on the water, and, after manning the small boats he captured, and needing others to keep up communication with Hongkong, he probably did not see how he could leave more men on land than was necessary to take charge of the naval arsenal and do the repairing work which he had on hand. He did keep the *Olympia* at work patrolling the peninsula, as well as could be done from the deck of a vessel. His report of May 4, unfortunately, is most meager of details, being the merest outline of the battle of May 1 and the incidents immediately following.

interior points north on the railroad during the few days before the naval engagement. The walled city of Manila was now abandoned by almost its entire population, which took refuge in the city suburbs farthest inland. The stores were all closed. It was said that Dewey had on May 2 demanded the surrender of the city, and Augustin had refused in truly Spanish formal style, which implied "resisting to the death," especially with a so-called fortified town. It is certain that the foreign consuls, particularly the British, German, and Belgian, were soon busily going back and forth between the Olympia and the Manila shore, and communications, of a purely informal sort on Dewey's part, were conveyed by them. Dewey was quite willing, from his own testimony,¹ that the authorities in the city should be kept in sufficient awe of his guns, and probably made virtual threats as to what he would do if the shore batteries attempted to injure his fleet. He also intimated, the very evening of the battle, the surrender to him of the cable-station in Malate; and, this being refused, cut the cable on May 2.²

¹ *Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2927-28. Admiral Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee in 1902, contained in the foregoing document, as well as his dispatch of May 4 to Washington, shows that he never entertained the notion of taking the city, until he should be so instructed and troops to occupy it should arrive, but only desired to warn the Spaniards that they must not use their guns. There were, however, frequent rumors to the contrary in Manila, and the inhabitants lived in momentary anticipation of a bombardment. The foreign colonies in Manila were informed, through their consuls, that they would receive sufficient notice before bombardment to get on board the vessels of their nations in the harbor, and would, if necessary, be accommodated at Cavite; and there were several times when these foreign vessels, under the eye of the American fleet, were crowded with such fugitives, including many Spanish ladies and children.

² The Spaniards had at times, however, more direct communication with the continent of Asia than the Americans. On May 22, Dewey reported that they were using the land wires to Bolinau and the cable to Hongkong from there; the insurgents, however, soon cut them off from communication with Bolinau. Later, they were reported to have communicated through Iloilo and thence to Borneo and Singapore. Long before the city fell, they were dependent for news on the mail which Dewey let pass through the foreign war-vessels which communicated with Hongkong. For a while, he opened the Spanish mail.

C. THE UNITED STATES PREPARES FOR A LAND CONQUEST

It is in entire agreement with the record of the times to assert that the idea of a conquest of the Philippines was, up to and even after Dewey's victory, almost as remote from the minds of the authorities at Washington as it was from the minds of the American people, who were, when the news came, half astonished at calling to mind that Spain had possessions in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic. President McKinley has stated: "When Dewey sank the ships at Manila, as he was ordered to do, it was not to capture the Philippines—it was to destroy the Spanish fleet, the fleet of the nation against which we were waging war, and we thought that the soonest way to end that war was to destroy the power of Spain to make war, and so we sent Dewey."¹ Yet there is the statement of Secretary of War Alger that it had been decided to send an army of occupation to the Philippines before Dewey's victory occurred, and orders for the assembling of volunteers at San Francisco had been given on May 4.² Simple obedience to the rules by which war is waged, however, implies that every effort shall be made to cripple the enemy, and that every advantage gained shall be followed up while war lasts; and this step of preparation was all the more natural at that early date, if we suppose that Dewey's letter of March 31, expressing his confidence that the Spanish fleet could be taken and the de-

¹ Speech at Youngstown, Ohio, October 18, 1899. (See *Republican Campaign Textbook*, 1900, p. 331.)

² R. A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War* (New York, 1901), p. 326. The author's statement that the orders of May 4 for the assembling of volunteers at San Francisco were given three days before the receipt of Dewey's cablegram announcing his victory (sent from Hongkong) loses some of its point from the fact that, before the cable was cut on May 1, the Spaniards had communicated through Hongkong report on the engagement which, though not accurate, established their defeat, and President McKinley had on May 3 sent a message of congratulation to Dewey at Hongkong. (See *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 68.) On p. 136 of the same document is a telegram of May 4 from Secretary Long to the navy yard at Mare Island, showing that the City of Peking was already chartered to send ammunition and was to be prepared also to carry troops. On p. 176 of *Report of the Major-General commanding the Army*, 1898, will be found a statement that orders for assembling volunteers at San Francisco were given on May 3.

fenses of Manila reduced in one day, had reached Washington before the news of the victory came. And in spite of this testimony, as a foreign critical observer has put it: —

They seemed to be surprised at Washington by the demand for reinforcements from Dewey. No troops were ready to be sent to him, there was even discussion for several days in the Department of War before the number of reinforcements was decided upon, and the first expedition did not leave San Francisco until May 25. It did not reach Manila until June 30. The hesitation which the President showed in regard to the fate of the Philippines after the defeat of Spain, comes to the support of the foregoing facts to prove that the American Government had no line of conduct mapped out with respect to this archipelago at the beginning of the war. The initial object of Dewey's expedition seems, then, simply to have been, apart from the destruction of the Spanish fleet, to create for the United States rights that would warrant them claiming at the end of the war a naval station in this part of the Pacific.¹

When, on May 7, Commodore Dewey was notified by cable that the President had named him acting rear-admiral (which was made a regular appointment after a vote of thanks to Dewey and his men was passed by Congress on May 10), he was informed that troops were being got ready to go on the Peking (which was to carry him ammunition and supplies), and was asked how many troops ought to be sent. He replied on May 13 that he could "take Manila any time," but 5000 troops were necessary to retain it, and thus, as he thought, to "control the Philippine Islands." As seen, orders had been

¹ A. Viallate, "Les préliminaires de la guerre hispano-américaine et l'annexion des Philippines par les Etats-Unis" (*Revue Historique*, Juillet-Aout, 1903, pp. 282-83). This writer had already (p. 281) refused to believe that the officers and executive heads of a growing and ambitious navy would have done other than plan for the securing of a needed coaling and naval station in the Orient when war brought this possibility to their very door. He says it is reported that the officers of the Asiatic squadron of the United States had for a long time back been paying particular attention to the study of the Philippine Islands, and he points to the securing of naval stations in the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands as evidence of the existing tendency to follow Captain Mahan's preachings. His article constitutes a very good review, from American and Spanish official publications, of the steps leading up to the war and of the treaty negotiations so far as these related to the Philippines.

given on May 4 to assemble at San Francisco the volunteers being raised, under the call of April 23, in the Western States; the first of these troops went into camp there on the 6th, and recruiting was hurried forward in those states. In addition to the Peking, under navy contract, vessels were hastily chartered by the army and fitted up as best they could be for carrying troops. The army staff was straining its resources to the utmost limit in the eastern part of the country at the time; and, with all the details as to clothing the volunteers, provisioning the ships, and equipping the expeditions in general, three weeks elapsed before the expedition sailed. Three merchant vessels, the *City of Peking*, *Sydney*, and *Australia*, sailed from San Francisco on May 25, bearing almost 2500 men, under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, who had come down from Alaska with a detachment of the Fourteenth Infantry. Five companies of these regulars and the California and Oregon regiments of volunteer infantry, together with a detachment of volunteer heavy artillery raised in California, constituted the force. At Honolulu they were joined by the cruiser *Charleston*, under orders to proceed to Cavite, consorting the troopships and navy supplies on the way. This expedition did not, however, reach Cavite until June 30, having proceeded, under sealed orders to Captain Glass of the *Charleston*, to the little island of Guam, in the Marianne Islands. The *Charleston* entered the harbor of the latter place on June 20, and her shots at the tumbling old fort were taken by the half-dozen military authorities of this lonesome outpost of Spain to be a courteous salute, which the subordinates at once put out in a launch to return by a call. The arrival of a ship in that part of the world was sufficient occasion for rejoicing, in any event; and, not having heard from Manila for about six months, they knew nothing of the outbreak of war.¹

¹ The classic story told to illustrate the fact that, under the Spanish régime, appointment to official position on Guam meant exile is that of a military governor some years back who boarded a tramp merchantman and made a trip *incognito* to Europe, returning after a year's absence to be greeted by his secretary with the

They were apprised of their error and were told to convey peremptory orders for surrender to the military governor of the group. He sent his inevitable formal protest against "this act of violence," when he had been given no information that war was on; but admitted his inability to resist the Charleston with his four rusty old cast-iron cannon, unsafe even for saluting, and acquiesced in the demand for surrender with a "God be with you." The next morning Captain Braunersreuther and a few marines on the Charleston went on shore and obtained the surrender of the Spanish officials and garrison before the landing party of Oregon troops which had been got ready had reached the shore. That afternoon the little garrison was disarmed, the few native soldiers released, the American flag was hoisted, and the six Spanish army and navy officers and fifty-four enlisted men were taken on board and carried to Manila.¹

Two more expeditions left for Manila in June, the first under Brigadier-General Francis V. Greene, and the second under Major-General Wesley E. Merritt, who had been designated commander of the new "Department of the Pacific," he being followed closely into Manila Bay by a shipload of troops under Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur. The ten ships chartered for these expeditions bore over 8000 men, and the total of officers and men arriving at Manila up to July 31 was 10,924. During the latter part of July, three more ships were dispatched, but of course none arrived until after the fall of Manila on August 13. This fourth expedition was under command of Major-General Elwell S. Otis, though the ships traveled some time apart, and its somewhat less than 5000 men brought the total of troops sent to the Philippines until late October of 1898 up to 15,689, exclusive of a few hundred recruits and teamsters and other camp-followers sent out on small

report "Nothing new." The Spanish supply-vessels then went there from Manila only once every year and a half.

¹ For the official account of this comic-opera conquest, see *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 151-57. A good descriptive account is contained in Henry Cabot Lodge's *The War with Spain* (New York, 1900).

boats with horses and equipments. Of the 11,000 troops arriving before the fall of Manila, only about 2500 were regulars, these being two battalions each of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, five companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, four batteries of the Third Artillery (serving as infantry and without field guns), and detachments of the engineer, hospital, and signal corps. The volunteers in these first expeditions comprised one infantry regiment each from California, Oregon, Colorado, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Idaho, Wyoming, Minnesota, and North Dakota, volunteer artillerymen from California, two batteries of Utah light artillery, and the Astor Battery of New York. The Montana and South Dakota infantry regiments followed them in August, and the regulars in Manila were reinforced by five more companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, two more batteries of the Third Artillery, and six troops of the Fourth Cavalry, the first men of that arm of the service to arrive in the islands.¹

¹ The official data as to the number and organizations of the troops in these expeditions will be found in *Report of Quartermaster-General of the Army*, 1898 (accompanying *Report of Secretary of War*, vol. I of *Message of the President and Accompanying Documents*, 1898, p. 460), in *Report of the Major-General commanding the Army*, 1898, pp. 499-500, and in Major-General Otis's report for 1899 (*Report of War Department*, 1899, vol. I, part 4, p. 3). Much previously unpublished information regarding the sending of the first expeditions to the Philippines may be found on pp. 635-782 of vol. II of *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902*. (This document published in 1902 for the use of the War Department, has not been made available for public distribution. Volume II is entirely devoted to the telegraphic correspondence regarding the Philippine expeditions and subsequent cable messages to and from Manila. The cable messages have in some cases been edited, in the way of omissions. This document will hereafter be cited as *Corr. Rel. War*. In these pages may be seen how, starting with Dewey's recommendations for 5000 troops, it had, by May 30, been decided, largely upon General Merritt's recommendations, to send 20,000 men to the Philippines. There was also some clash of opinion between Generals Miles and Merritt as to the number and nature of the organization and equipment of the troops to be sent, General Merritt being urgently desirous of having regulars for half of the force (though eventually expressing satisfaction with the Western volunteers). It is curious to note (pp. 654-56, 665, 675) how much more accurate was the information prepared in the War Department (probably from secret service reports from Spain) as to the Spanish forces in the Philippines and general military conditions there than that cabled by Admiral Dewey or by Consul Wildman at Hongkong. Other interesting points herein to be noted are President Mc-

D. FILIPINO COÖPERATION AGAINST SPAIN IS INVITED

Another element had, however, been added to the situation, even before the first expedition sailed from San Francisco. What has been brought out in preceding pages, as to the conditions in Luzon and the central islands from January to April of 1898, has made it apparent that, regardless of what attitude the exiled insurgent leaders might assume under the new war status, the rebellious element of natives in various provinces would have to be taken into account. Relying upon the information of Consul Williams, Dewey had assumed that the native population would at once, regardless of leadership, ally itself with the Americans, and was disappointed that thousands of them did not at once revolt in Cavite alone, within sight of his ships. It is at this date idle to speculate as to what would have been the outcome of the Spanish efforts to conciliate the native population, had not Aguinaldo and his associates in Hongkong returned to organize opposition to Spain with the apparent authorization and good wishes of the chief representative of the United States on the scene, though it may be recorded as unquestionable that, up to the arrival of Aguinaldo, the tardily adopted Spanish "policy of attraction," accompanied by indefinite promises, was making headway among the most troublesome natives, the Tagalogs. But Aguinaldo

Kinley's cautiousness in calling the new department the "Department of the Pacific" (hence the public impression of the times that the Philippines were to be attached temporarily, so far as regards military organization, to California, though it was from the first intended to be an independent military command, and was on June 21 made a separate army corps; also the reference, in this connection, to the President's *confidential* instructions to General Merritt. (*Ibid.*, p. 649: "The department [of the Pacific] is intended to include Philippine Islands only; but this fact is not mentioned in orders, and will be communicated to you in confidential letter of instructions" — telegram May 16 to Merritt.) The President's written instructions of May 19 to General Merritt (*ibid.*, pp. 676-78) were, for some reason, not included in the formal military reports of that year; they outline the duties of a military occupant of foreign territory, as prescribed by international law, and their most essential features were repeated by General Merritt in his proclamation of August 14 in Manila. (They are also to be found on p. 85 of *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.)

arrived, brought by one of Dewey's vessels; he set up headquarters for himself in Cavite, obtained a few more arms from the American commander, besides those which his former followers had already been careful to seize upon the departure of the Spaniards, and soon another lot of arms arrived for him, bought with the assistance of the American consul at Hongkong; he and his assistants sent the news far and wide that they had an "alliance" with the Americans and were going to have their independence; they surrounded and captured the Spanish armed forces in Cavite, and laid the plans for as complete an uprising to the northward of Manila; and within two weeks from the arrival of the insurgent leader of 1897, there were actively or secretly associated with him more Filipinos of prominence, entitled to be considered leaders among their people, than ever had been the case in 1896 or 1897, and the governor-general's plan of a united resistance of the two people to save the sovereignty of the islands to Spain had become an illusion and was clearly recognized as such by all save a few Spanish optimists.

There had been some communication between Dewey and the insurgents in Hongkong during March and April, supposedly with regard to the latter accompanying the fleet to Manila for the purpose of stimulating the native opposition to the Spaniards. Whatever were the propositions then discussed, it came to nothing on either side. Dewey did not take the "little brown men" very seriously; and the desire to go with the fleet, on the part of Aguinaldo at least, was not strong enough to prevent him departing hurriedly and secretly via Saigon for Singapore on the 7th of April, in order to escape service in the suit that had been brought against him by Señor Artacho for a division of the money received from Primo de Rivera.¹ His original intention, it has been claimed,

¹ Dewey says that he himself saw some of Aguinaldo's associates two or three times, that "they seemed to be all very young, earnest boys," and he did not attach much importance to what they said, and that, though he later wired Consul

was to proceed from Singapore to Europe.¹ But there was in Singapore a certain British subject who had resided in the Philippines. This Mr. H. W. Bray sought out Aguinaldo immediately upon his arrival, on April 21, and two days later he had arranged for an interview between the insurgent leader and Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States in Singapore. Two (Aguinaldo says three) interviews were held with great secrecy and formality between these parties, Mr. Bray serving as Spanish interpreter, while one of Aguinaldo's Filipino companions understood English a very little. Just exactly what passed between the two principals to the interviews perhaps only the interpreter could tell, as the stories of the principals conflict. Consul-General Pratt reported officially at the time, and has always maintained, that

Pratt at Singapore to have Aguinaldo come on, he did not think of delaying his expedition for him, as his information led him to believe that the people would all rise against the Spaniards anyway and these few Filipinos at Hongkong would have little to do with it (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 2927, 2932). When the time came to leave for Manila, says Admiral Dewey, none of the Filipinos who had been talking about it were "ready" to go with him, one excusing himself "because he did n't have any toothbrush." The "little men" kept taking up his time and "bothering" him at a period when his hands were full with his preparations to meet the Spaniards. (One Filipino, José Alejandrino, did, however, go with Dewey's fleet to Manila Bay, on board of one of the supply-ships; but he returned to Hongkong without landing at Cavite.) Aguinaldo's side of the story, told, it is to be noticed, in 1899, and then written by another than himself, is to be found in his *Reseña verídica*, already cited. He claims that he had personal interviews with the commander of the Petrel, between March 16 and April 6; that these interviews were sought by the American officer at the instructions of Dewey; that the Petrel's commander, in answer to his express query as to what the United States would concede to the Filipinos, said that "the United States were a rich and great nation and did not need colonies"; that he asked that the "agreement" be put in writing, and the American officer promised to lay it before his superior. The *Reseña verídica* is so inaccurate and uncandid that it will not do to accept any statement resting on its authority. Admiral Dewey may have become in 1902 somewhat inclined to minimize the importance which he originally placed upon the plan of using the Filipinos at least to hold the Spaniards in check. Still, it is plain from his deeds as well as from his testimony that he never took the Filipino insurgents very seriously; his attitude toward the "little men" who took up his time is too typically Anglo-Saxon.

¹ Sastrón, *op. cit.* p. 415-16. This statement has also been made by persons who met Aguinaldo at this time in Saigon and Singapore. See also *La Política de España en Filipinas*, vol. VIII, p. 52, for reports coming to Madrid papers to this effect in January, 1898.

he limited himself to endeavoring to secure the coöperation of Aguinaldo as a leader of insurgents with the American fleet; that this coöperation was, so far as his negotiations went, to be unconditional; and that he declined to discuss the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines. Aguinaldo claims that he was promised in these interviews that the United States "would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines under a naval protectorate," and that there was no need for putting the agreement in writing, as he asked, since "the words of Admiral Dewey and the American consul were sacred." The definite outcome of the conferences was that, in response to a cablegram of Mr. Pratt on April 24 that Aguinaldo was ready to come to Hongkong and arrange for "insurgent coöperation," Dewey at once replied: "Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible." Aguinaldo and his two Filipino companions left for Hongkong two days later; hence, of course, arrived there too late for any conference with Dewey.¹

¹ Aguinaldo's authorized version of the Singapore conferences is to be found in his *Reseña verídica*, in which are made the statements quoted above. Consul-General Pratt's official reports of the conferences and his subsequent correspondence with the State Department regarding the whole matter are to be found on pp. 341-58 of *Sen. Doc. 62*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Disregarding entirely Aguinaldo's *ex parte* statements, it is apparent from Mr. Pratt's own dispatches to the State Department that he plainly enough understood Aguinaldo and his companions to assert that independence was their object in mind in coöperating with the Americans. Aside from his statement of Aguinaldo's desires contained in his dispatch of April 30, he sent the Department on May 5 a clipping from the Singapore *Free Press* of May 4, giving an account of the whole Bray-Pratt-Aguinaldo episode, which account stated Aguinaldo's policy to embrace the independence of the Philippines, with American or European advisers [the chief of them to be Mr. Howard W. Bray?]. On June 8, up to which date Mr. Pratt had continued to be very self-complacent over his part in the affair (having, on June 2, in a dispatch to Washington, virtually claimed for himself the intimacy with Philippine affairs which Mr. Bray assumed to possess, and praising himself for having "assisted the cause of the United States by securing Aguinaldo's coöperation"), he sent to Washington another clipping from the Singapore *Free Press* of that date, in which Mr. Bray, who had constituted himself in the columns of that journal an oracle on Philippine matters, and who at about the same time addressed President McKinley in behalf of Aguinaldo, states that "independence is the only possible solution of the Philippine question." On June 9, Mr. Pratt fraternized enthusiastically with the Filipino colony in Singapore, exchanging toasts with them in a demonstration made by them in his honor, and passing over without protest the statement of their leader

No word had been left by Dewey as to sending Aguinaldo on if he should arrive at Hongkong, and consequently the insurgent chief waited in the latter port sixteen days, until the McCulloch had brought, on her second trip thither, permission for him and various of his followers to come to Cavite. Consul-General Wildman and Mr. John Barrett (ex-United States minister resident and consul-general in Siam, who soon after engaged as a newspaper correspondent in the Philippines) put Aguinaldo and thirteen companions on board the McCulloch at night, on May 16.¹ Meanwhile, Mr. Wildman had had many

that they came to thank him for bringing about the arrangement whereby their people were to have independence under American protection. Indeed, in a contribution over his own signature in *Collier's Weekly* for April 13, 1901, Mr. Pratt plainly states that he inferred from his interviews with Aguinaldo that the latter was thinking of Filipino independence and only feared that the United States forces would abandon them before they could establish it, never dreaming that the United States would permanently occupy the islands; the inference is that Mr. Pratt himself then felt that no such notion need be entertained. A very fair account of the episode from the Spanish side is to be found in Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 415-19. This writer claims that Mr. Bray engineered the whole proceeding; that he spent some time in argument with Aguinaldo before he could convince him that he was justified in disregarding the pact of Biak-na-bató and returning to raise insurrection against Spain; that, this accomplished, Mr. Bray was the instrument in bringing Messrs. Pratt and Aguinaldo together; and that, in order to pass judgment upon what occurred between them, one must know what sort of an interpreter Mr. Bray was. He says: "What is difficult to explain . . . is that Aguinaldo and Consul Spencer Pratt were, at the end of the interview, perfectly satisfied: the latter, because he believed that Aguinaldo would simply coöperate with the American forces to put an end to the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippine Islands; the former, because he was convinced that the reward of his coöperation would be nothing else but the attainment of independence for his land." Mr. Bray promptly gave the news of his achievement to his friend the editor of the *Singapore Free Press*, and the Spanish consul at Singapore entered a protest to the British authorities of the colony against this violation by the American consul of the proclamation of neutrality which had just been issued there. Messrs. Pratt and Bray later had a disagreement, the former claiming that the Englishman had misrepresented him. In his testimony at Washington in 1902, Felipe Buencamino said that the insurgent treasury was asked to pay \$6000 to settle a judgment for libel obtained by Consul Pratt in a suit against Mr. Bray in Singapore. (*See Hearings, etc., Committee on Insular Affairs, 1901-03*, p. 283.) In his testimony before the Peace Commission at Paris, General C. A. Whittier stated that Pratt offered Aguinaldo money for his expenses to Hongkong, but the latter refused (*Sen. Doc.* 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 499).

¹ The *Republican Campaign Text Book* for 1900, quoting from one of Mr. Barrett's accounts of early relations with Aguinaldo, cites (p. 220) his statement that

talks with Aguinaldo and his associates, and had put them in touch with two Americans in Hongkong who were to act as their agents in the purchase of arms and ammunition. Of the money paid to the insurgents by the Spaniards the preceding December, deposits amounting to \$117,000 (Mexican) were, according to Aguinaldo, made with Mr. Wildman, of which the first payment of \$50,000 was expended for rifles, ammunition, and a small boat, while he claims the subsequent payment of \$67,000 was embargoed. What is known of a certainty is that arms were bought, with the more or less active assistance of the consul-general at Hongkong, and that the first consignment, amounting to 2000 Mauser rifles and 200,000 cartridges, was allowed to be landed at Cavite, close by the arsenal.¹

Lieutenant Caldwell, of Dewey's staff, who came to Hongkong on the McCulloch, was rather averse than otherwise to taking Aguinaldo and his companions to Cavite.

¹ Consul-General Wildman, who was drowned in the unfortunate accident to the steamship Rio de Janeiro in the bay of San Francisco in 1901, seems never to have reported his action in regard to securing arms for the insurgents. Indeed, outside of cable messages in May, with regard to various Filipino exiles of wealth in Hongkong desiring to proclaim their allegiance to the United States after Dewey's victory, he seems to have made no report on his dealings with the insurgents until July 18, 1898, when he sent a dispatch assuring the authorities at Washington that the Filipinos were "fighting for annexation to the United States first"; and that, if the United States did not keep the islands, it was certain that Spain could not again assert her sovereignty. (See *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 336-38.) This dispatch contains several misstatements, and makes it appear that Wildman's reason for not communicating previously his negotiations with the insurgents was the instruction he had received the previous December not to hold such negotiations. By July, 1898, however, various reports were being circulated in the newspapers of Europe and the United States as to there having been some secret agreement between Aguinaldo and the United States consuls. Aguinaldo's version of his relations with the Hongkong consulate will be found in the *Reseña verídica*. Letters from Mr. Wildman to the insurgent chief, not elsewhere published, particularly with reference to the endeavors to send arms in June and July, were made public, on behalf of Aguinaldo, among the inclosures to an address to the Congress of the United States, written by Felipe Buencamino on August 20, 1899, the said letters being printed on p. 6180, *Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. In the letter of June 21 from Mr. Wildman, some rather remarkable advice is given to Aguinaldo as to his treatment of the Spanish prisoners he had taken, the consul being therein made to say: "Never mind about feeding them three meals a day. Rice and water will be a good diet. They have been living too high for the past few years." And

The McCulloch arrived off Cavite on the afternoon of May 19, and Aguinaldo was at once taken to the Olympia for an interview with Admiral Dewey. It is in this interview that Aguinaldo claims the American admiral assured him that he "must have no doubt concerning the recognition of Philippine independence on the part of the United States"; that "America was rich in lands and money and did not need colonies." That any such specific declaration was ever made by Admiral Dewey rests upon the unsupported testimony of Aguinaldo; it has been many times expressly denied by Admiral Dewey,¹ and all the contributory circumstances support the denial. In a cablegram written at Cavite on May 20, which dealt principally with the matter of maintaining the blockade and of preparing to meet a second Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey reported the arrival of Aguinaldo and said he was "organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance that will be valuable." The reply of Secretary Long, under date of May 26, was that full discretionary powers were reposed in Admiral Dewey to deal with circumstances which Washington could not know, but it was added: "It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future." Dewey's reply to this, on June 3, was: "Have acted according to the spirit of Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the de-

again: "Let them have a taste of real war. Do not be so tender with them. Handle them as they would treat you." The letters with the Buencamino document, relative to the little souvenirs to be sent by Aguinaldo to the consuls at Singapore and Hongkong, also shed some light upon the latter gentlemen's personalities. Aguinaldo claims (*Reseña verídica*) that Mr. Pratt wished to be made representative of the Philippines in the United States, and that he promised him a high post in the custom-house or something equally good.

¹ Notably in a personal letter to Senator H. C. Lodge, quoted in *Cong. Record*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1329, and in a memorandum written by Admiral Dewey for the first Philippine Commission, of which he was a member, to be found in its *Report*, vol. I, p. 171. See also *ibid.*, p. 121.

fenses of Manila at any time, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession." Again, after the authorities at Washington had, on account of various newspaper stories emanating from the Orient, begun to worry over what assurances or impressions might have been given to the insurgents by the consuls at Singapore and Hongkong, the Navy Department called for a full report from Dewey on his conferences with Aguinaldo. The latter replied at length on June 27, reiterating his statement that the United States had not been compromised with the insurgents in any way, denying that he had given them direct assistance, and saying that Aguinaldo was acting independently of the squadron. At the same time, he stated that Aguinaldo had been allowed to organize his army under the American fleet's guns, that he had conferred personally with the insurgent leader, and had "given him to understand that he considered the insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy," and that he had allowed recruits, arms, and ammunition for Aguinaldo to pass the blockade and had let him take Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal.¹

¹ *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 103. This dispatch contains also the many times quoted remark of Dewey: "In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." (The familiarity with the Filipinos does not appear; Dewey had had a very small acquaintance upon which to base any generalization.) This opinion is nullified, so far as Admiral Dewey is concerned, by his testimony, (*Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2983) in 1902 to the effect that he thought neither the Cubans nor the Filipinos were capable of self-government. In this last document will be found very definite statements by Dewey that he never made any pledges to Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo's very suspiciously worded account of the first interview with Dewey will be found in the *Reseña verídica*. It is worth noting that Aguinaldo could in 1899 show only a few purely informal notes from Dewey (see Buencamino's address to Congress, above referred to, *Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6180), the latter informing him, on June 16, that his letter to President McKinley had been forwarded to Washington, and, later in June, at the request of the British consul in Manila, asking him for passes through his lines for certain British subjects. The harsh judgments upon Aguinaldo passed by Admiral Dewey in his testimony before the Senate Committee (*Sen. Doc. 331*) seem rather testy, and perhaps acquired some of their harshness from the partisan prodding which the admiral underwent in the committee. He has remained always somewhat of a Filipino idol.

The first official mention of Filipino insurgents by the Government at Washington, after Consul-General Wildman was instructed in December, 1897, to have no dealings with those in Hongkong, would appear to have been the cable message of May 26 to Admiral Dewey, above quoted. Yet on April 27, the same day Dewey cabled his departure from Hongkong for Manila, Consul-General Pratt wired to the State Department from Singapore : "General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila." Dewey's victory was known in Washington on May 3, and, when his own message was sent from Hongkong on the 7th, there was already awaiting him there a message of congratulations from the President, which was borne back to him by the McCulloch on her first trip. Hence there had been time to instruct Dewey not to ally himself with the insurgents in any way. We have never been told whether the question was ever considered in the Cabinet at Washington. The matter of prime concern at the time was to get direct news from Dewey himself, the news through Spain and Hongkong being both indefinite and suspicious. When it was fully assured that he commanded the situation, it was nevertheless to be borne in mind at Washington that he was a great distance from the base of supplies, was unsupported on land, and had to meet a situation that might be full of complexities which could only be surmised at Washington. Before the message of May 26 was sent, moreover, it had been repeatedly rumored that a fleet of armored cruisers and perhaps a battleship was being prepared to go from Spain to the relief of Manila. While, therefore, the desire was expressed not to incur any political alliance with any faction in the Philippines, tacit permission to do so, if necessary for his safety, was implied in the wording of that message. It is difficult to draw from it anything but the inference that Washington was chiefly concerned at the time with the safety of Dewey's men and ships, and to insure them would incur responsibilities, to some degree at least, as regards

the future disposition of the Philippines. If a policy of "conquest" was in the background, and was beginning to find some popular expression in newspapers and other periodicals (which had turned their inquisitorial talents loose to forage for Philippine material), it certainly as yet lacked definiteness of aim and coherency of details. It is noticeable also that when, in June and July, the newspaper stories about pledges made to Aguinaldo by the consuls had assumed quite definite shape, and the dispatches received from Consul-General Pratt were themselves sufficient to cause uneasiness on this score, the State Department was at pains formally to disown any idea of alliance. Cable instructions were sent to Mr. Pratt on June 17 to "avoid unauthorized negotiations with insurgents." In a mailed dispatch of June 16, Secretary of State Day said to him: —

To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this Government any recognition.¹ The United States, in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter, will do in the exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would coöperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his coöperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.²

¹ This was, as already seen, not strictly correct, so far as regards the new Secretary of State's assertion that the insurgents had not "asked" recognition.

² *Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 354. The following four pages contain the subsequent correspondence and the various explicit denials of Mr. Pratt that he had discussed the policy of the United States with Aguinaldo. How far these two were from understanding each other may be seen from this statement in the former's dis-

Some weeks later, in consequence of dispatches to London papers with regard to promises being made to Aguinaldo by Consul Wildman, the latter was by cable "forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy"; and he was still later cabled to "take no action respecting Aguinaldo without specific instructions from this Department."¹ At about the same time, Consul Williams of Manila was also told by mail: "Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is approved."²

patch of April 30 (a dispatch which at first reassured the State Department on the score of the alleged unauthorized negotiations at Singapore): "The general [Aguinaldo] further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American advice and assistance. These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss." Admiral Dewey, in his blunt fashion, told the Senate Committee in 1902 (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2932): "I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people's business, and I don't think his letters impressed me. . . . I received lots of advice, you understand, from many irresponsible people."

¹ The correspondence here cited will be found on pp. 330, 338-40 of *Sen. Doc. 62*. In quoting, on p. 339, from his letter to Aguinaldo of July 25, which had been the basis of the London stories, Mr. Wildman made some important omissions. At any rate, the same letter, as quoted in the Aguinaldo-Buencamino document (*Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6180, the date here showing a mistake in the months, as the letter is clearly of July instead of June), contains the clauses: "Your reward from my country will be sure and lasting." "It will require all the power of the United States and Great Britain [in the face of a European coalition] to keep your islands intact and to hold you as the first man in them." "I have vouched for your honesty and earnestness of purpose to the President of the United States and to our people, and they are ready to extend their hand to you as a brother and aid you in every laudable ambition." Mr. Wildman also forgot to report his letters about the securing of arms, and his remark in the letter of June 28: "I suppose you have taken Manila by this time. I hope so." His last rebuke from Washington, that of August 15, was in consequence of his suggestion that he be sent to the Philippines, on the ground that he could "be of service to Dewey should Aguinaldo make trouble."

² Except for the warning cited above, Consul Williams managed to escape the censure that was being passed around at the time. (He did not come into contact with Aguinaldo until the same time that Dewey did.) He made the very remarkable statement in a dispatch of June 16 (*Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 329) that, immediately after the Philippine provisional government was formed and independence had been proclaimed and reiterated, Aguinaldo told him that "his friends all hoped

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Aguinaldo went on shore the afternoon of his arrival, but after interviews with some Filipinos at the arsenal, returned to sleep on the McCulloch that night. He had met some of his old companions and intimates in Cavite, and had not been encouraged by the news they gave him of the success of the Spaniards in allying themselves with former insurgent leaders.¹ The truth is, the Biak-na-bató affair had greatly injured the prestige of those who were commonly reputed to have reaped the greatest advantage from it (as, indeed, General Primo de Rivera had thought it would). Aguinaldo claims that it was agreed by most of the exiles to Hongkong that they should live economically, keep the money intact, and use it to organize another and more effective resistance to Spain, in case she did not provide better government;² and there is

that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States." This may have been a reference by Aguinaldo to the undoubted attitude and feeling of certain of the wealthier Filipinos not formerly associated with him in favor of an exchange of sovereignty from Spain to the United States; but it is a sufficiently strange statement to raise doubts as to the ability of Mr. Williams's interpreter. On August 4, he reported "friendly but unofficial" conferences with Aguinaldo and his associates, wherein "they traversed the entire ground of government," he urging upon Aguinaldo the advantages of annexation to the United States. Mr. Williams was never bashful about his annexation sentiments; he told the State Department on July 2 that he hoped to see an influx of ten thousand Americans at once, and he thought "early and strenuous efforts should be made to bring here from the United States men and women of many occupations"—among them mechanics, blacksmiths, and shipbuilders (!). See *Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 307, for a letter written by Aguinaldo to Consul Williams on August 1, 1898 (about the time the Filipinos were preparing their note to the foreign powers), wherein the former says that his people wish to see "active" instead of "passive coöperation" on the part of the Americans, and that they are opposed to annexation.

¹ Admiral Dewey testified (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2928) that Aguinaldo returned to him from his first visit ashore, much downcast, and informed him that he wished to leave the islands and go to Japan, and that he (Dewey) urged him not to give up, but try again.

² See his *Reseña verídica*. See also *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 2, pp. 2-4, for a meeting of the insurgent leaders in Hongkong on February 24, 1898, wherein the "contract" made at Biak-na-bató was declared "null and void," because Spain would not make the third payment of \$200,000 and was supposed to

much in the facts as known to bear out this claim, it being certain that the bulk of the money had been kept intact (in Aguinaldo's name) up to the time of his leaving Hongkong for Manila. This was not at the time the understanding of the people of the Philippines, however;¹ and it was far from certain how the insurgent leaders who had come to look upon the whole Biak-na-bató affair as a big "grab game" would receive the man commonly supposed to be the greatest individual beneficiary. It was with the knowledge that various of these leaders had already allied themselves with the Spaniards for defense against the Americans that the Filipino colony at Hongkong (a number of whose most prominent members had turned pro-American) sent to the Philippines prior to the departure of Dewey's fleet the proclamation beginning "Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach"; wherein the idea of alliance with the Spaniards is repelled, and the Filipinos are urged to organize resistance on land, while the Americans cut off Spanish reinforcements by sea, a closing exhortation being: "There, where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers."² There was for the moment, however,

have given the second payment to Artacho and his associates, it being resolved that the original payment of \$400,000 should be kept intact, in Aguinaldo's name, and to be spent only "for the common good." It is significant that no mention is made in this document of "reforms" promised by Spain; they are mentioned only when, in the meeting of May 4 following (*ibid.*, pp. 5-9), it was debated whether Aguinaldo ought to return to the Philippines and make common cause with the United States against Spain.

¹ Yet the Spanish authorities had, though apparently rather late in the day, bethought them of the danger involved in the accumulation of so much money in the hands of the insurgents in Hongkong, and this was one reason for the refusal of Primo de Rivera to pay over any further instalment of the sum agreed upon in December. (See his *Memoria*, p. 139.) It was claimed, too, by some of the insurgents that the suit begun by Artacho for a division of the money was the result of the intrigues of the Spanish friars resident in Hongkong, who had been commissioned by their brothers in Manila to use every effort to break up this accumulation of money.

² This manifesto has had a much wider circulation in *Sen. Doc. 62* (where it is to be found on p. 346) than it ever did in the Philippines. Foreman (p. 582) wrongly ascribes it to Aguinaldo.

something more positive about the Spanish programme of conciliation, offered by men with whom the Filipinos had had more or less intimate relationships, while the Americans were strangers, and, aside from the protection their guns afforded to the half-organized insurgent horde at Cavite, their attitude towards the Filipinos had nowhere else been shown. But when once the anti-Spanish propaganda was begun among the natives, with the prestige which Dewey's apparent championship of Aguinaldo gave it, it was speedily apparent, in spite of ties of blood between Spaniards and the upper-class Filipinos and of an acquaintanceship of centuries and some degree of unity in forms of government and community of speech, how weak was the allegiance of the native population to their former sovereign. Still, Aguinaldo made from the first the utmost use that was possible of the fiction that he had an "alliance" with the Americans. It is peculiar to note how, at the outset and for two months thereafter, he issued no proclamation of any sort in which pains was not taken to set before the people the fact that he and they could count upon the protection and the friendship of the Americans for the realization of their aims. The private evidences that he repeatedly gave definite verbal assurances that there was an alliance are plentiful.

Already, on the afternoon of the 19th, Aguinaldo had seen in the bay natives of Bataan province, which lies on its north shore, and had communicated to them verbally the word to prepare for an uprising in the provinces north of Manila. His arrival had been whispered about, and he probably felt more cheerful at meeting delegations from elsewhere than his native town of Old Cavite, when he went to land again the next day. His companions busied themselves in writing any number of copies of the first proclamation of the insurrection, assigning May 31 at noon as the time for a simultaneous uprising, urging the Filipinos to "expel from among themselves all treason," giving the implication that the Americans would help them establish their independence, and warning against all acts

contrary to the laws of civilized warfare.¹ He remained, however, for four days within the limited American territory on land (which was confined to the arsenal and surrounding navy buildings), and started to conduct his recruiting and his campaign of proclamations from there, not even going into the half-governed town of Cavite, which his compatriots held, until Admiral Dewey requested him to move outside of the American lines to conduct his campaign.²

The admiral turned over to him some sixty Mauser rifles and considerable ammunition for them, which had been taken from the Spaniards at the entrance of the bay. His followers on the little peninsula of Cavite had at the time probably no more than 200 miscellaneous rifles. But on the 27th, the first consignment (2000 Mausers and 200,000 cartridges) arrived from Amoy, and some were furnished at once to the volunteers of Aguinaldo's town of Old Cavite, just off the peninsula.³ It was

¹ This first proclamation seems never to have been published in English, and the decree of May 24 establishing a dictatorial government is usually called the first of Aguinaldo's series of 1898. This proclamation of May 20 was in the form of a personal letter to the "Revolutionary Chiefs of the Philippines." A few sentences are worth quoting. He urges those to whom the letter is sent to confer together with regard "to the manner in which we may capture our enemies, employing astuteness to realize that end. I therefore beg all our brothers to unite, expel from among themselves all treason, let there not happen what in former times has happened with regard to other brothers. . . . Bear in mind that as soon as the Spaniards know we are here, they will order the arrest of all our companions. Perhaps we shall never find an opportunity so propitious as this. . . . Seduce the force of native infantry, employing the means that you think suitable." [He gives the impression that he has had a four-hour conference with the American admiral] "with reference to what we all aspire to for the attainment of our liberty. . . . I have promised, not only the American admiral, but also the representatives of other nations with whom I have conferred, that the war they will see here shall be of the sort that is called war among the most civilized nations, to that end that we may be the admiration of the civilized powers and they may concede us independence." [The Spanish is bad.] Again: "Many nations are on our side." The full Spanish text of this document will be found in Sastrón *op. cit.*, pp. 419-20.

² See *Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2928. Aguinaldo virtually admits this in the *Reseña verídica*. He made his headquarters thereafter in Cavite, until the first American troops arrived, and General Anderson requested him to give up that place.

³ The arrival of these arms was reported by Admiral Dewey in a cablegram to Washington on May 27, he adding that Aguinaldo's "force is increasing constantly." So far as arms went, the small consignment above mentioned is the only one ever

the sending of a detachment of Spanish marines to capture these arms that brought on the first engagement between Filipinos and Spaniards, on May 28, resulting in the surrounding and capture of the marines and their arms. This was but the forerunner of a succession of similar events occurring in Cavite within the next week. General Peña had 2800 troops scattered in small detachments about Cavite province, and the orders to concentrate them came to him from Manila when they were already cut off and surrounded. They held out from one day to seven, before surrendering or being captured, the promptness with which the native military or police forces with them deserted or turned against them having something to do in each case with the amount of their resistance, which must, in any event, be accounted very weak. So rapidly did the outward state of affairs change that, within a week's time, the population of Manila, which had left the walled town almost deserted to flee to the districts farther inland, in fear of a bombardment, now began flocking back within the walls for refuge, lest their land enemies should make a successful attack upon Manila's outer lines of defense.

Even at the first, and while the official optimism as to native coöperation lasted, most attention had been devoted by the defenders to establishing a line of fifteen blockhouses around the outer districts of Manila and to preparing for a land rather than a sea defense. The plans for allying the natives with the sovereign power had, before the arrival of the American men-of-war, centered about two things; namely, the organization of Filipino volunteer militia and the introduction of a "Consultative Assembly," composed of prominent Filipinos, into the scheme of insular government. The "Board of Authorities," enlarged by various new members called in to consult upon

furnished to Aguinaldo directly by Dewey. He told him he was welcome to the few old smoothbore pieces of artillery at the Cavite arsenal; and right after the battle of Manila Bay, the natives of Cavite had taken two or three small pieces of artillery off the boats sunk in Bakoor Bay, and had later fished out some of the Mauser ammunition which had been thrown into the water by the Americans.

measures to meet the situation,¹ had, as early as April 24, adopted these two plans of the insular administration, with only two opposing votes, Archbishop Nozaleda being one of the chief advocates of the idea of organizing native militia. The day after the destruction of the fleet, this advisory board met for the last time. Both plans again received a favorable vote, but the opposition of several officials, who were sure that the native volunteers would not be loyal to the old sovereignty, and who urged instead that the Spanish troops both to the north and south of Manila be at once concentrated there for a defense of the city, had been so pointed that from that time Augustin and his personal cabinet of advisers determined to carry the plans through without so much discussion. On May 4, the governor-general published two decrees, the first of which prescribed the details under which the recruiting of volunteers was to be pushed forward in the provinces and in Manila. The other announced the Consultative Assembly of Filipinos, at the head of which was to be the "Gentleman of the Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic," Don Pedro A. Paterno; the seventeen other members were announced a few days later, and it was planned also to add some twenty more Filipinos of prominence in the provinces.²

The purpose of the Consultative Assembly was announced in the decree organizing it to be to "deliberate and report to the governor-general upon matters of political, governmental, or administrative character upon which the said superior authority may deem it proper to consult them." It was given

¹ Among them the provincials of the religious orders and certain of the Spanish civil authorities of Manila.

² The other members were: Cayetano Arellano, Isaac Fernando de los Rios, Joaquín Gonzalez, Maximino Paterno, Antonio Rianzares Bautista, T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Manuel Genato, Gregorio Araneta, Juan Rodriguez, Bonifacio Arévalo, Ariston Bautista, José Luna Novicio, José Lozada, Ricardo Esteban Barretto, Teodoro Gonzalez, Pantaleón Garcia, and Pedro Serrano. With two or three exceptions, these men were all Spanish half-castes of families of prominence in the Philippine capital. Most of them were conservatives, and the list was quite representative of Filipino leadership in professional and commercial affairs.

the faculty of "placing before the governor-general the advisability of measures affecting the interests of the towns, always provided that it does not invade the functions of other organizations nor infringe the laws." On May 28, the Assembly held its first meeting, which consisted principally of the reading of the address of Governor-General Augustin and of the oratorical reply of Pedro Paterno. A subcommittee spent some time in drawing up a scheme of Philippine government which virtually meant autonomy. The whole project for an assembly had been bitterly criticized from the first by those who called themselves "patriotic Spaniards"; and the governor-general's own secretary protested against its pretending to advocate governmental measures which, he declared, were far outside its jurisdiction as defined in the decree of organization, and were, besides, only in the competence of the Government at Madrid to decide. At the very moment of the first meeting of the Assembly, one of its best-known members, a lawyer, was with Aguinaldo at Cavite, whence he was calling urgently upon friends in Manila to send him treatises on international law and documents showing "how other countries declared their independence." Some of the members never attended the sessions of the Assembly, and others identified themselves with it only through motives of prudence. By June 13, Paterno and his personal followers were about all that was left of the Assembly as an active organization, and they went outside of its ranks to get together a delegation of natives which called on the governor-general that day and laid before him propositions for governmental reform amounting to autonomy, or at least aimed at that. The rapid change in the state of affairs, by which the Spaniards had lost all the neighboring provinces of Luzon and were besieged in Manila, had opened the eyes of Augustin, and he replied that he would undertake to secure what they wanted, provided they would induce the insurgents to lay down their arms. That had already been tried and had failed, and the revolutionists at

Cavite had threatened with death all who came to them as emissaries with such a proposition.¹

The first special emissary whom Augustin sent to Aguinaldo never returned, and very shortly afterward appeared as one of the chief propagandists at insurgent headquarters, instead of a colonel of Pampanga volunteers protecting the south line of Manila. After General Peña and his men were captured, there was no good reason to expect that Filipinos who had been given commissions would resist their own brothers. By the middle of June, there were only two of these commanders of any note remaining with the Spaniards.² There should have

¹ Information as to the conciliatory policy of Augustin, and especially as to the Consultative Assembly, may be found in the Manila newspapers of the time, notably *La Voz Española* and *El Diario de Manila*. Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, a member of the Assembly, gave testimony in regard to it before the first Philippine Commission (*Report of same*, vol. II, p. 389). Accounts of these events from the standpoint of the Spaniards who were bitter against the natives may be found in Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-10, 434-36, 463. Paterno's speech at the opening of the Assembly is the manifesto which he addressed to his countrymen a few days later; it is quoted by Foreman (*op. cit.*, pp. 590-97), together with the reply of the revolutionists of Cavite. It may be imagined how sarcastic the recalcitrant Spanish party in Manila would become over Paterno's apostrophes to his people to "ally" themselves with Spain, just as other "nations" sought allies. Paterno's plan of autonomous government, which he put forth unheeded in Manila on June 19, as a "graphic explanation in a synoptic form" of autonomy (a sort of attempt to achieve Philippine happiness and prosperity on a diagram, while the war-dogs were unleashed outside), is Exhibit VII to vol. I of the *Report of Philippine Commission*, 1900. According to a diary kept by the Belgian consul in Manila, General Augustin allowed Paterno to issue this manifesto because it was hoped at the time to get the insurgents to give up the Spanish prisoners captured in Pampanga (see *McClure's Magazine*, June, 1899, p. 172).

² These were Licerio Gerónimo and Enrique Flores, in arms on the north line in Bulakán, where things had not moved quite so rapidly as in Cavite. Mariano Trias, the personal friend of Aguinaldo in Cavite, and his closest military associate in the former rebellion, was one of those who held out longest; he had shown his loyalty to his Spanish commission, and had also given the Spaniards a sufficient indication of what was his judgment as to the situation, when he refused to distribute the rifles that had been sent out to him for the Cavite volunteers it was planned to raise, lest he might subsequently be charged with having betrayed the Spaniards who trusted him. Felipe Buencamino, the Filipino referred to above as the emissary to Augustin from Aguinaldo, charges that General Peña made no real defense, through his unwillingness to "defend the cause of the friars." (See *Hearings*, etc., *Committee on Insular Affairs*, 1901-03, p. 276.) Buencamino there says he was made a prisoner by Aguinaldo even before he had a chance to present the conciliatory propositions of General Augustin. His statements that he was assured by

been a sufficient warning to the Spanish authorities of what was going on under the surface in the Tagalog provinces in the fact that the provincials of the religious orders felt it necessary, upon their information, to call into Manila all the friars then in charge of parishes in the provinces, if not in the further fact that, when General Peña started to fortify the positions held by his troops, he could not even *hire* the natives of Cavite to work on the intrenchments, where formerly the Spaniards had been wont to impress their labor. The orders for the concentration of the friars came a little before that of the governor-general for the concentration upon Manila of the troops both upon the north and south lines; but the orders in both cases were sent too late to prevent most of the friars and practically all the soldiers from being made prisoners. The situation had become so threatening, by the time the order was sent to General Peña, that a column of 500 troops was started at the same time from Manila to relieve him in his position at Imus; but Paciano Rizal had already effected an organization of the Tagalogs of the Laguna province, and the last of the native volunteers south of Manila had deserted the Spaniards under the leadership of Pio del Pilar, making it impossible for this column to get through to Imus at all, much

Aguinaldo that Admiral Dewey had pledged him (though not in writing) the support of the United States to secure Philippine independence are to be found in the same document, on pp. 231, 275, 276, and 292. When Buencamino joined the insurgent forces, he issued a manifesto to the Filipino people explaining his desertion of the Spaniards, couched in the same terms as those of a letter which he then addressed to Governor-General Augustin calling upon him to surrender (portions of which are quoted in Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 460). These clauses are worth quoting: "Manila being besieged by sea and land, without hope of help from anywhere, and Aguinaldo being disposed to *make use of the squadron to bombard*, I don't know, frankly, any other recourse than to give up to death; for Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians, flushed with fighting, drunk with victory and with blood, would produce a hecatomb from which not even women, nor children, nor priests, especially the friars, would escape." And also: "We hold at this date seven provinces, with various seaports, namely, Taal, Batangas, Balayán, Cavite, Subig, and Mariveles, and we possess three steamers and various launches, with many small boats, to conduct our communications, *aside from disposing, when it is desired, of the North American squadron.*" [Italics inserted by editor.]

less to prevent the surrender of that town upon the third attack on it in numbers. Thus, on May 31, Manila was actually besieged, up to its very suburbs, at all points south of the Pasig River. The Spanish outposts were driven in upon Santa Ana on June 3, and on the same day the Spanish garrison at Kalookan, just north of Manila on the railroad, retreated toward the city. From June 1 to the day of the surrender to the Americans, rifle-fire could be heard in Manila every day, especially at night and in the early morning. The walled town soon held 80,000 to 100,000 people at night. Including the convents, seven infirmaries, with sick and wounded, were soon established there; and the Augustinian convent at least was made a great repository of rice and other provisions, while here were sheltered numbers of women and children, and here also for a time were the virtual headquarters of the governor-general and his closest attendants.¹

The revolt in Bulakán, just to the northward of Manila, had to some extent been organized from the Cavite insurgent headquarters, and arms had been sent across the bay from there, in one of the small boats that had been donated to Aguinaldo for his use by Filipino merchants of Manila. With the surrounding and taking of the town of Malabon on June 12,² the

¹ Early in the siege, a great commotion was created one day by the appearance in the courtyard of the Augustinian convent of two officers from the northern outposts, hatless and almost speechless in overwrought, nervous excitement, calling on the friars, "for whom we are fighting," to put off their "skirts," take rifles, and assume places of defense on the outer line. This was one of the many dramatic and curious incidents connected with the Spanish defense, for most of which court-martial were promptly held. The commander of the little gunboat which came into the bay on May 12, ignorant of what had taken place, and having, of course, had no choice but to surrender to Dewey's fleet, was court-martialed for doing so. Another mysterious episode was the suicide, at the door of the governor-general's headquarters, of the Spanish colonel of artillery who had charge of the guns of the Luneta and walled city. His friends in Spain claim that he committed suicide because of a reprimand just received from his superiors for firing on one of Dewey's vessels. Foreman (*op. cit.*, p. 579) says it was in despair because he was ordered to prepare the old guns of the fort for defense, and the rust could not be scraped off them.

² A description of this affair and of the uprising in Bulakán will be found in no. 1 of *La Libertad*, the first periodical of the insurrection, a few numbers of which

Spaniards were once for all driven back upon their line of outer defense, running through the fifteen blockhouses they had constructed in April and May. They had about 7000 men, mostly Spanish troops, for this outer line of defense; but the total number of their available troops within the city was steadily being reduced by the desertions of native troops constantly going on.¹

The Spanish troops further away from the city, along and near the railroad, were cut off from their capital almost as suddenly as the forces in Cavite. When General Monet, in command on the north, got his orders to bring his forces to Manila, and started to do so on May 27, he found the road between Angeles and San Fernando, Pampanga province, already intrenched.² Between him and Manila, an evidence of the attitude of the population had already been afforded by their attack upon a party of Augustinian friars and of Spanish men

were got out, under the direction of Clemente J. Zulueta (late Collecting Librarian of the Philippine Government, engaged in procuring from the archives of Spain and of other countries manuscript material bearing on the history of the Philippines), at the printing establishment run in connection with the orphanage of the Augustinian order at Tambobong (Malabon). The first number is principally made up of contributions from Messrs. Zulueta and Epifanio Santos (now provincial governor of Nueva Ecija), the latter writing, among other things, a letter from Manila which described the situation of affairs within the city. It contains a proclamation of war, based upon a decree of the dictatorial government of May 24, wherein it was stated that, among others, all those "who directly or indirectly oppose obstacles to the realization of our aspirations," and "who abuse, either in word or act, the enemies who surrender," will be summarily executed. We are informed that it was not necessary to carry out any of these provisions in connection with the taking of Malabon. This first periodical of the insurrection was very soon suppressed by the "kitchen-cabinet" of Aguinaldo, who wished to keep the entire direction of affairs at the headquarters in Cavite.

¹ An official list of May 29 showed 6760 Spanish and 4332 native soldiers in Manila on that date. That was about the number supposed to be surrendered when the city fell, but the native force had then shrunk by over thirty per cent.

² It was a very open secret in Manila that both Generals Monet and Peña had urged concentration of the troops long after the authorities in Manila continued to plan on holding all the Spanish territory through the aid of native volunteers. In a telegram as early as May 2, General Monet had expressed his objections to distributing arms among the Filipinos, and had asked reinforcements if he was expected to hold so much territory; General Augustin replied that Monet had "forces enough with the 7000 volunteers" organized and to be organized. (See *Historia Negra, por el "Capitán Verdades,"* Barcelona, 1899, pp. 73-74.)

and women on their way to the railroad station at Giginto, Bulakán province, several being killed and others wounded. His northernmost column of a few hundred men was unable to obey his orders for concentration, and retreated on Dagupan, where it was later captured. Already, in the last days of May, an uprising in Pangasinan had resulted in the assassination of several officers of the native militia and of a Spanish friar and a Spanish civil official. Pampanga—in which some of the earliest preparatory work of the new revolution had been done, and where Maximino Hizon, named “commanding general of central Luzon,” had gone immediately after Aguinaldo’s arrival as the direct representative of the latter—was ripe for insurrection at the appointed time. From June 1 to 8, every town in the province rose in revolt, with a single exception, and in the outlying towns the friar curates were all captured, one of them being assassinated. The single exception was the town of Makabebe, in the extreme southern part of the province, near the bayous of the river delta. Most of the land here was owned by a prominent Spanish family, the Blancos, to whom the people bore feudal relations, and, organized by the sons of this family, the Makabebes had remained loyal to Spain when all the other native troops deserted. It was toward this town that Monet felt it necessary to withdraw his column, for sheltered in the Blanco mansion were the wife and children of Governor-General Augustin. Similarly, he could not abandon the Spanish women and children nor the wounded soldiers caught by the outbreak in the province of Pampanga; and the movements of his 700 soldiers were seriously handicapped by these burdens. He reached Makabebe with comparatively few losses, though facing some opposition all the way to the river above, whence steamers were taken; but he would have sustained much greater losses, had he not threatened to burn the towns as he went through them if he was “sniped” from them. Makabebe was speedily besieged and bombarded with old cannon after his arrival, but eventu-

ally held out until July 3. He had the women, children, and friars placed on board a river steamer flying the red cross, and it reached Manila from the mouth of the Rio Grande de Pampanga without attention from the American vessels, this perhaps being due to the thick fog at the time. Placing the Augustin family in a large native canoe, General Monet boarded it himself, and under cover of the darkness succeeded in landing on the shores of the Tondo district of Manila without being observed. He was speedily court-martialed for his desertion of his troops. The latter were loaded upon large canoes at Makabebe and pulled out into the bay in tow of the little river steamer Leite, on which their officers had taken passage. As the Leite appeared at the mouth of the river flying the white flag, she was sighted by the Concord, and was speedily made a capture and the officers on board taken prisoners. They had cut loose the canoes bearing the soldiers (they claim, because they intended to "make parley" with the Americans); the canoes were driven on shore by the wind, and their inmates were speedily made prisoners by insurgents of Bataan and Pampanga. In the course of but a few days, the territory from Manila to the northern end of the railroad, the great valley of central Luzon, had thus passed almost without opposition from the possession of the panic-stricken Spaniards to that of the Filipinos, who had only to complete their control by the capture of the surrounded garrison at Dagupan.

F. HINTS OF A "PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC"

In the Filipino camp, the principal activities were, of course, devoted to the extension of the insurgent propaganda, and to organizing armed opposition to Spain. Their easy victories, however, speedily laid upon them the burden of the control in a governmental way of vastly more territory than they had ever held, even for a moment, in the previous insurrection. It is significant that, nearly from the first, they had laid their plans more or less comprehensively with this result in view.

Without attempting at this point an exposition of the form or character of the insurgent organization as a government, an outline of their undertakings must be presented. The call to arms of May 20 had speedily been followed on May 24 by three proclamations over Aguinaldo's name. The first proclaimed the establishment of a Dictatorial Government, "to be administered by decrees promulgated upon my responsibility solely," until the islands shall be "completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention, and to elect a President and a Cabinet, in whose favor I will duly resign the authority." In this proclamation also Spain was accused of lack of faith in not extending the reforms promised in the "treaty" negotiated by Paterno, Japan was declared to be the pattern for the Filipinos, and it was asserted that the "great and powerful North American nation has come to offer disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country." The first decree of the dictatorship thus assumed dealt with the manner of conducting the war, it being distinctly stated that the Filipinos must make a good showing in this respect before the nations of the world, and particularly the United States, which, it was reiterated, had come to offer its protection, "considering us sufficiently civilized and fit to govern for ourselves our unfortunate country." The lives of all foreigners including Chinese, as well as of those Spaniards not taking up arms against them or who should surrender to them, must therefore be respected, as also the medical corps of the enemy; the penalty for disobedience was to be execution after summary trial, if the disobedience resulted in murder, incendiarism, robbery, or rape. There followed this decree, drawn in consequence of the sending by Augustin of one emissary to Aguinaldo and the rumors that a mixed commission of Spanish military men and civilian Filipinos was soon to be sent to him from Manila; all persons who appeared for such purposes, unless under a flag of truce and with proper credentials to "negotiate," should be executed as spies, and any Filipino

accepting such a mission should be hanged with a label as traitor on him.¹

In these documents of May 24, it will be observed, "independence" was implied by the words used, but not formally stated, as in the private call to arms of May 20. Similarly, when the "flag of the Philippines" was formally acclaimed in Old Cavite on June 12, everything about the elaborate ceremonies got up for the occasion was made to center about the idea of independence, and the affair was bruited abroad among the natives far and wide as the "proclamation of independence." The significance of such an occurrence, close under the guns of the American men-of-war, is evident; yet the formal documentation of the Filipino "declaration of independence" was still delayed.² The succeeding month was,

¹ Aguinaldo asserts (*Reseña verídica*) that such a commission did afterward come to him in the names of Archbishop Nozaleda and Governor-General Augustin, offering him and his companions recognitions as generals with "a million pesos," besides "great gratifications and salaries in the assembly of representatives," if they would join forces with the Spaniards. According to his story, he discussed the situation very fully with them, but sent them back to say they were not received because they did not present official credentials. He also asserts that Nozaleda and Augustin had commissioned four Germans and five Frenchmen to assassinate him. It is true that there was some communication back and forth between Manila and the insurgent headquarters, and there is no doubt that Augustin authorized certain Filipinos (and perhaps some of the German naval officers) to offer conciliatory propositions to Aguinaldo at various times during May and June. The conversation which Aguinaldo here reports as having taken place, and as having been detailed by him to Admiral Dewey, probably has no basis in fact except the visit to his headquarters on June 19 of a committee of Spanish military surgeons, who bore passports from Augustin to accredit them to the commander of the American fleet and were charged with conducting to Manila 185 wounded soldiers and sailors who were in the hospital under Aguinaldo's control in Cavite. At the instigation of the British consul and with the approval of Admiral Dewey, Aguinaldo had consented to the transfer of these wounded men to their own lines, and had written a letter to Augustin to that effect. He was greatly chagrined that the latter did not reply directly to him, thus giving him something upon which he might set up the claim that he had been "officially recognized" by the Spanish authority. (Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-65.) On July 6, Aguinaldo commissioned two of his officers, "in my name and that of the Filipino people," to treat with Augustin for the surrender of Manila, promising treatment in accordance with the laws of war (*Sen. Doc.*, 208, part 3, pp. 3-4).

² The "Act of Independence," indeed, was not promulgated until August 1, after a number of towns had been organized under the rules laid down by the

however, a period of great activity in the making of decrees, etc. On June 18, there was promulgated a scheme for the civil organization of the towns and provinces, as soon as the Spaniards should have been captured or expelled from them, and providing also for the election by each province of three representatives in the Revolutionary Congress which was to be formed. Again Aguinaldo declared that he knew independence to be his people's aspiration, and he assured them that he had made it so known to the world. On June 20, as supplementary to the foregoing scheme of government, which was the merest outline, forty-five rules for the conduct of the municipal and the provincial governments were promulgated, the Spanish word *pueblo* (town) being proclaimed to be substituted by the Tagalog word *sangunian* (council). On June 23, a decree was issued organizing the "Revolutionary Government of the Philippines," which it was hoped would become

Dictatorial Government, and the chiefs of these towns joined at Bakoor in a proceeding which seemed to be designed mainly to prepare the way for the appeal to foreign Governments for the recognition of independence, dated August 6. This act was afterwards ratified by the Congress at Malolos on September 29, and the latter date was proclaimed to be that of the Filipino "Independence Day." The desire to imitate the procedure of other nations which had attained independence, by making the formal process at least *appear* to be the act of a representative assembly, of course had something to do with the procedure followed by these Filipinos. Yet one can hardly escape the conclusion that one thing in mind at the outset was to commit no overt act which might cause a break with Admiral Dewey and thus interfere with the use of the fiction of an "alliance" with the United States as the most effective campaign-cry for the time being. Admiral Dewey was, as if casually, invited to the celebration of June 12, and in an even more informal way sent his secretary on shore to excuse him because it was "mail-day." Yet there were scattered among the Filipinos outside of Cavite copies of a decree of Aguinaldo, dated June 9 (a copy of which was not furnished to the Americans with the others of the time), appointing June 12 "for the proclamation of the independence of our loved country"; and this curious language was used in hinting to the people at large the full participation in the event of the Americans: "There may attend also as many as wish of the notables who figure in our political communion, as the admiral of the North American squadron, the commanders and officers under him, to whom a courteous invitation will be sent, and all present will sign the record which will be drawn up by the official whom I may commission." (See Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 459.) Admiral Dewey did not report the occurrence to Washington, but cabled on that same day that on his advice the insurgents would not attack Manila until American troops should arrive.

the new central government of the islands. Aguinaldo discarded the title of "Dictator" for that of "President," and his cabinet was to be composed of four secretaries (under whom were to be combined such mixed functions as "war and public works" and "police and education"). The members of the Revolutionary Congress were, in general, to be elected, but the President could appoint for provinces not entirely freed from the Spanish domination. A large part of the decree was devoted to the matter of trials for "military offenses." The object of the Revolutionary Government was declared to be "to strive for the independence of the Philippines, until the free nations, including the Spanish, expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country to the end that it may be possible to set up a real Republic." (This last clause held an importance, in the plans of the insurgent leaders of the time, which has never been properly recognized.) This decree was accompanied by the "Message of the President" of the same date, which asserted that the Filipinos' effort to secure a liberal government from Spain had always been frustrated by the friars, and that now "it does not restrict itself to asking assimilation or the Spanish political constitution, but asks definitive separation and strives for its independence, in the full certainty that the time has come when it can and ought to govern itself." Rules for the conduct of executive business at the headquarters of the Central Government were put forth in a decree of June 27; but the members of the Cabinet were not named until July 15, in a decree which prescribed "Señor" or "Maguino" (Tagalog for "noble," a title which Pedro A. Paterno had dug up from antiquity and assumed for himself) as the proper form of address to officials, and which detailed the kinds of canes to be carried or of triangular plates of gold or silver to be hung from the necks of provincial and municipal officers respectively. Aguinaldo was to wear as his distinguishing emblem "a collar of gold, from which hangs a similar triangle and a whistle, also of gold,"

and could carry also a cane with gold head and gold tassels. On July 18, a strictly military decree was issued, prescribing the number of adjutants the various general officers might appoint (assigning twelve to the President, the first of whom might be a brigadier-general.¹

It was after the appointment of his Cabinet on July 15 that Aguinaldo addressed Admiral Dewey, inclosing the decrees of June 18 to 27 and asking him to forward them to the Government at Washington, with the statement that "the desires of this Government are to remain always in friendship with the great North American nation, to which we are under many obligations."² By this time, the first expedition of American soldiers

¹ The delay over the naming of the cabinet members had been occasioned by the customary jealousies in camp. The Department of Foreign Relations was left under the charge of Aguinaldo, until the "most fit" person could be selected. The President's cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, was made Secretary of War; Leonardo Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior, and Mariano Trias, Secretary of the Treasury. The organization of the insurgent government, as well as the details of the internal administration of the provinces controlled by it, will be hereinafter treated. All the documents referred to above are to be found in a little pamphlet, entitled *Disposiciones del Gobierno Revolucionario de Filipinas*, printed on the press set up at Bakoor, Cavite, in July, to publish *El Heraldo de la Revolución*, the official organ of the new government (the establishment of which had coincided with the suppression of the newspaper started independently, as hereinbefore mentioned, by the Filipinos who had taken Malabon). English versions of these documents are in part to be found in *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 431-39; *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, pp. 88-101, and part 3, p. 2; *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 104-05 and 111-19, and in various other books and documents. The detailed decrees of June 20 and 27 it was, unfortunately, not deemed necessary to translate in connection with the work of the Peace Commission at Paris (*Sen. Doc. 62*), and no English version of them seems ever to have been provided, except in a document of the War Department entitled *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and His Followers in the Philippine Archipelago*, compiled by Captain John R. M. Taylor in 1903, for use in connection with a suit brought against the Government, and not available for public distribution.

² *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 111. Two days later, Admiral Dewey sent the documents to the Navy Department, with this simple indorsement: "Respectfully forwarded for the information of the Department." He never cabled to Washington anything about the pretensions of the Filipinos to independent government. He testified before the Senate Committee (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2928): "This was the first intimation, the first I had ever heard, of independence of the Philippines. . . . I attached so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted independence." This will serve to indicate how well the admiral

had arrived and had taken possession of Cavite, and more were arriving and on the way, to the undoubted displeasure of the Filipino leaders. Talk of the United States retaining the Philippines had already become common in the American and European press, and had been communicated to Aguinaldo's camp by his informants in Hongkong and Singapore.¹ Insurgent documents captured in 1899 brought to light the fact that, at a meeting of Filipinos, held in Hongkong before Aguinaldo's departure for the Philippines, consideration was given to the possibility that the Americans might decide to impose their sovereignty upon the archipelago and to the possibility of fighting them also.² Either the arrival of American

was posted on what was going on under the shadow of his own guns. On the other hand, it is rather hard to reconcile this with the statement of General Anderson (*North American Review*, February, 1900, p. 276) that he "was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were captured," as well as with the statement of Aguinaldo (*Reseña verídica*) that, in their first conversation, he told Dewey that, before he left Hongkong, the Filipinos there had discussed the possibility of a war with the Americans, after they had conquered the Spaniards, because of the Americans' refusal "to recognize our independence," and that the admiral replied that he was "delighted with Aguinaldo's sincerity." Statements made in the *Reseña verídica* are to be regarded as suspicious, but this one, at least, had foundation in the fact that, as will hereinafter be seen, such a meeting was held in Hongkong and the possibility of a war with the Americans was there discussed. Moreover, except that they were more pretentious in form and specifically mentioned "independence," without it being formally declared, the decrees of June did not involve any greater assumption of authority on Aguinaldo's part than that of May 24, which Admiral Dewey had forwarded to Washington in a letter of June 12.

¹ Through the conduct of Mr. Bray, Aguinaldo had, on June 10, addressed a letter to President McKinley, protesting against the rumored intention of the United States (as reported in the *London Times* of May 5) either to demand an indemnity from Spain or to transfer the Philippines to some other power, preferably Great Britain. He protested "one and a thousand times" against such a project, and declared that the Filipino people trusted blindly in the United States "not to abandon them to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave them free and independent." (See *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 359-61.)

² *Sen. Doc. 203*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 2, pp. 5-9. A smoother translation of the minutes of that meeting than the one there given was recently made by Captain J. R. M. Taylor, the significant passage in which is: "There would be no better occasion than that afforded them to insure the landing of the expeditionary forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans, and to assure against those very people the situation of the Philippines with regard to our legitimate aspirations. The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, would be

troops or the extraordinary success which the insurgent forces had had in wresting from Spain the most important parts of Luzon, or both these attending circumstances, made them ready to adopt in July a very much more independent attitude than hitherto, which was manifest even to Admiral Dewey, much as their petty affairs "bothered" him.¹ The glowing phrases of gratitude to the United States disappeared from the insurgent proclamations.² Such documents ceased to make

the victims of the demands and the exactions of the United States, but, provided with arms, would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Philippines." This declaration appears in the minutes as the argument used by the chief speakers of the occasion to overcome Aguinaldo's objections to going to the Philippines without a written agreement with Dewey for the recognition of Philippine independence by the United States — a fact in itself sufficiently illuminating as to the later claims regarding an "alliance." Back of the reasons given by Aguinaldo for his hesitancy there was evidently some sense of a moral obligation to return to Spain the \$400,000 he held, if he joined the United States in fighting Spain. These scruples were overcome. It is also interesting to note that he wanted to send the members of the "junta" to prepare the way, instead of going himself. This document of May 4, even if unsupported by other bits of evidence, disposes of that view of the case which has regarded the Filipinos as poor, misguided souls, who, through their scanty experience in the ways of government and in international affairs, were led astray by the belief that the consuls of the United States, or even the admiral of its victorious fleet, could pledge their nation to a political course of action (whatever view is taken of Aguinaldo's interviews with the Americans). As a matter of fact, this is only the first of a series of events and documents which show that the Filipinos, during 1898 and early 1899, looked into the future more shrewdly, and mapped out their course of action in a less haphazard way, than did the Americans.

¹ Notwithstanding the very noteworthy surface change that took place in American and Filipino relations at this time, it is difficult to see how the first Philippine Commission came to make in its preliminary report of November 2, 1899 (vol. 1, p. 172), this extraordinary statement: "Now for the first time arose the idea of national independence," speaking of the period just after General Anderson's arrival.

² The one exception to the uniformity with which the insurgent documents up to July 1 made use of the boast of American protection is the answer to Paterno's manifesto in behalf of alliance with Spain, which Foreman cites on pages 592-97 of his book, wherein it is stated that the revolutionists "make war without the help of any one, not even the North Americans." But this was an anonymous document of little circulation, not put forth from insurgent headquarters at Cavite, though doubtless written with their cognizance, as it employed the arguments then being used among them to assure the doubting Filipinos that the United States could not go back on its "promises" to Aguinaldo, namely, "that its own constitution prohibits the absorption of territory outside of America," in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and that the independent countries of South

ostentation, in one mysterious form or another, of the "alliance" with the United States; henceforth, that "alliance" would be only for the purpose of extending the propaganda in provinces other than Tagalog, while in the Tagalog camp itself the more radical spirits would freely discuss the time when they might have to fight the United States.

America owed their existence largely to this fact. This view of the Monroe Doctrine, which has filtered through to the Filipinos from the many random and misinformed comments on that "doctrine" then being made in Europe, was what led Aguinaldo to make to General Anderson in their first interview what seemed to the latter the "remarkable statement" that he found "no authority for colonies" in the American Constitution. (*North American Review*, February, 1900, p. 277.)

CHAPTER V

GERMANY DISPLAYS INTEREST IN AMERICA'S INTENTIONS

THE relations which the Americans proposed to bear toward the Philippines and the Filipinos had become a matter of keen speculation among foreign nations other than Spain long before the first American soldiers arrived to continue the conquest. Among the members of the various foreign colonies at Manila, speculation on this question took on the form of anxiety, stimulated by the practical interest which the possession of property in the islands gave them. Naturally this anxiety was reflected, in quasi-official form, on the part of their respective consular representatives and the officers of their men-of-war which had followed Dewey to the scene to protect national interests. Not less in the natural order of events was it that national, as well as sometimes personal, prejudices should manifest themselves in this connection. With a mingling of jealousy and of ignorance of American motives and character, continental Europe undoubtedly sympathized with Spain in the war of 1898 and regarded the United States as a brutal aggressor; and this attitude was reflected more or less plainly by the acts of the European representatives on the spot. Partly through the Englishman's constitutional antipathy to most of the ways and beliefs of the Spaniard, and partly through greater community of interest and better knowledge of American aims and character, Englishmen everywhere, and particularly in the Orient, wished their kinsmen well. Nowhere were the opposing sympathies of these outside observers more clearly brought out than in the respective attitudes of the British and the German naval representatives in Manila Bay.

Admiral Dewey reported to Washington, on May 13, that there were in Manila Harbor five foreign men-of-war, — two

German, one British, one French, and one Japanese. On June 25, he reported five German vessels, three British, one French, and one Japanese; and soon after a second German battleship arrived, making six of the seven vessels then constituting the Asiatic Squadron of Germany. Considering that German interests in the whole Philippine Archipelago were practically confined to Manila and were not to be compared in importance with those of British citizens, while subordinate also to those of the French and even of the Swiss colony, the German naval representation, which was at times superior to the blockading squadron, was disproportionate. There was friction between the German and American naval officers and men, in small ways, most of the time, of the sort inevitable where two navies, which have grown to think, in some indefinite fashion, "that they don't like each other," are thrown into close contact. This feeling, which affected the fleets from the youngest apprentice up to the admirals in command, was responsible for considerable bluster and braggadocio on both sides. Technically, however, the right lay entirely on the side of the Americans; for they were the blockaders in command of the situation, and it was for them, within the limits of international law, to lay down the rules under which they would enforce their supervision. There were many little things to justify the reported message of Admiral Dewey to Admiral von Diederich that the latter's ships were acting as if they were the blockaders, and not the Americans.¹ On the other hand, from the German point of view, there was excuse for certain actions of a more conspicuous character, which were, to naval men with the traditional "chip on the shoulder," evidences of hostile intent, and which were magnified into ugly episodes by an over-patriotic press in the United States, then in the full tide of triumphant proclamation of victories. Germany was more

¹ This incident, as well as the message sent to Von Diederich by Dewey, after he learned that a German vessel had landed supplies for Manila, to the effect that "if he wanted war, he could have it right now," are reported by Joseph L. Stickney (*Harper's Magazine*, February, 1899, pp. 483-84).

or less avowedly on the lookout for colonies in the Asiatic Orient; the United States supposedly was not. Only in 1885-86, Germany, which had long had her eye on the Caroline Islands, had, through the over-zealous action of naval officers in the alleged protection of traders' and missionaries' rights in those islands, seriously offended Spanish dignity, and had withdrawn with apologies from an awkward situation.¹ Europe was much quicker than the United States to perceive that the end of Spain's domination had come in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, with the peculiar complication of events following upon the outbreak of war over Cuba. In the absence of any definite attitude on the part of the Government at Washington as to the future of the Philippines, there was more than a little in the history and traditional policy of the United States (especially as interpreted in Europe) and in the discussions of its press at the time, to warrant the belief that the United States would not retain hold upon the Philippines. And very much more important than this, to the Germans on the spot, the attitude of our naval representatives toward the insurgents, and toward the claims the latter put forth with regard to the Americans having no intention of keeping the islands, might afford easy confirmation of the conclusion that the Americans were simply making war on the Spaniards for the time being, and had no intention of involving themselves in the future control of the archipelago. It is to be remembered that, with Germany, the deciding upon a course of action under such circumstances would have lain

¹ The idea of foreign intervention in the Philippines had been exploited by friar organs, anxious to place an anti-Spain brand upon the advocates of Philippine reform, before ever the Filipino revolutionary party talked of intervention by Japan. The Caroline Islands affair, especially so far as Protestant missionaries' rights were put forward by Germany and other nations, was long used as a bugaboo by these organs (as was also the victory of Japan over China in 1895). The fact that Rizal and other propagandists had been to Germany for education was made much of; also the writings of Blumentritt in behalf of the Filipinos (Blumentritt, being, however, an Austrian subject). The German press protested vigorously against insinuations in the press of Spain that the revolt of 1896 was secretly instigated by Germany.

virtually with one man and would have been speedily announced or at least made fairly manifest; and German naval officers were scarcely to be expected to reason that the constitution and methods of government of the United States made any such one-man action out of the question. They were not slow to reach the conclusion that the world would not tolerate a Filipino Government. There was much in the attitude of the American naval commander to justify the conclusion that his home authorities were willing to see such a government instituted. They may have thought that a pro-Spanish, anti-insurgent attitude on their part would help Germany to step into the place of Spain when the Americans washed their hands of the affair. Naval men are rarely equipped with the training of statesmen; and these naval men overlooked the fact that, if Spain must go, the conquering power would inevitably become the chief factor in determining the future fate of the Philippines. If we assume, therefore, that such thoughts were in their minds, and not merely an anti-American prejudice, they were none the less shortsighted, as well as technically wrong, in the innumerable things, both important and petty, which they did during the siege of Manila, and which, whether so intended or not, operated to raise the hope continually among the optimistic Spaniards of Manila that a European coalition would come to relieve their situation, or that Germany at least would constitute herself their active protector against the Americans.¹

¹ Admiral Dewey's information that the German vessels supplied flour to the city of Manila was correct, as may be seen by a reference to the work of a Spanish official among the besieged in Manila (Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 413). When Admiral von Diederich visited the German consulate in Manila, he was the object of a spontaneous reception on the part of the crowds of Spaniards. Two officials of the Irene who visited the city for some days were taken about the lines of defense and banqueted at the Spanish Club. German vessels brought women and children and wounded men to Manila from the besieged town of Dagupan, and received Spanish refugees from the city whenever there was fear of bombardment (*ibid.*, pp. 413-14 and 465-66). Foreman relates (*op. cit.*, p. 584), as a rumor, that a German naval officer, at a lawn-party in Manila, "declared that so long as William II was Emperor of Germany, the Philippines should never come under

As we have seen, Aguinaldo had repeatedly claimed to be operating under the formally pledged protection of the United States; no protest against such pretensions on his part had come from the chief representative of the United States on the spot. Arms bought for him by Americans had been landed under the American guns at Cavite, and he had received some few guns directly from the American naval commander. Until the arrival of the American troops, he was allowed to retain possession of the town of Cavite, surrendered by the Spaniards to the Americans. When the small steamers bought with his funds in China and the steam launches donated to him by Filipino adherents began to move about the bay, they flew the new Filipino flag, with the tacit consent of the Americans. Indeed, when the German admiral sought to obtain from Admiral Dewey a definite statement as to whether or no that flag was officially recognized by the latter's home government, the American commander evaded the question by saying that it was "only a little flag," and anybody could fly a little flag or pennant.¹

When the river steamer *Leite*, bearing the Spanish officers from Makabebe, was captured in the bay, the prisoners were turned over to Aguinaldo to keep, though the steamer was retained by Admiral Dewey. Just after that, the inter-island steamer, *Compañía de Filipinas*, of about 800 tons burden, the property of the leading tobacco company of the islands, owned

American sway." But rumor among the British residents of Manila, whose sympathy with the Americans was not concealed, may easily have exaggerated what he did say.

¹ This is Admiral Dewey's own testimony (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 2929 and 2941): "I said [in response to Von Diederich]: 'That is not a Filipino flag; . . . no government has recognized them; they have a little bit of bunting that anybody could hoist.' . . . They called this a Filipino flag, but I did not." The official denial of Admiral Dewey that he or any of his vessels ever saluted "the flag of the so-called Philippine Republic" is contained in *Sen. Doc. 337*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. Yet Oscar King Davis, one of the best-informed American newspaper correspondents on the ground in 1898, says (*Everybody's Magazine*, August, 1901, p. 141): "Admiral Dewey had caused the marine guard to be turned out for him [Aguinaldo] and had given him a general's salute."

by French and Spanish capital, appeared in the bay flying the insurgent flag and was allowed to add herself to the "mosquito fleet" of the insurgents. On receipt of the news of the American victory at Manila, she had been ordered by her owners to leave Aparri to go and take refuge in Formosa. Just out of Aparri, her crew, led by a Cuban Spaniard, had mutinied and murdered her Spanish officers, taken charge of the vessel, hoisted the insurgent flag, and soon afterwards arrived at Cavite and placed themselves and the vessel they had captured under Aguinaldo's orders. Technically, they were subject, under international law, to the full penalties for mutiny and piracy, at least unless it was to be assumed that their act was a political one, performed in behalf of a governmental organization already recognized or with a right to be recognized by the nations of the world. Through the French consul, the French officers of the tobacco company, which had its headquarters at Manila, demanded of Admiral Dewey the seizure of the vessel and its return to them. It had, however, flown the Spanish flag in the inter-island service, and at the time of its capture by Filipinos, and Admiral Dewey replied to the French consul that "the forces under his command were in no way concerned in this affair, but that he would transmit his letter to Aguinaldo with a request that the latter show due regard for French interests."¹ Meanwhile, the Filipinos had loaded this vessel with armed men and had placed one or two small pieces of artillery on her. She was then dispatched to Subig Bay, to aid on the water side in the capture of the Spanish garrison of marines and 600 or 700 Spanish fugitives who had been driven into Olongapó on the outbreak of insurrection in Sambales province. When the *Compañía de Filipinas* arrived, these fugitives had all been transferred to Isla Grande in front of Olongapó, where, under protection of the

¹ This is Admiral Dewey's own statement, in an informal letter to Aguinaldo under date of July 16, 1898, which letter is reproduced in *Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 6180-81. Aguinaldo also relates the incident in his *Reseña verídica*.

trenches thrown up by the marines, they were safe from any attack that could be made against them by the insurgents from the Sambales shore, who must come over in small boats. The Cuban commander, who had assumed the title of "Admiral of the Filipino Navy," ordered them to surrender, and when they refused, prepared to open on their positions with the little artillery he had. The German cruiser Irene appeared in the bay at the moment, and ordered the Compañía de Filipinas to haul down the insurgent flag which it was flying. The latter vessel thereupon withdrew and reported the occurrence to Aguinaldo at Cavite. The German commander supplied the Spaniards on the little island with what stores he could spare, and took on board the women and children to carry them to Manila. As soon as the incident was reported by Aguinaldo to Admiral Dewey, the latter sent the Raleigh and Concord direct to Subig Bay, because, he afterward stated, he "did n't want any other power to interfere in the Philippines." The Irene retired from the bay on their arrival, on the morning of July 8, and the Spaniards on the little island speedily capitulated to the senior American officer in command, Captain Coghlan, of the Raleigh. There were over 600 of them in all, about one third of whom were marines and the rest Spanish civilians and friars. The Compañía de Filipinas had followed the American vessels to Subig Bay, and Captain Coghlan, acting upon the instructions of Admiral Dewey, turned these prisoners and what arms they had over to the Filipinos on that boat, against the protest of the captured Spaniards. The Compañía de Filipinas immediately steamed over to Olongapó with them, where they were put on shore and left under charge of the insurgent commander at that point. Fifty-two of them, including the friars, remained in the town, and the rest were marched inland with the insurgent forces.¹

¹ The American official version of this affair is very meager. Admiral Dewey's cablegram of July 10 reports the bare facts, with the obvious inference that he looked upon the affair chiefly as an instance of German ill-will and acted upon that basis (*Bureau of Navigation*, p. 110). His testimony in 1902 (*Sen. Doc. 331*,

Viewed from the standpoint of Spaniards and foreigners in Manila who looked upon the capture of the *Compañía de Filipinas* in the first place as an act of piracy and assassination, and who had in the preceding twenty months had only too serious reason to fear what might happen to Spanish prisoners who fell into the hands of the insurgents, especially in Sambales, the act of the German commander was not only justifiable, but highly commendable, upon broad grounds of humanity. Aside from Admiral Dewey's resentment of German officiousness, already sufficiently stimulated by minor incidents during the blockade, his justification for taking some hundreds of prisoners, who by their military code were forbidden to accept parole and who must be handed over to the insurgents or turned loose for the latter to capture, must rest upon his acceptance in good faith of Aguinaldo's promise that such

p. 2942) was wholly to the effect that it was German interference which led him to act. In *Sen. Doc. 387*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., he says that the Spanish garrison "was turned over to the Filipinos for safekeeping. . . . The prisoners had refused to give parole, and there were no facilities at my command for their care. Aguinaldo had promised that they should be treated humanely and according to the laws of war." The report of Captain Coghlan upon the incident (there stated to be on file in the Navy Department) has not been published. Various unauthorized versions of the affair appeared at the time in American periodicals, always in connection with the question of Germany's attitude, hence presenting the matter from one side only. A very good account from the American standpoint of the whole trouble between the Germans and the Americans was contained in a letter of July 18, 1898, written from Cavite by Oscar King Davis (*Harper's History*, pp. 40-43). American journalistic comment at the time was wholly commendatory of Dewey (see, e.g., *The Outlook*, July 23, 1898), as the idea of German interference loomed large in the American mind (see also *Public Opinion*, June 30 and July 7, 1898, for press comments before this incident). Just before sailing for the Philippines on July 29, General Merritt wired to Washington: "In view of possibility of foreign interference with my troops landing at the Philippines, I desire instructions as to how far, in the opinion of the Government, force should be used to enforce our rights." He was informed that the inquiry "was not understood," and replied that it was made "in view of the many reports that Germany was negotiating for control of the Philippines," but was "perhaps not important." (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 710, 713.) Spaniards viewed the Olongapó episode as a piece of barbarity on the part of the Americans, in turning over to the insurgents of Sambales, where assassinations had already occurred, Spanish prisoners (the majority of them noncombatants) who had surrendered not to the Filipinos, but to the American naval commander. For the Spanish side of it, see Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 471-75.

prisoners should be properly treated. He had already reported to Washington (in a cablegram of June 12) that the insurgents were treating their prisoners "most humanely," and he seems to have been convinced that not only was this the case with prisoners who were confined close to the insurgent headquarters in Cavite, but that Aguinaldo's injunctions on this point would be obeyed in the more remote parts of the island. A knowledge of the history of the events of the two preceding years and of the bitterness excited by acts of retaliation and of race hatred on both sides would have raised with him very grave doubts on this point. The Spaniards assert that the friars put on shore at Olongapó were hitched to carts and made to do the work of *karabaus*, while Spanish civilians were made to follow them and drive them along with whips, and that all these prisoners were given but scant rations of rice which had been wet in salt water.¹ As a matter of fact, there were some things about the treatment of the Spanish soldiers under Aguinaldo's own eyes in Cavite which were not in accord with his decrees or his protestations of humanity to Admiral Dewey. Except for their receiving scanty food, they were not seriously mistreated, but were subjected to many minor humiliations, doubly injurious to the proud spirit of the Spaniard, whose own previous haughty attitude toward the natives (the "Indians," as he was wont to call them) inevitably stimulated the latter to retaliation under such unforeseen circumstances of power. Unfortunately, the record of the Filipinos in their treatment of Spanish prisoners in some other places is not so pleasant to contemplate.² Many of the prison-

¹ Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

² Between 8000 and 10,000 prisoners, of all sorts and conditions and of both sexes, fell into the hands of the insurgents during 1898, nearly all in Luzon. The record of their treatment will receive discussion later on. Those in Cavite complained mostly of the humiliation of being turned into servants of the native families upon whom they had formerly looked with contempt, of being made to work on the roads and intrenchments in the hot sun, and of being underfed, unless they had money concealed about their persons with which to bribe their captors. A typical complaint of these prisoners is contained in a letter of the artillery lieutenant-

ers in Cavite were transferred across the bay to Bulakán late in June, when American troops were expected to arrive. Others were transferred after the arrival of General Merritt, in consequence of endeavors made to issue American army rations to them, which Aguinaldo seemed to resent.¹ The first intimation received at Washington that the insurgents were not treating their prisoners as promised seems to have come to the Government from the Vatican, which was solicitous for the lives of the captured friars. In accordance with this intimation, both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt were instructed by cable on August 1 to prevent the friars being put to death, if possible to do so.²

COOLNESS BETWEEN FILIPINOS AND AMERICANS — PREPARATIONS FOR CAPTURE OF MANILA

General Anderson and the troops of the first expedition arrived off Cavite on June 30. The Filipinos knew, probably through Admiral Dewey, that these troops would want some place along the Cavite shore. General Anderson called upon Aguinaldo in company with Admiral Dewey the day after his arrival; and both this and a subsequent interview between the same parties were most amicable.³ Nevertheless, the changed attitude of the insurgents toward the Americans, as soon as ant who had commanded the guns of Point Sangley on May 1 (cited in *Historia Negra*, por Capitan Verdades, p. 62).

¹ For General Anderson's report of this incident, with his message to Aguinaldo that, if the prisoners remained in Cavite, they must be fed, see *Sen. Doc.* 298, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, p. 15. At that time, also, the Americans demanded from Aguinaldo the Spanish officers whom they had taken prisoners from the gunboat *Leite*.

² The cable correspondence on this subject at the time is found in the *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 118, and in *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 743. On July 31, Cardinal Rampolla cabled to Apostolic Delegate Martinelli at Washington that the vicar-apostolic at Hongkong reported that the friars imprisoned at Cavite were in danger of death and "the Holy Father wishes that you take steps at once to have the Government of the United States prevent this evil." The instructions to Dewey and Merritt were identical in terms: "This should not be permitted, if you are in position to prevent it."

³ Aguinaldo again (*Reseña verídica*) makes the claim that what amounted to authoritative promises that the United States would recognize Filipino independ-

the latter became a land as well as a sea force in the Philippines, was speedily made apparent. Two of Anderson's officers were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo for passing from the arsenal into the insurgent lines in Cavite. The American forces were disembarked on July 2, and Aguinaldo was invited to a Fourth of July celebration in Cavite, but did not come, because the invitation was not extended to him officially as President.¹ The unfriendly attitude of himself and his followers seems, more than anything else, to have been the occasion for the first letter written to him by General Anderson on July 4; for, after courteous phrases about the "friendly sentiments" of the American people "for the native people of the Philippines," and about the desire to have them "coöperate with us in military operations against Spain," the letter comes to the point with a formal notice to Aguinaldo that Anderson feels it necessary to take Cavite as a base of operations and hints that there must be no interference with his officers. Aguinaldo's reply was conciliatory and studiously courteous, and the next day Anderson wrote again, in rather indefinite terms, about the desirability of an agreement in advance as to the territory which the American troops should occupy on shore, since they would move promptly against "our common enemy." After that, except for several notes virtually forming passports for American officers to go through the insurgent lines and reconnoiter the country south of Ma-

ence were made to him by Dewey and ratified by Anderson in these interviews. Fortunately, General Anderson has given us a somewhat detailed account of the conversations, as he recalled them, in his article in the *North American Review* for February, 1900. In a letter to the Secretary of War in February, 1900, General Anderson also categorically denied the statements of the *Reseña verídica*, declaring that, in answer to Aguinaldo's request for recognition, he answered that he "was there simply in a military capacity, and could not acknowledge his [Aguinaldo's] Government because he had no authority to do so." (See *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 5, pp. 4-5.) Admiral Dewey says that he and General Anderson went in an informal way, not wearing swords or full uniform. (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2976.)

¹ *North American Review*, February, 1900, p. 276. In his official report, General Anderson has also touched briefly upon the hostile attitude of the Filipinos at the time of his arrival (*Report of Major-General Commanding Army, 1898*, p. 54).

nila, Anderson's correspondence with Aguinaldo related to the difficulties which seemed to be purposely put in the way of the American army securing supplies or transportation from the people, and it was more or less peremptory in tone. To some extent, of course, the disposition of the natives of Cavite not to comply with the Americans' demands for labor and to conceal their means of transportation and their supplies was due to their ignorance as to how they would be treated, their doubt as to whether they would be paid, and their non-eagerness to work, as well as to the way in which the province had been scourged by war under the Spaniards and to the fact that the able-bodied population was already pretty effectually commandeered by the insurgent organization. Doubtless, too, the American quartermasters did not make proper allowance for the strength of the "*mañana*" habit and wanted things done rather more quickly than immediately, as is the American way. But the hiding of the wheels of carts, the sending of animals farther into the interior, and the exorbitant demand for such services and supplies as were furnished, are not altogether explained by these conditions. Admiral Dewey's naval officers had a pretty good force of natives at work at the arsenal by this time, receiving double their former pay and better treatment than ever before had been the case with them, and having no disposition to leave the service of the Americans and be commandeered by men of their own race; they were literally forced to give up a good portion of their pay in regular contributions to the insurgent treasury. General Anderson's communications of the latter part of July are virtually threats to Aguinaldo that, if orders understood to have been given by him were not countermanded and transportation facilities and men were not available at the points where the Americans were encamped, the latter would "pass him and make requisition directly on the people." Aguinaldo's reply of July 24 is virtually an admission that he controlled the attitude of his people in this respect.

General Anderson's correspondence with Aguinaldo has been criticized in somewhat guarded terms by his own superiors and by Admiral Dewey. He may derive satisfaction from the knowledge that he was the first American officer to come in contact with the revolutionary party who reported to Washington, without indefiniteness or ambiguities of any sort, that what they wanted and expected was independence, and that an attempt to set up an American Government in the Philippines would very likely bring on a conflict with them. On July 9, he wrote a letter to the Adjutant-General of the army (received in Washington on August 29) to the effect that Aguinaldo, at first suspicious, was now friendly and "willing to coöperate," but if, as seemed improbable, he could take Manila without American help, "he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government." On July 18, he cabled, through the conduct of Admiral Dewey: "Aguinaldo declares dictator and martial law over all the islands. The people expect independence." The same day he wrote to the Adjutant-General that "the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with the insurgents, now in active hostility to Spain," and that, in spite of the friendly declarations of the latter, they "in many ways obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us."¹ Three days later, he wrote again that he had let Aguinaldo know verbally that he had only military authority and could not recognize his assumption of civil authority, but that he had made no formal protest against the declaration of dictatorship, this being at Admiral Dewey's request, though he had written such a protest.²

¹ General Anderson had then read the instructions of the President of May 19, relative to establishing a provisional military government. This document was brought by General Greene, who arrived with the second expedition on July 16.

² On July 22, in a letter to Aguinaldo relative to the property of a wealthy Filipino half-caste of Cavite (which Aguinaldo claimed had been donated to the insurgent cause, and which he sought to recover from the Americans), Anderson did

General Anderson had been but three days in San Francisco between his arrival from Alaska and his departure with the first expedition, but in those few days he had heard enough of the discussion then going on in the United States about the future policy toward the Philippines to have the query arise in his mind as to what course of action the Government had decided upon. His instructions before departure did not mention the Filipinos. He was on arrival to confer fully with Admiral Dewey and dispose his troops so as to have them under the protection of the navy's guns. Hearty coöperation with Dewey was enjoined, and it was stated that he was not deprived of the "fullest discretion" after such consultation, as "he must be governed by events and circumstances of which we can have no knowledge." He has said that he supposed that, on arrival at Cavite, "all he had to do was to consult Dewey," but the latter "had no more definite orders" than he himself, and "matters were seriously complicated because he had set Aguinaldo up in business."¹

take the responsibility of putting it on record that he could not, without orders, recognize Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority. Aguinaldo's reply was the usual protest of friendliness, but conveyed the warning that American troops should not be disembarked without previous notice to him "in writing," stating, "the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation"; otherwise he could not answer for what his people might do, because, "as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights." (See *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 9-11.)

¹ The Anderson-Aguinaldo correspondence may be found in its most complete form in *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, pp. 4-20, it being there made up from the less complete records of it in *Report of Major-General Commanding Army, 1899*, part 2 (same as part 4 of *Report of War Department, 1899*), pp. 335-44, and in *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 390-99. All but an abstract of Aguinaldo's letter of July 15 (transmitting to Anderson, at the same time as to Dewey, the decrees of the new Revolutionary Government) seems to have been lost. (See *Sen. Doc. 244*, 56 Cong., 1st Sess.) Anderson's letters from Cavite to Washington are also found in *Sen. Doc. 208*, and his cablegram of July 18 in *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 117. His instructions before departure are summarized by him in his article in the February, 1900, number of the *North American Review*, and are quoted in full in a letter written by him to the *Chicago Record-Herald* and published in its issue of July 11, 1902. They are also given, in the form of a telegram to General Otis at San Francisco, on p. 668 of *Corr. Rel. War*. Therein it appears that the stars, which have been thought to point to significant omissions in *Sen. Doc. 208*, from

General Greene and the troops of the second expedition arrived in Manila Bay on July 16 and 17, and these troops were within the week disembarked and encamped in one of the few thicketless spots on the Cavite beach.¹ General Greene brought instructions to General Anderson, as senior officer, that if he and Admiral Dewey wished to attack the city and were sure of success, they might do so in advance of General Merritt's arrival.² It was decided that an attack by some 6000 men on perhaps twice their number behind fortifications and intrenchments was hardly authorized by these instructions, even though the fleet could speedily reduce the city walls. It was not possible to invite the coöperation of the 10,000 to 15,000 insurgents intrenched about the city, because, in General Anderson's words, "if Manila had been taken with his [Aguinaldo's] coöperation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and it would therefore have been practically under Filipino control."³

his letter of July 9, do not take the place of any other statements by him with reference to the insurgents, but indicate long passages of criticism of the transport service and the equipment, especially as regards clothing, of the first expedition, in connection with his transmission of the reports of the commanding officers of the regiments comprising this expedition. His letter of July 21, from which passages are also omitted in the Senate document, is not given at all in *Corr. Rel. War*. The preceding letters from him were all received at Washington on August 29. Admiral Dewey's disapproval of General Anderson's relations with the insurgents is most plainly indicated in his testimony before the Senate Committee. (See *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 2976-80.) Dewey then said (p. 2937) that he had no recollection of requesting Anderson not to make formal protest against Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority. He said, however, that "one's hindsight is better than his foresight," and if he had it to do over, he would not have anything to do with the insurgents. Similarly, General Anderson says, in the letter to the *Chicago Record-Herald* (cited above), which was written in protest against some of the statements in Admiral Dewey's testimony: "If I had known as much about him [Aguinaldo] then as everybody seems to know now, I might have arrested him then without correspondence."

¹ This was called "Camp Dewey." Some preparation for the location of troops there had been made before Greene's arrival, and Anderson had sent over from Cavite a battalion of Californians. (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 54-55, 61.)

² See General Greene's contribution to the *Century Magazine*, March, 1899, p. 790.

³ *North American Review*, February, 1900, p. 275.

General Merritt, who arrived on July 25, evidently bore instructions to avoid, as far as possible, all complications with the insurgents. He himself remained on shipboard, but the commanding officers on shore were in numerous instances explicitly instructed to keep as free as possible from the entanglements with the Filipinos who were investing Manila, while at the same time pushing forward the preparations for the capture of the city without their assistance.¹ These preparations were considerably delayed by the insufficient equipment of the first expeditions; the troops disembarked under Greene were poorly provided with shelter, and, because of the lack of land transportation in their own possession (no wagons or horses having been brought) and the difficulty of securing it on shore, the problem of supplying them was no small one to cope with. The rainy season had then begun, and the frequent typhoons outside kept the bay stirred up, while only the hardiness of the Western volunteers preserved their good temper and enthusiasm in the daily drenchings they received on shore, they having no change of clothing. The high surf running on the shallow beach and the lack of available small boats, except

¹ In his official report, General Merritt says: "As Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs." (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, p. 40. This report also forms vol. III of *Message of the President and Accompanying Documents, 1898*.) General Merritt here refers to his formal instructions of May 19 (*Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 85). In his testimony before the Peace Commission at Paris, he said: "It was part of my policy that we should keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much as possible, because we knew trouble would occur from his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender." (*Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 362.) And again (*ibid.*, p. 367): "The whole correspondence [of General Anderson] was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got there, and I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it was not the wish of the Government to make promises to the insurgents or act in any way with them. Admiral Dewey cabled to Washington the day after Merritt's arrival (*Bureau of Navigation*, p. 118): "[Aguinaldo] has become aggressive and even threatening."

the cumbersome native lighters (the insurgents having most of the launches, etc., that were not tied up inside the city on the river banks or in the possession of foreigners of Manila other than Spaniards), also made the landing of the 5000 troops arriving at the end of July a slow process.¹ But the chief problem from the outset was how to get the American troops in position for a decisive attack on Manila without in some manner joining with the insurgents or being compromised by some sort of recognition of them. The Americans held a comparatively small tract of land on the beach, but between this position and the Spanish line of defense on the south, terminating in the little old fort of San Antonio de Abad just south of Malate, the insurgents had themselves well intrenched. And from this point, running in an irregular line northeast to the river, and from the river near San Juan del Monte around the city on the north to the bay west of the Tondo district, their besieging line was fairly complete, and they had the country pretty thoroughly dug up with trenches, in some places approaching to within two hundred yards or so of the line of Spanish blockhouses. Sharp little engagements of no consequence occurred along these lines now and then,

¹ The brigade under General MacArthur, which had arrived on July 31, could not all be landed until August 9. The criticisms of General Anderson and his regimental commanders on the equipment and transportation of the first expedition have been cited above. For the criticisms of a naval officer on the second and subsequent expeditions (only the first being under the more or less direct supervision of naval officers) see *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 137-41. The *Springfield Republican* of September 30, 1898, raised the query why the China was kept waiting in Manila Bay for forty days at the expense of \$1500 per day to the Government. General Anderson, however, says that he retained the Sydney and Australia (which he had been charged to send back as soon as possible) at Admiral Dewey's advice (letter of July 14, *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 780), as it might have been desirable to transport his troops to some other point in Luzon if the second Spanish fleet came to Manila; also (letter of July 9, *ibid.*, p. 778) that he was advised by Dewey, on the above account, not to land anything at first but absolutely necessary supplies and impedimenta. Admiral Dewey cabled on July 17 that he retained the China and Peking as auxiliaries, in view of the rumors about Cámara's fleet being en route to Manila. General Greene (*Century Magazine*, March, 1899) very vigorously defends the records made in equipping the first expeditions, and says that the troops encamped outside of Manila were made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances.

mostly early in the morning or after nightfall; but there had been nothing like a general engagement inaugurated on the part of the insurgents, nor any evidence that they could drive in the Spanish outposts, defended by artillery, at any point, though the bullets might rattle about the roofs in Malate at intervals. Supplies in Manila were commanding four times the usual price, and horse meat had come to take the place of the tough flesh of the *karabau*; but the inhabitants were never in a desperate condition, or anything like it, as regards food, in part because of the provisions of the governing authorities with regard to the storing and sale of supplies, but principally because the Germans had supplied them with flour at several critical times, and because the insurgents' cordon was easily penetrated by bribery, and supplies were easily brought in from up the river and elsewhere.¹ The Spaniards within suffered principally from the barometric alternations of their changeful dispositions, now being raised to the heavens of optimism by the latest tale of European intervention (to be inaugurated by the naval forces of Germany and France in the harbor), by word that Admiral Cámara would soon arrive and sweep the Americans off the seas, or by a fully detailed cablegram announcing the destruction of the American fleet off Santiago de Cuba; and, again, they were cast into the pessimism of despair by new rumors of a bombardment, or tales of an uprising in the city and the sacking and massacre to coincide with the entry of the insurgents from outside.

One of the Spanish delusions, which was rather more than

¹ On June 27, the insurgents gained possession of the pumping-plant of the city water-supply, up the Marikina River. The Spaniards, however, retained the reservoir, near the city; and by allowing the water to run from it but three hours a day, and utilizing the rain water then falling so abundantly, the inhabitants were never in straits for water. The appeal to the insurgent commander Montenegro in the name of humanity, to let the pumping-plant continue its operations, was answered by him with a refusal to do so and a demand upon the Spaniards to surrender the city to the insurgents and thus avert the suffering they feared (Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 471). Most of the red wine in the city was embargoed for the rations of the soldiers in the trenches. Chickens rose to a price of four pesos each.

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a delusion, gave the Americans themselves no little concern, and had something to do with the postponement of the capture of the city. The Spanish squadron under Admiral Cámara, which, it was rumored, both in the United States and Manila, had started for the Orient about the middle of May, did leave Spain's coasts a month or so later, and on July 5 passed the Suez Canal. The three torpedo-boat destroyers with it were there turned back, supposedly that the fleet might make speed. The battleship Pelayo, protected cruiser Carlos V, three cruisers, and three transports with several thousand troops were, for several weeks thereafter, expected by Admiral Dewey, with some anxiety, since the Pelayo was so much more powerful a vessel than any that he had. Inasmuch as it seemed quite certain that this squadron would arrive at Manila before either of the slow-steaming monitors Monterey and Monadnock, which had been started from the Pacific Coast in June to add their powerful guns and protective armor to Dewey's force, could reach there, the latter considered various plans, it being finally decided that he would leave the close waters of Manila Bay, and, after uniting with the monitors, meet the Spaniards in the open waters, or else would await them inside the landlocked entrance of Subig Bay, while the American troops would either be transported to the northern end of the railroad at Dagupan or would strike inland with their thirty days' supplies. But the Spaniards did not come, and on August 4 the Monterey arrived, settling for once and all Dewey's apprehensions as to what he would do for defense against the rumored squadron; also as to the damage which might be done to his ships, in an attack on the city, by the few powerful modern guns on the Luneta.¹

¹ The cablegrams which passed back and forth between Dewey and the Navy Department in May, June, and July, on the subject of the Spanish relief squadron, may be found in *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 97-118. On May 20, Dewey said, if it came, his squadron "would attempt to give a good account of itself." In June, when the strength of the Spanish reinforcements was known more in detail, and after the American admiral had begun to entertain suspicions of the future pur-

It had been decided to make the attack on Manila from the south side and along the beach, where the navy could cooperate, and the chief problem was to get hold of the trenches held by the Filipinos between the American camp and the Spanish outer line. General Merritt instructed General Greene to endeavor by informal conference to secure these positions peaceably; if he could not, he was authorized, as a last extreme, to use force, as it was absolutely necessary to have this foothold for an attack. With the authority of Aguinaldo, the insurgent commander at this point moved out his troops, and the Americans moved in quietly on July 29, at once constructing new intrenchments a little in front of the old line. Subsequently, insurgent positions extending farther to the eastward and inland were also yielded to the Americans, Aguinaldo stipulating only that formal requests in writing be sent to him.¹

poses of the German fleet facing him, he suggested (June 25) that an American fleet be sent to threaten the coast of Spain. This had already been announced as the intention of the Washington Government. (For American press comment on this incident of the war, see *Public Opinion*, July 7, 1898.) The official reports of Generals Merritt and Greene both bring out the delay that was occasioned by waiting for the Monterey. This was due, after Merritt's arrival, to Dewey's desire to have the monitor's heavier guns to cope with the Luneta battery, if the city resisted; he had heard, on July 22, of Cámara's fleet having turned back. A letter of Merritt of July 25 (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 781) brings out very plainly Dewey's attitude at the time, as does Anderson's letter of July 14 (*ibid.*, p. 780). See also Anderson's and Greene's magazine contributions, already cited. It has never been made clear why the Spanish ships did not continue on their course; whether the threat to send an American fleet to the coasts of Spain caused their recall, whether their start was merely intended to frighten the Americans and prevent the fall of Manila until the inevitable truce was sued for, whether it was a false move of the latter sort but designed principally to relieve the Ministry from charges that might be made of abandoning Manila to its fate, or simply that Cámara's "nerve did not hold out" (as General Greene hints). The probabilities are that the Pelayo and Carlos V — boats hastily completed after the beginning of the war — were not in fit condition to fight.

¹ The formal request of General Anderson of August 10 for the trenches facing Blockhouse 14, and Aguinaldo's reply consenting to this, are cited in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 17. The letter of General Greene to General Noriel, making the first request of this sort on July 29, is to be found on p. 8 of *Telegraphic Correspondence of E. Aguinaldo, July 15, 1898, to February 28, 1899* (War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1903). That force was authorized, if necessary, to get the first trenches, was the testimony of General Merritt at Paris (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 363 and 367). The article of General Greene in the *Century Magazine*, April,

It was at this time that the insurgents were putting forth their first formal appeal for recognition by foreign powers.¹ There were at the time various instances of friction between the two attacking armies. The American Signal Corps, striving to meet the imperative demands made upon it to prepare a system of communication not only between the land forces at Cavite and those around the beach about Manila, but also between the sea and shore forces which were to coöperate in the attack, all with very scanty means of transportation, clashed more or less with Filipino detachments in places where it operated, and also with Aguinaldo himself; the peremptory fashion in which the Americans assumed possession of municipal buildings, etc., and their way of cutting in on the wires of the insurgent organization and temporarily disrupting its system of

1899, shows, however, that it was distinctly forbidden by General Merritt to use force in securing the trenches farther inland which MacArthur's troops occupied after August 9 (as before by the consent of Aguinaldo, through Noriel). MacArthur and Greene had proposed a plan of attack on the city, based on securing the insurgent trenches, "by removing the insurgents" if necessary, in a memorandum of August 9, and Merritt's reply on August 10 was specific: "No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused, not to use force." (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 72-73; also *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 14.)

¹ See *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 438-39; also *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 99-101. Certain municipal presidents, elected under the decrees of June 18 and 20, met at Cavite on August 1, to receive from Aguinaldo, as provided in those decrees, his approval of their election, without which they could not take office. Immediately thereafter they proceeded to "recognize and respect Señor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as President of the Revolutionary Government," and the validity of his decrees, and to "proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence of the Philippines." This was Mabini's project, that independence might appear to be declared by a representative assembly of Filipinos. These men, were, however, only a handful of village presidents from various towns in Cavite and Batangas, with perhaps a few from the north side of the bay, all of whom had been carefully selected in advance by Aguinaldo and his immediate followers. The proclamation of August 6, accompanying this document, was Aguinaldo's formal request to foreign powers for recognition, "since they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the equilibrium between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong." It contains exaggerations in the statements that the insurgents then had 9000 prisoners and 30,000 troops "in the form of a regular army." It declared that "the revolution now rules" in the Tagalog provinces and in Pampanga, Tarlak, Pangasinan, Unión, and Sambales, a statement which was in a sense correct, though most of these provinces had as yet no civil organization.

communication, injured the dignity of the Filipinos, besides jarring their leisureliness.¹ Also, the Spaniards feared a bombardment of the city by the war-vessels, there was also some feeling about the Americans' efforts to restrain the Filipinos from doing their customary firing nights and mornings and thus running the risk of prematurely bringing on a more or less general engagement, besides wasting lives uselessly.²

The Spaniards had not noticed, or at least had not given any attention to, the presence of the Americans in front of their trenches until the night of July 31–August 1, when, for a time after midnight and also after dawn, they opened with artillery and infantry a very vigorous fire against the American positions, on the first occasion also attempting to advance and drive the latter out of the trenches. Ten men were killed and 43 wounded on the American side. There were a score more of casualties in similar but lesser engagements (merely picket-firing) during the next four days. Finally, the Monterey having arrived, the Spaniards were notified that bombardment might begin at any time after forty-eight hours, or sooner, if they indulged in further hostilities. From the time of this notice, on August 7, no shots were exchanged between the Americans and Spaniards until the advance was made on the city.³

¹ See *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 14, for Aguinaldo's complaint to General Anderson about this. The reports of the American signal service officers (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 127–36) also confirm quite fully what he says. See also *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 8–9.

² The claim of Aguinaldo (*Reseña verídica*) that Noriel's troops one night came to the assistance of the Americans and repulsed the Spaniards, who had left their trenches and driven in the American outposts by a sudden attack, and that the Filipinos thus saved six cannon which the Americans had been compelled to abandon, has been categorically denied by Generals Anderson, Greene, and MacArthur and the colonels of the American regiments engaged (*Sen. Doc. 208*, part 5, and *Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 1902). Richard Brinsley Sheridan, "barrister-at-law," who calls himself an "eyewitness" of American aggression against the Filipinos, makes something of this incident in his book, *The Filipino Martyrs* (New York, 1900), p. 63; but this book is of no service in getting at the real history of affairs. The account of this episode by Foreman, *op. cit.*, p. 615, is wholly erroneous; there was no such engagement as he relates on August 12.

³ See General Greene's official report and magazine article, already cited.

CHAPTER VI

THE CAPTURE OF MANILA BY "THREAT"

ADMIRAL DEWEY had not only been waiting for the arrival of the monitor, but also was hopeful that negotiations then being carried on between him and the Spanish authorities in Manila would result in the surrender of the city without bloodshed. It had been apparent, even to the Spaniards, that they were really at the mercy of Dewey's guns at any time after May 1 when he might choose to direct them upon the city. The foreigners who had property in the business section of Manila were naturally very anxious that there should be no useless bombardment of the city. It was through the English and Belgian consuls (the latter a business man in Manila) that the proposal to arrange for a peaceful surrender of the city first came to Dewey; and it was through the Belgian that a quasi-agreement was finally reached in August, an agreement which more than gives color to the claim that Manila was really surrendered and not captured. However, the obstacle which prevented Consul André from securing the consent of the Spanish governor-general to surrender without further fighting (namely, the fact that, under the Spanish military code, the capitulation of a fortified town, unless it can be shown that all means of defense have been employed, involves court-martial and liability to severe penalties) made it impossible for any definite agreement to be conveyed by the consul to Admiral Dewey, other than that, after a certain amount of resistance had been offered, the walled city would capitulate under a white flag, provided it was not previously bombarded. In other words, "Spanish honor," as incorporated in the Spanish military law, required on this occasion that a number of Spanish lives should be uselessly sacrificed on the outer lines (where

the soldiers fought bravely for a time, in ignorance, except for a few superior officers, of the surrender previously agreed upon in their rear) before the inevitable verdict of stern necessity could be accepted. The other side of the picture presents also the loss of four American lives; but it is to be remembered that, although General Merritt was cognizant of the negotiations conducted by Dewey through Consul André, he did not think the Spaniards in authority were dealing in good faith, and that on the part of the American troops on shore, the attack on the city was planned and carried out in good faith as a *bona-fide* attack. The net result for the Americans was that the stipulated yielding of the Spaniards after a show of resistance had been made saved some hundreds of lives, which would have been lost had the resistance been real and been prolonged as it might have been. All this, however, makes talk of the "capture by assault" of Manila seem rather bombastic. The decisive factor in the situation throughout was the guns of the navy.

The verbal negotiations between Admiral Dewey and the governor-general, which had been conducted through the Belgian consul in a desultory fashion for two weeks, came to a head very quickly after Dewey and Merritt joined, on August 7, in the formal notice of bombardment at any time after forty-eight hours had passed. To the intimation that he remove non-combatants from the city, the governor-general replied that it was impossible to do this, he being "surrounded by insurrectionary forces." On August 9, when the forty-eight hours were about to expire, the vessels of the foreign fleets withdrew from in front of Manila, and private launches brought away from the city members of the foreign colonies.¹ Then Dewey

¹ The condition inside the city is described by Sastrón (*op. cit.*, pp. 490-96). The people crowded into the churches and convents, where supplies had been collected, even bringing their household treasures and furniture also, until the governor-general ordered this stopped. He forbade all carriage traffic in the walled city, and only two gates were left open. His own headquarters were transferred to the Augustinian monastery, which was very strongly built of stone. Places of shelter close under the walls and in earthquake ruins near by were assigned to the aged

and Merritt joined in a formal demand upon the governor-general to surrender the city and avert sacrifice of life. He replied that he was without authority to do this, but would communicate the situation and their demand to his Government, if given time to send to Hongkong and get an answer by cable. This request the American commanders refused on the following day. So much for the formal intercourse between American and Spanish headquarters, which was conducted through the British consul in Manila.¹ The Belgian consul now brought almost to a head the somewhat vague and indefinite proposals which he had been extracting, bit by bit, from the Spanish superior authority in the city. The incident can be fully appreciated only in the light of the change in administration which at that moment took place in Manila, by order of Madrid. Toward the close of July, it had become definitely known in Manila that the Spanish fleet had been disastrously defeated off the coast of Cuba, and, what was more immediately important to them, that Admiral Cámara and his long-expected relief squadron had repassed the Suez Canal. Thereupon, Governor-General Augustin sent a long cablegram to his Government explaining the difficulties of his situation, stating that the American forces were steadily being increased, and closing by declaring that he "declined the responsibility of the situation" produced by the return of the relief squadron and that there was "no possibility of resisting unless they had assistance." The reply from Madrid was an order to Augustin to turn over his office to the second in command, General Fermin Jaudenes, with virtual instructions to the latter to "preserve the Philippines to the sovereignty of Spain." This was received

and sick and to women and children. This crowding of the principal Spanish people into the places which would most quickly suffer bombardment, if bombardment there was, indicates that the Spaniards expected to yield without it, and also shows that their chief fear was that the Tagalogs would enter the parts of the city outside of the walls.

¹ This formal correspondence may be found in Admiral Dewey's report of August 16 (*Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 120-22) and in General Merritt's report of August 31 (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, pp. 46-48).

at Manila on August 3 or 4, there being received at the same time with it a telegram from Premier Sagasta of earlier date commending Augustin's efforts and stating that he must hold out at all hazards, as peace negotiations were being hurried forward.¹ On August 5, Jaudenes assumed command, with the inevitable "allocution." Quite naturally, the news received from Spain of peace negotiations being under way, and the instructions he had received to hold out at all costs, interposed a new obstacle to the hopes that had been entertained of a peaceful surrender. However, the facts that faced the Spaniards, particularly in the shape of a fleet which could readily reduce their works and cause great destruction of life and property, were as stubborn as ever; hence, the endeavor to gain time, in response to the demand of August 9 for surrender. According to the notes kept by Consul André, the chief concern of Augustin, who had, before August 3, almost consented to a mere show of resistance, was as to whether the Americans would allow the Tagalogs to enter and sack the city, and possibly massacre its Spanish inhabitants.²

Upon Dewey's authority, André had been able to reassure the Spaniard on this point. He now found that this was his strongest card to play with Jaudenes in getting the latter to promise that the Luneta guns would not be fired at the American ships, which was the condition stipulated by Dewey for refraining from bombarding the city. According to André himself, he, on August 9, on his own responsibility, virtually threatened Jaudenes that the Americans would permit the

¹ Data regarding the substitution of Jaudenes for Augustin will be found in Sas-trón, *op. cit.*, pp. 478-79 and 485-86, and in *McClure's Magazine* for June, 1899, wherein Oscar King Davis gives a very full abstract of the diary kept by Consul André. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile with this episode the dates assigned in these two sources to the cablegrams, but the fact that Augustin's pessimistic message of late July is what caused his dismissal is very well established by current Spanish comment.

² On July 29, Dewey cabled to Washington that he had reliable information that Manila would be surrendered to the Americans "if it were not for the insurgent complication" (*Bureau of Navigation*, p. 118).

Tagalogs to enter and do as they pleased when the city was taken. The threat worked so effectively that Jaudenes at once submitted to a council of war the question whether they should surrender or should make a show of resistance to the Americans.¹ The formal reply given after this meeting to André (at the same time that Dewey was asked to permit communication with Madrid) was that the Spaniards must "defend their honor" and make the most of their resources; but after that and subsequent conferences, he was allowed to convey to Dewey rather indefinite promises to the effect that the Luneta guns would not be fired "if he did not come too close"; that the resistance on the outer line of defense would not be prolonged if the Spaniards had sufficient chance to withdraw after the fleet had shelled the fort and their trenches on the south; and that a white flag would be displayed on the city wall when the Americans could come in to conduct the capitulation. The Spaniards wanted definite assurances that the insurgents would be kept out, and that they would be given honor-

¹ The best account of the discussion of this question in Spanish official circles in Manila is contained on pp. 14-24 of *Defensa obligada* (Madrid, 1904), a pamphlet by Archbishop Nozaleda containing answers to the charges against himself, quoting quite fully from the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Authorities on August 8 and from the records of the later courts-martial in Spain, which tried Jaudenes, Tejeiro, and others for surrendering Manila. We find the civilians of the Board of Authorities, including the archbishop, practically advising surrender, as being the wish of the inhabitants, with the exception of the chief judge of the Audiencia, who thought the Government's cablegrams required resistance to the last. A touch of Spanish character is found in the statement of the governor of Manila province, who, as a civil officer, reported that the people thought resistance to the last could be of no practical use, but who declined to speak for a surrender "in his capacity as a military officer." This meeting of civilians was a mere formality, calculated to put it on record that the inhabitants urged surrender upon the military authorities, thus protecting the latter in the inevitable trial they would have to face. The meeting on August 9 was that of the "military council of defense." According to Nozaleda, seven officers voted for conducting negotiations for an honorable capitulation and seven for resistance "until the outer line should be broken," and it is said that Jaudenes settled the tie in favor of the latter procedure. See also Sastrón (*op. cit.*, p. 495); he says it was also put on record that "military honor is already completely satisfied by the hundred combats so brilliantly sustained during the blockade and siege." The account of this meeting in *Historia Negra*, p. 98, differs somewhat from that of Nozaleda, but is there based upon rumors outside.

able terms of surrender; but they received no more decisive pledges on these matters than they had themselves given on their part. The whole matter, then, hung on contingencies; but the Americans were reasonably well assured in advance that they would have an easy victory.¹

Aside from the communications through André, somewhat similar messages had probably been exchanged through the British consul and through an American chaplain, a Roman Catholic priest,² who entered Manila some four or five days before the capture of the city and had interviews with Archbishop Nozaleda and with the Chief of Staff, Tejeiro, who was really the power behind the throne both under Augustin and Jaudenes, and was at the same time in command of the Spanish troops.

¹ The chief source of authority on this dramatic affair is the diary of Consul André, already cited (*McClure's Magazine*, June, 1899). Consul André's part in the affair there assumes an exaggerated importance, in view of the failure of the other principal actors to state their share in it as minutely as he has done. Admiral Dewey touched briefly, but unsatisfactorily, upon it in his testimony before the Senate Committee (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 2929, 2943-47, 2961), saying that "it was a part of the history which he was reserving to write for himself." His testimony left room for the inference that the part of the army in the capture of Manila was a sort of *opéra-bouffe* rôle; and it was in protest against this inference that General Anderson wrote his letter in the *Chicago Record-Herald* of July 11, 1902, wherein he points out very plainly that, if any such definite agreement had been made, it would have implied that "American soldiers were to be sacrificed for the honor of Spain." Admiral Dewey feels sure (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 2927-28) that the Spanish governor-general was ready to surrender the city to him in this same fashion at any time in May, and that at various times he desired to surrender to the navy; this is hardly possible, in view of the Spanish military code, and it must be assumed that the communications of the consuls were misunderstood by Dewey. In *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, John T. McCutcheon gives further data on the matter, mostly confirmatory of the proceeding. The magazine contributions of Generals Anderson and Greene, already very frequently cited, make it plain that the army's attack was *bona fide*, regardless of the knowledge, by some at least of the general officers, that a quasi-agreement with the Spanish authorities had been reached. General MacArthur says (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 1407) that he knew nothing about a prearranged surrender. General Whittier testified at Paris (*Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 391) to a full knowledge; he was on General Merritt's staff and was one of the commissioners to arrange the capitulation.

² This chaplain was Father William D. McKinnon, serving at the time with the First California, who afterward was made a regular army chaplain, and, under detail in Manila, served for a long time as a medium of communication between

The American troops had been organized by an order of General Merritt on August 1 into the "Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps," under command of General Anderson, composed of two brigades under command respectively of Generals MacArthur and Greene. The navy was all ready for the attack on August 9; but, besides the pending negotiations with the Spanish authorities, delay seems to have been caused by General Merritt's request that the attack be made on Saturday, August 13, when the tide in the estuaries between the American forces and the Spanish trenches and Fort Antonio de Abad would be most favorable for fording. Mean-

the Spanish archbishop and the American military occupants. He also first reorganized the Manila schools under General Otis. He died in Manila in 1902, in the midst of his labors in behalf of cholera victims. The only mention by any American of his mission to the city in early August of 1898 appears to be in General Anderson's letter to the *Chicago Record-Herald* of July 11, 1902, wherein the latter says that the chaplain reported that the Spaniards "would not surrender without a fight." It is altogether possible that this visit had something to do with a proposition to transport to Hongkong the friars then concentrated in the monasteries of the walled city, thus removing a possible source of embarrassment between Americans and Filipinos; the friars, it appears, were at that time anxious to leave. (See cablegrams of Dewey and Consul Williams, *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 125; Washington's permission to carry out the plan with army transports, *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 782; also *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 11, for a rumor of the plan.) In his *Defensa obligada*, pp. 10-14, Archbishop Nozaleda describes his meeting with McKinnon, and says the latter came merely to present to him a letter in Latin from the Archbishop of California, which served as a basis for his request for authority to exercise his ministrations on land, within the jurisdiction of Nozaleda, and that they did not discuss the question of a surrender. In his *Historia Negra* (pp. 21, 97-98), "Captain Verdades" (who was Juan de Urquía, a Spanish volunteer officer in Manila) makes much mystery of this incident. This book, already cited several times, is of value chiefly as showing the sort of semi-libelous attacks that were made in the Spanish newspapers of 1898 and 1899 on all who had had any part in the loss of the Philippines to Spain. There was plenty of room for charges of incompetence, and probably no little foundation for the insinuations of official scandals at the time. But Spanish public criticism is scarcely ever either temperate or well-reasoned, and the attitude of the Spanish officers who surrendered Manila was sufficiently quixotic without their being pilloried for not preventing the inevitable. The attacks on Archbishop Nozaleda in early 1904 (in connection with his nomination to the archbishopric of Valladolid) would have been much more to the point if, instead of accusing him of urging the surrender of Manila, or of thereafter being polite to the Americans, they had been devoted to showing how his bitter pursuit of José Rizal in 1896 played a leading part in bringing about the downfall of Spain in the Philippines.

while, the ground was thoroughly reconnoitered by various daring American officers and privates.¹ On August 12, General Anderson prepared the formal plan of attack for the 8500 troops who were in position in the two brigades south of Manila. Merritt himself did not come on shore, but kept his headquarters on the navy transport *Zafiro*, from which he could watch the operations and move promptly into the city when the time should come. His instructions to his forces on shore were sent over on the night before the attack, in the form of a "memorandum for general officers in camp regarding the *possible* action of Saturday, August 13," and the next morning his adjutant landed with precise instructions as to the posting of troops in the various parts of the city after it was entered. The wording of these instructions makes it evident that the chief thought in mind was not merely the ordinary policing of a city whose capture was regarded as a foregone conclusion, but was the keeping of the insurgents out. General Merritt sent a signal officer ashore in the surf late at night on the 12th, with instructions to General Anderson to let Aguinaldo know that his troops must not enter the city, and the following message was accordingly sent to the latter: "Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission of the American commander. On this side of the Pasig River you will be under our fire."²

¹ The most notable reconnoissance, made by Major James Franklin Bell, an engineer officer, on August 10, revealed that the estuary was easily fordable at certain points, and delay on that account was unnecessary. Major Bell and Lieutenant Means, of Colorado, crawled and swam to within one hundred and fifty yards of the Spaniards on the walls of the fort, after being discovered. An account of this exploit is given in *Harper's History*, pp. 80-81; the official account, in *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 124-26. Under Colonel Irving Hale, the Colorado troops cut Spanish wire entanglements close to the enemy's intrenchments the night before the attack.

² This telegram seems to be on record only in the Buencamino document heretofore cited (*Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6181). The memorandum of Merritt to the general officers and the verbal instructions of Adjutant-General Babcock are in *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 82-83. The instructions to MacArthur were, if he could move forward rapidly enough to the eastward, "to permit no armed bodies other than American troops to cross the trenches in the

The morning of August 13 was misty and cloudy, hampering signal communication between the vessels and the shore. At nine o'clock the Olympia led most of the fleet into position off the fort below Malate. The Monterey, however, steamed in as close as the shallow water would permit in front of the walled city, and trained her guns on the Luneta battery; while the Concord took position off the mouth of the Pasig, ready to open on the battery there or to meet any movement to escape on the part of the vessels in the river. The Olympia opened fire on Fort Antonio at half past nine, followed by the Raleigh and Petrel and the little captured gunboat Callao. The navy fire, which continued more or less spasmodically during an hour, did no great damage to the Spanish fort or other works, and probably was not meant to do so.¹ The guns of the Utah artillery, firing from a thousand yards on land, raked the parapet of the crumbling old fort, and finally a shell from one of the vessels exploded its magazine; but this was all wasted ammunition, for the fort never fired in return, and was abandoned almost at the first shot, in accordance with the plans which

direction of Manila." Greene, who was to proceed through Malate and Ermita, was to place a guard at the Spanish trenches near the bay for the same purpose. While "forcible encounters with the insurgents" were to be "very carefully guarded against," yet "pillage, rapine, or violence" must be prevented at any cost. The memorandum signed by Merritt stated that, even though the navy might be delayed in destroying the enemy's works, no advance should be made unless ordered by headquarters. "In the event of a white flag being displayed by the enemy on the angle of the city wall," its meaning would be surrender, and the troops should advance quietly and in good order. Finally: "It is intended that these results shall be accomplished without the loss of life." This memorandum was modified by verbal instructions to Greene in the morning that he might advance a regiment on the Spanish position as soon as the navy shells had made any effect, without waiting for the signal of surrender. The formal orders organizing the army and providing for the attack will be found in *ibid.*, pp. 59-60, 73-74.

¹ Oscar King Davis says (*McClure's Magazine*, June, 1899, p. 183) that the range with which the Raleigh gunners were set to work was officially given as 7000 yards, but a gun-captain soon found it to be actually 1700 yards. Sastrón (*op. cit.*, p. 499) says the projectiles fell thickly about Santa Ana, three miles inland from the fort. General Greene noted the inaccuracy of the fire, but charged it to the clouds and mists (*Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 926). John T. McCutcheon, on board the Olympia, makes the same comment as to the failure to do much damage to the fort (*ibid.*, p. 940).

General Tejeiro had secretly promulgated for a retreat. The Spaniards had, however, expected to make their retreat an orderly and, of course, a "dignified" performance, the troops of the entire line south of the Pasig to be withdrawn so as to come simultaneously upon a "second line," close in toward the walled city, into which, with or without resistance as might be ordered, they could then all be withdrawn.¹ Various circumstances combined to interfere with this programme of outward show: among them, the withdrawal of the Spanish right more rapidly than had been expected, under the Utah artillery fire and the advance of the Colorado infantry; the raising of the red flag on the fort somewhat earlier, therefore, than the troops farther inland were expecting it, while they had become occupied also quite vigorously with MacArthur's brigade in front of Singalong and with the insurgents at Santa Ana; the fact also that the Spanish plans of retreat had been confided to but a few of the general officers, and one or two of them were incensed and quite ready to take some comfort out of a short-lived resistance to the Americans.

Acting under his modified instructions, General Greene had started the Colorado volunteers forward upon the Spanish position about three quarters of an hour after the bombardment began, and the navy was then signaled to cease firing. The Colorado troops went gayly to the attack, rapidly fording the estuary, rushing into the old fort from behind, raising the American flag over it, and then starting to follow up the Spaniards who were withdrawing into Malate.² Opposition, how-

¹ For a résumé of the scattered items of information on this morning's events, as gleaned from Spanish officials' reports, see Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 497-503.

² The flag was raised over the fort by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. McCoy. One of the most amusing incidents of the siege and capture of Manila was the way in which the Colorado regimental band followed at the heels of its advancing fellows, splashing through the ford, the muddy marshes, and along the beach, to the tune of "There 'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night." Says the correspondent John Bass, who was with the Colorado advance, and had taken refuge with it in the Spanish trenches when firing from the right began: "Suddenly we heard the sound of martial music, and what was our astonishment to see the Colorado band come around the corner of the fort, the fat bandmaster blowing his cornet with

ever, had developed from the Spanish trenches on the right, and bullets also came from the Spaniards who had retreated into Malate ; one man was killed while raising a flag over a house, and several were wounded. But the Eighteenth Infantry and Third Artillery had been ordered forward against the trenches on the right near the beach, and their occupants were speedily in full retreat. At the same time, General MacArthur's brigade farther eastward had begun its advance, the Astor and one of the Utah batteries dragging their guns along by hand, after they had driven the Spaniards out of the block-houses on that part of the line. The resistance for Greene's brigade, such as there was, was all over. The troops held in reserve came along up the beach ; the Nebraskans marched in toward the walled city on the sand, the gunboat Callao guarding them ; the California and Colorado troops were reformed in the streets of Malate and, together with the Eighteenth Infantry, proceeded slowly through that suburb and Ermita, toward the open space between the latter and the walled town ; while along the two parallel streets of the suburbs the Third Artillery battery and the Tenth Pennsylvania followed them. A battalion of the Eighteenth Regulars elicited some spirited firing for a few moments from the Spanish troops ; there was also some stray shooting from the houses, and Mauser bullets were heard at intervals coming from the right, where the insurgents were pressing into the city, around the right of MacArthur's troops ; these circumstances made the advance through the suburbs somewhat slow. General Greene himself had ridden forward and came out into the open space in front of the Luneta at one o'clock, to see the white flag flying conspicuously on the southwest angle of the city walls, where it had been displayed since eleven o'clock, — the hour at which the American soldiers had entered the fort at

might and main in the lead. . . . With difficulty the valiant band was persuaded to take refuge behind the earthworks and stop their patriotic but dangerous blowing, which drew the enemy's fire. (*Harper's History*, p. 55.)

Malate,—and perhaps longer. Admiral Dewey had at that hour signaled the city, “Do you surrender?” and the reply in the international code had been a request for conference. The personal representatives of the American chiefs in command, Flag-Lieutenant Brumby and Colonel Whittier, had at once gone ashore, and were in conference with the Spanish authorities inside the walls when Greene’s troops arrived outside these old fortifications and faced the Spanish soldiers who lined their top and other Spanish troops who were retreating confusedly from the southeastward, each side uncertain as to what should be its attitude toward the other.¹

When the Spanish troops in the suburb of Santa Ana initiated their rather premature retreat, they were pressed closely by the insurgents, and one or two small detachments with officers were captured. This force of insurgents was now pushing on toward the walled city, and up the Pako road toward the walls there came also a large force of Filipinos who had moved with no resistance around MacArthur’s right. Shots between them and the troops on the walls and those retreating to the gates were being exchanged, and, as the American regiments came out into the open space stretching back from the bay, they also joined in. Several men of the California regiment, which, under General Smith, was endeavoring to block the Pako road to the insurgents, were hit. Most of all, there was danger of a promiscuous engagement, in the then bewildered state of mind of the various troops and their commanders; the only decisive-minded force was that of the Filipinos, who were bent on firing at the Spaniards as much as possible and on getting inside the walls if there was a chance.² The Spanish

¹ The white flag had been raised for some time before it was first seen by Admiral Dewey himself; the clouds had prevented it being seen, and the vessels fired some shots after it was raised. See Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 501; *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 942; and *Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2943.

² The part of the California troops in preventing a fight between Filipinos and Spaniards, or a promiscuous engagement, is related in *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 69, 96, 102, 678. Just before that, Major S. R. Jones, division quartermaster, and Private Francis Finlay, of California, had, all alone, stood off a crowd of in-

officers were as eager to prevent this indiscriminate firing as were the Americans, and communicated to General Greene from the walls that negotiations for the capitulation were going on at headquarters. He thereupon went inside, improving the opportunity to communicate with General Merritt, through Colonel Whittier, the condition of the forces on land.¹ The Spaniards offered no great objections to the general conditions of the capitulation as proposed by the Americans, although the specific terms were not agreed upon until the following day. Meanwhile, their consent to surrender caused the Oregon troops, who were awaiting on small transports at Cavite, to be sent for, that they might enter and police the walled city. It was General Greene's prescribed duty to march his troops across the river and distribute them as guards in the business and residence sections north of the Pasig. In order to do this, he had to form the Nebraska regiment in close order at "port arms" and virtually push out of the road a body of 2000 or more insurgents which had come in from the southeast and was massed between his troops and the bridge. Similarly, the forces which he sent southeastward to prevent the entrance of more insurgents from that quarter narrowly escaped getting into trouble with the latter and were fired on a number of times from cover.²

urgent troops and prevented them advancing farther toward the walls (see *ibid.*, p. 62, and *Harper's History*, p. 52). The strangest experience of the day was that of Captain Stephen O'Conner and a company of the Twenty-third Regulars, who, moving forward with the advance on MacArthur's extreme left, met no serious resistance, and pressed on till they arrived at one of the gates of the city, some minutes in advance of Greene's troops. There they held their position, quietly awaiting orders, with several thousand Spanish troops around them and on the walls above them (see *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, p. 58, and *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 929). The Third Artillery battalion had fired only one shot all day, "and that in disregard of orders," remarked Captain Birkhimer, its commander.

¹ The Spanish officers in highest authority, clothed in all the regalia of full uniform, were rather stunned when the mud-splashed American general and his special aide, Major Frank S. Bourns, entered the stately office in the Ayuntamiento, and, not having had anything to eat since four in the morning, offered to share with them some hard-tack and a flask of American whiskey. (*Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 929.)

² See *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 930, and *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, pp. 70, 102.

General MacArthur's troops had been assigned to occupy all suburbs of the city south of the Pasig. But, as has been seen, they had met some resistance, through the failure of the plans for a united withdrawal of the Spanish outer line, and perhaps also through a desire of the Spanish officers facing them to have the satisfaction of a fight. The *terrain* in which this brigade had to operate was much more difficult than that nearer the bay, while the unwillingness of Merritt to ask for more insurgent trenches or to extend the line farther inland had made it impossible to prepare as well as might have been done for an attack. The firing of insurgents on their right, where they had massed in numbers for several days, brought MacArthur's men under the Spanish fire early in the morning. They held their places, however, until the artillery had compelled the abandonment of the Spanish blockhouses in front and the American flag had gone up on Fort San Antonio. In the thickets near Singalong, they met vigorous resistance to their advance from intrenched troops who were under cover. General Anderson authorized them to move around to the left and follow Greene's men into the city, but they were too heavily engaged. An advance party of Minnesota volunteers and of Astor Battery men, with no arms but revolvers, charged the Spanish position against considerable odds; the main body of the Twenty-third Infantry and Minnesota volunteers supported them, and the resistance was soon over. The brigade moved on cautiously, however, through the uncertain territory, and it was 1.30 before it was discovered that all the Spaniards had withdrawn from the front — some time before, in fact. These forces then pushed on to occupy the districts assigned to them, and thus made contact with the troops which Greene had sent to keep the insurgents out on the southeast. The latter had, however, fully established themselves in some of the southern districts of the city, and were helping themselves to the Spanish military barracks.¹

¹ The casualties in MacArthur's brigade for the day were 4 men killed and 38

The Oregon troops were policing the walled city and had begun to receive the surrender of arms from the Spanish soldiers who had retreated thither, and also to occupy their military quarters, before the bases of the capitulation were finally agreed upon, late in the afternoon, upon the arrival of General Merritt at the new headquarters. It was only after the announcement of its terms that the Spanish flag was hauled down from over Fort Santiago, in the corner of the walled town, and the American flag went up in its place, at 5.30 P.M.¹ Even then, the capitulation was not put into formal shape until the following day. The Spaniards were conceded a surrender with the honors of war (which was in agreement with their previous stipulation and with the hypothesis that this was a surrender rather than a capture); but there were some difficulties about minor points, particularly as to the return of the arms of the troops, to which the Americans finally consented, in case either party should afterward evacuate the city. The most important difficulty lay in their desire to interpose a preamble, much in the form of the preliminaries to a formal treaty, prescribing especially conditions as to the public and private property of the city. The Americans insisted that all public property and public funds should be surrendered to

wounded, including 3 Minnesota officers wounded. This made the total of casualties for the day 5 men killed and 44 wounded, of whom 3 afterward died. Including 1 man killed by a stray shot on August 14, the total of casualties for the entire campaign before and in Manila was 123, of whom 17 were killed outright, 7 died from wounds, and 99, including 10 officers, were wounded but recovered. (The figures given in *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 58, 84, 503, have here been corrected by reference to General Merritt's cablegrams of August 9, 20, and 30 in *Corr. Rel. War.*)

¹ Flag-Lieutenant Brumby represented Admiral Dewey, and he himself hoisted the American flag. The confusion existing at Spanish headquarters may be indicated by the fact that no Spanish officer or guard was on hand to observe the customary military honors at the time or to receive the Spanish flag as it was lowered, and it was borne away as a souvenir by the Oregon troops. When the Spanish soldiers came forward at the arsenal to deposit their arms before the Americans there drawn up, many of them threw their rifles on the ground so hard as to break them. The Spanish officer of a battery near the walls stayed by his post for some time after the surrender, having received no formal notification, until his wife finally telephoned to him news of the surrender (Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 503).

them, pending peace negotiations, and closed the articles of capitulation as adopted with this declaration (on the lines of those governing General Scott's occupancy of Mexico City): "This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army."¹

All the Spanish troops defending the city did not surrender until the afternoon of Sunday, August 14. That morning word was sent out to the commanders of the outer Spanish line running from the river near Santa Mesa northwest to the bay, who had been holding off insurgent attacks, to come in and lay down their arms, and the American line was pushed out to cover practically the ground which they had held. The Spaniards stated that they would surrender over 13,000 troops, and they did eventually turn over about that many Mauser and Remington rifles; but most of their native troops had been lost by desertion, and there were fewer than 9000 soldiers under arms in the city, including two practically complete regiments of native troops.² Nearly \$900,000 (value in Mexican silver) were captured, \$750,000 being in the public treasury and the rest in the custom-house and other dependencies of the administration.³ The Americans had taken possession,

¹ For the text of the articles of capitulation and the official reports on the same, see *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, pp. 43, 49, 70-72. See also the account by General Greene, who headed the American commission to negotiate capitulation, in *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 931; also Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 504-06.

² For more detailed account of the men, arms, ammunition, supplies, etc., that were surrendered, see *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 364 and 413; also the scant report of Colonel Summers (Oregon), who received the surrenders (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, p. 136).

³ Of the sums in the central treasury, more than twice the total found there was owed by the Spanish Government of the Philippines to the Spanish-Philippine Bank of Manila for recent loans. The bank had advanced to the Spanish authorities \$600,000 silver on Monday of the week the city was taken, the record being that this was a loan "to cover confidential operations." (See Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 219.) Many dark hints have been made in Spain about the financial operations of the closing days in Manila. The bank and other private claimants sought to recover from the American military government the sums to their credit in the treasury,

on the afternoon of the 13th, of the captain-of-the-port's office, this over the protest of the Spanish officer in charge, who, in spite of the overwhelming military force surrounding him, declared that he dared not surrender the office unless given a written statement that he had yielded only to superior force, as otherwise he would subject himself to court-martial. The same process was gone through, only in more dramatic form, on the 19th, when the Americans took possession of the custom-house almost at the point of bayonets; and similar formalities, though less of theatric display, were connected with the transfer of control over the treasury, the mint, and internal-revenue office.¹ There was naturally delay in assuming charge of the affairs of civil administration, as the first days were occupied with the posting of the troops and the military and the provost organization necessary to control the situation and police the city. For a few days, the so-called Veteran Civil Guard (native soldiers organized to serve as police in the city of Manila) were retained in their places under their Spanish officers; but this was impracticable for various reasons, not the least being the bitter hostility of the native population to this organization, which was only too justly accused of past abuses. The fact also that, at first, from very necessity, Spanish civil officers and employees were, when they would consent to

but of course could only be referred to Spain with their claims, as this money was captured in war. However, the American Peace Commission at Paris conceded the return of these and other public funds to Spain.

¹ General Greene describes these events, with which he was connected, in the *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, pp. 930-34. The custom-house episode has been most humorously described, from the point of view of the American who had no great reverence for forms and formalities, by Collector James F. Smith (now a member of the Philippine Commission) in his annual report, appendix P to the report of Military Governor MacArthur for 1901 (*Report of War Department, 1901*, vol. I, part 4, p. 282). Collector Smith says, however, that the conquerors were like the man who caught the bear, "they hardly knew what to do with the custom-house after they got it," for the little gray old Spaniard had departed, "firing protests" and carrying most of his assistants with him. The formal protest of the latter is cited in *Historia Negra*, p. 116. The viewpoint of another nationality is given in this author's description of the document as an "act of energetic protest formulated with all the characteristics of our race."

remain, left in their places in the various administrative offices was the cause of much criticism on the part of Filipinos. In the main, however, there was very apparent a disposition, on the part, at least, of the more important Spanish civil employees, to embarrass the Americans in their assumption of the administration as far as might be done; and sheer necessity compelled the reorganization of the post-office, the custom-house, and other minor departments from the ranks of the volunteers (among whom every sort of mechanic, clerk, and professional man could be found), while also many Filipino employees, hitherto subordinates, found their services in demand and their assistance recognized as of more importance than formerly.¹ The feeling alluded to as existing on the part of most of the Spaniards of any prominence in the civil administration was also manifested in other ways. The gunboat which had been used to block the mouth of the Pasig was set on fire, lest it might fall into the hands of the Americans, at the very moment when the capitulation was being agreed upon, and her flames lighted up the sunset sky when the new flag was raised over the city. The spirit shown in this deed was exhibited in many pettier ways; in some cases, it led to the mutilation of public records, in others to the spiteful disfigurement of the furniture or fittings of the Government buildings ere they passed into the conqueror's hands.² On the whole, however, there was comparatively little friction between Americans and Spaniards, and the latter have generally been willing to testify to the effective way in which order was main-

¹ Some of the employees of the United States postal service in California had accompanied the third expedition, and they took charge of the organization of the post-office in Manila, conducting it virtually as an adjunct of the War Department.

² In some cases, the mutilation or absence of public records, only noted afterward, when the military authorities began to take systematic control of the offices of the public administration, was due to the American soldiers, who were quartered in the buildings where such records were lying loose and unguarded, and who sometimes sold them to Chinese hucksters for waste-paper. Both sides bear their share of blame for the carelessness which permitted some offices of the public administration to be virtually unguarded and their contents to be scattered or mistreated.

tained in the city by the Americans and to the considerate treatment which Spaniards and their property received. There was some feeling over the crowding of the Spanish soldiers into the churches when the Americans took their quarters. Spanish officers took advantage of the privilege allowed them of retaining their sidearms to make themselves very prominent in public places, with their swords clanking about them; and there was such a feeling between Spaniards and Filipinos that, in order to avoid quarrels that might involve more serious consequences, they were asked to desist from wearing their sidearms. The conception which the Spaniards generally had held of the Americans, as being no respecters of persons, property, or religion, may be seen from the astonishment which they expressed at the literal fulfillment of the clause of the capitulation relating to the churches and other property pertaining to the Catholic worship.¹ As for the foreigners resident in Manila, however much they might afterward criticize the taste of the American soldiers in matters of drink, they have never failed to render tribute to the effective way in which they brought about and kept order in the city, with comparatively few instances of disregard of private property.

¹ It need not be remarked that, among the more ignorant Spaniards and Filipinos, the alloctions of the governor-general and the archbishop in April and May (see p. 155), in which the Americans were held up as profaners of temples and brutes generally, had had their effect in causing most of the inhabitants of the city to expect especially outrageous conduct on the part of the American troops, while at the same time they reveal what is unfortunately a too common Spanish idea about Americans, though somewhat overdrawn to suit the purpose of the moment. Sastrón (*op. cit.*, p. 516), who has small tolerance for Americans, found himself compelled to exclaim: "It is a great pity that, among not all civilized peoples, and very much in spite of what has been written in all political constitutions, and very contrary (though not so considered) to the true liberal principles, religious interests fail to find such effective evidence of the consideration and respect as the Americans displayed in the Philippines for those there existent." Sastrón also (p. 518) has to admit that the Americans, "practical as they are wont to be," speedily made the city cleaner than it had ever been before. For accounts of the capture of Manila from the American point of view, aside from those herein cited, see the current letters of John F. Bass, in *Harper's History*, pp. 50-57. Another Spanish account is *El Sitio de Manila*, by Juan and José Toral (Manila, 1898).

Both Merritt and Dewey had dispatched cablegrams to Hongkong, for transmission thence to Washington, as soon as the city fell. These messages did not reach Washington until the morning of August 18. But Washington had meanwhile received word of the arrival at Hongkong on August 15 of the Kaiserin Augusta, a German battleship, bearing there ex-Governor-General Augustin and news of the capture of Manila, this vessel having taken the Spanish general on board and started for Hongkong just before the flag was changed over the city.¹ The peace protocol had been signed on behalf of Spain by Ambassador Cambon of France at about 4.15 p.m. on August 12 in Washington, or at the same time that the American troops were drawn up in their trenches, all ready for the attack, on the dawn of the 13th at Manila. The orders to suspend hostilities, cabled from Washington on the 12th, together with the text of the protocol, which provided for the occupation by the forces of the United States of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the negotiation of a definitive treaty, did not reach Dewey and Merritt, through Hongkong,

¹ This episode caused a renewal of the attacks upon Germany in American newspapers. It coincided with news that Admiral Chichester, in command of the British forces in Manila Bay, had, on the morning of the bombardment of the Malate fort, steamed over with the battleship *Immortalité* and taken a position squarely between the German vessels and the American attacking squadron. (See *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 940, for Correspondent McCutcheon's account of this.) The British news-agencies also sought to impress upon the Americans that the friendship of their nation had helped avert European intervention. The criticisms of Germany in regard to the Augustin episode were based on the supposition that he was still governor-general in Manila instead of being a private citizen, virtually under orders to come home (see *Public Opinion*, August 25, 1898); also, that the Germans took him away surreptitiously. The writer had it upon the authority of Dr. F. Krüger, then consul of Germany at Manila, that the arrangement for Augustin's departure was made by the former with Admiral Dewey, who gave full consent to it. The Germans in the Philippines observed afterward that there was considerable hostility toward them among the Filipinos, on account of their pro-Spanish attitude during the summer of 1898, and in consequence addressed a letter of explanation to one of the insurgent newspapers (see *La Independencia*, Malolos, October 17, 1898). On November 7, General Otis cabled Washington that a German battleship, just arrived in harbor, had not saluted the flag on the city wall, but later gave the Admiral's salute, and that the cruiser *Irene*, coming in at the same time, had not saluted at all (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 833).

until August 16. The Spanish governor-general at once sought to have the terms of the capitulation nullified and the American occupation of the city based upon the protocol; but the American official attitude at Manila, as also later at Paris in negotiating the treaty of peace, was that Manila was captured, and was not surrendered in consequence of the protocol.¹ By the operations of the United States Signal Corps, cable communication between Manila and Hongkong was restored late on the night of August 20, and the first message that it bore direct from Washington was one of congratulations from President McKinley.² On the 26th, General Merritt was instructed to turn over the command to General Elwell S. Otis, who had arrived on August 21, at the head of the fourth expedition, comprising nearly 5000 troops on four transports,³ and him-

¹ See General Merritt's report (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, p. 44). The circumstances of the signing of the protocol and the bearing which they had afterward upon the negotiations regarding the Philippines will be discussed below, in connection with the Paris Treaty. In his executive proclamation of August 12, announcing the signing of the protocol, President McKinley said: "I . . . declare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspension of hostilities, and do hereby command that orders be immediately given through the proper channels to the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain from any acts inconsistent with this proclamation."

² Communication was restored by the consent of Spain, as her consul at Hongkong had that end of the cable (a subsidized enterprise) sealed up (see *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 935). For previous diplomatic correspondence relative to the opening of this cable see *Foreign Relations of United States, 1898*, pp. 976-80. It therein appears that the United States, after ascertaining that the British company which held the concession could not operate this cable contrary to the permission of Spain, without forfeiting the concession, wished in May to obtain permission from Great Britain to land a new cable, run from Cavite to Hongkong; but this was refused by Great Britain, on the ground that it would be a violation of neutrality. In July, Spain consented to the operation of the cable from Manila, if fully neutralized and open to the messages of both parties, pressure having been brought to bear at Hongkong and Madrid, because of the desire of maritime interests at Hongkong to have the typhoon warnings of the Jesuit observatory at Manila. This time, however, the United States Government objected. (*Ibid.*, p. 979.)

³ For an account of this expedition and his assignment to duty, see General Otis's report (in *Report of War Department, 1899*, vol. 1, part 4, p. 3). For the orders both of a military and a civil nature, given by Merritt during his two weeks of command at Manila, see *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 50-54. General Otis had originally been selected as the officer to command the first expedition to the Philippines (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 639, 661-69). Before he sailed from San Francisco,

self to proceed to Paris, after consulting fully with Admiral Dewey, in order to present his information and views and those of the admiral to the Peace Commission there.¹

A. DUAL OCCUPATION REJECTED, AND FILIPINO DISTRUST INCREASED

The first official act of General Merritt, after the capitulation was arranged, was the publication, as commander of the American forces, of a proclamation "to the people of the

General Merritt had obtained authority to transfer the command of the Eighth Army Corps (made a corps at his request) to some one else, if he desired to do so, retaining for himself the place of military governor, "so as to devote attention to the important matters of the government of the vast territory and the general military operations." (*Ibid.*, pp. 705-08.) He had availed himself of this authority on August 23, assigning General Otis to the command of the corps; and, with his departure on August 30, the positions of military governor and of commanding officer of the American troops in the Philippines were united under one man, and so remained until 1902.

¹ The cables exchanged between Merritt and Dewey at Manila and the Government at Washington, in connection with the capture of Manila, will be found in *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 118-24, and in *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 742-67. Admiral Dewey answered the intimation of the President that he might be summoned to Washington to give advice and information by saying: "Should regret very much to leave here while matters remain in present critical condition." He was thereupon told to stay, as he desired. On the other hand, it would appear that it was not originally intended to call Merritt home, as he was instructed on August 25 to cable fully the information he possessed. But he at the same time intimated that he would like to be on the Paris Peace Commission (perhaps having heard of military men being on the evacuation commissions of Porto Rico and Cuba), or at any rate wanted to come home (*ibid.*, p. 764). Before he sailed from San Francisco, also, General Merritt had been quite insistent on having a navy vessel assigned to take him, as thus "the prestige and importance of his mission would be more clearly indicated." (*Ibid.*, pp. 703, 710.) This record of army cablegrams also shows some discussion between Washington and San Francisco as to whether, after the signing of the protocol, the troops then ready for shipment could be sent. Washington seems at first to have been disposed to send them, in case it was learned that Merritt needed more troops to control the situation; but even before his answer arrived showing that he did not need them, the protocol had been interpreted to forbid the sending of reinforcements, though the organizations already in the islands might be completed by recruits. The Arizona (afterward the transport Hancock) took the New York volunteers and California troops to Hawaii, and she and a hospital-ship and horse-boat made trips to Manila with supplies, Hospital Corps men, transportation facilities, etc. The day before the protocol was signed, however, Washington had sought to hasten the dispatch of the troops then ready for the Philippines. (*Ibid.*, p. 749.)

Philippines," on Sunday, August 14. This followed the lines and phraseology of the President's formal instructions to him of May 19, and was chiefly occupied with laying down the more fundamental rules of international law as to the rights and duties of a military occupant, relative to public and private property, to the maintenance of public order, to the continuance of municipal laws except as modified by special orders, to the resumption of trade, collection of duties, etc. The Filipinos were assured that the United States forces had not come to "wage war upon them, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights"; that "all persons who, by active aid or honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection"; and that, so long as they should "preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States," they should not be "disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines."¹ The United States, as a military occupant merely, could not presume to provide for anything more than temporary conditions; but the Filipinos were already raising the troublesome queries as to whether the Americans intended to return Manila to the Spaniards, or intended to retain it and seek possession of the entire archipelago, or would wrest it all from Spain only to establish them in possession and guarantee their status before the world.

More important for the moment to the Americans than the embarrassing questions as to their future policy was the prac-

¹ This proclamation has been frequently reproduced in official documents. It is cited, in conjunction with the President's instructions, in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part I, pp. 85-87; also by General Merritt in *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, p. 49. For the general order by Merritt, congratulating the soldiers in his command on having "captured by assault" the city of Manila, see *ibid.*, p. 51.

tical difficulty which confronted them simultaneously in the shape of the 4000 or so insurgents who had got into the city on the south side and established themselves in the Spanish barracks and other Government buildings of the suburbs. They had come in, as seen, around the right of MacArthur's brigade, despite the battalion which Anderson had sent to a bridge east of Pasai to intercept such a movement; and before the troops of this brigade were posted on the afternoon of the 13th, the insurgents who had followed Greene's troops into Malate and Ermita had established themselves in Spanish barracks and other Government buildings. Aside from the question of pillage, to prevent which the Americans were somewhat informally compromised with the Spaniards, but more especially compromised before the world, there was danger of friction between Americans and Filipinos in these two suburbs, and in Pako friction actually did arise, and threatened serious trouble on that evening and the next day.¹

There is no evidence that insurgent headquarters either sought or desired trouble with the Americans at this time, although some of the American officers thought so. Some of the subordinate insurgent officers, in command of troops which were pressing into the city, were, however, much more bitter enemies of the Americans than of the Spaniards, and were ready to make trouble. And the insurgent organization itself had laid full plans for a vigorous attack on the city throughout the full length of its besieging lines, and hoped, if not able to capture parts of it before the Americans entered, at least not to be behind the latter in getting inside. From their point of view, this was merely an intention to prevent their siege of a month and a half going for nothing. When Merritt's orders to remain outside were received just before the attack by the Americans, the insurgent commands had all been forewarned of the Americans' intentions to capture the city unaided (indeed, they were fully posted as to there being some

¹ See *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, pp. 79, 88, 121, and 678.

sort of plan on foot for the surrender of the city, for they received information from inside), and had been instructed to press their own attacks. This order from the Americans probably was received too late for these instructions to be changed had the insurgent headquarters entertained any notion of changing them; but it did serve one purpose, namely, to arouse all the more the growing resentment toward the Americans.¹

The Tagalog lines about the city had been reinforced on all sides for several days prior to the 13th. The commander of the forces along the river above the city had, indeed, some days before the Americans were ready to attack, used the fact that the latter were getting into position for assault in an attempt to coerce the Spaniards at Santa Ana into surrendering their position to him.² It was here that the insurgents had

¹ *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 12, shows that Aguinaldo gave orders late the night of the 12th for General Ricarte's troops (stationed just east of MacArthur's at Pasai) to attack at four o'clock the next morning. It is not certain that this order was given after the receipt of the message from Anderson. Ricarte's men did begin firing early in the morning, and thus drew Spanish fire upon the Americans, leading to feeling between Americans and insurgents and to some interchange of threats. (*Ibid.*, p. 12; also *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, p. 79.)

² This was Pio del Pilar, an ignorant fellow of bad antecedents, who had risen from house-servant to chief of *ladrones*, and from chief of *ladrones* to insurgent general, in which position he earned for himself a very dark record during 1897, 1898, 1899, and 1900, after which he was exiled to Guam. (He is never to be confused with Marcelo del Pilar, the intellectual propagandist, or Gregorio del Pilar, a young general of the Filipino aristocracy, who lost his life at Tilad Pass in January, 1900, in a chivalrous attempt to cover the retreat of Aguinaldo.) He was always a consistent hater of Americans. The letter in which he intimated to Major Acévedo, the Spanish commander at Santa Ana, the advisability of a surrender to him before the Americans began to attack, which he asserted would be on August 2, was dated July 30, and may be found in Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 484. He claimed to have this information through Aguinaldo, who charged him to inform the Spaniards and to tell them "not to be afraid or become disheartened, but, on the contrary, to take courage, fortify themselves well, and not yield before their [Americans'] cannon." It has already been seen (*Sen. Doc. 208*, part 3, pp. 3-4), that Aguinaldo had commissioned officers on July 6 with the futile notion that they might be able to negotiate the surrender of Manila, disregarding the Americans. *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo* (p. 19) shows also that he knew something of this dickering with Acévedo. The same document shows that, on August 10, Pio had telegraphed to Aguinaldo an absurd tale about 10,000 Germans having disembarked at Subig to seize the country; and that, on August 14, Pio said he was constructing trenches ready for a fight with the Americans.

most easily got into the city on August 13, the Spanish retreat being so confused, as already seen, that the insurgents cut off and captured five columns.¹ There is, however, no reason for supposing that, except for the preconcerted Spanish withdrawal upon the walled city, they could have driven the latter in and taken Santa Ana and part of Pako any more on this occasion than during their many preceding attacks, especially as they were at the time short of ammunition.² In spite of the confusion prevailing on the south side of the Pasig all day of the 13th, and of the surrender of the walled city to the Americans, together with the occupancy by the latter of the business section on the north side of the river, the Spanish troops on the north line of defense virtually held their positions from the river near Santa Mesa to the bay west of Tondo, losing, indeed, the waterworks reservoir, a little outside of their lines, and temporarily being driven in at various points, but surrendering to the Americans their outer line almost intact the following day. Some of their troops were in the trenches until the following afternoon. The artillery in the blockhouses and at other points had, as always before, repelled the unusually fierce attacks of the insurgents north of Tondo and at La Loma, as well as the repeated attacks in numbers on Sampalok and Nagtahan. The following day, when the Spaniards withdrew from the north of Tondo, the Americans moved quietly into their places and reached an amicable agreement with the insurgents facing them. The capture the previous day of Santa Ana and Pandakan by the insurgents had facilitated their crossing the river at the latter point and reinforcing their compatriots from Santa Mesa in their renewed attempts to take the rotunda at Sampalok; and, when the Spaniards withdrew with the two cannon they had had at this point, the troops of

¹ These were four columns of volunteers and one of marines. Aguinaldo's assertion in regard to this capture (in *Reseña verídica*) is corroborated by Sastrón (*op. cit.*, p. 500).

² *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 10.

Pio del Pilar pressed forward so rapidly as to become engaged in an attack on the Americans going to take outpost at Santa Mesa. One hundred and fifty of them were surrounded and disarmed by the Americans on the afternoon of the 14th. Other insurgents pressed on, in disordered bands, as far into the city as Kiapo.¹

Under instructions from Merritt, Anderson had telegraphed to Aguinaldo at Bakoor on the evening of the 13th: "Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves into the city until we have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you." Aguinaldo had already, earlier in the day, in reply to Anderson's telegram of the night before, ordering him to keep his troops out of the city, complained that his troops were being threatened with force by the Americans in the trenches outside, before the attack, and had intimated that the two forces should coöperate. He had also directed Felipe Buenca-mino and other Filipinos at Cavite to see General Anderson or some other American commander and "demand an explanation" of the order, but they could find no one in authority. The next morning, Aguinaldo wrote to Anderson, reminding him of his cession of the trenches to the Americans and claiming that he could not order his troops to withdraw from

¹ See Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 512-13; also *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 12, 15, 16. The latter contains the unintelligible telegram of Gregorio del Pilar, insurgent commander at Kalookan, saying trouble was threatening with the "Napotas" people there. This can be interpreted as referring to the Americans only on the supposition that he thought the position taken by one of the American gunboats off Tondo indicated an intention to attack there; for no American troops were disembarked on the north side of the Pasig. Aguinaldo seemed to have guessed his meaning to be that trouble was threatened with the Americans, for he answered: "We must avoid conflicts with the Americans by every means possible." Gregorio del Pilar, in immediate command just outside of Tondo, reported on August 15 the withdrawal of the Spaniards the afternoon before and the apparently amicable arrangement of a line between Americans and Filipinos. The disarming of the insurgents at Santa Mesa was reported on the same date by Colonel San Miguel. There is a report by Colonel Irving Hale on the same incident (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.*, 1898, p. 77). These arms were afterward returned to the insurgents. This was the place where the trouble occurred between Filipinos and Americans the following February, and the insurgent commander was the same.

Manila in their present state of mind, as they had "always been promised that they should appear in it"; yet he thought some arrangement might be possible, and sent as commissioners Messrs. Buencamino, Araneta, Legarda, and Sandiko, the first two of whom were Filipino lawyers of Manila, the third a prominent Filipino business man of the capital, and the last a young Filipino revolutionist who had come over from Hong-kong. Anderson took them in to see Merritt. Their instructions were to consent to the withdrawal of the insurgent troops from the city, if the Americans would make a formal promise to reinstate them where they were in case the United States should withdraw from the islands on making peace with Spain. General Merritt had no instructions on the latter point,¹ and could

¹ See *Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 367, for General Merritt's statement about this interview before the Peace Commission at Paris. He says he "had to mix diplomacy with force in order to avoid a tilt," not having received any reply from Washington to his request for instructions as to how he should treat the insurgents. He refers here to his cablegrams received at Washington August 1 (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 743), wherein he did not specifically ask instructions, but said: "Situation difficult. Insurgents have announced independent government; some are unfriendly, fearing they will not be permitted to enter Manila with my troops. Will join Dewey in note demanding surrender, with assurance of protection [to Spaniards] from insurgents. May be important to have my whole force before attacking, if necessary to hold insurgents while we fight Spanish." On August 13, he sent, through Dewey, a message stating that the insurgents were demanding joint occupation, and asking immediate instructions as to how far he might go in "forcing obedience," concluding: "Is Government willing to use all means to make the natives submit to the authority of the United States?" (*Ibid.*, p. 754.) This message reached Washington late on the night of the 17th (in advance of Merritt's formal message about the capture of the city), and a reply was at once sent: "The President directs that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. . . . Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end." This message reached General Merritt on the 22d, and was acknowledged at once, with the remark that the instructions had been anticipated. (*Ibid.*, p. 760.) For Dewey's side of this correspondence, see *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 123-24. Said President McKinley in his message to Congress in December, 1898: "[The insurgent forces] were constrained by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt from attempting an assault. It was fitting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone. Obeying the stern precept of war, which enjoins the overcoming of the adversary and the extinction of his power wherever assailable as the speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided victory was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and responsibilities attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be thought of."

only hold before them the impracticability of a dual occupation, emphasizing the likelihood of conflicts between Spaniards and Filipinos. At the same time he furnished them his proclamation of that date, outlining in a general way the duties of a military occupant and the intentions of the United States. The Filipinos were already greatly concerned over whether the Spaniards were to retain their governmental offices in the city, and were watching with jealousy the use by the Americans of the Veteran Civil Guard in portions of the city. Merritt's proclamation of military rule evidently inspired the more definite and numerous demands which the commission presented when it returned the following day. As conditions precedent to the withdrawal of their troops from the city, they stipulated for such a statement of the limits of Manila as would leave them Pandakan and Santa Ana (on the river beyond Pako), for free entrance for themselves and their products to Manila (but Americans to pass through their lines only by permission); for possession of the governor-general's palace at Malakañang and the convents they were occupying in the suburbs; for the return of the arms taken at Santa Mesa; for the ousting of the Spaniards from office and the recognition of Filipinos nominated by themselves; and for "a part of the booty of war"; all which they wished to have incorporated in a formal agreement in writing. In return, they would have the waterworks started up again and would be responsible for order there, provided the Americans would bear the expense; but they desired it recorded that such action did not "signify acknowledgment on their part of North American sovereignty for any longer than during the necessity of the present warfare." General Merritt, for the first time addressing himself directly to the "Commanding General of the Philippine Forces," accepted the city boundaries as outlined by the insurgents, and agreed to their stipulations about the waterworks and free transit to and from the city on the river (the Americans being, in fact, eager to have the country products brought in), and that

unarmed Filipinos should have free access and entrance to the city, while the same privilege must be conceded to Americans going outside. Aguinaldo promptly stated that his request had been for free navigation for all his boats, and in all ports controlled by the Americans, and also put in a claim for part of the Pako district, well inside the city. General Merritt referred Aguinaldo to Dewey as to navigation matters, refused to concede occupancy of what Americans then adopted as territory within the city's limits, and made the assurance to Aguinaldo that, in case the Americans should withdraw from Manila, they would "leave him in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government." The insurgent troops in Malate and Ermita were mostly withdrawn, but at Merritt's departure Aguinaldo was still clinging to his claim to part of Pako, having on August 27 proposed a new line of delimitation which would give him an excellent foothold in Manila south of the Pasig and enable him to move freely on Malate and Ermita, if not the walled city. He also stated that his concession of the waterworks was only an evidence of good will, not an indication that he could yield the other points offered, unless he could have a written agreement with the Americans.¹

¹ Nevertheless, General Merritt, in writing his report on his way to Paris, said that he anticipated no trouble with the insurgents, because the leaders were "sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement." (See *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, p. 44.) He had, of course, only come in contact with the better-educated men who had been sent to see him. They were constantly urging conciliation upon the insurgent authorities at Bakoar, and it was the radical, Mabini, always close at Aguinaldo's side and the adviser who for months dictated almost every move of importance, who was now pressing the demands upon Aguinaldo. *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 12-18, sheds much light on these negotiations. On the 13th, Buencamino and Araneta had telegraphed from Cavite that it was impossible to see Anderson or Dewey; hence they advised to "continue hostilities while we ask for an explanation." They knew of the prearranged capitulation, and anticipated that it would be pleaded as an objection to joint occupation, but suggested the answer: "We do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation not favorable to our independence." Mabini was more than agreeable to this, but urged the securing of a definite answer from the Americans, in order, if they refused joint occupation, to "lay a protest before the foreign consuls." Mabini was always more particular about written forms than he was about meeting the practical exigencies of a situation, and for the succeeding few days he con-

During the first week in September, Aguinaldo transferred his headquarters to Malolos, some twenty miles northward of

stantly held this idea of a protest to the consuls before the commissioners who went to Merritt. As soon as these men of legal training had been presented with the difficulties in the way of joint occupation, especially after the terms of the protocol were known, they admitted the force of the American argument; at the outset they told Aguinaldo that it was "prudent to yield"; especially as the Americans refused further negotiations until Noriel's troops were withdrawn from Malate and Ermita. The conservatives eventually prevailed, under the necessities of the situation. American engineers were allowed to start the pumps at the waterworks on August 23, and later to construct a telegraph line to the pumping-plant; but Mabini insisted they must take no troops there. (*Ibid.*, pp. 18, 20; also *Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 814.) The sources of information from the American side as to these negotiations are: *Report of War Department, 1898*, vol. I, part 4, pp. 342-450; *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 399, 400-03; and General Anderson, in *North American Review*, February, 1900. The data from the foregoing official reports were presented in nearly complete form, with a few errors of position, in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 17-28. The Americans resented especially the pretension that they could not pass outside the city without permission from the Filipinos. On August 15, Merritt instructed Anderson that the insurgents must be made to understand that he would not "tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our troops were hemmed in by a besieging force." (Yet this is exactly what afterward came to pass.) After the first few days, Merritt conducted negotiations directly by letters or through Major J. F. Bell of his staff. According to Bell's memoranda (made afterward for the information of General Otis), the assurance to the Filipinos that, if the Americans withdrew, "they would be left in as good condition as they were found by the Government," excited distrust in Aguinaldo's headquarters; also, Merritt intended, if necessary, to interpret this subsequently to mean in the same condition in which they were found by Dewey. When Merritt made this offer and wrote his letter of August 24, he had not received the instructions from Washington not to permit joint occupation. He accompanied this offer with some flattering remarks on Aguinaldo's personality, with the promise to speak well of the Filipinos before his Government, and with the suggestion that it would be a good idea for Aguinaldo to visit Washington with some of his leaders (which was an informal authorization for Agoncillo, then preparing to go to the United States, to represent Aguinaldo at the American capital). Aguinaldo kept urging that Merritt secure from Dewey a pledge as to the free navigation of Filipino boats, and Bell thinks that Aguinaldo already felt himself "at outs" with Dewey; the latter soon after seized all his small boats in the bay. The Spanish text of the Filipino memorandum of August 15 has not been published, hence it is unsafe to assert just what might have been meant by the words translated as "booty of war." (The early American translations of Filipino documents were quite commonly made by incompetent translators.) Benito Legarda, one of the first commissioners to Merritt on behalf of Aguinaldo, testified positively in 1899 (*Report Philippine Commission, 1900*, vol. II, p. 383) that there was a plan to sack the city, known to Aguinaldo. Sastrón asserts (*op. cit.*, p. 514) that the insurgents in Malate and Ermita did pillage to some extent public and private property. Before the entrance into the city, Merritt had communicated to Aguinaldo his order to the American soldiers forbidding pillage and looting. (*Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, p. 50.)

Manila and near the railroad.¹ His commanders south of Manila were still keeping possession of most of the Pako suburb and part of Malate, and Filipino officers were attempting to exercise civil authority within those limits, when, on September 8, General Otis sent a long formal reply to Aguinaldo's proposals to Merritt. He went, in some detail, into the obligations which international law imposed upon the Americans as occupants; pointed to the friction there had already been as indicating the impracticability of joint occupation; informed Aguinaldo that the United States Government had never recognized "booty" in war, and severely penalized the converting of property to private uses at such times; stated that all people would be treated alike as regarded commerce and navigation; said that he had "not been informed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here" (inferentially a reply to Aguinaldo's requests for a formal agreement as to the reinstatement of the Filipinos in the positions surrendered, in case the United States left the islands); assured Aguinaldo that he realized that his forces had made "many sacrifices in behalf of civil liberty and for the welfare of their people," but reminded him also that the United States had made sacrifices in taking up war with Spain in behalf of the latter's colonies; and, finally, while hinting that more troops were ready to come from the United States, though he hoped this would not be necessary, he ordered that the insurgents "withdraw beyond the line of the city's defenses" before the 15th, or he would be "obliged to resort to forcible action." Aguinaldo again commissioned some of the conservatives, men of education and property, who were now associated more or less closely with the insurgent organization, to discuss the matter with the American commander. He was ready to concede the with-

¹ Already, in July and August, the insurgents had virtually put the railroad under their control, the English manager apparently reaching some sort of working agreement with them. See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 18, for an order to him on August 22 not to transport troops without Aguinaldo's consent.

drawal, as he had in fact already done, but the point of all their discussions was that he could not do this under a virtual threat, as it would compromise him before his people.¹ Otis did not withdraw his letter, but wrote an informal one in the nature of a request on the 16th, the day after the insurgent troops had withdrawn from Malate and part of Pako nearest the walled city, marching up past the Luneta and being cheered by groups of American soldiers as they went out. General Otis had not specifically stated what districts were to be evacuated; hence the insurgents continued to keep the portions of Pako lying on the river and all the south bank above that point, giving them a frontage on the river which for over a mile faced the American territory on the north bank. They exercised the right to stop traffic here, and finally, by order of Pio del Pilar, General Anderson and a party were stopped and told they could not pass up the river without permission from Aguinaldo. In all their correspondence and negotiations, the Americans had been more concerned with laying down international law and assuring the Filipinos in general terms of their good intentions than with definitely prescribing the limits of the city as they interpreted them; so General Otis finally had to have the records searched for an official delimitation of the boundaries, and even to have his engineers construct a new map of the city in place of the faulty Spanish maps.² Thus

¹ Already Aguinaldo was playing the conservatives against the radicals in his camp, or wavering between the alternate councils of the two groups, as one chooses to see it. The conservatives had made him see that insistence on joint occupation was legally untenable, and moreover was unwise; but he wished to "keep face" before the radicals (especially commanders like Pio del Pilar, whose allegiance was never very stable), and hence wished to have his yielding appear like the granting of a request from the Americans, if he could not obtain from the latter some sort of formal agreement as to the future.

² Manila, as a city, was originally, and, until quite recent years, considered to be, the only walled town in which, even as late as 1844, natives, half-castes, or Chinese were forbidden to have their residences. The outlying posts on the north and south of the river, once separate villages, gradually grew together, though some open stretches still intervene. As business grew during the last half-century, making Binondo particularly, and to some extent Tondo, Santa Cruz, and Kiapo, the most important section of the city, while the walled town became merely the

fortified, he again opened correspondence with Aguinaldo on October 14, demanding the withdrawal of the Filipinos not only from all Pako but also from Pandakan, lying just beyond and along the river. He intimated that force would be used on the 20th, if necessary; but the tenor of the letter was conciliatory, and it broached the idea of establishing, with Aguinaldo's good will, a convalescent camp for sick Americans on higher ground outside the city. As Pandakan had been omitted by Aguinaldo in his list of suburbs included within the city, and Merritt had accepted this list, it was now vigorously claimed by the insurgents. There was really much doubt about it ever having been included technically within the city; but it was well within the lines of defense the Spaniards had maintained; and moreover it held a commanding position at a turn of the river facing the territory held by the Americans on the north side at Sampalok and Santa Mesa, and Otis had to insist on its being evacuated. The insurgents finally withdrew on October 25, and from that time forward occupied virtually the same positions which they had held against the Spaniards from early July to August 13, sometimes encroaching inside the blockhouses, which the Americans did not use.¹

governmental and religious headquarters, it was necessary to effect a better consolidation of the city under one government; yet the various districts outside the walls were to some extent separately governed until 1898. There was no great precision about the boundaries of the city as included under the *Ayuntamiento*, because of a certain Spanish aversion to precision in such matters, as well as because there had been some recent rather confusing provisions of law as to boundary extensions, and accurate maps had not been made. Moreover, since the city government was to a large extent united to the province of Manila, there was not an urgent necessity for precision as to the more scattered outlying sections.

¹ The published sources as to these negotiations between Otis and the insurgents are all from the American side, though some of the captured documents from the War Department shed light upon the attitude of the different insurgent factions at the time and as to preparations for resistance on the part of their military leaders. The correspondence and Otis's statements as to the interviews are given, as forwarded by him to Washington in *Rept. War Dept. 1899*, vol. 1, part 4, pp. 6-10, 15-22, 334, 350-54, and these were brought together in order in *Sen. Doc. 208*, pp. 28-41. See also *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 742-56, for Otis's testimony about these negotiations in 1902. The idea of a convalescent camp was dropped by Otis in November; Aguinaldo appeared suspicious about it, and claimed to be afraid it

† That the military Filipinos were ready to fight the Americans as early as September, and on various occasions before it was definitely known that the Americans would take the Philippines from Spain, as well as before their own organization had been well established in Luzon or extended to other parts of the archipelago, is fairly well shown by evidence left by themselves. Before the withdrawal of troops on September 15, Aguinaldo issued instructions to Generals Noriel, García, and Pio del Pilar, commanding the troops about the city, to be prepared to resist the Americans, though waiting for them to give the provocation.¹ Already, on September 10, when it was reported that the Americans on the north of the river were pressing forward their lines toward Kalookan and La Loma, Aguinaldo had authorized resistance to secure these positions again and had given instructions to "warn the Sandatahan" (a sort of Katipunan militia inside the city) to be ready to coöperate with the troops outside when trouble began.² Again, in October, when Otis delivered a second quasi-ultimatum as to the withdrawal of the insurgents from the city, he noticed

would excite his people, unless the Americans would first conclude a formal agreement with them. (Perhaps also the sight of insurgent trenches going up around the city did not invite the placing of sick Americans where they would be subject to capture.) In closing these negotiations in November, Aguinaldo brought up again the absence of a "fixed basis of agreement" as a reason for the lack of confidence on the part of his countrymen. These negotiations marked the appearance for the first time of Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera (later a member of the Philippine Commission, and one of the foremost "Americanistas" among the Filipinos from the time it became apparent that the Filipinos would resort to war) as a medium of communication between Filipinos and Americans in the interest of peace. He misunderstood Otis as to the blockhouses, thinking the latter gave permission for the Filipinos to occupy them; and there was a little friction over this matter later on, though not serious.

¹ See *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6107, for captured insurgent documents containing these instructions, stated by the editor of the insurgent documents in the War Department to be in the handwriting of Aguinaldo, though unsigned. It is curious to note that, in cautioning him to save ammunition, Aguinaldo tells Pio that "there are occasions when one shot kills as many as four men."

² See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 28. General García's report leading to these instructions was to the effect that the Americans had sought to push the Filipinos back; and there had been trouble between the outposts. The Filipinos, however, were at the time inside the line of blockhouses.

that their forces on the north were being recruited by troops brought down the railroad, and upon his protest this was stopped for the time being.¹ On November 30, upon a rumor that American troops were to be landed on the shores of Pampanga along the bay, Aguinaldo authorized the commander there to fire on them.²

The American correspondents in the Philippines were from the first disposed to discount the official optimism prevailing with regard to their country's relations with the insurgents. They and the subordinate army officers who sought to satisfy their curiosity as to the Philippines and the Filipinos soon found themselves objects of suspicion whenever they went outside the city, and they constantly acquired evidence that the military Filipinos at least were preparing for a fight, and that a great many of them were using every means to excite the masses to distrust the Americans. They had to run the gantlet of a troublesome system of permits, and the possession of photographic cameras subjected them frequently to detention or other interference. They were also inclined to lay more stress upon the growing animosity between the American soldiers and the natives in Manila than were the superior officers of these troops, who were confronted daily in their offices with questions of administration that seemed more important for the moment than psychological questions as to the attitude of the Filipino populace. The American — already well advertised to the Filipinos by the Spaniards as an intemperate, irreligious product of mixed ancestry, who had ruthlessly slaughtered the red man of his continent and was engaged in lynching the black men whom he had held in slavery till late in the century — was not slow in putting in evidence his Anglo-Saxon contempt for people of any other color than white. He also (in a very conspicuous minority of cases, that

¹ See *Otis's Rept., 1899* (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 4), p. 19. This document will hereafter be cited by the above foregoing short title.

² *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 31.

is) succeeded in justifying the reputation that had been given to him for intemperance, and, being confined within the limits of a tropical city, was quite commonly most obtrusive about it, which latter feature probably seemed to the average Filipino more a sign of weakness than the intemperance itself. Whatever may be the faults of the Spaniard, his race is a most temperate one, taking its stimulating drinks mostly in the form of wine with meals; and neither by disposition nor by example are the Filipinos themselves intemperate. Moreover, the Western volunteers, sometimes the officers as well as privates, regarded the fighting as over and the rest of their Philippine experience as justifiably a sort of "lark": perhaps the least offensive manifestation of this disposition was the mania for acquiring souvenirs of this semi-mediæval outpost of Spain, though this not infrequently led to abuses well within the meaning of the proclamations against looting and misconduct generally.¹ For, as indicated, there was no lack of official ef-

¹ The letters of John F. Bass and F. D. Millet (*Harper's History*, pp. 56-57, 65) are typical of contributions to the American press of that time, showing that the correspondents appreciated the seriousness of the trend of thought and action among the Filipinos. Says Mr. Bass, in a later article (*Everybody's Magazine*, August, 1901, p. 142): "An hour after [Aguinaldo made his triumphant entry into Malolos in September], I was discussing with two of his most important cabinet officials what would happen when the Filipinos tried to fight the Americans. More than four months later, General Otis telegraphed to Washington his opinion that there would be no conflict of arms." A contemporary letter of the same writer (dated at Manila, August 30, 1898, cited above in *Harper's History*) gives the typical American attitude toward the Filipino masses at that time: "There can be no doubt that our soldiers are spoiling for a fight. They hate and despise the native for the manner in which he has lied to and cheated them, and on the whole they are inclined to treat the Filipino the way a burly policeman treats a ragged street urchin. The native is like a child, unreasonable and easily affected by small things. Unable to appreciate the benefits of a good government, he fiercely resents the rough manner in which the soldier jostles him out of the way." The common opinion of foreigners in Manila is expressed by Frederic H. Sawyer, though himself not an eyewitness: "I have no doubt that they [the American volunteers] are good fighting men, but from all I can hear about them, they are not conspicuous for military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate." (*The Inhabitants of the Philippines*, p. 114.) In the *Reseña verídica*, Aguinaldo charges abuses by the American soldiers. He claims that the soldier killed at Cavite before Merritt's departure was killed in a drunken quarrel with his own companions; this matter was not satisfactorily cleared up. General Anderson (*North American Review*, Febru-

fort to check abuses or misconduct on the part of the American forces. This was not merely limited to orders from above, but extended to informal instructions to commanders of regiments and of companies, which were quite generally acted upon, and to the operations of military courts, which as a rule treated offenses by soldiers, mostly of a minor character, with all due severity. In the main, the things which were only too constantly operating to produce friction and animosity between the native people and the Americans were too small in themselves to be reached either by general orders about the conduct of the war or specific regulations as to military discipline. They were of the sort inevitably incident to the quartering of a restless body of troops in a strange and tropical city, after a brief campaign that seemed somewhat like the "picnic" many of the men were after and which had not been calculated to sober them to a realization of war. Add to this a prejudice against all other ways and customs but those of "good American citizens," and a disposition to look upon being born to any other color than white as in some degree a crime, and the situation is pictured.¹

ary, 1900, p. 282) says the attitude and conduct of the American soldiers had some part in bringing on the trouble. The numbers of *La Independencia* reveal many of the things, unimportant in themselves, which were at the time causing comment and criticism among Filipinos about the Americans and their administration of affairs in Manila. On November 16, 1898, it says the native street-venders are being interfered with and complain about the licenses they have to pay; it also says the residence-streets of the pleasant suburbs of Ermita and Malate are being invaded by unseemly laundries, tailor-shops, etc., springing up around the barracks. In the issue of November 30, 1898, there is an enlightening advertisement: a partner is wanted for a new saloon in the walled city, and he is assured profits of one hundred and fifty per cent; for, says the advertiser, "In the present historic moment there are no business undertakings offering as positive gain as restaurants, bars and taverns, cafés and saloons of recreation. For here are the Americans, the most practical men in business matters, and has any of them started here any other business than that?"

¹ General Anderson, on July 5, had issued an order reciting the paragraphs of the Army Regulations relative to respect for private property and for noncombatants, with some strong remarks upon the subject, and had directed them to be read before each company daily for one week; he repeated this order in September. Before attacking Manila, General Merritt, in a general order, stated to the troops that they had "come not as despoilers and oppressors, but simply as the

B. FIRST STEPS IN AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

More or less constant friction was also necessarily involved in the attempt to administer affairs in Manila, as military occupation presumes, under the municipal (as distinguished from international) law previously obtaining there, except as specially modified by the conqueror. The Spanish system was in many ways an anomalous one for Americans, whether military men or civilians, to undertake to carry out; and in this instance there was the further anomaly of American possession being limited to the capital and to some general supervision over navigation, while the remainder of the archipelago, already to a considerable extent lost to the Spaniards when Manila fell, was, before the treaty came to confer upon the United States sovereignty over the whole group, in the hands of Filipinos, more or less openly hostile to the United States and to some degree in possession of a governmental organization. Inside the city itself, the Spanish prisoners, who were to a very slight extent deprived of their liberty, more and more came to be an unnecessary menace to the peace and the health of the city as it became apparent that Spain was not to retain the Philippines. Coincidentally with the course of events, the hostility of the native population was gradually being transferred from Spaniards to Americans, and there was a tendency to

* instruments of a strong, free Government, whose purposes are beneficent, and which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish misrule"; and acts of pillage, rapine, or violence were to be punished "on the spot with the maximum penalties known to military law." This order was furnished to Aguinaldo before the city was taken, as a statement of the attitude of the United States with regard to private property in time of war. In January, it became necessary for General Otis to publish some instances where soldiers had made purchases from native tradesmen and refused to pay, and thereafter during the course of military operations frequent orders were issued as to respect for private property and for noncombatants. (See *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 982-89, for such orders; there also follows a list of trials of officers and soldiers for abuse of natives, mostly in 1899 and 1900.) The orders from Washington at the beginning of the war, being one of May 17 announcing the adherence of the United States to the Geneva Convention, and one of May 30 enjoining strict military discipline, are found in *Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898*, pp. 512-13, 517.

fraternize between the former foes, stimulated by some community of speech and customs.¹

The sanitary condition of the city, overcrowded with troops, was worse than usual; and the hygienic conditions prevailing in Manila under Spanish rule were never other than wretched. One of the first steps in the reorganization of the city government was the establishment of a board of health composed of American army surgeons, which set out at once to vaccinate the inhabitants of the city more effectively than had ever before been done. It had also to round up again the 200 or so lepers who had, at the time of the taking of the city, been allowed to escape and mingle with the population.²

The Spanish newspapers of Manila, which had resumed publication a few days after the occupation, adopted the policy,

¹ General Otis secured authority from Washington to permit the departure for the Bisayas of some of the Spanish troops, under the pledges of their officers that they would not resume hostilities against the United States if a treaty should not be concluded. He was also glad, under similar authorization, to permit the sailing for Spain of officers certified to be sick.

² The city health board was organized on September 10, its head being Major Frank S. Bourns, who had in previous years accompanied two scientific expeditions to the Philippines and had come with General Merritt to the islands as chief surgeon of volunteers. The vaccination campaign was vigorously conducted by him. Some notes on the organization of sanitary work in the city may be found in Dr. Bourns's Report of 1899, exhibit B with appendix M to *Otis's Rept., 1899* (pp. 260-61), and in appendix UU to General MacArthur's *Report for 1900* (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10). From the first, prominent Filipino physicians were associated with the board as advisory members, the first being Drs. T. H. Pardo de Tavera and Aristón Bautista Lim. For an account of how the lepers were neglected and allowed to scatter at the time the city was taken, see this subject in appendix AA to *MacArthur's 1901 Report* (*Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 4, pp. 248-50). The Franciscan friars had been in charge of the leper hospital and of the estate near Manila which supported it; on May 23, 1898, they had asked the Spanish governor-general to release them from their charge, thus admitting, what was a well-known fact, that the institution was a public one, belonging to the crown of Spain. Notwithstanding the abandonment of the lepers at the time of the surrender of the city and the fact that the Americans subsequently took the hospital and the estate in charge, the following January the Franciscans petitioned that it be restored to them, alleging that it belonged to their order. They were, of course, refused. A most thorough résumé of the provost-marshal government of Manila up to August 7, 1901, when the city was again given a civil government, was made by Major-General George W. Davis at that time (see *Rept. War Dept., 1902*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 77-274). Appended to it are all the laws and regulations promulgated by military authority in this connection.

which, with one or two exceptions, they have steadily followed ever since, of stimulating hostility between Americans and Filipinos, principally by holding constantly before the latter, in the many ways of insinuation in which their editors excel, the fear of a ruthless "exploitation" by the Americans and of a fate like that of the red man and the black man in North America. Finally, one Spanish editor was tried by military commission and fined heavily and his paper suspended, though afterward permitted by General Otis to resume publication; but in the main, the carefully worded insinuations of these writers were beyond the reach of the military censor's bludgeon-like pen, and could only have been prevented by the absolute suppression of their periodicals. Two insurgent papers also sprang up in Manila; they were at first more cautious, also more friendly to the Americans; but when the cables from Paris showed a determination on the part of the United States to take over Spain's sovereignty, their political articles began to be directed chiefly at the Americans and in behalf of Filipino independence, and they removed to Malolos for greater safety.¹ Besides the editor mentioned, two other Spaniards, officers of the army, were tried by military commission and convicted of conspiracy and embezzlement of funds of Bilibid Prison, which they had been allowed to continue to manage for three months under the provost-marshal; they were heavily fined, but the imprisonment for three years in each case was reduced by General Otis to six months.²

¹ See *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 52-53, and Military Secretary Crowder's résumé of the activity and attitude of the Spanish press up to 1901, in *Rept. War Dept.*, 1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 250-52.

² See *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 51-52; also the *Historia Negra* of "Capitan Verdades," pp. 179-84, for the full findings of the military commission in these trials, translated into Spanish. The two officers convicted were subordinates; their superior, who was in direct charge of the prison, escaped conviction, with which finding of the commission General Otis disagreed. Their prosecution was due to the investigations of Brigadier-General R. P. Hughes, the very active provost-marshal-general of Manila from early in September 1898, to late in May, 1899. After the action was well under way, the Spanish authorities made a demand that they be allowed to try and punish the offenders, which was refused. Later, one of the

When the Americans entered the city, Bilibid Prison contained about two thousand prisoners, nearly all Filipinos, and about half of them charged with political offenses under the Spanish régime, while of those supposed to be held on purely criminal charges a large proportion had no definitely formulated cases against them, and some had been awaiting trial in the slow-going courts for not only months but years. The political offenders were soon released, and on July 1, 1899, the prison contained only about one thousand prisoners, of whom two hundred were there upon conviction under the operations of American military courts. In this "jail-delivery" some few bad criminals escaped, mainly owing to the faulty character of the Spanish records or the absence of records, and the Spaniards had a good deal to say about the turning of these criminals loose upon the population.¹

The question was also raised by Filipinos as to the return by the American Government of property which had been embargoed by Spain, under the decree by General Blanco, during 1896 and 1897. Under the law of military occupancy, it not yet being certain what would be the future sovereignty over the islands, it had to be held that the United States might be responsible to Spain for retaining and administering these possessions; and, though the properties and all their proceeds under American control were subsequently turned over to the owners by order of the Secretary of War, considerable criticism was meanwhile excited among the Filipinos.²

prisoners, who had prominent social connections, was released on payment of his fine, subscribed by Spaniards, and upon presentation of a petition headed by Archbishop Nozaleda.

¹ See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 7, p. 79 (the previously cited report of General G. W. Davis). Also, *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 12-13. That the 1898 "jail-delivery" was not complete as to prisoners held in Bilibid without the proper formulation of charges against them was indicated by the release of nearly one hundred more in 1900, through the writ of *habeas corpus*.

² See *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 38-39, 288. The particular case in point was that of the estate of a prominent family of half-castes, most of them in Hongkong since 1896 or 1897, who had in May induced Consul-General Wildman to cable to Washington their "allegiance" to the United States, and later to implore Senator Hanna in their

The attempts of the Spanish judges of lower courts to exercise jurisdiction, in several instances plainly in behalf of interested parties, compelled the military authority to intervene and suspend their operations. General Merritt's proclamation of military government had contemplated the continuance of the civil courts already in existence in the city, and, in organizing provost courts on August 22, he had exempted from the operations of the civil courts only those cases in which one or more of the parties should be connected with the American army. General Otis found it necessary to modify the inferential jurisdiction thus left residing in the existing civil courts by providing, on October 7, that they should have no jurisdiction whatever in criminal cases, and should exercise jurisdiction in civil cases "subject to such supervision as the interests [of the military government] might demand." The judges of the Audiencia (Spanish supreme court) refused to act under such supervision, and, from that time until the following May, Manila was without civil courts.¹

Operating in another branch of the former administration, certain Spanish officials and other Europeans, as well as a few Americans, undertook to carry through a very badly conceived plan for plastering over with fictitious mining claims a goodly portion of the public domain of the archipelago. The mining bureau, a branch of the Spanish Directorate of Civil Administration, was not formally taken over by the American authorities until March, 1899, and in the interval from May 1, 1898, when not only were the officials in Manila effectually "bottled up," but mining prospectors had small chance to do any work in the rest of the archipelago, three times as many claims

behalf (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 334, 361). General Otis remarks that Consuls Wildman and Williams were very active in their behalf.

¹ *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 11-12, 35-36. See also the résumé of "Military Commissions and Provost Courts," by Military Secretary Crowder, in *Rept. War Dept.*, 1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 245-47. A summary of the more important military orders affecting governmental administration, up to the time of civil government, is given in the preliminary number of the *Official Gazette* of the Philippines, published at Manila under date of January 1, 1903.

were denounced as had ever been established in all the preceding years. These frauds were readily discovered by the American officer who, in 1900, took charge of the bureau, but meantime and thereafter attempts were made to float fictitious mining companies on the strength of the recognition which had been obtained from the Spanish officials.¹

Anticipating the military occupation of Manila, if not of other portions of the archipelago, the Government at Washington had, on July 19, sent out to General Merritt translations of the Spanish customs tariffs in the islands, only modifying them by making them applicable against Spain as against other nations and by imposing an internal-revenue tax on tobacco and its manufactures. When this document arrived, the new customs authorities were already administering the old laws, with their cumbersome surcharges and faulty classifications, as best they could; and, partly on the ground that the *status quo ante* had already been proclaimed, Spanish and other foreign merchants in the city were quick to protest against the comparatively few changes made. Finally, after several postponements to permit shipments contracted for in Spain under the old privilege of free entry of goods from

¹ Lieutenant C. H. Burritt, the industrious officer in charge of the mining bureau during 1900 to 1903, made a most entertaining report on this matter to General MacArthur in 1900 (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, appendix II). He shows that the claims filed from May 1, 1898, to March 29, 1899, numbered 1618 and covered almost 150,000,000 square meters, while those established during all the preceding years of Spanish rule numbered 594 and covered about 50,000,000 square meters of territory. One of the steps taken in the effort to comply, ostensibly, with the very precise Spanish provisions as to proof of claim, surveys, etc., was to get the certificate of United States Consul Williams in Manila to the authenticity of the documents used in filing. In one case, at least, the report shows the consul's certificate to state that, "because of want of custody of Spanish books of record in such matters, I, as representing whatever of Spanish authority that remains, do hereby recognize," etc. With the definite transfer of sovereignty to the United States, the post of United States consul at Manila became, of course, an anomaly; in January, 1901, Mr. Williams was made consul-general at Singapore. Other points brought out in Lieutenant Burritt's report are the plundering of the survey maps of the mining bureau and the malicious destruction of a microscope and of other property, during the time the Spanish officials remained in charge.

there (with the payment merely of the surcharges for harbor improvement, etc.) to be received by these merchants, the tariff was put into effect on November 10; the new excise laid upon tobacco had, however, been omitted from it, as it was devised without knowledge of the conditions in the Philippines, and was virtually prohibitive of the manufacture and sale of cigarettes.¹

The difficulties attendant upon the resumption of inter-island trade were yet more embarrassing. The foreign business houses were anxious to obtain the waiting hemp and tobacco crops upon which their money had been advanced, and the Government was also desirous of having this commerce renewed, with its influence toward the normalization of conditions throughout the archipelago. But there were two other factors to be taken into account: the Spanish military authorities held possession of the principal ports of the central islands, and theoretically asserted the sovereignty of Spain over all the archipelago outside of Manila; and the Filipinos were in possession of practically all Luzon, as well as of some of the hemp ports in the Bisayas, while the Government at Malolos, everywhere more or less obediently recognized by them, had imposed a 10 per-cent tax on all inter-island shipments, besides establishing various regulations which gave wide opportunity for "squeeze." As between the Spaniards and Americans, it was easily agreed that vessels flying the American flag

¹ See *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 14, 30, 48-49; also, Collector James F. Smith's humorous report of 1901 (*Rept. War Dept.*, 1901, vol. I, part 4, p. 283). There was, in some cases, very serious doubt of the good faith of merchants who claimed to have contracted for goods from Spain before the outbreak of war and to have been prevented from securing their free entry in Manila by the events of the war, as well as a likelihood that some of the shipments had been purchased elsewhere than in Spain and reinvioiced from there. Among the War Department documents are *Customs Tariff and Regulations of the Philippine Islands, 1898*, and *Tariff Circulars, 1898-1900* (Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines). The revised tariff, as put into effect in November, 1898, was also republished in Manila under the foregoing title. For a War Department ruling on a case of Spanish goods arriving after the tariff went into effect against Spain, see *Magoon's Reports* (long title, *Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation*: Washington, 1902), pp. 625-30.

should be permitted to enter the Spanish ports, in return for a like privilege for vessels flying the Spanish flag and entering Manila Bay. Most of the vessels in the inter-island trade had hoisted the American flag, under fictitious transfers to American citizens (which transfers were winked at by the American authorities, in order not to render inter-island traffic an impossibility), as a vessel with the Spanish flag was liable to prompt seizure in ports held by the Filipinos. For fear of subsequent claims for damages against their Government, the Spanish authorities in the Bisayas refused to give clearances for such ports; and, as those vessels traded from port to port, and the Filipinos were constantly gaining control of new points, with the withdrawal of Spanish troops, they were frequently stopped after having cleared satisfactorily from Manila. Complaints and discontent, of course, succeeded, and the natural result was that the foreign business houses were led more and more to come to amicable terms with the insurgent authorities, a thing which some of them had already been very forward in doing, and which bore consequences of importance later on, when some of these houses, in order to carry on their profitable trade in war-times, furnished the funds which maintained insurrection against the United States.¹

From the outset of American administration in the Philippine Islands, the customs taxes have produced much the greater portion of the revenue: this is now the consequence of the governmental policy as adopted into laws, not of conditions which, as at the outset, limited the operations of American tax-collectors to Manila. As we have seen, the customs revenues, due in large part to the discrimination in favor of imports from Spain, and also in no small degree to both incompetent and corrupt administration of the customs service, were,

¹ See *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 45-48, 70-71. After November 25, the merchants were warned that all inter-island traffic was at their own risk. A new aspect was put upon affairs with the outbreak of insurrection against the United States, as Aguinaldo forbade the entry of a ship flying the American flag into any Filipino port.

up to 1898, secondary to the receipts from the personal taxes. The *cedula* (personal registration certificate), reputedly so unpopular with the Filipinos, was at first abolished; but the people were so habituated to its use, and to the necessity of having it as a means of establishing identity, that it was restored, with only a nominal charge for issuance (at first, 20 cents Mexican). The tax on house-rents was continued in Manila, as well as various forms of municipal licenses, with some modifications; but the internal-revenue taxes involved, for the most part, the conduct of business of a general character throughout the archipelago, and all such were held uncollectible by the military occupant of the capital city. The public revenues obtained from these various sources were made disbursable for purposes connected with the administration of government, as distinguished from purely military purposes, and a military officer was appointed auditor of these civil funds.¹

The Manila branches of the two large English banking concerns of the Orient were pressing to have the Spanish prohibition of the importation of Mexican dollars removed, as the amount of currency on hand was insufficient for the sudden increase of trading operations in the city incident to the reopening of commerce and the occupation by an army from the United States. They claimed that only thus could they be sure of continuing to quote a rate of two Mexican dollars for one American, or better; and upon their pledge to maintain such a ratio, their request was granted.²

¹ See *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 30-33; also pp. 275-94 (appendix O, *Report of the Treasurer of Public Funds*). From the first, there was a tendency among the military officers to stretch the public civil funds to cover really military purposes, notably for transportation of officers about the city, rent of quarters, etc.

² The banks continued to make a profitable business of exchange until July, 1900, when the trouble in China sent silver up and disturbed the ratio, causing these banking concerns very speedily to seek relief from the Government. Until then, they had continued to quote such rates as gave them a profit on exchange whichever way it was made. See *Report of Taft Philippine Commission, 1900*, pp. 85-87, for a history of this matter.

In another important respect, existing laws having an economic bearing were modified, namely, by the abolition of Spanish regulations as to Chinese immigration, registration, etc., and the substitution for them in September of the United States prohibitory laws and regulations, with some modifications in the latter designed to permit the entry of Chinese who could prove former residence in the islands. Supposedly, this was a change dictated from Washington. The traditional hostility between Filipinos and Chinese made it also a popular measure in the islands. Inside the city, the military government from the first employed the Chinese extensively as laborers. Outside, they were quite generally liable to become the victims of native hostility or had to purchase immunity if they continued their business operations; the connection of various wealthy Chinese half-castes with the revolution as contributors, and in several instances their active association with its military organization (notably in the case of General Paua, of Albai province), did not signify anything in this respect, as Chinese half-castes in the Philippines invariably are recognized as Filipinos and assume that status.¹

¹ *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 33-35. There seems to be no published evidence as to whether or no Washington dictated the Chinese exclusion order; but it may fairly be assumed that action in so important a matter was not taken without consultation. However, in February, 1899, when the Chinese Minister at Washington made his first queries about this matter, Secretary of State Hay apparently did not know of Otis's exclusion order. (See *Foreign Relations, United States, 1899*, pp. 207-17, for the correspondence of that year on the subject, the exclusion order itself, a circular of the Philippine customs administration dated September 28, 1898, being cited on p. 211.) In August, the State Department informed Minister Wu that the exclusion order was a "military measure," as yet not a settled policy of the United States Government; the minister had entered formal protest against it.

CHAPTER VII

THE FILIPINO ORGANIZATION

It is now necessary to turn back and examine the steps in the formation of the rival organization of government which was in active opposition to the remnant of Spanish power left in the archipelago and was preparing for opposition to the Americans, in case they attempted to take the place of Spain. Indeed, in the light of subsequent events, the processes of revolutionary organization and the character of the government instituted by the Filipinos, obscured as they have been by conflicting testimony and by the meagerness of the evidence made public, become the queries of greatest importance connected with the events of 1898. A résumé of the insurgent proclamations up to the capture of Manila has already been given, and enough was therein brought out to indicate that the revolution was not organized from below, but imposed from above — this only with reference, for the moment, to the civil organization of government, and leaving out of consideration the question whether the masses were eager to volunteer for military service or were coerced into it. For the very reason that the spontaneity of the movement is somewhat in doubt, it becomes important to discover the persons and the personalities behind it and to inquire as to their representative character.

The first thing made clear by the study of the records is that Aguinaldo, whose name was always and everywhere employed, first in the Tagalog provinces and later in other parts of Luzon and the Bisayas, and whose name has constantly appeared in these pages as if he were the very soul of the movement, was really a subordinate — though a gilded and insignia-clad subordinate, to be sure — in the camp where the revolution

was making. Many partial explanations of this fact have been offered: the view most favorable to Aguinaldo (which implies, too, that he was not really a subordinate) is that he was shrewd enough to draw to himself all sorts and factions of Filipinos and to balance them one against another, while at the same time sufficiently disinterested and sincerely solicitous for the welfare of his country and his people to take advice and counsel from all sides and to subject his personal ambitions and wishes to the opinions of men of greater education and attainments; a very common opinion, held by Filipinos of discrimination as well as by Americans, is that he was the merest figurehead. There is considerable truth, it is probable, in both these views. The personal jealousies and factional dissensions which seem inevitably to attend every purely Filipino movement, and generally to its disruption, made it all the more easy for a Filipino of not too decided views and of no arrogance of intellectual attainments to gather about him his prominent countrymen of different camps who would almost surely have set up rival claims if one or the other of their own number had assumed leadership. Moreover, if name and prestige with the masses were essential, what more natural than that the middle-class Filipino who had established himself as a quasi-divinity by his military operations in Cavite in 1896, who had been deemed by the Spaniards of sufficient importance to balance the account, along with a mere handful of rifles and a score of companions, against \$800,000 in 1897, and who now came back surrounded by all the glamour which familiarity with the American conqueror in Manila Bay could give him, should be regarded as the man of the hour?

If we were here passing judgment on Aguinaldo personally, it would be necessary to note that there is no satisfactory proof of his insincerity in the cause he espoused, and that he proved at least capable of maintaining his position as the balance between the Filipino factions and as the idol of the masses until

the insurrection and he himself were driven into hiding; but that judgment we may well leave for the events themselves to indicate.

The Aguinaldo, however, whom a great many Americans have since 1898 been constructing from his proclamations, his instruments of government, and the false prominence given to his name in everything was really another man, whose name was Apolinario Mabini. He was the Aguinaldo who devised the schemes of government, afterward ostensibly ratified by the representatives of the people; who dictated nearly every important move up to the transfer of the organization to Malolos; who thereafter, except when there were momentary changes of oracle, continued to speak through the mouth of Aguinaldo the President, in matters of civil organization, and to a large extent even in the direction of military operations, until his downfall from control in May, 1899. Mabini, though a student-radical, was, as previous mention of him will have disclosed, not the less a radical of radicals. A man of ideas and not of action, he soon found himself the inspiring lever of a machine created out of human masses stirred from lethargy by the name and prestige of another, for whom intellectually he had considerable contempt; and some of the analogies of his favorite study, the French Revolution, seemed to have moved him to re-perpetrate it in the hitherto lethargic tropical Orient. Obviously, here was a man whose friendship or whose hostility to the United States might prove to be very important to the Government, if its future policy was to involve connection with the Philippines in one form or another. Yet no American, whether of the army or of the navy, seemed for a long time to have ascertained what position in the midst of affairs was held by this paralytic who had been carried over to Cavite soon after Aguinaldo arrived; and it was only through Filipinos favorable to the Americans that it was later discovered that he was the chief obstacle at Malolos to their efforts toward conciliation. It suited Mabini's dispo-

sition as well as his aims at the time to remain in the background. He seems to have been at least suspicious of the Americans from the first, and, though he had been connected with the revolt of 1896 only as a sympathizer, he was now fully bent on seeing his dream of an independent Filipino republic realized.¹

All the proclamations, decrees, and other published documents of Aguinaldo of May, June, July, and August, 1898, were from the pen of Mabini, with the probable exception of two or three of the shorter proclamations in which Aguinaldo protests his unfitness for the position which he had just so boldly assumed.² Besides those which have been found available for citation above, Mabini, whose pen scarcely ever rested, edited a great many other documents and projects, some of which attained printed form later as regulations of the executive department or as laws of the Congress, while others have never seen the light.³ One of these, issued in pamphlet form

¹ See above, p. 93, footnote, for Mabini's own statement of his change of attitude between 1896 and 1898. Contrary to the belief generally entertained in the United States, Mabini was not an old man, but was barely thirty-three at the time of his death from cholera at Manila in 1903, hence only about twenty-eight, or slightly younger than Aguinaldo, when these two joined forces at Cavite in 1898; the paralysis of his lower limbs led to the belief that he was old, and he was prematurely old, physically at least, though not altogether through the visitations of Providence. He came of humble parents, pure Tagalogs, of Tanawan, Batangas, and, after getting his bachelor's degree in arts, worked as an employee of the Spanish civil administration and in a lawyer's office in order to be able to finish his course in law, which he did in 1895. His connection with *Liga Filipina* was mentioned in the chapter III (footnote), p. 93, as cited above; after his release from arrest in 1897, he returned to his native town of Tanawan, where he lived quietly until shortly after Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. He was wide awake to all that was going on, however, and had already, in April, before Dewey's arrival, addressed a manifesto to "the Filipino Revolutionists," taking sides against Spain at the moment when some of the active participants in the revolt of 1896-97 were protesting their loyalty.

² This Spanish habit of groveling in the dirt and protesting one's personal unfitness or incapacity for a task he is voluntarily taking upon himself has left its mark upon almost all the Filipinos; scarcely one of them ever opens a speech in public or starts a contribution to a newspaper without wasting much time or space by protesting his own inability to enlighten his auditors or readers, so vastly superior to him in wisdom.

³ Some of these are now, in manuscript form, in the possession of Mabini's brother at Manila, who has offered them for sale in order to secure funds with

from the official printing establishment which the revolutionists set up at Bakoor in July, 1898, was perhaps the most interesting document of the whole Filipino revolution. It contained Mabini's "Constitutional Programme of the Philippine Republic," and was so entitled. Many of the provisions of the constitution as drafted by Mabini had already been promulgated in the Aguinaldo decrees, and this work formed the basis of the constitution afterward adopted at Malolos. A discussion of the modifications subsequently made in this scheme of government and of the practical workings of it constitutes practically the whole history of the insurrection as a civil organization. Yet in some ways a more interesting and a more significant document was that published under the same cover, entitled "The True Decalogue." It is a sort of political Ten Commandments, inculcating the Christian doctrine of love of God and fellow-man, but proceeding therefrom to develop a doctrine especially fitted to the circumstances, viz., that all Filipinos should see in their fellow-countrymen "something more than in their fellow-man," should cultivate their intelligences, and should reject all authority but that which was sanctioned by themselves. The significance of such a doctrine, given

which to publish the memoirs left by Mabini at his death (from two chapters of which, as given advance publication in a Manila newspaper, citations have already been made herein). Mabini's decree of July 30, 1898, providing for the organization of the revolutionary army, underwent various modifications, but it was the basis of the similar decree of Aguinaldo (published only in *El Heraldo de la Revolución*) and the regulations issued later on. The Library of Congress seems to have only the reprints of a few of these documents made at Nueva Cáceres in 1899 (see *A List of Books on the Philippine Islands in the Library of Congress*, p. 154); and, in general, American writers and American publications have given but scant consideration to the documentation of the insurrection in the Philippines. The appeal to foreign powers for recognition, under date of August 6, after the presidents of a few towns could be got together to give the affair a representative character, was particularly Mabiniesque, and his manuscripts show that it was his work. This, as seen above, has received wide publication; quite the contrary is true of his manifesto of August 18, 1898, "against the unjust procedure of the American Army" (in refusing to share the occupation of Manila with the Filipinos), which was intended only for Filipino circulation, and which the objections of the Filipinos working for conciliation caused to be partially or wholly suppressed.

to the masses in a semi-religious form at such a time, is apparent enough; it is not less interesting as shedding a strong light upon the mental makeup of the new leader, Mabini. His ideas, as set forth in the "True Decalogue" and in the accompanying manifesto, for a revolution of customs and habits along with the political revolution, were excellent, though he seemed to make scant allowance for the fact that such internal revolution comes only by evolution. But over and above all else in connection with this strange document, one cannot but think of the unconscious intellectual egotism and of the almost total lack of humor of the man who put it forth.¹

Just how far Mabini was identified with the practical steps taken for the extension of the revolution as a military organization, it is not easy to say; and it is readily apparent that herein lay the real work of the propaganda, and that, if he was not supreme in this respect, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the leadership he exercised. He was always an idealist and a man of theories, rather than a practical organizer, much more of a political critic than of a statesman; and the work which was done in the Tagalog provinces in May and June, in other parts of Luzon in the next three months, and thereafter in the Bisayas, was by no means mere work of the pen. Mabini, as we have seen, declared that he did not belong to the Katipunan of 1896 and 1897, because, as he says, he did not then think the time had come for armed revolt, and because, as he does not frankly say, he was not

¹ This document has never, so far as the writer has noted, found any mention in American publications. Even leaving aside the fact that the history of the constitution adopted at Malolos in January, 1899, is only to be traced in the light of Mabini's "Programme" and in his early decrees, it is strange also that the journalists in the Philippines should have overlooked such a "feature" as the "True Decalogue." Two versions of this document were printed at Bako in July, 1898; the Tagalog pamphlet was entitled *Panukala sa Pagkakanang Republika nang Pilipinas*, and the Spanish title is a translation of this: *Programa constitucional de la República Filipina*. Aguinaldo's name appears only as authorizing the sale of these pamphlets among the people at a peseta apiece, to obtain funds for the revolution. The author owes his copies of these versions respectively to Messrs. Clemente J. Zulueta and Florentino Torres.

the sort of man to employ some of the methods of the Katipunan. It is rather hard to conceive of this idealist, who was busy with efforts to teach the people their duties as patriots, sanctioning a resort to such methods as were implied in Aguinaldo's order including all Filipinos, regardless of their wishes, in the Katipunan and threatening them with this organization's severe penalties for disloyalty to it.¹ The leaders who had inspired and maintained the Tagalog revolt of 1896-97 understood, however, that the people with whom they had to deal could not yet be held together simply by an appeal to ideals, and that a resort to military coercion and to the methods of secret organization was necessary. Yet Mabini himself, if not actually inspiring such methods of organization, could not have been without cognizance of them; and, if he ever stopped to reconcile them with his ideas of a revolution of conscience and a propaganda of sentiment, it was probably on the basis of his declaration that he had become satisfied that in 1898 the great majority of the people had turned against Spain because of her maladministration and her recent cruelties. And, moreover, there are not lacking indications that Mabini was, in the early months as well as later, closely identified with the military programme.² It was in connection with this pro-

¹ This order, which was issued on July 15, the day when Aguinaldo forwarded to Dewey the proclamations of independence and the decrees organizing the revolutionary government, is among the captured documents now in the War Department at Washington. A translation of its most significant paragraph was given in *Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6130, in a speech of Senator Spooner, and reads as follows: "All Filipinos must understand that they are now in the Katipunan, whether they want to be or not, and hence it is the duty of all to contribute life and property to the arduous enterprise of freeing the people, and he who disobeys must stand ready to receive the corresponding punishment. We can not free ourselves unless we move forward united in a single desire, and you must understand that I shall severely punish the man who causes discord and dispute."

² Indeed, it is only too plain how well such appeals to the race instinct as Mabini put in religious form in his "True Decalogue" concurred with the secret propaganda of the Katipunan, which was founded more frankly on racial feeling and contemplated the resort to more brutal methods. Many versions of the oath of the Katipunan have been given, but they all practically amount to the same thing, differing somewhat in phraseology. Here is the form of initiation and oath, translated from the original Tagalog, from a document signed March 5, 1900, by

gramme, however, that Aguinaldo displayed his dominance ; though it was not altogether undisputed, especially later on, when the revolution had expanded to include a wider range both of men and of territory. The influences of favoritism and nepotism were again at work with Aguinaldo, as they had been in 1896-97, and his relatives and personal associates of Cavite were so prominent as to give the lie to Mabini's attractive picture of a government free from "spoils," founding its distinctions upon merit and achievements.¹

"Moises Abueg," filed as "No. 514-15 of Captured Insurgent Documents" in the War Department and reproduced here by the courtesy of Captain J. R. M. Taylor : —

"1st. From to-day you will be a brother of the Katipunan, you will understand your obligation to regard with esteem the true brother of the Katipunan, because we are born in one and the same country, of one and the same people, descendants of one and the same blood and color, that is to say, sons of one common mother.

"He who desires to become a brother will be asked the following questions : —

"1st. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will never do injury to the Philippines ?

"2d. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will help the Filipino people in their aspirations ?

"3d. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will always esteem our brothers of the Katipunan ?

"4th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will be able to assassinate your parents, brothers, wife, sons, relatives, friends, fellow-townsmen, or Katipunan brothers should they forsake or betray our cause ?

"5th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will shed your last drop of blood in defense of our Mother Country ?

"6th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will sacrifice your life and goods when there is the slightest possibility of our brothers being in need of help?

"For all of this, that we, your brothers in the Katipunan, may have evidence of all you have sworn, you will allow us to extract a drop of your blood with which to write your name, so that we, your brothers of the Katipunan, may know that you will never betray our cause.

"This being done, and the blood being drawn, his name will be written in his own blood, and although it is but a little drop, he will never up to the last hour of his life cease to remember to be on his guard as a true brother, for it is blood drawn from his own body.

"MOISES ABUEG.

"March 4th, 1900."

¹ Whether Mabini ever raised his voice against this favoritism at the time does not appear ; others did later on, though guardedly, and with the entrance of new elements into the revolution, especially men of education and position, it was somewhat curbed. In his posthumous memoirs (in which Mabini, who was deposed

Coincident with the transfer of the insurgent capital from Cavite to Bulakán province early in September, the revolution entered upon a new phase. This was not, however, because of the fact that the first revolutionary Congress assembled and was formally opened at Malolos on September 15,¹ but because there were associated with the congress, and there were coming into the executive councils of the revolution at the time a number of men of wider experience and education, conspicuous among whom were several distinctive conservatives who unquestionably enjoyed great prestige and respect. As far as the Assembly itself was concerned, it was representative in character in no proper sense of the word; its members had not been chosen by the voice of the people, and they were to a very slight degree real representatives of the provinces or the different tribal divisions for which they were the nominal spokesmen.² Moreover, the Assembly was rarely ever more

from power in May, 1899, judges Aguinaldo very harshly), Mabini says: "Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was only his own personal aggrandizement, he [Aguinaldo] did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, and patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which united them to him; and, desiring to have his favorites disposed to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself lenient toward even their faults." (*El Comercio*, Manila, July 23, 1903.)

¹ For a description of this event, see a letter of F. D. Millet, *Harper's History*, pp. 65-72. Among the accompanying illustrations are also those of the menu of the banquet given at Malolos on September 29, which was declared "Philippine Independence Day."

² No one seems ever to have analyzed carefully the membership of the Assembly, though various general statements have been made about it. The Government at Washington cabled in 1901 for a list of its members, showing those elected and appointed, but the one on file in the War Department does not seem to be final or authoritative. It is not of vital importance, in any event, to know just how many were elected and how many were appointed directly by Aguinaldo; for, as will be seen further along, the elections conducted in the provinces were held by commissioners of his own appointing (usually by his military representatives), and the men who were chosen in this way, whether as municipal or provincial officers or as representatives at Malolos, could not be chosen unless acceptable to the persons in charge at the center of insurgent affairs. The decrees of June 18 and 23 provided that the representatives should be chosen by the votes of the chiefs of the towns of each province, but where the majority of the towns of a province had not yet liberated themselves from Spanish control, "the Government shall have power to appoint provisionally those persons who are most distinguished for high character and social position." Most of the provinces of Luzon (which alone had

than the mouthpiece of the men who held executive positions, either in the military or the civil organization or in both, and such divisions as on rare occasions took place among the members were, with one or two exceptions, merely the echoes of dissensions among the principals of the insurrection. The discussions of the constitution of the new government occupied the Assembly for over two months, and kept certain political theorists quite busy; it ended in the adoption of practically the same instrument as Mabini had drawn up, and meanwhile the government was administered by decrees as it had been before the Assembly was convened, though that body was occasionally consulted. The real contest going on for several months at Malolos was not fought on the floor of the Assembly, except as echoes of it were there heard. It was, at first, a contest between conservatives and radicals to see which should direct the framing of the plan of government and of a policy to be adopted as to future relations with the United States; entering upon a new phase at about the time the treaty was

been civilly organized under Spain) were to have two representatives each, though Cavite (which had not yet become a civil government under Spain) was, like Manila, to have three; the military governments, including all the provinces of the Bisayas, and the *comandancias* were to have one representative each. I have a copy of the official list of the representatives, furnished by a member of the Assembly. It contains ninety-four names, but the column headed provinces, which should show the district supposed to be represented by each member, is blank. Of the ninety-four members therein listed, forty-seven are known to me to be Tagalogs, of whom thirty-four live all or a part of the time in Manila; eight are Ilokanos (one a resident of Manila); there are two each from the Kagayan Valley, Pangasinan and Pampanga, and two Bikols, the latter residents of Manila; only four are certainly from Bisayan provinces, of whom one is probably Tagalog by descent; and twenty-seven names I am unable to place, among whom there may be a few Bisayans. The list includes such military men as Pio del Pilar and Isidoro Torres. The majority are half-castes, and it is probable that some among the twenty-seven unclassified are or were also residents of Manila. In January, 1899, Aguinaldo's commissioners to treat of a *modus vivendi* with the Americans admitted that no delegates to the assembly representing other islands than Luzon had been elected, being appointed instead (*Sen. Doc. 331, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2711*). The list of members which they furnished (*ibid.*, p. 2750) is, with the change of one or two names, the same as that analyzed above, as is also the list printed with the official edition of the *Constitución política de la República Filipina*, which contained ninety-two names. Later, appointees were added to make the number one hundred and ten.

signed at Paris, it became a contest between the partisans of peace and those of war.

Long before the fall of Manila, the effort of the Spaniards to draw the Filipino conservatives to themselves had "fracased," to use the expressive Spanish intransitive. Some of these men were in the Filipino camp before the 13th of August, and Aguinaldo seemed instinctively to feel that they were the Filipinos whom he should put forward for negotiations with the Americans following the events of that day. There can be very little doubt that, with the exception of a very few conspicuous sycophants and hirelings of the Spaniards, this class of Filipinos were quite as glad to see the downfall of Spain written upon the wall as were their brothers who had taken a more decided position and had striven to bring about that downfall. Those who were simply waiting to see how events would turn, and then to cast their fortunes on the winning side, were only too numerous, both in Manila and in the provinces. But there was a handful of men who, besides having property interests at stake, held very decided opinions both as to the fitness of the masses for independence and of their self-appointed leaders to guide them, and who, furthermore, even had they felt satisfied on these points, were sufficiently well posted on international politics to predict failure for any attempt at that juncture to establish an independent government in the Philippines. The fact that these men were now willing to associate themselves to some degree with the Aguinaldo organization is testimony to the great importance which that organization had already assumed among the people, at least of Luzon; quite as much as that, it is also evidence that Aguinaldo himself felt that it was important to have these men nominally if not actively identified with his cause.¹ In September, the place of Secretary of

¹ General (then Major) J. F. Bell, who had been among the Filipinos a great deal before August 13, in a special report to General Merritt (*Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 381), remarked upon the efforts of Aguinaldo to ally with himself prominent and wealthy Filipinos, as early as August 29.

Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet, which had been left open until some one with prestige could be named for it, had been bestowed upon Cayetano S. Arellano, generally recognized as the Filipino of most solid legal attainments and a man respected by all, Spaniards as well as Filipinos. Judge Arellano, who had been named by the Spaniards a member of the "Consultative Assembly," and had for three months been eagerly sought also by the Cavite organizers, had held himself rigidly aloof from affairs until the fall of Manila somewhat cleared the situation. He had, however, in private letters urged upon the Filipinos the desirability of securing definitely the aid and protection of the United States for whatever should be the future government. This idea was actively pressed upon Aguinaldo by Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, himself the nephew of a prominent *déporté* of 1872, a physician and a man of attainments in Oriental linguistics and in the bibliography of the Philippines, and who, after long residence in Paris and Spain, returned to Manila a few years before the war between Spain and the United States. Aguinaldo conferred upon him the nomination of Director of Diplomacy in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Gregorio Araneta, a prominent young lawyer of Manila, of Bisayan birth, also of the conservative party, was made Secretary of Justice, and Benito Legarda, a wealthy half-caste business man of the capital, was named Director of Agriculture, Commerce, etc. Aguinaldo's military associates, Baldomero Aguinaldo and Mariano Trias, retained respectively the posts of Secretary of War and Secretary of the Treasury, while Felipe Buencamino was for a time head of the Bureau of Public Works. The membership of the Cabinet shifted so often that it was afterward difficult at times to say just who was who or what. The main thing to note is that the more characteristic conservatives remained but a short time in it. In the background was always Mabini; and, though Aguinaldo listened with deference and with every evidence of agreement to the counsel of the men whose names he was glad

to make ostentatious display of, they soon discovered that he was really giving his ear to some one else. The project of addressing to the United States Government a manifesto asking the establishment of a protectorate on lines mutually acceptable was the chief aim of the conservatives. Aguinaldo gave his verbal assent, and ostensibly the foreign policy of the Government was to be directed to that end; in fact, it seems to have been so decided by a formal vote of the Cabinet; but the representatives who had been empowered to speak for the Malolos Government in Paris and London and those sent to the United States were not instructed along those lines. "Ask for the recognition of our independence," was their word from Mabini; and to the conservatives at home, Mabini, though at the outset not holding any official position at all, claimed that he thought it would be more dignified to wait for the United States to propose the idea of a protectorate. At the beginning of November, the distinctive conservatives virtually dropped their connection with the Malolos Government, though they did not all formally renounce their relationship with it until late in December. Whatever connection these gentlemen maintained with the Malolos organization from November to February following was for the purpose of exerting their influence for peace, and, in some cases at least, this connection was maintained at the express request of General Otis.¹ The atti-

¹ See *Otis's Report, 1899*, for his statements about how he kept in touch with all that was going on at Malolos. The fact that these conservatives were so decidedly favorable to a peaceful arrangement with the United States, and that it was only this class of men with whom General Otis came in contact, seems to explain in large part his remarkable optimism, lasting almost up to the outbreak of hostilities; he appears to have taken it for granted that the conservatives were going to control. Señor Arellano has been, since 1899, the Chief Justice of the Philippine Court; Señor Araneta was one of its members under the military government, and is now Solicitor-General; Señores Pardo de Tavera and Legarda were members of the Taft Philippine Commission. Felipe Buencamino is authority for the statement that Arellano wrote him in June, 1898, from the province of Laguna, whither he had retired and where he remained until after the fall of Manila, presenting the idea of union with the United States, and saying: "Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws." That remained consistently the political creed of this able jurist,

tude of the conservatives has been stated by one of them as follows:—

As soon as it seemed highly probable that the sovereignty of Spain in this archipelago would be transferred to America . . . the idea occurred to certain of the wealthy and educated residents of this capital and of some adjoining provinces of immediately accepting the new sovereignty. As the absolute independence of the country was impossible, owing to its peculiar conditions and those of its inhabitants, on account of its situation and of the dangers to which it was exposed by the conflicting interests of the foreign powers and the ulterior designs which they might have upon any or all of the islands, these people thought that this was the best thing that could be done.¹

Against this class of men, ordinarily of the greatest prestige and influence among their people, there was arrayed the paralytic young ex-law clerk Mabini, firm in his ideal of racial unity and independence, and becoming more and more bitter toward the Americans every day that it seemed more likely they would stand in the way of the realization of his dream; while behind him — yet for the most part not really in sympathy with his intellectual aims — were the military chiefs and

who, Governor Taft has repeatedly stated, would honor the highest bench of any country. For testimony on these points, especially regarding the effort of the conservatives in September and October of 1898 to address to the United States an appeal for a protectorate, see exhibits B and C of *MacArthur's Report of 1901* (*Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 4, pp. 117, 120); *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. II, pp. 390-92 (Dr. Tavera's testimony); and *Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 504. The last citation is from the testimony at Paris of General Whittier, who stated that he had a personal interview with Aguinaldo at Malolos on October 25, when the latter said "that his people were divided into two parties — those in favor of absolute independence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that he is waiting to see who will have the majority; in that case to take his position." Dr. Tavera, testifying in August, 1899, gave it as his opinion that Aguinaldo merely pretended to accept the conciliatory policy in the early fall of 1898 and that he identified the conservatives with him to "keep them from forming a party." In exhibit B of *MacArthur's Report*, Buencamino says that the plan of a protectorate was adopted in the Cabinet meeting, but that at the same time the youthful propagandist, Teodoro Sandiko, came to Aguinaldo from Manila and assured him that the Japanese consul had told him his country would help the Filipinos to their independence, and thereupon independence stock once more rose in the Malolos market.

¹ See exhibit C (statement of Florentino Torres, of *MacArthur's Report*), cited in preceding note.

x civilian place-hunters, now occupying positions of greater power, prestige, and gain than ever before, or than they might expect to hold in any stable society, and having no desire to relinquish these benefits. There was a large number of moderately educated men, especially in the provinces, who, from former association with the Filipino propaganda of reform, or from having been made to suffer recently at the hand of Spain, or from a natural sympathy of race, were inclined to go with the Malolos Government in anything it might do; if reached, these men might readily fall in with the position of the outspoken conservatives, especially after the Malolos military organization began to commit abuses in their localities, but otherwise they would accept the decision of their compatriots at the center of affairs, whether for independence, a protectorate, or even quite complete American control. As for the great majority of the people, they, as always, awaited the word from above; it was to be taken into account, however, even though their *initiative* in this or any other matter is completely out of the question, that the stories they had heard about the Americans, first from the Spaniards and now from the military Filipinos, made them quite ready to regard the newcomers as a scourge to be averted if possible.

It is less important to make a detailed study of just what were the ideals of government of certain Filipinos, as revealed in the constitution and decrees of Mabini and the constitution as modified in some degree by the Assembly, than it is to compare these pretensions as to what government should be with the practical workings of the institutions which the Filipinos called into being. Of course, it is easy to be unfair to them in doing so; it was a time of war and social disturbance, and the government they put in operation can in no sense be considered to have had a fair trial. On the other hand, we have, for these present purposes, to deal with facts, not with written proclamations, and it is also to be borne in mind that the theoretical constitutions of men like Mabini do not by any means

indicate what sort of government the Filipinos would conduct for themselves if they had a fair start and were working under normal conditions. Even with all allowance for the unsettled state of affairs in 1898 and 1899, there are certain discrepancies between the principles of the revolution as proclaimed at Bakoor and Malolos and the actual operations of its various branches which we cannot overlook.¹

First, we have to note that the strict separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, proclaimed both in the Mabini and Malolos instruments in various ways, was a thesis merely. It was not only infringed by various provisions for expanded powers of the executive that were written into these constitutions themselves, but was virtually rendered null and void by the operations of the clique of men who directed the Government and who could base almost any assumption of power by the executive upon the reading of some of the vague "provisional clauses" of the constitution. Mabini and the others, who, to a lesser degree, dabbled in constitutional writing, were not at all familiar with the history of parliamentary and constitutional government in those countries wherein in modern times such government had been originated and carried through to success. Their model was Spain and the Spanish-American countries, and the direct connection of the Filipino constitution with those of Spanish or semi-Spanish institutions, particularly with those of the Argentine Republic and Mexico, may be easily traced. Part of the preamble to the Constitution of the United States was copied literally; but in the main such influence as that constitution had upon the Malolos document is seen in provisions which came to the latter filtered through the constitutions of Spanish-American

¹ As the Malolos Constitution has been widely circulated in *Rept. Phil. Comm.*, 1900 (vol. I, exhibit IV), and in *Sen. Doc. 208* (part I, p. 207 *et seq.*), and as this document was so largely based upon the draft made by Mabini, it has been thought unnecessary to make either of these documents a part of this volume. The Spanish text of the Malolos Constitution may be found in the official editions issued from the Barasoain press in 1899, under the title *Constitución política de la República Filipina*.

republics. Mabini provided for the election of the President of the Republic by delegates, or electors, of the provinces, themselves chosen by delegates from the municipalities, as in Mexico; at Malolos, this was altered so as to provide for the election of the President by the Assembly itself — thus violating at the very outset the principle of mutual independence of the three branches of the government. He had a four-year term, and Mabini gave him an absolute veto, which the Malolos Assembly provided might be overruled by a two-thirds vote. Whereas Mabini conferred upon the Assembly the specific powers ordinarily considered vital to parliamentary government, discussion at Malolos and the growing demand for executive control caused these powers to be sadly curtailed, and they appeared only in a modified form, and negatively, as prohibitions upon the power of the executive to negotiate treaties, alienate territory, etc., except after the consent of the Assembly.¹

The qualifications, manner of election, and number of members of the Assembly were not prescribed in the constitution, but left to a special law, which had been passed upon the lines laid down by Mabini in his draft. As for qualifications, aside from that of being twenty-five years of age or more, there were only certain general stipulations that the men chosen must be fit and worthy, of which the most specific was a property qualification (itself indefinite), to the effect that every representative must possess a "steady income assuring him a decorous and independent life." Plainly, the provision of Mabini that, after the census had been taken, there should be one representative for each 25,000 people (though not

¹ One of the instances of the failure of the Filipino authorities to preserve the separation of the powers of government (or, more probably, really to comprehend what was so repeatedly proclaimed as a principle of their government) is seen in Aguinaldo's instructions to the President of the Assembly on November 16, 1898, that he should report weekly all members absent and the excuses given for absence. (See brief of same, p. 42 of the compilation of insurgent documents by J. R. M. Taylor entitled *Report on the Organization of Civil Government by Emilio Aguinaldo and his Followers*, which will be cited hereafter as *Taylor's Rept.*)

more than five to any one province) would require men of property; the taxing capacity of the Filipino people would make a congress of 250 men a heavy burden. The idea of a permanent committee of the legislature to sit during its recesses and see that the government is not looted by the executive (that seems to be its chief end) was copied from the legislative schemes of Spain and the Spanish-American countries. Though it was provided that no national debt should be incurred without the consent of the Assembly, and that this body should also fix the size of the army, nevertheless the provision whereby it should pass on the budget annually presented by the executive might easily warrant the incurring of expenditures by the executive which the legislature would be compelled to pay; the initiative in this respect lay with the executive, not with the legislature. In providing for the right of the members of the Cabinet to appear on the floor of the Assembly and take part in the discussion, yet requiring them to withdraw before the vote, there was some confusion of ideas as to the separation of powers; apparently, the Filipinos halted between a plan of responsible cabinet government and that of which the United States is the principal example, as when they proclaimed their government to be "popular, representative, alternative, and responsible."

Again, such a provision as that giving the President power to "see that in the entire territory speedy and complete justice shall be administered" was open to all sorts of possibilities for interference, not merely with local governments, but also with the judiciary. As a matter of fact, the new Government never came to possess a real judiciary, and therein lay perhaps its chief defect, considering the opportunity which its quasi-military tribunals afforded for abuses. No provision was made for courts in the constitution, except that inferentially there was to be a supreme court; its organization and that of all subordinate courts was left to the Assembly to provide by laws, except that the Chief-Justice and Attorney-General were

to be nominated by the Assembly "with the concurrence of the President and his Cabinet," and it was asserted that these judicial officers should have "absolute independence of the executive and legislative powers." Mabini's constitution had provided an elaborate system of courts, from the supreme court to the justices of peace, including district *audiencias* and provincial courts. In spite of the oft-declared separation of the branches of government, the courts were, according to him, to "see to the execution of their judgments." Yet they were strictly limited to the application of the particular law to the particular case; there was, in repeated ways, the appearance of the Spanish idea of hedging about the discretion of the judge, who becomes, under that system, a sort of refined automaton for the application of the hair-fine distinctions of a literal code to the adjudication of a specific right or the pre-measured punishment of a criminal. Evidently having the abuses of the Spanish summary courts in mind, Mabini strove to throw about the individual the safeguards of such a bulwark as the writ of *habeas corpus*; not knowing what that procedure was, he but stabbed after it with his pen in the dark. At Malolos they followed him in providing that every man arrested must be arraigned within twenty-four hours, and must be committed for trial or released within seventy-two hours;¹ but no penalty was ever provided for the violation of this guaranty, nor was any specific procedure provided as the remedy for such violation. Similarly, with the declarations as to the inviolability of domicile and other individual rights; and Mabini's very definitely worded prohibition of the confiscation of property, except by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, was not closely copied in the Constitution of Malolos, which would appear to have left the door open for the embargo and enjoyment of the income of private property, if not actually for its confiscation. Nor was Mabini followed in his prohibition upon the entail of property (in line

¹ The full benefits of this guaranty were, however, accorded only to Filipinos.

with his idea of a republic which should eventually place all men upon an equality), nor in his prohibition of the pain of death, except for military insubordination in the face of the enemy, nor in his other rather vague efforts to do away with the abuses of military courts. For, in the mean time, military courts and the courts of civilians which might virtually be called military courts were in full operation under the provisional decrees of Aguinaldo, and these courts furnished what administration of justice there was in most of the provinces for a long time—except directly under the sword of the district commander of the Filipino army. The decrees of June gave the municipal and provincial executive officers jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, which were to be conducted for the time being under the existing Spanish codes: in criminal cases, the municipal chief was to conduct the preliminary examination and remit prisoners for trial to the provincial board of four members; in civil cases, the municipal councils of four members were to sit as a court of first instance, and their decisions went on appeal to the provincial board; in both civil and criminal cases, there was appeal to a permanent committee of nine members of the Assembly of the central government. As legal attainments were not specifically required for any of these offices, it may be supposed that such a system, even though temporary, left a very large opening for all sorts of abuses. Yet a distrust of courts and of judges, born of years of experience under the thoroughly corrupt Spanish judicial system in the islands, had spoken in a dozen generally worded safeguards of Mabini's, and had appeared in the final constitution as Article 81: "Any citizen can institute a public prosecution against any of the members of the judicial power for the crimes they may commit in the exercise of their office." It is quite common in Spanish-American countries for local executive officers to possess also the powers of a sort of police judge; but here the entire judicial power, both in civil and criminal matters, was turned over to the executive and legis-

lative branches of government. Perhaps it is even fortunate that the events which brought one war upon the heels of another in the Philippine provinces prevented this civil jurisdiction from being exercised. And even before the second war brought the excuse for the proclamation of martial law, the military power was almost invariably supreme in the provinces, as well in judicial matters as in executive. Aguinaldo's decree of June 23 had devoted a whole chapter to "Military Courts and Procedure," wherein, in place of the strict prohibition on the trial of civilians by military courts which Mabini was reserving for the future, the clauses as to what constituted military offenses, not only in their definition of what constituted spies, but also in their inclusion of those who committed robbery or arson, opened the way for the military commanders most thoroughly to police the country and impose their ideas of law through the military courts. And under the existence of martial law, of course, Mabini's guaranties of individual rights were relegated to the distant future.

Following Mabini, the Malolos Constitution guaranteed the rights of petition and association and of freedom of speech and of the press, but it omitted Mabini's clause "without previous censure" in affirming the liberty of the press, which was somewhat significant, even had not all these rights been suspended throughout the whole period of the revolution.¹ If the guar-

¹ It has already been shown that the first periodical of the revolution was suppressed because not under the immediate control of the authorities at Bakoor. On July 4, 1898, Aguinaldo had issued a decree establishing *El Heraldo de la Revolución* (afterward *Gaceta de Filipinas*) as the official organ of the Revolutionary Government, and providing further that "while the abnormal circumstances of war continue, every kind of publication is prohibited unless licensed by the Government." (See *Disposiciones del Gobierno Revolucionario de Filipinas*, pp. 55-56; this pamphlet was the first document issued by the press just established at Bakoor, which was later transferred to Barasoain, near Malolos.) Mabini's idea had been that each provincial government should as soon as possible publish a newspaper in the local dialect, in order to enlighten and instruct the masses. Such periodicals were later on started in Batangas, Camarines, and perhaps in one or two other provinces; but they had a brief existence, and were not altogether encouraged by the Filipino military authorities. The official gazette above mentioned continued in existence until the collapse of the insurgent organization at Tarlak, and during

anties of individual rights which only a well-organized and respected judiciary could assure were nullified by the absorption of judicial power into the executive, it was hardly to be expected that such liberties as depended largely or wholly upon a subordination by the executive of its own powers to the interests of individual freedom would be more carefully preserved. The theoretical scheme of government which the Filipinos put forth did not back its elaborate protestations and assertions of individual rights by any specific safeguards and forms of procedure designed to secure what was so generously promised; but we might waive all questions of their theory of government, if we found that actually, regardless of forms employed, their local institutions assured to the people of the provinces and of the municipalities the security from abuse and the actual freedom of life which it was the announced aim of the revolution against Spain to achieve. It is more important to know what was the actual state of affairs in the provinces between the time of the overthrow of Spain's authority and that of the appearance of the American army than to analyze the Constitution of Malolos or the manifestoes of Mabini. It was in local government that Spain had started to make reforms, had achieved so little, and had left the people so generally dissatisfied and restless. We should expect a Filipino government to set to work at once to remedy the defects of the municipal and provincial régime, which touched the masses of the people in their daily life, whereas the central Government was far-removed and virtually non-existent to most of them. What did the Filipino reformers of Bakoor and Malolos actually do?

the time from September, 1898, to November, 1899, several dailies openly or secretly allied with the insurrection were printed at Manila and at the various insurgent capitals, the one of most note and of longest life being *La Independencia*. They were more properly newspapers than the official gazette, but were scarcely under less close control of the authorities. Though *La Independencia* was for a time the mouthpiece of General Luna, it never ventured to speak freely the criticisms on Aguinaldo's party which Luna made in private.

First, they made the entire scheme of local government, clear down to the outlying *barrios* of the towns, center in themselves, just as it had previously centered in the governor-general. One might wonder why there should be in the Cabinet a Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, when there was already a Department of the Interior; but it speedily appears that the Department of the Interior was the clearing-house of governmental operations in the provinces and municipalities, and that "intervention of the Government" in the affairs of these local entities was provided for in the constitution, exactly as it was under the Spanish Directorate of Civil Administration. The old Spanish system of municipal and provincial organization was also retained; and the few modifications made in it by the decrees of June 18 and 20 were never actually carried into effect in the towns. Even where some opportunity for local initiative was left to the local officials, they did not improve it. It was enjoined upon the municipal councils, for instance, that they must give especial attention to keeping up and improving the schools, and the Malolos Constitution made education "obligatory and gratuitous"; but it was not a time of devotion to matters of education, and, while there were schools in most of the towns, at least until active fighting came near at hand, the curriculum and the methods continued to be the same as before, and the teachers had either no pay at all or the same wretched pay as ever, and resorted to the usual methods of squeezing it out of the pupils in fees, to living in the schoolhouse or renting part of it, and so on.¹

In the matter of the suffrage, the new Filipino Government

¹ Mabini had, as had most of the revolutionists of the intellectual type, great dreams of future educational reforms. Under his provisional constitution, private schools were to be allowed to flourish, but the Government should also adopt a complete system, comprising a primary school in each town and large *barrio*, a "college" (Spanish secondary school) in each province, and a university in Manila. Tagalog was to be the official language of instruction, but English and French (not Spanish) should be taught in the secondary schools, and when the knowledge of English became sufficiently common, it should be the official language.

was no more generous, if always as generous, with the people whom it was supposed to represent as the Spanish Government had been. The *principalía* of each town had included those families in which village offices had been virtually hereditary, and had in 1893 been extended to include also the principal taxpayers; this local aristocracy really comprised, as a rule, all the Filipinos of education or property, and the chief defect of the system lay in that it did not impose the test along those lines, and thus use the franchise as a stimulus to advancement (something of little consequence, however, in the Spanish system, since the voters exercised no real influence in local affairs, and government was a thing from above or was at the dictation of the friar curate). The Aguinaldo decree of June 18 provided that the local officers should be elected by a gathering of the "citizens most distinguished for their education, social position, and honorable conduct," provided they were twenty-one years old and were "lovers of Philippine independence." This was a new way of perpetuating the *principalía*, though it might, reasonably interpreted, have opened the way for the exercise of the suffrage by those members of the new middle class who had in some places begun to rise from the ranks by virtue of possessing a degree of education. Such a loose clause, however, left it in the power of the election authorities to admit or exclude whom they pleased, especially in view of the test of loyalty to the revolutionary government which was implied in the phrase "lovers of Philippine independence."¹ And it is a matter of fact that the elections were

¹ Mabini apparently planned for a broader basis of suffrage when conditions should be more favorable; but that might wait, as his entire provisional constitution waited, till the country was "prepared" by the revolutionary government "to be a true republic." The clauses were, however, drawn loosely, as were nearly all of Mabini's, and might have been so interpreted as to restrict the suffrage very closely; moreover, it is noticeable that he always put forth rather vague educational and property qualifications for the holding of office. In the new municipal law which Mabini later drew in more definite form, and which was not passed because of the outbreak of war, the lines were drawn more definitely in favor of both education and property as qualifications not only for holding office but also for voting. The significant thing is that the man who was perhaps

managed as the authorities at Bakoor or Malolos had previously dictated; in those places where there was reason to fear that this would not be so easy, Aguinaldo's military representatives, almost invariably Tagalogs, simply took charge and ran the civil organization, unless it was disposed to be amicable and acknowledge their authority. From Bakoor, and later from Malolos, Aguinaldo sent out commissioners to organize the towns of each province, and municipal elections were held under the control of these men, while provincial elections were either so held or the electors were gathered at the Filipino capital itself to choose their officers under the eye of authority. In all cases, no civil officer could assume his functions until his election had been formally accepted and promulgated by Aguinaldo. There is plenty of evidence that the elections so held no more expressed the free choice of the people interested than did those which had previously been subject to the dictation of the Spanish friar or the Spanish provincial governor.¹

inclined to be most liberal about Filipino suffrage should have recognized the necessity for its limitation to the comparatively few. And still he proposed in his constitution that the chief executive officers of both towns and provinces should not be chosen by vote, but be nominated by the President from lists prepared by the local councils.

¹ *Taylor's Rept.* says (pp. 11-13): "The commissioner of elections was appointed by Aguinaldo, usually from the military commanders in the province where the election was to be held. . . . It is evident that the commissioner appointed to supervise really chose the municipal authorities; a limited group of adherents confirmed his selection. . . . Men who had been on friendly terms with the Spaniards were usually excluded from all participation. . . . Aguinaldo usually approved the decision of his representative. One case of informality which led to his disapproval of the election was that the *presidente* who had been certified to him as elected was reported to have been on good terms with the Spanish authorities of the town. . . . The number of electors evidently depended upon the will of the commissioner appointed to hold the election. . . . In the town of Lipa, Batangas, with a population of 40,733, at the election held July 3, 1898, a *presidente* was chosen for the town; 25 votes were cast for him. On November 23, 1898, at an election held at Bigan, Ilokos Sur, for *presidente*, to succeed one who had been elected representative in Congress, 116 votes were cast; the population of Bigan is 16,000. October 5, 1898, at an election held at Gamu, Isabela province, 72 votes elected a *presidente*; the population of Gamu is 6101. October 7, 1898, at Echague, Isabela province, a *presidente* was elected for whom 54 votes were cast; the population is 5400. October 2, 1898, at Kabagan Nuevo, Isabela, 111 men voted out of a population of 6240. . . . The town of San José, Batangas, protested

With a few changes of the names of officers, the system of municipal and provincial government was merely a continuation of that already in existence, conforming to the Maura law of 1893. The only new features in local administration to be borne in mind are that, in the towns, the police or quasi-military control which had formerly been in the hands of Spaniards was now in those of Filipino military chiefs or of the local officials themselves, and that the superior authorities of the provinces, who had the same close supervision over the towns as of old, were now Filipinos instead of Spaniards. The friar was gone, or was a prisoner in his former place of power, and this, to be sure, was in some respects the greatest change

unavailingly to Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 P.M. in a storm of rain being considered valid." On August 9, 1898, the local *presidentes* of Panganga province had been assembled under Aguinaldo's eye at Bakoor to vote for the four members of the provincial government; and, on the very day that Manila fell, one of Aguinaldo's commissioners and Cavite friends was conducting at Old Cavite a similar election for Bataan province. In December, 1898, over forty presidents of towns in the Bikol province of Camarines, in southern Luzon, were summoned all the way to Malolos to select their provincial officials. Similarly, in the case of Pangasinan, a province of northern Luzon, of doubtful loyalty to Aguinaldo, in the preceding September; for the form of the act of this election and Aguinaldo's approval, as well as a similar document in the case of a municipal election in Batangas, see *ibid.*, pp. 34-37. Immediately thereafter (pp. 37-51) follow briefs of various decrees and executive orders of the Revolutionary Government. Among them is one of August 10, 1898, wherein, at the time of the departure of a military expedition for the provinces of the Kagayan Valley, under the command of Aguinaldo's associate, Daniel Tirona, the latter is endowed with all the powers possessed by the President with reference to the appointment of commissioners and approval of elections in northern Luzon. The central Government used its power of "intervention" in the local governments: we find, for instance, that permission to open a drug-store in one of the Cavite towns was passed upon by the Secretary of the Interior; we find decrees of Aguinaldo permitting the annexation of new *barrios* to towns or of towns to provinces to which they had not formerly belonged (one, allowing a town in Tayabas to be renamed "Aguinaldo"; another, declining the petition of the people of Paete, Laguna, to rename their town "Rizal"); we find orders of the Secretary of the Interior to the provincial governors to check abuses of authority being committed in their towns, and a reminder of Spanish rule in the prohibition of the use of corporal punishment by local officials; similar orders for the inspection of municipal accounts to prevent embezzlement; and, just before the outbreak of war with the United States, an order from this source that the towns be cleaned up and better police measures be taken, as it is desired to show strangers "that the Filipinos know what is customary among civilized people."

wrought by the new régime ; but his successor in the pulpit, the once despised native coadjutor, usually sought to exercise the same control over local affairs as had his Spanish predecessor, and, where the municipal chief was a man of force enough to resist his control, there was commonly a continual clash between the two. This contest, where the civil officers were not disposed to be mere puppets, was made three-sided by the pretensions of the military chiefs of the provinces and of their subordinates to the exercise of powers over the people in all sorts of ways. Between them all, it is a question if ever before the humble Filipino had had so much bossing.

CHAPTER VIII

DRIFTING INTO DISAGREEMENT

SPAIN had, as we have seen, employed her taxing powers in the Philippine Archipelago so as to create monopolies or favors for herself and her own citizens; so as to bear unduly upon the masses, thus tending to stifle ambition; so as to put a handicap upon new industries and economic progress generally, thus limiting the opportunities for the individual to rise; and so as to restrict, if not wholly prevent, local improvement and initiative, through the absorption by the central Government of practically all the products of taxation. Here, then, there lay open to the public economist so many opportunities for reform as to embarrass his decision upon a comprehensive system which should do more toward achieving the professed aim of the revolutionists than the best constitution ever written, by giving them economic freedom, the most real freedom there is. It is hard to find any evidence, however, that there was embarrassment in this particular way at Bakoor or Malolos. Mabini had but a dim comprehension of the most simple principles of public economy, and his thinking was wholly in another line; to him, reform was merely a political charter. Those Filipinos who had some definite ideas as to faults in the Spanish economic system were not in power. Doubtless in time, had the insurgent organization survived, the system of taxation would have been changed, perhaps improved, and at any rate it is quite sure that the more unpopular imposts would have been abolished or reduced. All we know is that, so long as it did rule, its first thought was for the products of taxation, and not for the forms in which it should be laid; hence, there was a disposition not to let go any of the imposts that had produced money for Spain, and there was no little ingenu-

ity displayed in obtaining new and additional war taxes without going on record as creating a new form of impost. Nor was the hold of the central Government relaxed; it continued to control the financial administration clear down to the last *barrio*. The municipalities had the same sorry privilege as under Spain of levying and collecting for their own use what they could obtain from market and fishery licenses, fees for registering cattle, etc. All money collected under the general levies must be reported quarterly to the provincial board, and only so much of it was to be left in the town as was immediately needed for current expenses. The provincial officers must send all surpluses to the central Government, which exercised through its control of the local budgets the right of deciding just how much should be spent in every town.¹ The new Government had sustained at the outset the loss of the customs revenues of Spain; Manila, where much the greater part of the foreign trade was carried on, remained in the hands of the Spaniards, and the Filipinos succeeded the Spaniards in the possession of Iloilo and Sebú only for a little while, and when conditions forbade trade. They recouped themselves in some of the hemp and tobacco ports they held by imposing a ten per cent *ad valorem* tax on exports from the provinces to Manila, and in one form or another they continued to make the hemp crop pay money to their or-

¹ This system was perpetuated in the Constitution of Malolos, which virtually turned the entire control of the fiscal policy and administration into the hands of the central executive. Mabini clung to the same idea of central control of all the funds of government; in his constitution, he provided that one third of the money collected in the towns should go to the provincial treasury and two thirds to the central Government. That the insurgent organization should at first have continued the system already prevailing, and should have sought to draw from the towns all the funds possible, was not strange, especially as some of the Spanish sources of revenue were now cut off; but the constitutions of Mabini and of Malolos expressed the ideas of their makers as to what the Government ought to be in the future, and in them one discovers no evidence of a comprehension of where Spain had most seriously crippled internal improvement. In the budget for 1899, proclaimed by Aguinaldo without the intervention of Congress, the towns were allowed, as a means of replacing the former revenues from cock-fights and gambling games, to tax all meat sold one cent per pound.

ganization for a long time after this organization had really ceased to exist. But these were all really special war levies rather than evidences of Filipino ideas upon methods of taxation.¹ Spain's other chief source of revenue, the *cédula* tax, which produced more than the customs, was retained; its unpopularity with the Tagalog masses led to its being reduced at first to a peseta (twenty cents Mexican) per quarter, it being assessed only against males over eighteen years of age, but it was restored in February, 1899, as a war tax, called a "certificate of citizenship," but in reality imposed according to the old Spanish regulations.² It could not, however, even if well enforced, produce so much as formerly, owing particularly to the loss of the collections from the Chinese and others in Manila who paid higher rates for *cédulas*.³ So

¹ Mabini's ideas on taxation, as revealed in his provisional constitution, are interesting: "Care will be taken to make the contributions direct and very easily borne." . . . Office-holders are to be exempt from all forms of taxation [not so confusing a provision as it might seem, as Mabini had in mind taxes assessed directly upon persons rather than upon possessions]. . . . He would have a sort of income-tax, levied upon those who receive "an annual income more than covering the necessities of a comfortable existence." . . . The urban tax was the only real-property tax he had in mind, and that was a tax on rents, not on value, of real estate. . . . There is much unconscious humor, therefore, in his reiteration of a belief in direct taxation, especially when he also says as to customs duties: "Recourse will be had to indirect taxation only to protect the industries of the country, or when the burden it imposes is compensated by some benefit, or, at most, to restrain undue luxury." After thus curtailing, as he apparently supposed, the opportunities for unduly expanding the Philippine tariff system, he naïvely provides: "So also the rates of duty will be fixed with regard to the tariffs established in the neighboring ports and in the greater part of the other nations of the world."

² The old division of the population into eight classes was retained, but the basis was made the ownership of real or personal property, not occupation: those "owning, controlling, or managing a capital in money or property" of over \$25,000 were to pay \$100 a year; so on, down to \$1000 capital; the sixth and seventh classes, the most numerous, being those over eighteen years of age, without property to the value of \$1000, paid, as under Spain, the males \$2 and the females \$1.

³ Methods were not lacking, however, for making the Chinese who came under the jurisdiction of the Filipino Government in the provinces pay at least their full share. In authorizing the appointment of *Capitanes de Sangleyes* ("Captains of the Chinese," local officers who, under the Spanish régime, were invested with authority not only to collect the registration fees, but also to enforce certain police and hygienic regulations among their countrymen) on October 20, 1898,

also the old Spanish system of forced labor was retained; this was perhaps because of the exigencies of a time of war, but at any rate it was true that the humble Filipino had, in losing his Spanish masters, retained the same Filipino masters in the village caciques, whose power was unchecked, and had acquired new military masters of his own race. The local chiefs were already skilled in using him as their personal "fag," and they now found no interference with their enjoyment of this privilege from higher Spanish officials; if the public got any greater benefits than formerly out of the use of the labor thus embargoed in its name, there remained no evidence that this was so.¹

The new Government voluntarily deprived itself of what revenues it might have secured for the central treasury by the

Aguinaldo stated that for the time being they would have no power but that of collecting taxes from their fellows. See the brief of decrees, etc., already cited, in *Taylor's Rept.*

¹ In consequence of the pressure of those Filipinos still remaining at Malolos who had some comprehension of the fact that, if their reform did not begin with the masses, it was no reform at all, Aguinaldo issued a decree on January 5, 1899, abolishing the old fifteen-day tax of forced labor, and proclaiming that henceforth the Government would pay wages for all the services rendered to it and all the citizens would be treated alike. (It is supposed, also, that the fact that the Americans at Manila and Cavite had from the first paid regularly, by the day or week, high wages to their Filipino employees, had something to do with the issuance of this decree.) But this remained a dead-letter; it was bound to be so, in view of the inveterate caciquism of the Philippines (which virtually makes whole populations the peons of certain families), unless the central Government was able to enforce it, and took stern measures to do so, and the central Government winked at the violations of the decree. Indeed, on March 21, Aguinaldo, in response to queries from the provinces, decreed that the revenue deficiencies produced by the abolition of forced labor should be covered by the work of men who had not paid their registration tax, and, if necessary, the people might be exhorted, on patriotic grounds, to "work for the public good." On April 17, it was specifically provided that those who had not paid the personal contribution could be forced to work; but one familiar with Philippine conditions will understand that the loophole left by the decree of March 21 was quite sufficient to insure the continuance of the old abuse. The April 17 decree hints that the Spanish methods of 1897 were being copied by the new Filipino authorities, in so far at least as concerns the charging for military passes from town to town. Again, on June 9, 1899, we find Aguinaldo instructing his provincial officers to secure donations of horses and carts for the army, exempting those who donate them from "carrying baggage and doing other personal services" for the army. (See *Taylor's Rept.* for these decrees.)

continuance of the old Spanish system of selling monopolistic privileges for conducting cockpits, lotteries and other gambling games ; but it is to be feared that its subordinate provincial and municipal officers not infrequently found it convenient to convert revenue from these sources, in a more irregular manner, to their own pockets.¹ The Spanish tax on the rental value of town property, the nearest approach there had been to a tax on real property, was retained, but it had never been productive of much revenue outside of Manila. It was in connection with their efforts to expand the revenue by special war taxes that the revolutionists made their only approach to basing their impositions on real property. Mabini's idea for an assessment of one per cent on all real property, land as well as buildings, for the purpose of securing registration in the land records, now in possession of the Filipino provincial governments, was expressed in a decree of November 7. How far, with the continuance of their rule, the revolutionists would have gone on from this step to institute a real-estate tax, it is impossible to say, as this provision was apparently designed for employment only on the single occasion and for the emergency. The issuance of Government bonds seemed to offer a more easy way of raising money from the provincial Filipinos who possessed much property ; where these bonds were not subscribed with real or feigned willing-

¹ Mabini provided in his constitution that lotteries, raffles, gambling licenses, and the cockpit monopolies should be "in the future only sad reminders of the Spanish Government," though cock-fights could still be held on one Sunday of each month and on civil holidays. Part of this provision was incorporated into the Aguinaldo decree of June 20. But deep-rooted customs, however good or bad, are not thus easily wiped out, and cock-fighting and card-gaming were interfered with only by the operations of war and the depletion of the gamblers' pocketbooks. Cock-fighting had, indeed, been absolutely prohibited, along with card games for money, in a decree of Aguinaldo on August 16, 1898 ; the repetition of these provisions on March 24, 1899, is some indication of how far they were obeyed. The idea that Mabini had in mind, namely, that for such diversions there be substituted athletic exercises and village fairs, was a most salutary one ; but such reforms, these Filipinos were to learn, do not come by prohibitive laws. The opium monopoly was retained, in a modified form, for the purpose of getting revenue from the Chinese.

ness, there was no great hesitancy about applying virtual coercion. "Loans" and "donations," with informal promises to repay when the financial affairs of the new Government should be in better shape, were also resorted to, as was the seizure of property, mostly that of the religious orders and of Spaniards, but sometimes of Filipinos not considered properly zealous for the cause. A great many of the latter were in Manila, and there can be no doubt that much of the money raised from them, especially in 1899 and thereafter, was virtually a sort of blackmail; even assuming that the majority of them were desirous of doing something to assist the revolutionary campaign, it is quite certain that the size of their contributions was, in very many, if not most cases, dictated by an anxiety to protect their property interests in the provinces, and later on even by fear for their own persons. On a par with the compulsory subscriptions to bonds was the organization of coöperative companies with high-sounding names, every "good Filipino" being supposed to take stock in them.¹

¹ *Taylor's Rept.* contains the only important data thus far published regarding the sources of revenue of the Revolutionary Government (see pp. 15-19, 56-101; also the briefs of decrees, 37-51); and these data are very incomplete. They show that the revolutionary central Government should have received, from May 31, 1898, to September 1, 1899, 2,586,733.48 pesos; but there is discrepancy between this sum and the actual receipts, as recorded in the final ledgers, of some 530,000 pesos, while over 700,000 pesos are not traceable, in the accounts available, to any particular province. Of the money traceable to provinces, it is significant that, except for Samar and Leite (where tribute was laid on the exports of hemp), which contributed about 200,000 pesos, practically all the rest came from Luzon, particularly from the tobacco and hemp provinces; less than 5000 came from all Panai and less than 3500 from Sebú or from Mindanau, while Negros, the island most important for its sugar crop, contributed a paltry 834 pesos. "Seizures" of one sort and another represent nearly 432,000 pesos, of which 70,000 were in cash; "loans," 143,000 and "donations," 76,000 pesos. Captain Taylor finds that 6 per cent bonds for at least 500,000 pesos were issued, in denominations of 25 and 100 pesos; the cash-books show that 388,500 should have been paid in on subscriptions by September 1, 1899, but the ledgers reveal that only 233,000 had been recorded as paid up to October 19, 1899, a very noticeable discrepancy, even for faulty bookkeeping. The annual budget, approved by Aguinaldo, under his war powers, on February 12, 1899, just after the outbreak of war with the United States (see pp. 68-77), shows an approach to systematization of taxes and revenues; these were estimated to be 6,324,729.38 pesos. Perhaps it was to this sum that Felipe Buencamino had reference when he testified (*Hearings Com. Ins. Aff.*, p. 307) that

Ostensibly, the foreign merchants of the archipelago paid the export and other taxes levied by the insurgent Government on the trade of the provinces carried on by sea.¹ In fact, it was, of course, paid in part by the foreign consumers of Philippine products and in still larger part by the Filipino producers and consumers themselves. Import duties were also for a short time levied, but never worked satisfactorily; and there was much fluctuation in the minds of the revolutionary authorities about the export dues, which were first five, then ten per cent, and at intervals abolished entirely, while it is to be feared that they were sometimes as much as the military commander at a shipping-point thought the foreign merchants would stand, or were gauged by "arrangements" made with him by the latter. They were taken off in early 1899, upon the representations of the foreign business men that they did damage chiefly to Filipino interests, but were restored on April 1 of that year, under the name of a "pilotage tax" (the

Aguinaldo's commissioners "to request donations from the rich in the provinces . . . have assuredly collected more than \$50,000,000, but the Philippine treasury . . . received nothing but \$7,000,000"; he declares also that the provincial and municipal officials "appropriated to themselves all the public materials and built their own houses." Among the decrees and orders of Aguinaldo were the following of significance: One of September 23, 1898, ordering provincial governors to arrest and punish men collecting funds for the insurrection without authority; one dated August 22, 1898 (probably issued in November and dated back), appointing committees to collect contributions in Manila; and one of November 16, 1898, instructing the presidents of towns in Pampanga, where many of the wealthier residents were not in sympathy with the Tagalog administration, "to see that the national loan is subscribed for." One of the means by which Filipino patriotism was exploited at the time is cited by T. H. Pardo de Tavera (*Biblioteca filipina*, p. 158), who says of the "Philippine Electricity Company" that it was organized by an employee of the lighting-plant in Manila "who was suddenly transformed into a general of Aguinaldo's army. The company was only an exploitation of the unfortunate stockholders." The project, a favorite of Aguinaldo's, of organizing a bank with large capital, the shares to be subscribed only by Filipinos, was abandoned at Malolos in December, 1898. War contributions were levied not alone upon the rich or well-to-do; when the insurrection began to suffer the strain of fighting and defeat, the masses were everywhere called upon for contributions in kind, sometimes even losing their entire crops.

¹ At first, a duty of five per cent *ad valorem* was also laid on all goods shipped from one point to another by rail or by river, as well as by sea; but this part of the decree of October 17, 1898, was repealed on November 15 (*Taylor's Rept.*, p. 57).

amount being, however, ten per cent of cargo, not an assessment upon tonnage). The foreign owners of vessels engaged in the inter-island trade had already paid at Malolos (in one case, at least, to Aguinaldo in person) license fees for these vessels. The very remarkable decree of November 30, 1898, that foreigners doing business in the provinces should pay an amount anywhere from 100 to 5000 pesos for a license was revoked on January 23, 1899, when war seemed imminent and it was desired to use the foreign houses as bankers for the revolutionary organization; but it was not forbidden to the foreigners to "gain favor" with the organization, or with its chief agents, and the captured records reveal that the former knew how most effectively to do so.¹

The avowed chief aim of the revolution was to free the Filipino people from the domination of unpopular ecclesiastical masters, and to secure for them the religious, political, and social freedom which that domination had denied them. It would, therefore, not be unfair to judge the organization which had assumed the burden of this programme by what it accomplished, and proposed to accomplish, in these respects. The all-important religious question, underlying all others, should be considered under two aspects: first, as to how far the people were secured in the enjoyment of religious freedom; and, second, as to what attitude the Revolutionary Government, which assumed to represent the people, adopted

¹ *Taylor's Rept.* was written primarily to bring forth important evidence showing the connection of a suit brought against the United States. The part foreign business houses had in prolonging the opposition to the United States, is especially full of data on this subject (see pp. 17-18, 56-101, particularly pp. 80-81 for donations of rice to the insurgent army by one of the most prominent companies of Manila). See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 33, for the message of one of his agents in Manila on December 22, 1898, to the effect that the high license fee on foreigners doing business in the provinces was "impolitic at this time, when we seek the sympathy of the powers." See *ibid.*, p. 18, for an indication that in the preceding August the British railroad company operating the line to Dagupan was already working in harmony with the Filipino Government. *La Independencia*, November 16, 1898, presents the complaint of the Government collectors that the railroad company had not yet paid its taxes for September and October.

toward the Roman Catholic Church, and particularly toward the friars.

By "religious freedom" is here meant not so much a theoretical attitude as to the old questions of separation of Church and State and of freedom of worship, which were not of great or immediate practical importance among a people so uniformly Roman Catholic as the Filipinos. Rather is it of vital concern to discover how far, with the forcible removal of their former ecclesiastical masters, the people were liberated from the petty tyranny that had been exercised over them in their social life as well as in matters of conscience, and how far, if at all, their new Government undertook to make sure that this tyranny was no longer exercised. It need not occasion surprise that decrees of the President, both before and after the question was supposed to be settled at Malolos, violated the principle of separation of Church and State; but it is of significance that so little effort was made to reform abuses against which outcry had been made, and that, both from governmental provisions and from the testimony of individuals, we obtain evidence that the people were subjected to dictation as before in their family and local affairs, though now by priests of their own color, who had less prestige and undivided authority than their predecessors and hence not uncommonly clashed with the local officials. That the people preferred the new masters to the old, especially in this time of the arousing of racial sympathies, was most likely true; but that they were the actual gainers, except in this matter of sentiment, has at least not been made plain. The establishment of civil marriage and the revival of the schedule of fees for religious services that had been promulgated by Archbishop Sancho de Santa Justa y Rufina in 1772 were, indeed, efforts at the reform of abuses; but aside from the fact that the schedule of fees was by no means always observed by native priests, the Government not only does not seem ever to have conceived any broader plans for reform in the matter of ecclesiastical ca-

ciquism, but, had it promulgated such plans, they would have been nullified by its repeated efforts to employ the priests to serve its cause as propagandists or as instruments to restrain the people or to incite them to do its will.¹

The religious question was the subject of one of the few real discussions which took place in the Assembly at Malolos. Preferential importance has herein been assigned to the deeds of the Revolutionary Government as showing how far it could have been expected to guarantee a new era of freedom of thought and action in religious as in other matters; yet the discussion and final vote on this question at Malolos, which stand only as an expression of Filipino theory as to what government should be, has also its significance. When a vote was reached on the question of recognizing the equality of all forms of worship and proclaiming the separation of Church and State, on November 29, 1898, the result was at first a tie, and the friends of freedom of worship finally prevailed by a single vote, cast by a general of the revolutionary army who had been one of the secretaries of the meeting and at first refused

¹ Civil marriage and civil registry had been established by the decree of June 20, though not in the form in which they figured in the provisional constitution of Mabini, nor afterwards in the Malolos Constitution, which put in effect the exact provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on this matter (simply nullifying, therefore, the exceptions to that code as it was promulgated in the Philippines in 1889). The decree of June 20 provided that civil marriage was obligatory, and ecclesiastical marriage, if performed, should follow it; it consisted simply, so far as regards the ceremony, in the signing of a document before the municipal chief to the effect that the marriage was by "mutual consent"; but the publication of notice thereof was required to be made during three weeks in a manner very similar to the proclaiming of banns by the Church. From July, 1898, to late 1899, the 1772 schedule of fees were so many times enjoined upon the native priests, in decrees, circulars, letters, etc., as to confirm the information that it was not by any means uniformly observed. Among the briefs of decrees and orders of Aguinaldo, already cited above, may be found these: July 26, 1898, the priests are to preach loyalty to the insurrection; August 10, 1898, church questions are to be left to the Congress; September 1 (also December 9), 1898, the civil authorities are to avoid conflicts with the Filipino priests, and are again reminded that the decision as to a religious policy is for the Congress; nevertheless they are to see that the July 26 decree is enforced; June 24 and August 10, 1899, provincial officials and certain priests are to see that the parish funds in the hands of the Filipino priests are invested in the national bonds, in order "to avoid loss."

to vote.¹ Moreover, the article thus incorporated into the constitution was a negative sort of clause, of the briefest sort, quite in contrast with the specific clauses in which Mabini had proclaimed his theories as to freedom of conscience, while there was conspicuously lacking the clause whereby Mabini had exempted all religious societies, not subject ecclesiastically to the jurisdiction of the ordinary, from the freedom of association guaranteed to all others. And in January, when the constitution was finally put in force with the clauses conferring full dictatorial powers upon Aguinaldo in case of war, the entire provision as to separation of Church and State was suspended until the meeting of a "Constituent Assembly," and it was provided that the municipalities should employ and pay the native priests. Certain circumstances make it difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was, in late 1898 and early 1899, some sort of flirtation between the Roman Catholic

¹ An account of this day's session, with brief summaries of the discussion, will be found in *La Independencia* for November 30, 1898. Only fifty-two representatives were present, of the approximately one hundred members of the Assembly as listed; at least thirty-five of these were Tagalogs, six were Ilokans, and the real representative of the Bisayas seems not to have had any part in the matter. This was an unusually important meeting of the Assembly, and more interest had been aroused over it than over almost any other day's session; yet the number as above stated was swollen by eight officers of the army. The Manila attorney, Felipe Calderón, who was afterward to be identified very prominently with the suit against the Roman hierarchy at Manila for the possession of the estates of St. Joseph's College, was the chief spokesman for making the Roman Catholic the state religion. Some of his arguments are worth mentioning: he declared that all nations but Belgium have an established church, — disregarding the United States, not to say Mexico, upon whose constitution a great deal of the document then under discussion was based; England's trouble in Ireland he thought an example of the disasters consequent upon doing away with the State Church; the separation of Church and State he pronounced a "pure Utopia," possible in pure reason, but never in practice; the Filipinos were united in one religion, and they ought not to open the way for discord, but should foster national unity; and he considered that the principle of majority rule implied also that the religious views of the majority should prevail over those of the minority; while, to the objection that the Papacy would interfere in the working of government, he retorted that it never had done so. The session was rather disorderly, as the speakers were somewhat heated. The first vote was 25 to 25. It was objected that the presiding officer had no power to resolve the tie, and that officer, Pedro Paterno, was apparently not eager to do so. Pablo Tekson, later governor of Bulakán province, finally cast the deciding vote in favor of freedom of worship.

hierarchy at Manila and the clique in control at Malolos, or some members of it. Perhaps, on the part of the friar hierarchy, this was only an attempt to try diplomacy with the organization which had so rapidly extended its control throughout the archipelago and which held in its power several hundred members of the religious orders. Undoubtedly, the Malolos dictators for a time entertained the notion of recognition by the Vatican, in the same way that they bolstered themselves up with hopes of recognition by Japan, by Germany, or by other nations; and they crazily imagined that clinging to the friar prisoners would help them secure such recognition. Certainly, there was at no time anything in common between these two parties, unless they regarded opposition to the Americans as such. Yet the hierarchy allowed itself to appear at times in 1898 to be dallying with men known to be in the councils of Aguinaldo, and often appeared to be hostile, passively if not actively, to American sovereignty, until the arrival of an American archbishop as apostolic delegate in early 1900 caused a "right-about-face" in its attitude. And Filipinos not hitherto distinguished for their friendliness to the friars, or to the Church itself, were, in 1898, suspiciously fond of dwelling upon "religious unity"; the new Filipino "chief military chaplain" became a much more important figure in the revolution than his predecessor in the office had been in 1896-97; and it was planned to negotiate at Rome for the full recognition as parish priests of the Filipino coadjutors, just as they were to be used as the effective political propagandists of the insurrection in the field.¹ Exactly what was

¹ There are only certain suspicious circumstances upon which to base the hypothesis that there was some sort of flirtation between Malolos and the archbishop's palace in Manila; and all are explainable upon grounds indicated above. Until all those concerned shall speak frankly, we shall not know the truth. Gregorio Aglipai, the Filipino priest who, as "war chaplain," gradually assumed virtually the control of a bishop over the native priests in most of northern Luzon, who afterward organized and led the guerrilla warfare against the United States in North Ilokos and Abra provinces, and who became the head of the "Independent Philippine Church," the important schism from Catholic ranks in the Philippines,

going on is not plain, and it may be that the revolutionists' plans were simply incoherent on this point, as on some others, and not capable of explanation. Whatever may have been the truth, the Filipino Government claimed, in holding the friars prisoners and in taking charge of their estates, to be acting in behalf of and as representative of the people; and it is more to the point to discover in what manner and in what degree they thus benefited the people. By an "additional article" to the constitution, appended at the time of the clauses providing for war in January, 1899, all the property of any sort belonging to the religious corporations was "understood to be restored to the Filipino people" from May 24, 1898. This was, as appears, simply a retroactive clause designed to give legal authorization to the confiscations already carried out. So also the clauses of the 1899 budget, adopted a few weeks later, providing for the administration of the friar estates by responsible parties or for their lease at auction, were measures designed to give some show of regularity to the handling of this

is a central figure in the whole religious controversy from 1898 on. He has claimed (in the *Manila Times*, January 1, 1903, and in the *New York Independent*, October 29, 1903) that in the summer of 1898 the Spanish archbishop and governor-general in Manila enlisted his services to negotiate with the insurgents in the field for coöperation with the Spaniards against the Americans; that Bishop Hevia, of the Nueva Segovia Diocese, a prisoner in 1898 and 1899 in the Kagayan Valley, conferred upon him authority to perform the bishop's duties in that diocese; and that his general authority over the native priests in the province, acting as "military chaplain" under Aguinaldo, was recognized, and he was used as an agent by Archbishop Nozaleda at Manila. It is true that Aglipai, like others, was asked to urge upon the Filipinos coöperation with the Spaniards. He is not sufficiently specific about his other statements. It is, however, worthy of note, that, in spite of the virtually episcopal powers which he had assumed over the provincial clergy, he was not declared excommunicated by Nozaleda until very late in the day. It was Aglipai who was employed, in accordance with a decree of Aguinaldo of June 24, 1899, to inspect all the parishes of northern Luzon and see that their funds were invested in national bonds; the forwarding of funds by native priests to Archbishop Nozaleda was declared to be a "highly unpatriotic act." The Dictator's decree of October 26, 1898, directing that appointments to parishes by Nozaleda would not be recognized, shows that at least no formal *entente* was ever reached on these matters, just as its implied requirement that preferment to parishes must reside in the Revolutionary Government is another indication of how far this Government came in practice from realizing Mabini's ideal.

property by the comparatively small faction of revolutionists who had exercised the authority all the time, but who had just before shown that they dominated policy as well as practice at Malolos by rushing through the provisional clauses of the constitution and framing up formal authorization for their dictatorial control, virtually thrusting the conservative Filipinos to one side.¹ The property which it was claimed had in times past been usurped from the people was not restored to the people, who were instead to continue to pay the old rentals to new landlords, though landlords of their own race. No detailed accounts seem ever to have been kept to show in what manner this property was administered, what were the proceeds from it, and how these proceeds were applied. Before many months, most of the territory in which friar properties lay was in the hands of the American army. Its tenants were made thereafter (secretly) as before to pay their old rentals, on the ground that they were contributing to the revolution; but there are serious reasons for suspecting that, as in 1898, private parties were beneficiaries of the losses of the friars. Certainly, the tenants themselves had no gain to report.²

The 300 friars whom the Filipinos made captives were a very conspicuous minority among the 8000 or 9000 Spaniards who at one time or another were made prisoners of the Filipinos in Luzon; for not only was the Government of Spain con-

¹ For the provisions regarding the lease or administration of the friar estates by the Revolutionary Government, see *Taylor's Rept.*, pp. 70-73. It may be significant, in connection with the hints above as to the revolutionists trying to come to terms with the Church, that the "additional article," formally confiscating the friar property, was held in abeyance so long at Malolos.

² Filipino gossip was busy in 1898, and later, with the intimate connection of members of the Aguinaldo family and close friends of Aguinaldo with the handling of friar property in Cavite and Mindoro. One of the first steps taken after the revolution was organized in Cavite in May and June of 1898 was the sending of an expedition from Batangas to seize the estates of the Recollects in Mindoro, in which island some of the Aguinaldos had conducted business operations. The concern of Emilio Aguinaldo over the sale of cattle seized on this estate is indicated in *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 27. It should be added that no part of the money thus obtained had ever been traced to Emilio's hands; indeed, it is not now traceable at all.

cerned in their behalf, but the Vatican also on repeated occasions evinced its solicitude, by representations made directly at Washington or through the medium of France and Spain, and the United States Government finally directed its commander at Manila to use all efforts in their behalf. Washington had at first stood upon Admiral Dewey's assurances that the revolutionists accorded excellent treatment to the prisoners, and it had, after the occupation of Manila, for a long time been indisposed to take any step that would seem to interpose the Americans between the Spaniards and Filipinos. But as the statements from Rome about the treatment of the friars became rather definite charges in place of rumors, and as the question was interjected to a slight extent into the negotiations at Paris, Washington finally went so far as to instruct Otis by cable on October 28 to "use every possible means to secure their [the friars'] release and care for them."¹

¹ The cable instructions of August 1 to Dewey and Merritt to prevent mistreatment of the friar prisoners, if possible to do so, has been noted above (see p. 219). In this case, the complaint at Washington was made by Monsignor Martignelli, at the instigation of Cardinal Rampolla. On August 29, the Spanish Government complained, through the French ambassador at Washington, that the friars and other prisoners were being barbarously treated in the Philippine provinces. Admiral Dewey repeated in reply his previous information that the Spanish prisoners were not cruelly treated, though neglected, for want of proper food, medical attendance, etc. The following instructions, sent on September 6 by President McKinley to both Dewey and Otis, are especially interesting and enlightening (to the reader of to-day, though perhaps not to their recipients at the time): "You will exert your influence during suspension of hostilities between United States and Spain to restrain insurgent hostilities toward the Spaniards, and while maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, pursue, as far as possible, a conciliatory course to all." Rampolla renewed his charges on September 13, making them specific as to the friars held prisoners in northern Luzon being brutally treated. On September 16, replying to Spain's complaint through M. Cambon, Secretary Day said that the Government at Washington understood that the prisoners were "well treated." Yet on September 20, the War Department wired Otis: "If under control of your forces, protect [them] from inhuman treatment." Upon the renewed representations of the Vatican and of Cardinal Gibbons in October, along with further representations by Ambassador Cambon, Otis was on the 18th of that month instructed to "use his good offices discreetly for the protection" of the friars, and finally the more urgent message of October 28 (quoted above) was sent. Otis replied, on October 30, that Nueva Segovia' (the diocese of northern Luzon) did not recognize to any extent Aguinaldo's authority. (It had, as a matter of fact, been organized in insur-

This caused the correspondence which Otis held with Aguinaldo in November, endeavoring to make the latter see that the imprisonment of the friars was not justifiable according to international law, besides urging their release upon humanitarian grounds. The contention of Aguinaldo, as drafted for him by Manila lawyers then at Malolos, was that the Spanish parish priests, as well as the civil officers, could be held prisoners under the laws of war because they had been virtually or actually combatants against the Filipinos, the priests in organizing the opposition to the insurrection, and the civil officials by virtue of General Augustin's circular of April 23 enlisting them all in the volunteer forces. It was also stated that the Spanish civil officers were being held "in order to obtain from Spain the liberty of the imprisoned and deported Filipinos," and the friars were being held both to assist in this purpose and "in order to obtain from the Vatican the recog-

rection by troops sent from Cavite, and was in command of Aguinaldo's personal military representative, Daniel Tirona, who gave minute orders regarding the location and the treatment of Bishop Hevia and the friars with him.) The matter had also been brought up by the Spanish treaty commissioners at Paris, they asking for Spain the right to send reinforcements to deal with the Filipino insurgents, on the ground that the United States was reported to be sending out troops and ships of war. The American commissioners denied these reports, but informed President McKinley that they thought every effort should be made to restrain the insurgents and maintain the *status quo* in the Philippines, since they could not take very strong ground with the Spaniards in the face of Dewey's cablegram of October 14. In this message, the admiral indicated how his attitude toward the Filipinos had undergone a change; he said: "Distressing reports have been received of inhuman cruelty practiced on religious and civil authorities. . . . The natives appear unable to govern." (For the complaints from the Vatican and the instructions to Otis, see *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 743, 788, 790, 793, 804, 831; for the correspondence with Dewey, see *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 125; also *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898*, p. 928; also *ibid.*, pp. 808-11, 815-17 and 928-29, and *Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 314, for the representations through the regular diplomatic channels and in course of the negotiations at Paris.) Some aspects of this matter were within the ken of the American press at the time; as early as August 11, 1898, the *Nation* treated editorially the question of American responsibility for the conduct of the Filipinos toward their friar captives. The daily and weekly press for the succeeding two months contains stray hints of informal interchanges of opinion and information between Washington and the Vatican, and we find Archbishop Ireland, after conferences with President McKinley, setting out for Rome.

nition of the Philippine clergy.”¹ General Otis dropped the correspondence, because satisfied, according to his own statement, that the Filipinos would not give up the friars, while he was privately assured that they would soon release the Spanish civilians. Perhaps also the publicity which the Malolos authorities had at once given to the correspondence and the indications that they were anxious to put him in the light of a self-constituted defender of the friars had something to do with the American commander’s decision to let the matter drop. At any rate, the only practical outcome of the entire episode was that the Filipino leaders spread far and wide the report that the American commander in Manila was, like the Spanish governor-generals, under the control of the friars. Various promises were made during the next few months as to the release of the religious and civil prisoners in the provinces, upon the urgent representations not only of Archbishop Nozaleda, who held some direct communication with Aguinaldo, but also of Señor Arellano, who still retained a nominal connection with the Malolos Government, though actually removed from it.² Finally, on January 23, when preparations were hastily being made for war, Aguinaldo decreed the release of these prisoners and of all Spanish military prisoners who were sick. This decree was never meant to be carried out (unless, by carrying it out, the Filipinos could secure foreign

¹ For the November correspondence on this subject, see *Otis’s Rept.*, 1899, pp. 22-29. The Spanish text of the Aguinaldo letter of November 18 may be found in *La Independencia* of November 22; it was considered final and unanswerable in the Malolos camp, and it closed the correspondence, as Otis did not send the reply which he had prepared. In *La Independencia* for November 16 will be found a lengthy editorial exposition of the Filipino Government’s attitude on the retention of the Spanish civilians and friars, quite likely prepared by the same hand which wrote the letter; it is even more outspoken with reference to the idea that the retention of these prisoners would aid the Malolos Government in securing recognition.

² In his *Defensa obligada*, p. 37, Archbishop Nozaleda praises Chaplain Reaney of the United States Navy for his efforts in behalf of the prisoners, and claims that he (Nozaleda) induced Arellano to accept the place of Secretary of Foreign Affairs at Malolos, “only with the patriotic purpose of freeing the prisoners,” but that the latter was forced to resign by the “Masons” who surrounded Aguinaldo.

recognition and intervention), as subsequent events showed. It was repeated on July 5 and September 17 following; but the friars and other prisoners who survived were released only as the advance of the American army set them free.

The accounts that have been given, both by Americans and Spaniards, of the treatment accorded by the Filipinos to their prisoners have been very diverse and conflicting. This is in part due to the fact that in some places they were fairly well treated and in other places they were very badly treated. To bring out the facts, it is necessary to survey the operations connected with the spread of the revolution throughout Luzon and then to the central islands; in this way, we may at the same time discover its *modus operandi* as a military organization and somewhat about its character and the extent of its authority. We have already seen how the revolt was organized in the Tagalog provinces in June and July, also to some extent in Pampanga and Pangasinan and Sambales, and how the Spaniards were cut off and captured in an almost farcically easy manner. We have also seen that in these provinces, even in Cavite, close under the eyes of the revolutionary leaders, the proclaimed intention to conduct the war according to the most humane methods and civilized principles had not always been followed. Still, there were comparatively few authenticated cases of serious mistreatment of prisoners, most of these also being popular outbursts against certain friar priests, and there were some instances of scrupulously correct conduct toward the Spaniards.¹

¹ *La Independencia*, November 16, 1898, contains a letter signed by the late civil officials of the province of Pangasinan, including the governor and judge of first instance, and by some thirty civilians, all at the time (July 31, 1898) prisoners of Makabulos in Dagupan, and addressed to Governor-General Augustin at Manila, informing him that they were most chivalrously treated by their captors, and protesting against the reported shooting of Filipinos in Manila as being a possible provocation for a change in the treatment accorded to Spaniards held prisoners in the provinces. How far faith and credit are to be given to such a document is a question; there may very likely have been some compulsion about the signing of it, and it could readily be interpreted as a threat on the part of the Filipinos to retaliate upon their prisoners. On the other hand, there was not much bitterness

There had been no spontaneous uprising in the Ilokan provinces or in the Kagayan Valley (the Kagayan natives not being connected with the mutiny organized by a Cuban Spaniard on the steamer *Compañía de Filipinas* off Aparri), though those districts which were most easily in communication with the capital had, of course, been greatly stirred up over the incidents occurring in Manila Bay, and there was some secret propaganda on foot among the Ilokans. The Tagalog organization at Bakoor did not feel ready to attempt any movement in northern Luzon until about the first of August; they were waiting for more arms from China, they had their hands full in central Luzon, and they were not sure what would be the popular attitude in northern Luzon. When, finally, they had arms and men to spare for the expeditions to the Ilokan and Kagayan provinces, they entrusted the leadership entirely to Tagalogs, and the latter were very greatly aided, both in compelling the surrender of the small Spanish detachments and in winning the native people of those regions to their cause, by the news of the fall of Manila and of the naval rout of Spain in Cuban waters.

The Spanish military commander in the Ilokan provinces had, earlier in the course of the trouble, attempted to march into Pangasinan and join forces with his countrymen there;

of feeling between Spaniards and Filipinos in Pangasinan, and there was unquestionably some fraternization between them, even under the peculiar circumstances. Colonel Ceballos, the military commander captured when Dagupan surrendered on June 22, was at this very time accompanying the troops of Makabulos in their advance upon San Fernando de la Unión, ostensibly as a mere observer, though perhaps under compulsion. *El desastre Filipino* (Barcelona, 1899), written by Carlos Ria-Baja, a prisoner of Makabulos, puts a rather different aspect upon the latter's treatment of the Spaniards. A very rabid Spanish book on the treatment of the Spanish prisoners, mostly Augustinian friars, in Pampanga is *Episodios de la revolución filipina* (Manila, 1900), by Joaquin D. Durán, one of these friars; some of its charges have been proved well founded. See also *Nuestra prisión en poder de los revolucionarios filipinos* (Manila, 1900), by Ulpiano Herrero y Sampedro. Other Spanish books and pamphlets on the subject, except as subsequently mentioned, are of little value or reliability; the history of the times may best be patched together from scattered contributions and news items in the Manila press in 1898 and 1899.

but he was cut off and made prisoner, as were they. His successor in command at Bigan seems to have felt that there was no great risk to his position, so long as the civil guard held in check any uneasiness on the part of the Ilokan towns. The same confidence must have prevailed among the Spanish civil officials. This and the friction between the civil and military authorities caused them to be caught off their guard when, at the beginning of August, forces under the youthful Tagalog leader, Manuel Tinio, started northward from the important Spanish port of San Fernando de la Unión (which had been taken by a land movement from Dagupan, combined with the sending of reinforcements by steamer from Subig Bay) and rapidly threatened the scattered Spanish detachments in South and North Ilokos. After Bigan was abandoned, Tinio's advance was uninterrupted, and in Bangi, North Ilokos, the main body of the Spanish military force in that territory, numbering but 200 or 300 rifles, finding itself entirely cut off, surrendered to him. Other smaller detachments and scattered parties of civilians, who had hastily attempted to concentrate and escape when the alarm was spread early in August, were also captured at one and another point. Most of the civilians in North and South Ilokos and Abra, including particularly the friar priests of those regions, had managed, after a series of exciting adventures, to escape on small sailing-crafts, which rounded the capes of Northwest Luzon in stormy waters and landed them finally at Aparri. Thus Tinio missed the prize he especially sought, Bishop José Hevia of the Diocese of Nueva Segovia, who had been fleeing before his country's troops from Bigan, and who had escaped at Aparri at the head of a party of about threescore friar priests from those provinces, and a dozen nuns from the convent at Bigan. In the towns through which these fugitives had passed (along with other Spanish civilians, men and women), the friars had received many demonstrations of sympathy and evidences of regret that they were thus put to flight

by the advance of the Tagalog forces; unquestionably, these demonstrations of sympathy were to some extent sincere, as well as being mere outward expressions of Spanish-Filipino courtesy. The prisoners, mostly military men, who were captured and held in the Ilokan provinces were, at least after their transfer to Bigan, treated quite well; this was in part due to the fact that native residents of prominence frowned on any display of harshness or cruelty toward them, and in part to their being kept under the eye of Manuel Tinio, a humane commander. We have to record, however, that Bigan was promptly sacked, that Tinio proclaimed there a decree of the Revolutionary Government embargoing not only public property, but also that of the fugitives and prisoners, that the Spanish troops who capitulated on condition that lives and property be respected were searched and deprived of all their personal possessions, and that a Spanish lieutenant was stripped and publicly whipped before the house of the Filipino commander, Tinio's brother, at Lauag.¹

The Spanish fugitives who had managed to escape in boats had reached Aparri on August 20, and they looked forward every day to the arrival of a steamer which would bear them

¹ See Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 541. Sastrón takes most of his data regarding the spread of insurrection and treatment of prisoners in northern Luzon from *Memorias del Cautiverio*, published at Manila in 1900 by Father Graciano Martinez (Augustinian), one of the fugitives with Bishop Hevia. As Lauag was the scene of whippings later on which led to a *cause célèbre* in the American army, this incident of 1898 may be remarked as bearing on the case of 1901. Whippings have been very common in that section, as in most others of the Philippines. The Spanish lieutenant in question was only getting a dose of his own medicine, which explains how he came to be singled out for such treatment. The Aguedo Agbayani who is mentioned (Father Martinez, p. 29, and Sastrón, p. 539) as being at the time so desirous of having the Spaniards remain, promising to organize the Ilokans to the number of 10,000 or 20,000, if necessary, to oppose the Tagalogs, was afterward as ardent a friend of the American military commanders in North Ilokos. At their urgent recommendation, he was made governor of the province by the Philippine Commission, when civil government was organized therein in August, 1901. This appointment was very bitterly resented by the Ilokans who had been identified with the late insurrection, and they repeatedly charged Agbayani with having conducted a sort of inquisition in his home, where men were beaten, one being killed, in order to make them give information of benefit to the American forces.

to Hongkong. On the 25th, the *Compañía de Filipinas*, which had figured in the Olongapó episode in July and had later been used in the successful attack upon San Fernando de la Unión, arrived off Aparri, almost direct from Cavite, where 300 or 400 soldiers had been loaded on board under the chief command of Aguinaldo's friend, Daniel Tirona, with Aguinaldo's former private secretary, José Leyba, and another close associate, Simon Villa, as subordinate commanders, under full instructions as to dividing between them the military command of the Kagayan Valley and as to the civil organization of the provinces of Kagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya and their towns. As soon as this vessel had taken on board the pilot sent out from Aparri at her signal, she lowered the Spanish and raised the Filipino flag. Aparri was defended only by soldiers of the civil guard and a few Spanish marines, forty rifles in all, and their commanders surrendered at the instance of the Spanish civilians, who thought that resistance might earn a worse fate for them; it had also been discovered that the people, always considered loyal to Spain, would not fight against their fellow-Filipinos, and two towns just above Aparri on the Rio Grande were ready to surrender, if they had not already done so, soldiers from the steamer having disembarked and prepared to occupy them. The terms of capitulation provided that the lives and property of the Spaniards were to be respected, and that they should be free to go where they pleased, no exception being made of the friars, while the Spanish military men were expressly included when they should have yielded their arms.¹ The promise of liberty

¹ Such, at least, are the terms of the document which purports to be a literal copy of the act of surrender, cited as appendix 1 to Father Martinez's *El Cautiverio*. It has been understood that Tirona afterward disclaimed this particular agreement, or at any rate interpreted it as not including the friars, perhaps on the ground that it was made without his sanction by the officers in command of the 100 soldiers who were landed on the opposite bank of the river from Aparri and gave notice of an attack on the town in two hours. In describing the event Father Martinez (pp. 44-52) says the Tagalogs declared they had 2000 men on board the steamer, and he seems to believe it; any one who has ever seen this

never was fulfilled with respect to any of the prisoners, and that of respect for life and property was in many instances violated both with the friars and with some of the Spanish civilians. The friars were at once confined together, and their money and jewels ("watches," one of their number puts it) taken from them; one, who tried to conceal the money he had, was beaten before the rest, and others suffered buffetings at Aparri. They were at first not given food by their jailers, but the soldiers on guard and some of the residents of Aparri prevented their suffering any real distress on this account. Some of the more prominent members, including the bishop, were marched off, and salvos of blank cartridges at first caused the others to believe they had been shot.¹ The real hardships and abuses began with the order to transport all the friars and nuns and some few of the lay prisoners, women

600- or 800-ton boat will know how impossible that could be. On the other hand, General Otis, in assuring Washington on September 4 (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 787) that the Filipinos had no boat that could carry over 250 men, either did not take into account their possession of this vessel or overlooked the crowding capacity of Filipino boats. This was the expedition of which Spain had complained, through Ambassador Cambon, that it left Manila after the surrender to the Americans and comprised 700 men. Otis's information was that it left the bay August 10, which was probably incorrect, and that it bore only 100 or 200 men, which was certainly incorrect, unless it stopped en route in Subig Bay and there recruited more men. Secretary Hay's reply, based upon Otis's cablegram, was, therefore, somewhat misleading (*Foreign Relations of United States, 1898*, pp. 810-11). Otis's reference in the message to the coming together of Aguinaldo and the northern Filipinos, and to the former being in accord with the "chiefs of priest party," probably sprang from the rumors he had heard of conferences recently had by Aguinaldo with Ilokans and Pangasinans, and to the identification with the revolution of Father Aglipai, who was soon to go north to organize the native priests and, through them particularly, to make the Ilokans join hands with the Tagalogs.

¹ See Father Martinez, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-72. This writer has been rather cautiously followed, as his statement is wholly *ex parte*, and his pen, like that of most of his fellow-friars, was too often dipped in gall to warrant unquestioning acceptance even of his statements of fact. In the main, however, his testimony has been corroborated by that of other witnesses, and, allowing for some exaggeration, may safely be followed. Despite some of the worst abuses which he relates, and which must figure in this text because of their seriousness and significance, the reader will readily discover, between the lines of his book, that the actual state of the friars imprisoned in the Kagayan Valley was in general not so bad as he would make out, and some of the things he makes into martyrdom are very petty.

as well as men, up the river and distribute them among the various towns of Kagayan and Isabela. This happened about the middle of September, by which time these provinces had, by successive advances up the river, fallen under the control of Leyba and Villa. The former then completed the conquest of Northeast Luzon by pushing into Nueva Vizcaya, where he captured the Spanish officers of Isabela province and some few soldiers, who were cut off between the Filipino forces of central Luzon and those of the Kagayan Valley. The Spanish provincial governor and register of deeds, who were brought back to Ilagan, were beaten and put in the stocks at intervals during eight days, Leyba himself, it is charged, finally taking a musket and raining blows upon the father and upon the governor, the former absolving the latter in what they thought would be their final punishment. The register of deeds died of further tortures at Tugegarau, whither he was taken at the instance of enemies of his residing there. The captain of the civil guard who had surrendered at Aparri, after enduring tortures by being strung up and whipped for three days, disappeared one night and was, it is said, buried in some unknown place.¹ The worst passions were let loose for a time in certain of the towns of that rich valley, the great tobacco-growing region of the Philippines, where the Dominican friars had reigned supreme in the moral and social realm, and first the Government, then great private tobacco companies, had helped rivet an economic slavery upon the sodden masses, and where the Filipino who aspired to any independence of thought or

¹ For these incidents, related with some very horrible details, mostly obtained by hearsay, see Father Martinez, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-23. Martinez charges that Leyba's wrath was aroused at the governor of Isabela because he had carried off the provincial funds and had, before being captured in Bayombong, used them in paying the arrears of salaries to the abandoned Spanish soldiers who were left in the mountainous regions. He states also that the captain of the Aparri civil guard had declared, when he yielded to the request of his fellow-countrymen to surrender, that he knew he was signing his own death-warrant. As he had been connected with the very bitter persecution of certain prominent Filipinos of the valley, and had employed the weapons of torture and others of the reign of terror of 1896-97, he had some reason for his fears.

action, rare specimen though he was, was promptly squelched if he would not be relegated to the place of a sycophant. Personal and business jealousies entered into these few cases of barbarism, which were, after all, only imitations of similar cruelties perpetrated by the ruling race during the preceding two years, and which found echo later in several dark deeds of revenge under the shadow of American control in the valley. These were, moreover, exceptional instances among the lay prisoners of the Filipinos in this region. The latter were generally treated reasonably well. Not quite the same can be said of the friars; after they had been distributed among the towns, unless they had come in some way under the direct animosity of Leyba and Villa, they were treated according to the attitude of the local civil officials, as a rule, which meant sometimes fairly well, sometimes indifferently, and sometimes badly. A few cases there were where the friars were beaten publicly or privately; two were physically exposed in one town where they had been parish priests; and efforts were made by torture to compel several to confess to improper conduct. These cases were, however, mainly due to Tagalog subordinate military officials in certain towns. Most of the cases of actual physical abuse of the friars are said to have occurred under the immediate knowledge, if not at the instigation, of Leyba or Villa. Before advancing from Isabela on Nueva Vizcaya, the former had the water-torture administered to two priests caught in Isabela. The estate the Augustinians had cultivated he promptly seized, putting up a sign naming it "José Leyba." Three friars were given the water-torture there at the time of its seizure, to make them confess to living with women, and later on Villa had one of them strung up by the feet and whipped in the endeavor to find out about money supposed to be buried on the estate.¹ But the first outbreaks of passion

¹ See Father Martinez, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-16. He says the water-torture was administered to the friars of Ilagan in "an unusual and brutal manner," melted wax being dropped on the eyes at the same time that water was forced down the throat.

and a certain brutal delight in the power of command seemed soon to wear away, and the friars confined in the Isabela towns, equally with those in Kagayan, had, after the first few weeks, few things more serious to complain of than that they were humiliated in various ways, such as being made to clean streets, to carry water from the river, to form ranks and parade, military fashion, in the sun at the caprice of the men in charge of them, etc.¹ Though in some of the towns their food was not always the most satisfying, they lived really well in other towns, owing to the charity of prominent natives or of the foreign representatives of a large tobacco company. Of the one hundred and eighteen confined in the various towns of the valley, eight died before their release in December, 1899; one or two of these were rather far advanced in illness at the time of their capture, but the other deaths may fairly be charged to exposure, hardships, and lack of proper food and attention, and probably two or three of them also to physical abuse and torture.²

¹ Father Martinez tells (p. 117) of the friars at Ilagan being compelled by Villa to take the instruments of the town band and sally forth to salute Leyba as he returned in triumph from Nueva Vizcaya. Also (p. 127), he charges that the latter commander confiscated the forty boxes of food and comforts which a pious *mestiza* of a prominent Manila family had got together in the capital and conveyed to Aparri herself, to distribute among the friars in the valley; and that Leyba imprisoned her and sent her overland to Malolos, her trip lasting three months.

² Appendix 2 to Father Martinez's *El Cautiverio* gives the names and places of confinement of 118 friars, of whom 60 were Dominicans, including Bishop Hevia and the provisor and the secretary of his diocese, and 58 were Augustinians, including the provincial, Father Zallo, who died from abuse and disease. This included not only most of the friars who had parishes in North and South Ilokos, but also all those having parishes in the Kagayan Valley, besides the few Augustinians on the estate mentioned, and a half-dozen or more Dominicans resident in their convent college at Tugegarau. Moreover, in September, a Tagalog landing-party had taken possession of the Batanes Islands, off the north end of Luzon, and had carried away the Dominican fathers there, much to the undoubted regret of the backward populace of these islands (one of the first places to which the friars felt it safe to return in 1900-01), though they had refused to volunteer for resistance under the Spanish governor, who was slain by the Tagalogs. The information the Vatican furnished to Washington was that the captured religious numbered 130, but this included also the nuns of Bigan. Aguinaldo back-handedly assured Otis in the November correspondence that the nuns were free to go where they pleased, but it was some time later before they were actually allowed to return to Manila.

News of Aguinaldo's first order for the release of the non-military prisoners reached this valley in February; but it was only the first of a series of disappointments based on similar rumors during 1899, and they were not reached by the American advance until December of that year. Aside from the hope of forcing terms out of Spain or the Vatican by the retention of these prisoners, there seems also to have been some effort on the part of the revolutionary leaders to profit more directly by the possession in their power of Bishop Hevia. "Military Vicar-General" Aglipai visited him at a time when the hierarchy at Manila had not yet disowned him, but was showing a disposition to use him, if possible, and, probably on this account, was very well received by the bishop. He brought with him a number of seminarists who had pursued studies at Bigan and whom the revolutionists were very anxious to have ordained to supply the visible lack of parish priests, and the bishop ordained a number of them. He refused to do so in the case of some of the students (including several who had been tortured as revolutionists at Bigan in 1896), who he said were not prepared for ordination; and, when the order of release was reported in February, Tirona was instructed from Malolos to secure the ordination of these seminarists in some way before letting Hevia or the friars go. Villa accepted the mission of pressing the matter on the bishop, and it is charged that, when the latter refused to yield to arguments or threats, he removed him to a private room and beat him with his hands and with a cane, afterward keeping him three days on rice and water in the effort to make him yield.¹ When such

¹ So Father Martinez, pp. 163-64. He cautiously finds fault with the bishop for having been so compliant with Aglipai, but one cannot help wondering if letters Aglipai bore from Manila did not have something to do with this. The latter today claims that Hevia named him to discharge the duties of his bishopric for the time being. This incident grows the more curious when we learn that Aglipai made his visit as "Military Vicar-General" of the revolutionary organization which held the bishop and his associates captive, and that they saw the numbers of *La Independencia* claiming for Aglipai all the powers of a bishop or of a cardinal (Martinez, pp. 176-77).

things as this happened with a man whose position was more or less of a guaranty of safety, if not of respect, for him, we may imagine that the Tagalog military leaders were restrained in their dealings with the Kagayan populace only by the necessity of being somewhat tactful at least with the leaders, to prevent their becoming openly disloyal to Malolos, and we may perceive one reason why these people were ready to turn over their towns without resistance to the Americans when they arrived.¹

¹ Reference may here be made to the report to Admiral Dewey and the various magazine articles written by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Cadet L. R. Sargent, of the United States Navy, who in October and November, 1898, went on a trip overland through Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Kagayan, North and South Ilokos provinces. This report and these articles (published together as *Sen. Doc. 66, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.*) have not in this work been followed in regard to the status of the prisoners, nor cited in connection with the discussion of the Filipino provincial and municipal governments. They have been quoted times without number in the United States, and on them alone very comprehensive conclusions have been drawn as to the Filipino Government being entirely successful. They are, in fact, remarkable, not for what the naval officers saw and learned, but for what they did not see. Compare, for instance, with the facts related above their statements (*ibid.*, p. 35), that the friars "appeared in good health and we could detect no evidence of ill-treatment," and that José Perez, the Spanish ex-Governor of Isabela, "appeared to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts." They arrived at Iligan just after the scenes of torture under Leyba and Villa. Their statements may, indeed, be taken as indicating that the Spaniards exaggerated the hardships they suffered, and that the punishment administered to Señor Perez was at least not such as to disfigure him; but it is plain that these Americans saw and learned only what the Filipino military officials intended for them to learn. One wonders how much Spanish they knew, and how much real investigating they did, when he reads such a statement as this: "The Catholic Church itself seems to have very little hold on the people of these provinces [Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, and Kagayan]." It was in these last two provinces precisely that the friars had held the people in the most complete state of subjection and backwardness in the islands, unless, perhaps, it might have been more complete in some parts of the Bisayas. The American officers noted that the native priests were very conspicuous in the Ilokan provinces, but not in the Kagayan Valley, hence this conclusion, among others which also evidence that they were unduly influenced by the statements of a few Filipinos of progressive ideas whom they met; they did not know that the Tagalog machine was in undisputed control in the Kagayan Valley, and that in the more advanced Ilokan country it had to temporize and to rely upon the influence of the native priests, who were in consequence often more prominent than the native civil officials, to the discontent of the latter. Some of the Americans' observations are interesting and are valuable in a confirmatory way; but their report is not a document upon which, by itself, to base conclusions of any importance. They were very solemnly impressed by the ceremony at Aparri wherein Tirona

Practically all Luzon north of the Pasig River was thus in the possession of the revolutionists by the middle of September, and they had established their control, so far as outward forms go, in all except the most remote mountain regions; the conquest, too, had been most easy.¹ Southern Luzon fell into

turned over his authority to the new civil officials of the valley, and Mr. Sargent remarks: "Had the Filipino Government been allowed to work out its own salvation, this movement could hardly have failed to become historical (*ibid.*, pp. 22, 36)." The knowledge (which they could easily have obtained) that these officials were chosen at the dictation of Tirona himself would have saved solemnity at this point. The Wilcox and Sargent documents are only of value as interesting little bits of travel at an interesting time; their authors could only have been qualified to pass upon the workings of the Filipino governmental machine had they previously been familiar with conditions in these very provinces. They seem to have been astonished at finding that the masses of the people were going about their business peacefully and quietly, instead of living in a state of semi-anarchy. One might have found as great peace and quiet in any Filipino village during 1899 and 1900, except when a fight was occurring right near; the Filipinos are not in the habit of going about things noisily, and they later conducted their operations of guerrilla warfare in and about villages which pursued their ordinary daily life in the most orderly fashion. Albert Sonnichsen's *Ten Months a Captive among the Filipinos* (New York, 1901) is also of small value in so far as it describes the workings of government among the Filipinos, not alone because it is chock-full of errors about the system actually in vogue at the time, but also because the writer was totally without a basis of comparison with the preceding conditions. In the Philippine communities, peacefulness and tranquillity are the traditional outward state; but they may cover, and nearly always have covered, bossism of the most tyrannous sort, if not downright abuses and outrages. On this line, Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and Sonnichsen do not seem to have been very competent, or at least energetic, observers. Sonnichsen's book is more interesting than the writings of other Americans who were captives of the Filipinos in 1899 and 1900, and his attempts to speak favorably of the Filipinos give it a judicial tone; but some of his statements compare rather queerly with these sentences in letters which he left behind in San Isidro on May 1, 1899, when General Lawton's advance was driving the Filipinos farther to the north: "We have been treated in a most barbaric manner, starved, beaten and bound. . . . The Spaniards have been treated even worse than us, being tortured in the stocks and starved. Some hundreds are dying of dysentery and various other diseases, but, whether incapable or not, the Government does nothing for them. . . . For God's sake, can nothing be done for us? We have been starving, abused, and treated like animals." (*Rept. War Dept.*, 1899, vol. 1, part 5, p. 243, and *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, pp. 10-11.)

¹ The exceptions to this last statement are two: In the mountainous part of Morong, but not far from Manila, one hundred Spaniards held out until the fall of Manila, surrendering on August 19. The other instance was the celebrated one of Baler, the scene of vigorous resistance in 1897. Forty-seven Spanish soldiers and three friars held this isolated port on the stormy east coast of Luzon from July, 1898, when they were besieged in it, until June, 1899, sustaining repeated attacks.

line with the insurrection almost as readily, though in a few cases the Spanish resistance was not quite so easily overcome. As for the Tagalog provinces, after Trias joined his old comrades in June and took with him the rest of the native soldiers of Spain, it was only a question of capturing a few Spanish strongholds in order to give the Bakoor leaders full sway over Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas as well as Cavite. Again, the Spanish officers started their efforts at concentration too late. Near Lipa, six hundred men had to surrender, and Lipa itself soon capitulated to Paciano Rizal ; the agreement that civilians and wounded were not to be made prisoners was not respected. Sixty more prisoners, Spanish civilians and troops, fell into this leader's hands at Kalamba, after which he moved on the important town of Santa Cruz, on the Laguna de Bay. Six hundred or more Spanish civilians and soldiers were shut up here, including a half-dozen native members of the civil guard, the only members of that organization in Laguna who had not joined their fellow-countrymen. Before Manila fell, the Spanish authorities had tried several times to get the river gunboats through to the aid of the besieged towns of Kalamba and Santa Cruz, but the Filipinos held the banks of the Pasig River after the first week in June, and made it too warm for the Spanish boats. Three rather determined attacks upon Santa Cruz were repulsed before August 13 ; but after the capital had surrendered to the Americans, the Spanish military and civil officials of Laguna acceded to the terms of honorable surrender offered to them by Rizal's brother, by which the men

They had stocked up with provisions, and refused all overtures made to them for an honorable surrender after the fall of Manila ; indeed they still refused to yield after they were assured that the archipelago had been transferred by Spain to the United States and the treaty had finally been ratified, twice refusing to see emissaries whom General Diego de los Rios, the Spanish commander in authority in Manila in 1899, sent to them to order them to surrender and accept the safe-conduct of the Filipinos to Manila. They afterward declared that they thought the documents that were brought to them were forged, and they did not believe the promise of honorable surrender would be respected. They were treated as heroes upon their arrival at Manila. The captain and sixteen soldiers had died in the siege.

under arms were to be retained as prisoners of war, but the civilians and a dozen friars were to be allowed to proceed to Manila. Rizal performed his part of the contract, bearing the noncombatant prisoners to the town of Pasig, the limit of his jurisdiction; but here they were met by orders from Filipino headquarters to convey them as prisoners to Santa Ana, whence they were later transferred to Pangasinan, suffering the same fate as other Spanish civilians and friars.¹ Into Batangas there had already been brought some few prisoners and the plunder obtained by the Aguinaldo family expedition to Mindoro, including lay brothers of the order of Recollects, whose estate it was the object of the expedition to seize; several assassinations marred still more seriously the record of this expedition. The Spanish military commander in Tayabas ordered the concentration of all his fellow-countrymen living in that province in the capital in June, before the insurgent organization there was well under way; 443 soldiers and some few civilians, including friars, were gathered in the church and convent and one or two neighboring stone buildings of the town of Tayabas, which were stocked with provisions, connected with covered passageways, and prepared for defense by burning away all the thatched structures encircling them. The attacks of the Filipinos began on the 20th of June, and were frequent thereafter, the Spaniards several times repulsing them with bayonet charges. The place held out for fifty-six days, and it fell then because the malaria which causes so high a mortality in this town was decimating the force of ill-fed defenders. The surrender was absolute, but the Spaniards marched out with the honors of war, and the Filipino commander Malvar held their defense before his troops as a model to imitate.²

¹ See the report of the Spanish civil governor of Laguna, one of the parties to the capitulation: *Sitio y Rendición de Santa Cruz de la Laguna* (Manila, 1899), by Antonio del Río.

² In the *Rept. Phil. Comm.*, 1901, vol. I, opposite p. 11, may be seen a picture of the convent of Tayabas, showing the effect of the Filipino rifle fire on this building, one of those in which the Spaniards were besieged.

The only place in the territory of the Bikols in which the uprising in 1898 seems to have been entirely spontaneous was at Nueva Cáceres, the capital of the two provinces of the Camarines and the seat of the bishopric and the friar colleges, where feeling had run high in 1896 and 1897, several native priests had been tried for treason, and certain of the leading citizens had been executed and their property embargoed. News from Cavite of American protection and of a new movement for independence found eager recipients here, though at the outset no really responsible leaders. The civil guard in Nueva Cáceres and near there revolted in June, and the detachment in that town killed its superior officer, his wife and four children, and the prosecuting attorney of the province, besides wounding other Spaniards. Prisoners were released from jail, and some dark deeds of personal revenge were enacted for a few days. Still, the new local commanders gave the other Spanish officers of the provincial government, against whom there had been no personal resentment and who departed unmolested, their pay up to the day "when the Philippine Republic began to rule." Besides the captured public funds, they seized all the property of the rather well-to-do Chinese storekeepers there, and made the latter pay 150,000 pesos for the ransom of their goods. After this first outbreak, which is fairly chargeable to the long-pent-up feelings over the treatment this community had received at the hands of the Spaniards in the preceding two years, the Bikols themselves seemed quite humanely disposed, as a general thing, toward the Spaniards who had fallen into their power. As many of the latter as could had fled at the first sign of trouble. One party from Nueva Cáceres, including a number of friars and some women, went overland in June through the Bikol provinces of South Camarines and Albai, finding the people digging trenches and preparing for fighting everywhere, but being generally well treated, though at one place they had to give up the few arms they bore in the face of the hostile attitude of the small party of

native troops that had been organized. The native authorities at the important hemp port of Legaspi, promised them protection if they should remain there, but they thought it wiser to take the first steamer that arrived and proceed to Manila. A similar party of Spanish fugitives from the Bikol province of Sorsogon, in the extreme southeast of Luzon, made its way overland to Legaspi, being unmolested on the way and being allowed to leave Legaspi in peace. This all happened before the leaders at Bakoor had been able to get ready any commanders or troops to send down to Legaspi or into the Camarines, or it is almost certain that these Spaniards would not have been permitted to reach Manila. Somewhat over 1500 prisoners, mostly Spanish soldiers, eventually fell into the hands of the representatives of the Malolos military authorities in the various parts of southern Luzon, and the greater number were not released until the American military operations for the capture of the hemp ports in early 1900 drove the insurgent forces into the mountains. On February 23, 1900, over 100 of these prisoners from the Camarines were bound, fastened to trees, and slashed to pieces by detachments of bolomen under the command of Francisco Braganza, a Filipino commander sent down from northern Luzon, because, in their weakened state, they could not move rapidly enough to keep away from the American troops which sought to rescue them.¹

¹ The number is variously reported from 107 to 120. They were all Spanish soldiers. The responsibility was never fastened upon any Filipino officer of high rank. Braganza, who held the rank of major, and who was in immediate command, was brought to trial in June, 1901, at Nueva Cáceres, and was found guilty of not only ordering but personally supervising the massacre. For the publication of the findings and sentence in this case, see *General Order*, no. 291, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, 1901 (reproduced on pp. 1278-80 of *Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.). Braganza was also found guilty of robbing the persons of the slaughtered prisoners, and of having their bodies stripped and, all mutilated, left to be devoured by dogs. He was executed at Nueva Cáceres in November, 1901. In approving the sentence, Major-General Adna R. Chaffee, then commanding in the Philippines, said: "That these chiefs of the insurrection made the act of the accused their own is evidenced by the fact that they did not bring him to trial therefor nor cease to continue him in office. . . . In this, it is believed, they betrayed the better sentiments of the Filipino people, and demonstrated their lack

Aside from the desire to have in command in all parts of the archipelago men who would be loyal to the persons at the center of the revolution, there was also a special reason for the desire of the latter to control the new governmental organization in southern Luzon and in the other islands nearest it. This was the fact that they would thus be able to obtain the revenue from the shipments of hemp. They had to be content at first with stimulating from a distance the movements of the Bikols to rid themselves of the Spaniards, but before long the direction of affairs in the Bikol provinces was taken mainly into the hands of the Tagalogs. The first emissary sent into those provinces was of Bikol origin, but of a Manila family, and this commander, Vicente Lukban, later headed an expedition to the Bisayan islands Sámar and Leite to take charge of the hemp ports there. The next chief commander in the hemp country of Luzon was a Philippine citizen of nearly or quite Chinese blood, Paua by name, who had been with Aguinaldo in 1897, but whose principal qualification for his task as "general" seems to have been his ability to make the Chinese business men of Albai and the Camarines contribute their full share of taxes and "voluntary offerings." Lukban's first expedition to the hemp regions had been planned in June, but it was not until after the Filipinos at Bakoor had gained more confidence in their freedom to sail the Philippine waters, from the action of Admiral Dewey in the Olongapó matter and the withdrawal farther from Luzon of the Spanish gunboats in the central islands, that they ventured to use for expeditions around southern Luzon the five small vessels they had, aside from the Aparri steamer, that were larger than launches. Marinduke, a progressive little island of five Tagalog towns, close to Tayabas, had early organized itself. Masbate, less advanced, and less inclined to revolt, was quite readily stirred up

of comprehension of the means of governing humanely and wisely. History will surely record against them large responsibility for this, the most barbarous and revolting massacre of helpless prisoners known to the modern history of war."

by little expeditions from here and from Tayabas. Early in September, the Spanish positions in the little Romblon-Tablas-Sibuyan group of islands north of Panai were so threatened that it was deemed advisable to withdraw their small garrisons.¹ The move upon Sámar and Leite had been begun in August, both from Masbate and from the southern end of Luzon. It was not entirely an affair from without, however, as all northern Leite and two or three towns in Sámar had been ripe for trouble on their own account, since long before the return of Aguinaldo from Hongkong (indeed, it is hardly probable that they knew of this event until July or August), and the Spanish military authorities of the Bisayas had found it advisable to concentrate and keep on concentrating their small garrisons in these islands, and to abandon some of the towns where the loyalty of the civil guard was more than suspicious. This state of affairs did not, however, become acute until September or October; for it was not until the virtual withdrawal of the Spaniards from Sámar and Leite and the disappearance of their gunboats from those waters that the Tagalog organization ventured to send troops there, though emissaries had been sent down to help stir things up.

Before May 1, as if in prevision of the victory of Dewey and the isolation of Manila from the Bisayas, the Spanish Government had appointed Diego de los Rios, its chief military officer in Mindanau, governor-general and captain-general of the Bisayas and Mindanau. On June 30, it gave him power to adopt all reforms and measures of a political and administrative character that were conducive to the welfare of those provinces, meaning those things that would help to unite the people under Spain and preserve to her the sovereignty over those islands at least. Subsequently he was made governor-general of all parts of the archipelago that could not be

¹ See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 22, for a report from Marinduke on September 10, 1898, of the "bombarding" of Romblon by the little Spanish gunboats; the little Romblon group was already in the hands of the Bisayans who inhabit this group, aided, however, by a few Tagalog soldiers from the mainland of Luzon.

reached by the commands of General Augustin; but, by that time, all Luzon had passed, or was about to pass, from under Spanish control. General Rios had in May abandoned the campaign he was directing against the Moros in Mindanau, and had proceeded to establish the new capital of the central and southern islands in Iloilo, taking with him 100 Spanish and 700 native soldiers. This gave him a force for all the central islands (excluding Mindanau and the Sulú group, of course) of less than 400 Spanish soldiers,¹ many of them sick, and, at the outset, 3500 or 4000 native soldiers. The uprisings which occurred in the Bisayas in February and March had been virtually quelled by May 1, on which day the Spaniards had taken the town of Panai, in Kapis province, after an all-day fight with the hordes of natives who had seized it from the civil guard, and had burned the town "as a lesson." Except for a few minor local disturbances, things were thenceforward quiet in the central islands until October. There was as yet no reflection of the Aguinaldo movement, and communication of their plans by the Filipinos of Luzon, except in Sámar and Leite and smaller islands near Luzon, had not been easy. An evidence that something was going on under the surface was afforded, however, by the fact that in October the Spanish authorities discharged many of their native soldiers, having discovered conspiracies among the garrisons, extend-

¹ John F. Bass, who visited Iloilo in September, 1898, wrote from Manila on October 8 (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 73) that there were 800 Spanish soldiers on the island of Panai. Probably the Spanish officials and press of Iloilo exaggerated the number, for political reasons. The figures above are stated after a comparison of Spanish sources. Bass quoted from an Iloilo newspaper the charges of American brutality in Manila, the editor (who afterward, as an editor in Manila, sedulously fostered suspicion and hatred of the Americans among the Filipinos) claiming to know that the Americans had definitely adopted a policy of extermination. His charges read very much like those the Englishman, John Foreman, made two, and even six, years later (*National Review*, September, 1900, and *Contemporary Review*, September, 1904). Bass says, however, that the natives did not seem to be much impressed by the newspaper campaign, but would, apparently, "welcome an American Government enthusiastically. The inhabitants of the island of Panai are not on friendly terms with those of Luzon, and at heart they do not like the idea of being governed by Tagalogs from Luzon."

ing even into the Moro country; 117 of the conspirators believed most guilty were quite summarily shot. General Rios soon followed this step by ordering the concentration in Iloilo and Sebú of all Spaniards and Spanish troops in the Bisayas; the friars had begun to concentrate upon their own initiative before this. Small expeditions from Luzon had by this time disembarked also upon the north and west coast of Panai, and were making headway toward the capture of Antike and Kapis provinces, though the people were in large part apathetic, and in some instances actually hostile, and the Tagalog commanders had met with some reverses before the Spanish troops were all withdrawn to Iloilo.¹ Some idea of the Spanish resources in the central islands may be obtained from the fact that General Rios had for the defense of Iloilo, the new Bisayan capital, about 300 Spanish soldiers and three little mountain guns, besides about 2500 native soldiers, many disposed to desert when the favorable opportunity offered; and that Sebú was garrisoned by less than 100 Spanish soldiers and a few marines, assisted by some small gunboats. In the latter city, the Spaniards still had, however, some Moro warriors from Samboanga, Mindanau, who had been offered by their chief, a Moro with Spanish blood, to help put down the rebellion in Sebú during the preceding March and April. Sebú

¹ See the report of the governor of Antike province for 1901 (*Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 487) for some data about the expedition under Leandro Fullon, which landed in the northwest part of Antike late in September with 140 soldiers from Cavite and 340 rifles. At first, some of the detachments of the civil guard deserted to them. Then they suffered a defeat at the hands of a detachment of native troops of Spain, after which various of the local presidents, to whom rifles had been given to arm their people, turned the guns over to the Spaniards. Fullon had to take to the mountains, his force reduced to 100 rifles. Angel Salazar, like Fullon, a Bisayan by origin, with whom he had been sent down from Luzon to organize a Filipino government in Antike, defeated a Spanish detachment in October, and desertions of the native troops to the Filipino organizers began again. Thus reinforced, and aided by the withdrawal of Spanish troops to Iloilo, the Filipinos moved to occupy the southern and more populous part of Antike, entering San José, the capital, on November 22, and burning all the official records, including land registration books, to "wipe out the last vestiges of Spanish rule."

was perhaps as little disposed to rebel against Spanish rule as any island in the group, the populace in general being very peaceable, though there was an element of educated men heartily in sympathy with the movement for reform in the Philippines. But Spain could not have chosen a better method to alienate the sympathies she had in the island than by letting loose, as she did, the fierce and uncivilized Moro bolomen to "regulate" the population, a task very much to their taste. The presence of these Moros, and the zeal of the Spanish military officials in imprisoning prominent residents during the fall of 1898, completed the work of the preceding spring in gaining for Spain the ill-will of practically the entire population of the island. But there was no open outbreak and the island was externally at peace when the Spaniards withdrew to Samboanga in December.¹

For over a month before it was decided to abandon the Bisayas, Iloilo had been beset, though at a safe distance, by a cordon of Filipinos, at first mostly bolomen, but gradually becoming equipped with some hundreds of rifles;² and General Rios had been forced to give up all hopes of reaching a harmonious agreement with the Bisayan leaders which might assume Spanish sovereignty against the conspiracy of the Tagalogs, and perhaps also against an attempt by the United States. He had made use of the authority granted to him to organize a "Reform Junta," composed of a few Spaniards or *mestizos* addicted to Spain and also of certain of the more distinguished and wealthy lawyers and plantation owners among the Filipinos. The membership of this committee gave no

¹ See *La Independencia*, November 16, 1898, for reports reaching Malolos about the Moros and Spanish scouts around Sebu preventing the people going out to gather their crops in the fields, and other abuses; also *ibid.*, November 22, 1898, for a letter from Iloilo rehearsing tales from Sebu about these abuses and the imprisonment and torture of prominent Sebuans. This letter also declares that the Filipino forces under Martin Delgado have held Iloilo besieged since November 4, and contains one of the characteristic exaggerations of the time in the statement that over 25,000 Filipinos are under arms in Panai.

² The Spanish writers expand them into thousands.

promise for agreement on any measures of reform, or, indeed, for any frankness of speech among themselves; and Rios's appeal to the people to remain loyal, offering to submit all "suitable reforms" to his Government, had lost whatever effect it might have had by being coupled with a request for the co-operation of the friar priests and a eulogy of their work.¹

It only remains to complete the picture of the Spanish collapse of power in the Bisayas by relating how, on November 6, 1898, the Spanish garrison and Government officials of the important sugar province of western Negros had formally surrendered, at Bakolod, its capital, the government and all its property to a Filipino commander whose men were armed with more cornstalks and bolos than rifles.² After the withdrawal of the Sebú and Iloilo garrisons, on December 20 and 24 respectively, Spain held only her military posts at Samboanga and Joló, in the midst of the Moro country, where her claims to sovereignty had never yet really been made good.

Outside of Negros, whence the Spaniards departed in peace, there were no Spanish prisoners captured in the Bisayas, except for a score or so in Antike, and perhaps here and there a stray

¹ See Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 524. The Spanish editor who had been temporarily banished from Manila journalism in February, 1898, for broaching a campaign of reform and putting Primo de Rivera in a rather ridiculous position, headed this committee. With its Spanish and pro-Spanish members eliminated, it afterward became the "Committee of the Bisayas," which for a time treated with the American authorities in Manila, and finally worked more or less in harmony with the Malolos Government.

² See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 10, appendix TT, for some account of the overthrow of Spanish authority in Negros and the establishment of a Filipino provincial government in November, 1898. The articles of capitulation at Bakolod are cited in Captain Verdades's *Historia Negra*, pp. 33-35. They copied quite literally the terms of the capitulation at Manila. The Spanish civil and military authorities delivered up the government in true formal style, with its buildings and funds and their arms, and in return were given their liberty and a daily allowance of money, eventually being permitted to depart for Iloilo in peace. The friars, however, were shut up, and some of them were put to work on the Government farm at La Carlota. It is credibly stated that they were frightened into surrender by the report of an officer who, from the church tower, surveyed the "hosts" advancing against them, which had for this purpose been provided with cornstalks to bear as rifles, and reported that there were "thousands of rifles." The Spaniards had from 400 to 600 troops in Bakolod, but nearly all were native soldiers.

civilian. The record of the insurrection in those islands, such as there was of it prior to the beginning of armed opposition to the United States, was therefore quite free from deeds of violence, and was conducted, indeed, on a dignified basis. It was in Luzon, where alone the Filipino national movement had gained good headway before the close of 1898, that deeds had been committed which foreshadowed the more serious crimes that were to stain the record of the revolution later on, when it should find itself no longer triumphant, but in desperate straits to maintain its dominance over the people. These crimes of 1898 were altogether too frequent and too comprehensive, as we have seen, to call them isolated cases. Moreover, the whole conduct of the Malolos chieftains toward the question of releasing their friar and civilian Spanish prisoners precludes them from denying their share of responsibility for the darker deeds of violence, as well as for the many minor abuses not compatible with civilized warfare. And when we find the Secretary of War, Aguinaldo's brother, at the time when the Americans were beginning to drive the latter northward from Manila, instructing an officer of high rank at Malolos to search out an unhealthy town for the place of confinement of the friars held by the revolutionists in central Luzon, we have an infallible indication of the low moral tone of the sort of Filipinos who unfortunately predominated in the counsels of the would-be government.¹ Yet it is perhaps unfair to arraign a whole population upon the basis of deeds done by their least cultivated leaders, or for the instances of personal revenge taken after fashions already shown them by their Spanish victims. And aside from the more shocking incidents of crime,

¹ Baldomero Aguinaldo had instructed General Isidoro Torres to find an unhealthy town for the concentration of the friars, as appears from the note the latter wrote to him at Malolos on February 17, 1898, which is among the captured documents in the War Department, and which was cited by Senator Spooner in a speech on May 29 and 31, 1902 (*Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6130). Torres recommended the town of La Paz, Tarlak, saying: "According to my observation, even the persons born there are attacked by malarial fever and ague, and if they are strangers, very few will escape death."

the picture was not quite so dark as the Spanish prisoners have painted it in their tales, which simulate martyrdom. It is known that in many places the prisoners (except, as a general rule, the friars) lived on quite amicable terms with their captors, and that frequently they had virtual freedom within local limits — though how commonly this was due to the bribery of the officers in command or to their enjoyment of the favor of Filipino women is another question.

Tagalog military control had not been hard to maintain in the Bikol and Kagayan provinces, hitherto generally most peaceful and submissive. The case was somewhat different with the more advanced towns of the Ilokan provinces, where the Malolos commanders had to mix diplomacy with their show of invading force and to employ the native priests to commandeer the people, and with the provinces where the Pangasinan and Pampangan dialects were spoken. The latter had had some share in previous revolts, some of their leaders were discontented over the Biak-na-bató settlement and were not cheerfully disposed toward the head of the Malolos machine, while there was also a strong pro-Spanish element, at least in Pangasinan. This last took the form of an organization called the "Guards of Honor," which had been called into being among some of the more ignorant and fanatic populations of Pangasinan and Sambales the year before by friar priests, for the purpose of combating the spread of Katipunan ideas, and which was now being similarly employed by certain native priests in Pangasinan and Tarlak who were addicted to the friar hierarchy at Manila and opposed to the talk of a "Filipino priesthood." Dealing with such ignorant masses, it is hard to recognize anything like real "public opinion" in the clashes of the opposing causes; they are only significant as indicating the kind of division which existed, and still to some extent exists in those regions, among the Filipinos of some degree of education, both priests and laymen. The religious question was undoubtedly in the background of the disturbances in

Tarlak, Pangasinan, and to a certain extent in Sambales and Unión provinces, in November and December of 1898. Those disturbances are also to a considerable extent evidence of opposition to Tagalog dominance, of lack of sympathy with the insurrection, and, more than either of these, of protest against the abuses which the new provincial and municipal officials were committing, right and left, in the first flush of their new-found power. The insurrection at Malolos had, indeed, to count in December with an insurrection against itself, which assumed considerable proportions at one time and required vigorous efforts to put it down.¹ Other dissensions in camp

¹ See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 27, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, for telegrams of November, December, and January with regard to the uprising against Aguinaldo's subordinates in Tarlak and Pangasinan. On November 7, Colonel Hizón reported that he had imprisoned certain rebellious local chiefs and confiscated their property, which action Aguinaldo commended. On November 30 and December 18, General Makabulos, who had had to give the matter his personal attention, minimized the trouble, charging it to *tulisanes* (bandits), but reporting one four-hour fight. On December 27, Sandiko wired Aguinaldo from Manila his information that affairs in the disturbed provinces were very serious, adding: "It is impossible to describe the abuses committed by the military and civil authorities of the said provinces." On December 27 and 28, reports of fighting came from a number of places; Secretary of the Interior Ibarra sought to minimize the importance of the outbreak, yet recommended the proclamation of martial law in Tarlak. Within the next day or two prominent civil officials, including one Cabinet officer and various army officers, including General Luna, went to Tarlak to quell the trouble; it was also planned to have Aglipai go there, to enlist the aid of refractory native priests. In his *Episodios de la revolución filipina*, p. 71, Father Durán says this revolt in Tarlak was headed by an ex-sergeant of the civil guard, who, with ten companions, was slaughtered at a feast to which he had been invited by the president of Kamiling, Tarlak. *La Independencia*, November 30, 1898, prints a sweeping denial of the reports published by Spanish papers in Manila to the effect that the people of central Luzon and the Bisayas were opposed to the Malolos Government, and says the whole trouble in Luzon is caused by the fanatic "Guards of Honor." On December 22, a decree of Aguinaldo forbade the entry of people into Sambales from Pangasinan, Tarlak, Bataan, or Pampanga, unless they had passes, in order "to prevent crimes being committed" in Sambales. The echoes of the trouble lasted long after the outbreak of fighting with the United States had come partially to unite the Filipinos; indeed, these dissensions had something to do with the manner of the collapse of the Filipino organization. In March, Aguinaldo appointed commissioners to inspect the conditions of local government in northern Luzon and bring offenders to trial; on March 21, he appointed a delegate to hold entirely new elections in Tarlak; and again, on June 26, a commissioner was sent to Pangasinan to investigate abuses by the local officials. (See again *Taylor's Rept.*)

during 1898 were mainly personal in character, though sometimes indicative of tribal feeling also. Ilokan half-castes had been quite prominent in the reform propaganda in Spain, and it was felt that this element must be placated by recognizing some of its leaders. Besides this, Antonio Luna was said to have dedicated himself to the study of military science in Europe, with a view to its future use in the Philippines, and Filipino sentiment quite generally demanded that he be given recognition in the programme of military organization.¹ It was precisely here, however, that Aguinaldo felt himself to be pre-eminent, and could not brook the thought of a rival. Luna was appointed "Director of War," with a somewhat anomalous combination of staff and field supervisory powers. But Emilio Aguinaldo had no intention of yielding the supreme command of military affairs, and his cousin Baldomero was Secretary of War; even had there been no personal jealousy, a clash would have come under this triple-headed arrangement for military leadership, and there was from the first no cordiality between Luna and the Aguinaldos.² The proscriptions of the Cavite revolt of 1896-97 were recalled also by the vindictiveness displayed at Bakoor toward certain Pampangan and Pangasinan leaders of 1897 who had clashed with Aguinaldo over the division of the Biak-na-bató money, who had found it was not safe to go into their own provinces after his military organization had been set up there, and who for a time before the fall of Manila took refuge on one of Dewey's ves-

¹ Antonio and Juan Luna, mention of whose rather abject retractions of anti-Spanish or anti-Catholic sentiments after their arrest and trial in 1896 has been made in chapter III (*ante*, pp. 113, 114), had been released after a brief imprisonment in Spain. Juan, the painter, died in Hongkong in 1898, while awaiting a chance to return to the Philippines. Antonio arrived there soon after the fall of Manila.

² See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 27-29, for messages exchanged in November between Emilio and Baldomero Aguinaldo, indicating one of the first series of clashes between them and Luna. Aguinaldo was always suspicious and afraid of Luna. Almost simultaneously with the latter's entry into the new military organization, *La Independencia*, first published at Manila and then at Malolos, appeared to rival the official organ of Aguinaldo and it was generally recognized as Luna's organ.

sels in the bay. Friction there was also, of a local sort, over whether the military or civil officials should administer the confiscated Spanish property and the "booty" of a more personal sort; also over the requirement that the local officials must quarter and supply the troops which passed through their towns or were garrisoned in them.¹

There were desertions among the Filipino troops, even before the stress of warfare had begun, and even in the Tagalog provinces.² The enlistments had been to a large extent compulsory, military discipline under all but a very few commanders was lax, and the people also wished to attend to the gathering of their crops. Still, there were always more men on hand than rifles. It has been estimated that the Filipinos had, when the outbreak against the United States began, upwards of 25,000 rifles, and that they eventually possessed about 35,000, of which not more than 2500 were in the Bisayan Islands: of this total, they had obtained 10,000 or 12,000 from the Spaniards whom they had made prisoners and from the desertions with their weapons of native members of the Spanish army and the civil guard; several thousand more firearms, of a nondescript pattern, came forth from the hiding-places of those who had them in the revolt of 1896-97 and from the retreats of the motley band of outlaws in the mountains, whose connection with the organized insurrection was sporadic; and the rest were obtained by shipments from Asia.³ Whether or no

¹ See the decree of Aguinaldo of September 3, 1898 (*Taylor's Rept.*), entrusting the administration of all "booty" and confiscated property to the military and not the civil officers, and requiring the local governments to quarter soldiers at their own expense.

² See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 28, 29, for reports of desertions in Tayabas and Nueva Ecija in November, 1898; in the former case, Lukban declared it was because of insufficient food.

³ The number of arms in the possession of the Filipinos in 1899 and 1900 has frequently been put at a higher figure than 35,000; but this is more likely an over-than an under-estimate. General Merritt was probably about right when he told the Peace Commission at Paris that they had 15,000 to 20,000 rifles when he left Manila, although Major Bell, military-information officer, had reported to him a total of 40,000, estimating that the Filipinos had 15,000 rifles left from the former

Admiral Dewey had stated that he would seize these arms, the Filipinos evidently feared that he would, and, after the American troops arrived in the bay, they never again ventured to bring a shipment from Hongkong or Macau direct to Cavite. Perhaps 10,000 rifles, with a large amount of ammunition, were brought by contraband traders to Batangas, Aparri, and small islands near Luzon during 1898; and it may be that an equal number were surreptitiously introduced into these places and the Bisayas during the succeeding year, when the navy gunboats were patrolling the coasts as well as might be, but the total prevention of contraband trade was impossible. Some of the funds which were on deposit in Aguinaldo's name in Hongkong were also used to start a large though crude sort of arsenal and cartridge-factory at Imus in July, 1898; and the revolutionary funds supported this and another in Bulakán until they fell into the hands of the American soldiers. In October, Admiral Dewey had seized the five small steam vessels which Aguinaldo had for inter-island communication and the steam launches that plied about the bay flying the Filipino flag.¹ Just before, one of Dewey's vessels had captured at

insurrection (which was three to five times as many as they had in 1896-97), and had secured 20,000 by captures of Spanish troops and desertions of Filipinos (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 379-80).

¹ In a memorandum for General Otis on Aguinaldo's letter of August 27 to General Merritt, asking the latter, among other things, to "reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships for their free navigation," Major J. F. Bell said: "Admiral Dewey . . . has been much concerned and displeased by Aguinaldo's course of conduct, and told me several days ago that he had ceased to recognize him in any way and had refused to any longer receive his representatives. This prayer to you to 'reclaim' Admiral Dewey's protection is doubtless due to this change of attitude on the admiral's part, who, if permitted to follow his own inclinations, will not only grant Aguinaldo no protection, but will seize his boats and launches at the first overt act." (See *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 26.) In "A Filipino Appeal to the American People," contributed to the *North American Review* for January, 1900, over Apolinario Mabini's signature, it is stated that, when Aguinaldo's commissioners went to Dewey in October, 1898, to ask the return of these boats, they were received very haughtily by the latter, he scolding and berating Aguinaldo, and treating the commissioners so brusquely that Major Bell, who accompanied them, openly expressed his disgust at the admiral's manner. (This alleged contribution by Mabini, which must have been written, if at all by him, when

Batangas a steamer which had brought arms shipped from Macau by American agents of Aguinaldo there, though the arms themselves had already been landed and taken inland.¹ Later on, steamers engaged in the inter-island trade had to be seized by the military authorities for distributing arms and soldiers from island to island. The Malolos Government had its quartermasters and shipping agents in the port of Manila quite as it had a committee of tax-collectors and a number of organizers of native militia in the various districts of the city. As far back as September, Filipino "clubs" had begun to be organized in Manila, and in November, when the result of the negotiations at Paris was foreshadowed, the work of establishing these centers was pushed in all its districts. Ostensibly, they were "popular clubs," for recreation, athletic exercise, etc.; but in reality they were even more than centers of the revolutionary propaganda, for they were designed to form

he was in retirement in Pangasinan province in the fall of 1899, has not been herein considered, in connection with its charges as to an "alliance" between the United States and the Filipinos; for, if it is Mabini's at all, its style has undergone a complete change in translation, and it does not read like Mabini in substance. As will be seen in chapter XI, pp. 404 ff., Mabini himself, early in 1899, put the quietus to the claim of an "alliance.")

¹ See *Bureau of Navigation*, p. 126, for the Batangas seizure. See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 22, for evidence of the previous landing of arms at Batangas. The design of the Filipinos later to make extensive shipments from Shanghai to Aparri, at the northern end of Luzon, was pretty effectively prevented by the patrol the navy maintained of the northern coasts of Luzon. Information of this attempt came to Otis through the Filipino in Manila whom Aguinaldo desired to employ as a banker to negotiate the purchases in Hongkong and Shanghai; he wished to invest \$100,000 in a single purchase of arms. *Corr. Rel. War* contains messages between Manila and Washington in November and December, 1898, regarding these projects, and the injunctions of Washington that Dewey and Otis cooperate to prevent the landing of contraband. Here the foundation was laid for the later downright disagreements between the two commanders in the Philippines, regarding the blockade, shipping in the archipelago, and things in general. Dewey thought the permits for trade from Manila, and thence from island to island, neutralized all his efforts to prevent the transportation of Filipino soldiers from one island to another and the introduction of arms in places free from insurrection; evidence in favor of this view is obtained in *General Orders, Military Governor, Philippines*, no. 33, July 31, 1899, confiscating the inter-island steamer *Toneng* for a long series of contraband operations in and near southern Luzon from October, 1898, to January, 1899.

the nucleus of a militia to be used in an uprising inside the city when the time should come.¹

¹ The files of *La Independencia* for November, 1898, contain plenty of information about these "clubs," sufficient to give more than a hint of their character. On November 29, their "directors" went to Malolos to pay their respects to Aguinaldo. The chief organizer of these circles and of the Filipino militia in Manila was Teodoro Sandiko, who was until December an employee of the American provost-marshal-general in Manila, who had, before resigning his post in the center of American affairs, become Director of Diplomacy for the Malolos Government, and who later became Secretary of the Interior at Malolos. He had entered the employ of the Americans solely to facilitate this work.

CHAPTER IX

THE TREATY OF PARIS

WHILE in the Philippine Islands themselves Spain's house was thus tumbling down about her like a stack of cards, abroad her power of sovereignty was reduced to the mere utterance of the feeble word which confirmed their alienation. The first official indication of a determination on the part of the United States Government to have a hand in deciding the future of the Philippines was given at the same time that Spain was compelled to renounce all her possessions in American waters, in connection with the negotiation of a preliminary peace in July and August. The spread of the revolution to the central islands was simultaneous with the more definitive negotiations for peace, wherein the sovereignty over the Philippines was the real crux ; and Spain's giving way at Paris was followed by her surrender of the slender foothold she still held in the Bisayas. There are many reasons for thinking that she had from the first abandoned the hope, if not the desire, of retaining the Philippines, but that she proposed to use them to the utmost advantage in securing a bargain for herself, and that, if the United States did not insist upon their being surrendered, she was all ready to dispose of her rights in the highest market. But, of course, the Spanish Government never proclaimed this intention abroad, and her attitude at Paris was, indeed, carefully calculated to make her appear in the rôle of a surprised and deceived victim of aggression.

On July 30, 1898, in reply to Spain's proposal for peace made through the French ambassador at Washington on July 26, President McKinley demanded of Spain the immediate relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba, the object of the war, and, while waiving the claim of the United States to

pecuniary indemnity for the costs of the war, inferentially substituted for such indemnity the sovereignty of Porto Rico and an island in the Ladrone group. The third of the terms of peace as outlined by him read: "On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." Spain's Minister of State, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, replied on August 7, accepting the first two conditions, but complaining that the terms regarding the Philippines seemed "quite indefinite." The Americans, in spite of the siege of their native allies, had not yet, he declared, been able to take Manila, and he argued that Spain's sovereignty over the entire archipelago was still unimpaired. "As the intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not *a priori* renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the conditions of these possessions and the level of the culture of their inhabitants may render desirable." The question of the Philippines had already been the subject of considerable cabling between Ambassador Cambon and the Spanish Ministry, and at the ambassador's request the words "control, possession, and government of the Philippines" in the American note of July 30 had been changed to "control, disposition, and government of the Philippines"; Spain did not wish it to appear that the future sovereignty of the Philippines was a prejudged matter, said M. Cambon, and the President and Secretary of State had regarded the phrase as covering quite as wide a scope in one form as the other, and had declared in substance, that "the case was not prejudged either as to the United States or as to Spain." But the Spanish note of August 7 was deemed by the President evasive and unsatisfactory, and, although the ambassador assured him that his cor-

respondence showed Spain's intention to accept the conditions outlined, he had a protocol drawn up, which should "state precisely" the bases upon which the peace should be temporarily proclaimed and upon which the formal negotiations for a treaty should proceed. Hostilities were, therefore, not proclaimed to be suspended until M. Cambon had on the 12th received from Spain authority to sign the protocol in her behalf; and he and Secretary of State Day were putting their pens to it at about the hour the American forces were preparing to enter Manila (about 5 P.M. on August 12 in Washington, and about 6 A.M. on August 13 in Manila). It said simply, as to the Philippines: "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."¹

Spain was given permission to resume her shipping of merchandise and her mail service to the Philippines, immediately after the temporary peace was made. On August 29, and during the two months following (until the United States had made definite demand for the Philippines at Paris), Spain put forth various protests against the treatment of Spanish prisoners in the Philippines, and demanded that the United States recognize its own responsibility in the premises, or let Spain use against the Filipinos the troops surrendered at Manila, or at least let the Spanish Government send reinforcements to deal with them. If there had been no other ground for refusal, the United States must have declined thus to put itself in the light of a protector of Spanish interests in the islands and an enemy

¹ The fullest source of information in English on the diplomatic correspondence regarding the war with Spain is, of course, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898* (American Red Book, hereafter cited as *For. Rel., 1898*), which contains the correspondence regarding the protocol, its text, etc., on pp. 819-30. *Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.*, which was published primarily to display the negotiations at Paris, but which contains much other material already referred to herein, recites the same documents on pp. 272-84 of part 2. The differences between Spain and the United States regarding the provisions about the Philippines in the protocol were fully aired in the negotiations at Paris, and will be mentioned further on.

of the Filipinos. All the demands of this sort, whether presented through the French ambassador at Washington or through the Spanish treaty commissioners at Paris, will not be judged unfairly if it be stated that the Spanish Ministry had no expectation (indeed, strictly speaking, probably no desire) of seeing them fulfilled, but, having recovered their breath, were now keeping up a show of sovereignty over the Philippines, for reasons already suggested. The positions which they assumed in this correspondence were clearly inconsistent with each other. If the United States would not let them use fresh troops or those in Manila against the insurgents, then, they argued, the United States must itself rescue the prisoners from barbarous treatment, must constitute itself policeman of the Filipinos in the whole archipelago; yet, at the same time, Spain was formally interposing the most comprehensive demands with regard to strictly limiting the Americans in Manila to the territory and the powers which the protocol conferred, instead of those of a military conqueror. On September 11, M. Cambon submitted at Washington a formal statement of Spain's view of the protocol and its effect in the Philippines, which was, in effect: (1) The Americans occupy Manila by virtue of the protocol, not of the surrender made to them after the protocol was signed, in consequence simply of the failure of telegraphic communication; (2) they cannot change the laws and methods of administration there while they are in control, as it is not a case of "military occupation," and the customs laws, in particular, must not be changed or the customs revenues diverted to other than the prescribed purposes; (3) the Spanish troops in the city of Manila must be set free, as the terms of the capitulation are void; (4) the United States must secure from the Tagalogs the release of the Spanish prisoners (all of whom were imprisoned outside of Manila, within which place Spain sought to hold the United States so literally); (5) the Filipino vessels ought not to be allowed to fly an unrecognized flag and to clear from Manila for other ports of the

islands (something which never occurred after the Americans occupied Manila), as otherwise Spain must arm her merchant-vessels and treat them as pirates. The American reply, on September 16, called attention to the fact that this tardy protest of Spain seemed to be an afterthought, and declined to concur in the view that the occupation of Manila was in consequence of the protocol and not of the Spanish capitulation, saying: "It is the opinion of this Government that the suspension of hostilities is to be considered as having taken effect at the date of the receipt of notice." Spain entered a final formal protest against this view of the occupation of Manila, in a note to M. Cambon on October 4, pressing particularly to the front her complaints about the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the archipelago. Secretary Hay denied, on October 29, that the United States was sending war-vessels to the archipelago, and the correspondence came naturally to an end when the possession of the Philippines became the center of the discussion at Paris. At the first session of the treaty commissioners, on October 1, the Spaniards had demanded that the *status quo ante* be restored in Manila and that the protocol govern the American occupation in every respect; but the American commissioners had insisted that this was properly a matter for direct negotiation between the two Governments, and that the position of the American Government had already been made plain. The Spaniards reserved the right to refer to the matter again if the *status quo* in the Philippines should be further altered in a degree serious to them; but they never again made a formal protest on the matter, although complaining informally, on October 17, of the American reinforcements reported as being sent to the Philippines, in view of the fact that they were prevented by the conditions of peace from enlarging their own forces of opposition to the Filipinos.¹

¹ The dispatch in which this complaint was reported to Washington by Chairman Day of the American Commission is given on pp. 928-29 of *For. Rel.*, 1898. The American Commission suggested: "Might not our Government, in reply to representations which it has received, or probably will receive, from Spanish Govern-

The two peace commissions assembled at Paris the last of September. The American Commission was composed of Mr. William R. Day (who had just resigned the office of Secretary of State, in which he had been intimately connected with the previous diplomatic correspondence relating to the war), Senators Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, and George Gray, and Mr. Whitelaw Reid. Its instructions from President McKinley at the time of its departure were, of course, specific as to Cuba and Porto Rico, and were more specific as to the Philippines than was known at the time or could have been guessed from anything in the attitude thus far publicly assumed upon this phase of the problem by the Government at Washington. Manila and its suburbs were "held by the United States by conquest as well as by virtue of the protocol," said President McKinley; and after some observations with regard to the righteousness of the American cause, to the growth of the nation's responsibilities in consequence of the enlargement of the war's sphere, to the duty resting upon it to treat magnanimously a foe defeated in a war undertaken upon humane considerations, he instructed his commissioners that "the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon," together with commercial privileges in the other islands in the Philip-

ment, offer to take more active and positive measures than heretofore for preservation of order and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands?" The difficulty at Washington was that such action would promptly incur the enmity of the Filipinos; it was logical to ask Spain to consent to the extension of American authority outside of Manila, if she wished to hold the United States responsible for the conduct of the Tagalog army, but she could not have given such consent without virtually admitting her loss of sovereignty in the islands. The entire correspondence conducted through the French embassy with regard to the Philippines will be found in *For. Rel.*, 1898, pp. 784-818 (also, up to September 6, in *Sen. Doc.* 62, pp. 284-318). It centered more particularly about the treatment of the Spanish prisoners by the Filipinos, and its most important features have been summarized in chapter VIII, p. 328 *ff.*, in discussing the subject of the Filipinos' prisoners. "The refusal of the United States to allow Spain to use her troops has contributed to the spread of the insurrection," declared Spain, in the note of October 4. This statement was undoubtedly true, but the complicated situation in the islands was not to be described in any such simple fashion.

pine group.¹ Nevertheless, the wording of the instructions with reference to Luzon did not confine the commissioners to a demand for that island alone, and the question was felt to be still open at Washington. General Merritt had been ordered to report at Paris, bringing also the views of Admiral Dewey and the best information of military circles at Manila. On the day after the protocol was signed, Admiral Dewey was asked to cable any "important information" he had about the Philippines: "the desirability of the several islands; the character of their population; coal and other mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages, and in a naval and commercial sense which would be the most advantageous." Dewey of course replied that Luzon was the best island to take, whether from commercial or strategical considerations.² These messages, taken in connection with the instructions to the

¹ The President's instructions, together with the cable correspondence between him and the commissioners in Paris, were submitted to the Senate, in response to a resolution of inquiry, in January, 1899; but the injunction of secrecy was not removed from these papers until January, 1901, after which they were ordered printed as *Sen. Doc. 148*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. At the same time, the volume on Foreign Relations, for 1898, which had been held back for two years, was prepared for publication; its pages 904-66 are identical with *Sen. Doc. 148*. A piquant review of the negotiations at Paris, in the light of this new information, from the pen of Sidney Webster, appeared in the *North American Review* for June, 1901, under the title "Revelations of a Senate Document." These passages of the President's instructions indicate the workings of his mind at the time: —

"The presence and success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our efforts, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

"Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges."

² See *Bureau of Navigation*, pp. 122-23, for both cablegrams.

Peace Commission, are entirely consistent with the supposition that President McKinley had in mind the securing of a naval station and of a commercial depot at the doors of Asia, and, while aware in an indefinite way of possible responsibilities which the progress of the insurrection in the archipelago had imposed upon the United States, was disinclined to make the radical break with American traditions which the assumption of sovereignty over this large and distant group of islands would involve. But to set Luzon apart from its sister islands of the group was to take two fifths of the territory of the archipelago, including the metropolis and only important port in the group, and the island upon which lived seven of the eight civilized tribes of Filipinos. For a naval station merely, some other island could have been substituted. Commercially, Luzon was either too much or too little to take; in Manila centered the business of the whole archipelago, especially the hemp shipments, and to a large degree the sugar shipments from the Bisayas. Politically, to plant American power in the very heart of the group and to assume control of the island that was overshadowingly the most important, while leaving Spain, or more likely Germany, as the sovereign of Luzon's neighboring and dependent sisters, was to invite the possibility of all sorts of complications. All these things began very speedily to press themselves upon the attention not only of the President, as he gained information from officers returned from Manila and from private sources, but also particularly upon the attention of the commissioners at Paris, who had been able to defer the formulation of any demands as to the Philippines until they could make special inquiry as to the conditions. Moreover, considerations of another sort soon came to claim attention in preference to naval or commercial advantages: it was realized, rather tardily, that the setting on foot of another rebellion in the Philippines had led to consequences beyond the control, it might be also beyond the ken as yet, of the American commanders in the islands; to take

only Luzon, the head and front of the Filipino national movement, was to assume all the responsibility for a delicate problem of adjustment, while voluntarily relinquishing that full control of the situation which, it was dimly felt, would alone make possible such a satisfactory adjustment of conditions to Filipino aspirations as would acquit the United States of playing first the blunderer and then the shirk. It was this view of the case which forced itself more and more upon the attention, as the news from the islands told of the very great broadening of what had been contemptuously regarded as the "Aguinaldo movement." The witnesses before the Peace Commission at Paris in October made it plain that the United States could not evade a large share of responsibility for the complicated state of affairs existing in the Philippines. Without exception, too, the testimony of those who had come into touch with the situation was that the Filipinos would never rest under Spanish sovereignty again. On the other hand, the trend of all the oral and written testimony at Paris was to the effect that it would be easy for the United States to come to terms with the Filipinos; this optimism was most marked in the case of the superior commanders, who knew least about the actual facts of the situation and were least cautious about hazarding sweeping opinions, yet whose testimony carried most weight at the time.¹

¹ *Sen. Doc. 62* is the source as to the evidence regarding the Philippines presented at Paris and at Washington from September to November, 1898. General Merritt's testimony and the papers he brought from Manila will be found on pp. 362-89. He himself thought there was small possibility of serious trouble with the Filipinos. Admiral Dewey presented a brief paper in favor of the choice of Luzon, based on his assumption, from the cablegrams he had received, that the United States meant to take only one island; therefore, on October 4, the commissioners requested that Dewey be asked if he thought it best to take the whole archipelago. The only clear-cut information came from General Greene, Major Bourns, and Major Bell. Writing on August 27, General Greene had said: "If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish

The Spanish commissioners at Paris remained during October in a purely expectant attitude as to the American demand regarding the Philippines. The American commissioners had meanwhile disagreed among themselves as to what their demand should be, and had, on October 25, cabled at length their respective opinions, asking the President for final and definite instructions. Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid believed it impracticable to divide the archipelago; regarded the restoration of Spanish power over it as a whole as being impossible; pointed out that the Bisayas were now in revolt, and Spain would only sell them if left in possession, and were optimistic as to the ease of ruling the Filipinos; pressing forward commercial considerations, they would, if the whole archipelago was not to be taken, demand in addition to Luzon the undeveloped

power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection." Upon his return to Washington, this same officer furnished a valuable memorandum (*ibid.*, pp. 424-40) upon conditions in the Philippines, in which he again plainly set forth the impossibility of overlooking the insurgents as a factor in the situation, saying: "The United States Government, through its naval commander, has to some extent made use of them for a distinctly military purpose, viz., to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops. . . ." Following Dewey and Merritt, the commissioners cabled to Washington on October 7 that General Anderson had at first "seemed to treat Aguinaldo and his forces as allies," but that "Merritt and Dewey both kept clear of any compromising communications." (As Anderson pointedly remarked in the *Chicago Record-Herald* for July 11, 1902, "it did not require any correspondence to induce Aguinaldo to start his insurrection.") John Foreman, who, for lack of other recent treatises on the Philippines in English, was at the time assigned fictitious value as an "authority," was summoned from England to testify, and furnished a blend of information and misinformation (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 441-71). The other testimony obtained at this time, most of it comprised in written statements or in articles from encyclopædias or periodicals, concerned mainly the resources of the Philippine Islands. In this connection, the preliminary report on the mineral resources of the Philippines (*ibid.*, pp. 513-18) by Dr. G. F. Becker, who accompanied the first military expedition to the Philippines at the request of his chief, the Director of the United States Geological Survey; the notes on the strategic importance and the mineral and other resources of the Philippines prepared in the Navy Department in August, 1898 (*ibid.*, pp. 519-28); and the article in the *Century Magazine* for August, 1898, by F. A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 563-71), are interesting as indicating how promptly the idea of commercial and territorial expansion had come to the front.

islands of Mindoro and Palawan, commanding the entrance into the group from the Asiatic side. This last proposition was favored by Mr. Day, who steered a middle course between his recognition of the responsibilities which the United States had incurred in the Philippines and his desire to involve the country as little as possible in colonial ventures. Mr. Gray took position squarely upon the ground of opposition to colonies in the Orient, saying he could not "agree that it was wise to take the Philippines either in whole or in part."¹ The following day, President McKinley replied that, since he had given his previous instructions, it had become apparent to him that "the cession must be of the whole archipelago or none," but "the latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required"; and he indicated that he had come to this conclusion mainly because of the interests of the Filipino people, "for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility."

Before the American commissioners had made their demand for the whole archipelago, an episode occurred outside of the formal sessions to which attention must be directed in order to understand the subsequent course of the negotiations. The Continental newspapers were full of talk of a rupture between the two commissions and were apparently kept posted from inside

¹ Mr. Gray found no place for consideration of the argument that the United States had, wittingly or unwittingly, incurred responsibilities in the Philippine archipelago; his was the typically "anti-imperialistic" attitude, which looked at the question primarily or wholly from the standpoint of what was best for the United States, and his outline of the argument against the retention of the islands may be regarded as one of the earliest and best statements of this position: "To do so [take the Philippines] would be to reverse accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Proximity governs the case of Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to the largest of powers; a greatly increased military establishment; immense sums for fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap; no area for homes for American citizens; climate and social conditions demoralizing to American youth; new and disturbing questions introduced into our politics; church question menacing."

sources as to the Spanish contention that the debt of territories should pass with them in any change of sovereignty; the European view of the United States as a brutal aggressor seeking self-aggrandizement by picking a quarrel over Cuba was confirmed by the reports spread abroad that the United States had determined to take Cuba and leave Spain to pay the debts hanging over her. Regarding those debts as accumulated by wars which Spanish misgovernment had imposed upon the island, the United States had, in its attitude as attorney for Cuba, refused to acknowledge the validity of certain precedents in international law wherein debt had passed with the territory; indeed, President McKinley had instructed the commissioners not to consent to a clause requiring the United States to use its good offices to induce the future Cuban Government to assume any part of the colonial debt, because it was reasonably plain that no part of it had been incurred directly for pacific internal improvements, and the American position was that only misgovernment in Cuba had, since 1860, led the island into debt at all.¹

On October 26, the Spanish commissioners had provisionally accepted the articles proposed by the Americans as to Cuba,

¹ See the cablegrams between Paris and Washington on October 25 (*Sen. Doc. 148*, p. 31). Also, for a full discussion of the Cuban debt and of the Spanish proposition that the debt passes with territory, see *Sen. Doc. 62*, protocols 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10 and the documents respectively annexed to them. The entire formal record of the negotiations at Paris is contained in this document, pp. 3-271. It should be read, of course, in connection with the American cable correspondence, already cited. Little additional light is thrown on the history of the negotiations by the Spanish documents in the case, which are hard to obtain; they are found in two of the three Spanish Red Books for 1898, viz.: *Negociaciones diplomáticas desde el principio de la guerra con los Estados Unidos hasta la firma del protocolo de Washington, 1898*; and *Conferencia de París y tratado de paz de 10 de Diciembre de 1898*, both published at Madrid in 1899. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France also issued: *Négociations pour la paix entre l'Espagne et les États Unis, 1898*. For a further statement of the position of the United States on the question of debts of a territory passing with the sovereignty over it, see *The Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation* (Washington, 1902; short title, *Magoon's Reports*;) pp. 180-93, 529-31; these opinions of the law officer of the War Department, unfavorable to the payment of subsidies to the cable and railway concessionaires of Spain in the Philippines, met the approval also of the United States Attorney-General.

Porto Rico, and Guam, pending possible "advantages which Spain may derive from other stipulations of the treaty," and had specifically asked that the Americans now outline their propositions as to the Philippine Islands. That night, Spain's ambassador to France called on Commissioner Reid, and hinted that, unless some concession for Spain could be got out of the clauses regarding the Philippine Islands, no treaty could be secured; the Spanish Ministry then in power could not, he said, retain its position if it accepted the Cuban debt and got no concession in its place. Mr. Reid said the sentiment in the United States was not wholly unanimous upon the point of taking all the Philippine Islands, and hinted at something, "either in territory or debt," which might furnish the concession enabling the Spanish Ministry to keep face before its own people.¹ In response to a further request for definite instructions in view of this new turn of affairs, President McKinley renewed his demand for the whole archipelago and enlarged upon the chief reason, viz., duty toward the Filipinos, but left it to the commission to make whatever concession Spanish demands should require in order to get a treaty.² The

¹ See *Sen. Doc. 148*, p. 36, for the cable report of this extra-diplomatic conference, and for a similar appeal by the secretary of the Spanish Commission after the meeting of October 27. The latter said "no government in Spain could sign treaty giving up everything and live, and that such surrender without some relief would mean national bankruptcy." The American commissioners believed that a rupture of the negotiations was averted "because Spaniards grasped at hint thrown out in the conversation of Mr. Reid." But the only alternative of the Spanish Ministry, if it broke off negotiations, was a resumption of the war, in which the feeble hold it still had on the Philippine archipelago would speedily be relaxed, and the Ministry would be in a worse case yet before the people. Better knowledge of Spanish politics, which Mr. Davis later showed that he had, would have made it plain that the Spaniards need not be taken literally. Indeed, their rather frantic appeals at the time for the best terms possible regarding the Philippines showed that they expected the Americans to put forth the most comprehensive demand, and that they wished to get the maximum of advantage. The assertions of Continental critics of the United States at the time, and of home critics afterward, that the Spaniards were surprised by the American demand for the Philippines and reluctantly yielded only to force, will not hold water, in the face of the protocol negotiations and of this episode of October 26.

² This dispatch, dated October 28, is found on pp. 37-38 of *Sen. Doc. 148*. It said: "The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the

latter body thereupon obtained authority to assume on the part of the United States any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and improvements of a pacific character in the Philippines. The article providing for the cession to the United States of the Philippine archipelago, which was presented to the Spaniards on October 31, was accordingly accompanied by such an offer.

Four days later, the Spaniards rejected this proposal for cession as positively and completely as if they had not just been begging, informally, for lenient treatment with regard to the Philippines, but instead had never for a moment expected a demand for those islands on the part of the United States. They took the utterly untenable ground that not only was the cession of the Philippines by Spain not contemplated by the protocol, but that it was "in flagrant violation of [that] agreement." They submitted what they called a "counter-proposal," which embodied Spain's diplomatic demand of September that the occupation of Manila be recognized as regulated by the

Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs." Also: "Whatever consideration the United States may show [to bankrupt Spain] must come from its sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real or technical obligation." "While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded," yet the President preferred to have them secured "by negotiation." This position the President clung to quite tenaciously, though it was never formally asserted at Paris. On November 3, Mr. Day cabled that "the majority of the commission are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippines cannot be based on conquest"; and they virtually rejected the position assumed by the State Department in September regarding the capture of Manila and acknowledged the validity of the Spanish claim that the city should be regarded as held only under the terms of the protocol of August 12. The President replied: "In fact, the destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1 was the conquest of Manila, the capital of the Philippines." And in his annual message to Congress for 1898 he again asserted: "Only reluctance to cause needless loss of life and property prevented the storming and capture [of Manila], and therewith the absolute military occupancy of the whole group." Again: "By this [the capture of Manila] the conquest of the Philippine Islands, virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of the 1st of May, was formally sealed." These sentences indicate how little was known at the time in Washington as to the course of events outside of Manila, not only in the Bisayas but also in Luzon, from May to December of 1898.

protocol, and which went far beyond this in demanding a restoration to Spain of the city, her troops, and the taxes collected, and even an indemnity for the losses sustained by the detention of her troops and the consequent spread of the rebellion.¹ This was, of course, merely a part of the Spanish process of bargaining; yet the positive tone that was adopted, coupled with the constant expressions at the time of European sympathy with Spain as the victim of an aggressor, sufficed to make the American Commission adopt a defensive attitude in "explaining" the protocol negotiations in their subsequent memoranda, and, as later events showed, made some of the Americans think the Spaniards would lose the treaty rather than give up the Philippine archipelago. The three following sessions, those of November 9, 16, and 21, were occupied with the presentation of lengthy arguments on the protocol, its negotiation and its meaning, the question of colonial debts and the events that had happened in the Philippines during the year, some rather sharp passages being interchanged over these last.² On the 21st, however, the American Commission,

¹ For this remarkable document, see *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 110-28. Their proposition that the cession of the Philippines was in "violation" of the protocol was based largely on the definition of the French word *contrôle* (by which "control" in the protocol as drafted had been rendered in translation) as "inspection" and "intervention," which they undertook to say was an admission by the United States that its concern with the Philippines should never be anything but temporary, and should be limited to the securing of reforms or changes in government. They endeavored to support this contention by quotations from the protocol correspondence (*ibid.*, pp. 120-23). They also introduced a gratuitous reflection upon Admiral Dewey for taking the city after the protocol (of which he knew nothing) was signed, and charged the American administration of Manila with releasing common criminals from jail. The question of the Philippines debt (which they stated was 40,000,000 pesos, besides pensions and other colonial obligations) gave them an opportunity also to reintroduce the whole question of the Cuban debt.

² In their answer of November 9 (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 129-51), the Americans dealt in detail with the question of the protocol negotiations, pointing out rather mildly the Spanish inconsistencies in this matter and also in their demand for the surrender of Manila and their troops; on the latter point the Americans took the ground that everything that had been done in Manila since August 13 was justified and proper whether their army was there by virtue of conquest or in consequence of the protocol. The Spanish and American memoranda of November 16 and 21 respectively also contained pages of verbal sparring about the meaning of

after rejecting the Spanish proposal to submit the question of the sovereignty of the Philippines to arbitration, made an offer of \$20,000,000, coupled with the promise of equal commercial rights in the Philippines for ten years, for the cession of those islands by Spain.

This cash offer had gradually presented itself as the solution of the differences between the two Governments, as an outcome both of the American proposition to assume the debt for pacific improvements in the Philippines and of the feeling of some of the American commissioners that they must make a concession in order to get a treaty. On October 30, Mr. Frye had addressed a personal message to the President, expressing a pessimistic view as to the prospects for a treaty, and suggesting the payment of \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000 as a salve to Spain's feelings; the President had agreed to a money payment, "to cover peace improvements," and as a means, if such were felt to be necessary, of averting the renewal of war.¹ But, by November 10, the commissioners had found that no

the protocol, etc. The differences of meaning which the Spaniards endeavored to introduce by quoting Ambassador Cambon's notes to Madrid were more apparent than real, and were in some cases not even apparent. Even had they been serious, the arguments as to differences of opinion before August 10 were meaningless, since on that date President McKinley drew up the protocol expressly because dissatisfied with Spain's answer to his terms, and Spain had thereupon signed the protocol. (President McKinley's Annual Message, 1898: "[Spain] appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine Islands. . . . I directed that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken.")

¹ *Sen. Doc. 148*, pp. 38-40. Mr. Frye renewed the suggestion that the United States use its good offices with Cuba to bring about the acceptance of the Spanish debt for internal improvements; the amount would be small, he said: "Would not our people prefer to pay Spain one half of war expenditures [if war resumed] rather than indulge in its costly luxury? Europe sympathizes with Spain in this regard exactly." The reply was that the President "desired the commissioners to be generous in all matters which did not require a disregard of principle or duty. . . . If it should be the opinion of the commissioners that there should be paid a reasonable sum of money to cover peace improvements, which are fairly chargeable to us under established precedents, he will give cheerful concurrence. The money payment, if any is determined upon, should rest solely upon the considerations suggested in your message."

part of the Philippine debt of 1897 had been used for public works or improvements of a specific character.¹ On November 11, they again cabled diverse opinions as to the Philippines, and asked definite instructions from the President: Mr. Day preferred to limit the United States to a naval and commercial base in the Orient, and minimize its holdings so far as existing circumstances made it possible to do, but, as the President's instructions required taking the whole archipelago, he would pay Spain \$15,000,000, and also, if necessary, let her keep Mindanau and the Sulú group; Mr. Frye wanted the whole group, and would pay \$10,000,000, but feared a treaty was possible only by leaving Spain the Bisayas and Mindanau, in which case he would pay \$5,000,000; Mr. Gray was still on principle opposed to taking the Philippines, but would acquiesce in such a step, making "reasonable concessions," in order to secure a treaty, as he foresaw that a renewal of the war would mean the speedy conquest of the Philippines by the United States; Mr. Reid thought the United States had full claim to the whole archipelago on the basis of

¹ See chapter III, p. 124, for the circumstances connected with the bond issue of 200,000,000 pesetas, or 40,000,000 pesos, in July, 1897. See *Sen. Doc. 148*, p. 44, for the commission's report of the details it had ascertained about this loan. It produced 38,570,494.27 pesos net: of this sum, 19,891,800.60 were used in the Philippine War of 1896-97 (part of it, it is understood, to pay Aguinaldo); 7,660,403.13 were returned to Cuba to pay a loan made from the Cuban war revenues; and 10,938,477.02 were advanced to Cuba for the war there. In view of the various statements that have been made in the United States as to the reasons for the payment of \$20,000,000 to Spain, it is worth while quoting from Mr. Whitelaw Reid (contribution on the Treaty of Paris in the *Anglo-Saxon Review* for June, 1899): the American commissioners "resolved, in a final transfer, to fix an amount at least equal to the face value of that debt, which could be given to Spain as an acknowledgment for any pacific improvements she might ever have made there not paid for by the revenues of the islands themselves. She could use it to pay the Philippine bonds if she chose. That was the American view as to the sanctity of public debts legitimately incurred in behalf of ceded territory; and that is an explanation of the money payment in the case of the Philippines, as well as of the precise amount at which it was finally fixed." Forty million pesos then equaled approximately \$20,000,000 in United States currency. A letter of Commissioner Day to D. K. Watson, of Columbus, Ohio, in October, 1899 (much commented on in the press at the time), has often been quoted as authority for the statement that the Philippines were acquired simply as a "purchase."

indemnity for war expenses, but, in order to get a treaty, would leave to Spain Mindanau and Sulú, or would pay her \$12,000,000 to \$15,000,000 for the entire Philippine archipelago and the Carolines; Mr. Davis, in his emphatic way, coolly declared that only an ultimatum would get a treaty from Spain, as she was protracting the negotiations in the hope of European intervention, and he would promptly deliver her an ultimatum demanding Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and offering her no money at all, as it was plain that she had contracted no debt for pacific improvements in the Philippines.¹ President McKinley again replied that the cession of the whole Philippine archipelago must be demanded, but, if necessary, a payment of \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000 could

¹ For these cablegrams, see *Sen. Doc. 148*, pp. 45-48. Had the bluff Mr. Davis's advice been followed, the outcome in the Philippines "might have been" very different. In the event of Spain refusing the ultimatum and resorting to war (a most unlikely event), her ports in the Bisayas would speedily have been occupied by the United States, and the chances for amicable arrangement with the Bisayan native leaders (mostly rather conservative), before the Aguinaldo propaganda made headway there, would have been ten to one. The sentiment for opposition to the United States in Luzon, and even at Malolos, was by no means crystallized in November, 1898, and all strategic points in Luzon might perhaps have been occupied without resistance. At any rate, the Americans would not have had to fight their way out from Manila through Tagalog territory while the sentiment against them in the other parts of Luzon was being carefully fostered and developed. Had Spain yielded, on the other hand, and made a treaty, the proclamation of American sovereignty would have come that much earlier, which would have given a better chance for a peaceful arrangement with the Filipinos. The proposal of the Spanish commissioners on November 16 to submit the question of Philippine sovereignty to arbitration was, in some degree, a confirmation of Mr. Davis's opinion that Spain was endeavoring to create the basis of an appeal to European sympathies: as Europe then viewed the project of American occupation of the Philippines, an unprejudiced tribunal of arbitration was next to impossible; moreover, the two peace commissions were themselves already met as a board of arbitration for the two nations, and met for the precise purpose of settling this question, among others. Under the circumstances, one cannot feel that the Spanish proposition and their appeal to American traditions in favor of arbitration were made entirely in good faith. It was at about this time that the American Commission felt it necessary to give out a statement as to the protocol negotiations through the Associated Press, in order to counteract the repeated assertions in the Continental press, and also in leading English journals, that the United States had in November unwarrantably expanded the conditions of peace which it had laid down in August.

be made to Spain.¹ The American commissioners apparently thought it was best to offer the full sum that was authorized.

Without formally submitting this proposition of November 21 as an ultimatum, the American Commission had virtually declared that only the acceptance of it on or before November 28 could insure a continuance of the negotiations.² On the 23d, the chairman of the Spanish Commission, in a letter to Mr. Day, made these alternative offers: (1) Spain would yield all the territory asked, but the cash payment to her should be \$100,000,000, instead of \$20,000,000; or, (2) she would yield all, except Mindanau and Sulú, but in addition also one island and cable privileges in the Carolines, receiving \$50,000,000; or, (3) she would yield all the territory mentioned in (1), the two countries to submit to arbitration the question of what colonial debts ought to pass with the sovereignty (so sure was she, apparently, of a favorable verdict from foreign arbitrators, or else so desirous of introducing the Philippine question into European politics).³ The American commissioners were again divided in submitting these counter-proposals to Washington; but Mr. McKinley instructed them, at midnight

¹ *Sen. Doc. 148*, pp. 48-49. Again Mr. McKinley insisted that responsibilities to the Filipinos demanded that the United States wrest the sovereignty from Spain; to divide the archipelago would involve difficulties and embarrassments; moreover, it could all be claimed as indemnity. In the memorandum of November 21 (*Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 210), the American Commission said: "The Spanish commissioners have . . . spoken of the Filipinos as our allies. This is not a relation which the Government of the United States intended to establish; but it must at least be admitted that the insurgent chiefs returned and resumed their activity with the consent of our military and naval commanders, who permitted them to arm with weapons which we had captured from the Spaniards, and assured them of fair treatment and justice. Should we be justified in now surrendering these people to the Government of Spain, even under an amnesty, which we know they would not accept?"

² On November 22, also, they had cabled to Washington that they intended to inform the Spaniards, if the latter rejected the proposal, that the "offer was final," and it only remained to close the negotiations; and Mr. McKinley gave his approval to this (*Sen. Doc. 148*, p. 58). On November 22, in a letter of query as to the details of the American proposal, Señor E. Montero Rios, the president of the Spanish Commission, had asked if it was an ultimatum, and had in substance been informed that it was (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 216-19).

³ *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 220-21.

on November 25, to stand by the ultimatum.¹ When the next meeting of the peace commissions was held on November 28, the Spaniards accepted the terms offered, in few — amazingly few — words, ending with this dignified expression of resignation : —

The Government of Her Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of patriotism and humanity, will not assume the responsibility of again bringing upon Spain all the horrors of war. In order to avoid them, it resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the law of the victor, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States offers her for the concluding of the treaty of peace.

Five more sessions were devoted to perfecting the details of the treaty before it was finally signed by the plenipotentiaries on December 10. The Spaniards evinced a disposition to hold strictly to the terms which had been put into the treaty by ultimatum, preferring to relegate the question of a revival of formerly existing treaties to future negotiation, and finally refusing the American offer of \$1,000,000 more for one island and certain concessions and privileges in the Caroline group.² They might have accepted this last proposition in part or in whole, had not the Americans, under President McKinley's explicit directions, refused to extend to Cuba and Porto Rico, either for five or for ten years, the same pledge as to the equality of treatment for Spanish and American commerce and shipping as was made in the case of the Philippines.³ In the light of

¹ For their reply of November 26, see *Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 222. For the cablegrams to and from Washington on the Spanish proposals, see *Sen. Doc. 148*, pp. 58-60. Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid thought they must stand by the ultimatum, though Mr. Day preferred not to take the Moro islands and feared the Spaniards would refuse the full demand. Messrs. Frye and Gray were favorable to accepting the second proposition of Spain, though paying \$20,000,000 instead of \$50,000,000. Mr. Gray, however, put in also an earnest private plea for the arbitration proposal. Mr. Davis bluntly said : "Spain will accept our ultimatum if we firmly insist upon it."

² See *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 251-52 ; also *Sen. Doc. 148*, pp. 45-48, 50, 60, 62, 64.

³ *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 225-26, 228, and *Sen. Doc. 148*, pp. 62-63, 64. On December 1, Mr. McKinley cabled that "preferential privileges to Spain in Cuba and

subsequent events, perhaps the failure of most consequence to the United States was that of its proposal to maintain public order in the whole Philippine archipelago pending the ratification of the treaty; the Spanish Government insisted, through its commissioners, that "the authorities of each of the two nations should be charged with the maintenance of order in the places where they might be established, those authorities agreeing among themselves to this end whenever they might deem it necessary."¹

The boundaries of the Philippine archipelago as defined in Article III of the treaty left outside two little islands, Sibutú at the extreme southwest of the Sulú group toward Borneo, and Kagayán de Sulú, lying northwest of Joló and of some strategic value; and two years later \$100,000 was paid to Spain to relinquish whatever claim she might have to these islands.² Article IV comprised the provision for the entry for ten years "of Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and mer-

Porto Rico" were "undesirable," and, if those offered in the Philippines were accepted, "care should be taken to avoid possible embarrassments to legislation by Congress or demands by other Governments under favored-nation clause." In his letter of November 22, Señor Rios had asked Mr. Day if the declaration of the "open door" in the Philippines meant that other nations were to share the same privileges as Spain, and Mr. Day replied (*Sen. Doc. 62*, p. 218): "The declaration that the policy of the United States in the Philippines will be that of an open door to the world's commerce necessarily implies that the offer to place Spanish vessels and merchandise on the same footing as American is not intended to be exclusive. But the offer to give Spain the privilege for a term of years is intended to secure it to her for a certain period by special treaty stipulation, whatever might be at any time the general policy of the United States."

¹ Yet Spain withdrew her troops from Iloilo only ten days after the treaty was signed, without waiting for the American troops to arrive. Immediately after the treaty was signed, and continuing well into 1899, her military officials in the Philippines urged that the Americans relieve them of the charge of Mindanau and Sulú. It would almost appear that Spain's refusal at Paris to yield full control to the United States outside of Manila was purposely intended to embarrass the latter country.

² For this little treaty, signed at Washington on November 7, 1900, ratified by the United States Senate on January 22, 1901, and finally proclaimed on March 23, 1901, see *Sen. Doc. 124*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., and *For. Rel.*, 1900, pp. 887-88. Article III of the Treaty of 1898 defined the boundaries of the Philippines almost exactly as the American commissioners had proposed on October 31.

chandise of the United States.”¹ Besides the return of Spanish prisoners from the Philippines to Spain (as had already been done in the case of Cuba and Porto Rico), under Articles V and VII, the United States returned to the Spaniards the arms surrendered at Manila and all movable property belonging to their land or naval forces.² That all immovable property passed with the cession, was specifically provided by Article VIII,³ which also contained the stipulation that the cession “cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other association

¹ This provision of the treaty expired on April 11, 1909, ten years from the date when the ratifications of the treaty were formally exchanged. The Spanish Cortes had ratified the treaty on March 20, 1899.

² The Spaniards had, on December 2, proposed the “repatriation at the expense of both nations of prisoners taken.” But Spain then held no American prisoners, and reciprocal relations were struck by having her return at her expense to their homes all political prisoners (*déportés*, practically all) whom she still held on account of the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines. As to the Philippines, at least, it is claimed by Filipinos that this engagement has never been completely fulfilled by Spain. Up to November 30, 1899, the United States had spent \$908,583.75 in returning to Spain the prisoners taken in Manila and those subsequently released by movements against the insurgents (*Report of Secretary of War, 1899*, p. 23), and thousands more of the latter were subsequently released from the Filipinos and returned to Spain; Congress in 1899 appropriated \$1,500,000 for this purpose (see War Department estimate, *H. R. Doc. 264*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.). Sastrón (*op. cit.*, p. 563) gives the number of Spaniards repatriated from the Philippines as 29,418, including officers’ families and 22,498 enlisted soldiers; this, however, includes those brought home by the Government of Spain also, and the number of those who were actually soldiers was hardly more than half the figure cited.

³ The return to Spain of the movable war material captured by the American troops and the lack of precision in the clauses on this subject in Articles VI and VIII, led to various contests during 1899 and 1900 between the boards of liquidation in the Philippines. On the American side, there was a single body of army men, though there coöperated with them, with regard to naval questions and property, a committee of officers of the navy; for the reports of the American board of liquidation, see appendix R to *Otis’s Report, 1899*, (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 4), and appendix NN to *MacArthur’s Report, 1900* (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10). There were three Spanish boards, respectively military, naval, and civil; for the Spanish side of the liquidation, which dragged along in some of its details till late 1900, see Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 571–85 (Sastrón being president of the Spanish civil board).

having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be." The history of the insertion of this clause, which is virtually a pledge by the United States that it will not practice confiscation, is not yet fully known; but it has generally been assumed that the Spanish commissioners secured its insertion at the instigation of the monastic orders which had acquired large estates in the Philippines.¹ Peninsular Spaniards in the islands were guaranteed in their property rights, and were allowed to retain their status as citizens of Spain by registering as such within one year from the taking effect of the treaty. "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants," it was provided, "shall be determined by the Congress."² The

¹ On December 6, the Spanish Commission had proposed to insert in the treaty articles pledging the United States to carry out grants and contracts for public works and services in the islands ceded, specifying the Hongkong cable concession and the Manila and Dagupan railway subvention among others. The American commissioners refused to bind their country thus, saying the United States would "deal justly and equitably in respect of contracts that were binding under the principles of International Law" (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 240-41). The Spaniards next proposed this article: "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion, its institutions and ministers, shall continue to enjoy in all the territories which are the subject of this treaty the liberty and the rights in the undisturbed possession of which they are at present. The members of this Church, whatever their nationality, shall continue to enjoy the same liberty they now enjoy with respect to the profession of their religion and the exercise of their form of worship." The first clause was clearly impossible of acceptance by the United States, and the American Commission expressed its willingness to insert simply a pledge of freedom of worship, which finally appeared in the treaty as Article X (*ibid.*, pp. 241-42). The record contains nothing further on the subject until the final signing of the treaty with the clause quoted in the text above.

² President McKinley had, on November 29, suggested leaving the status of native inhabitants to Congress, having in mind particularly the uncivilized tribes and the prevention of any provision which would confer American citizenship on the Chinese in the Philippines (*Sen. Doc. 148*, p. 61). On December 6, the American Commission proposed the article on citizenship (IX) substantially as it finally appeared, and rejected the Spanish Commission's proposal that native inhabitants also should have the right to choose Spanish citizenship within one year (*Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 237-39; also pp. 258 and 261-62 for the exchange of comments upon this subject in the memoranda). The period of registration of Spanish citizens in the Philippines was subsequently extended, by mutual convention, for six months from April 11, 1900 (by a protocol signed at Washington on March 29, 1900,

Philippines were not otherwise affected by the treaty, except by the general provisions regarding pending judicial proceedings, patents and copyrights, etc.¹

approved by the Senate April 27, and proclaimed the following day; see *Foreign Relations United States, 1899*, pp. 714-20, and *ibid.*, 1900, pp. 889-190).

¹ See Articles XI-XIV; also *Sen. Doc. 62*, pp. 245-49, for alternative articles proposed on these points. The last memorandum filed (*ibid.*, pp. 261-62) contained the Americans' refusal to accept the Spanish proposal for a board of arbitration to fix the responsibility for the Maine disaster. This had been rejected by the Americans in the session of December 6, on the ground that it was a "closed incident." The Spaniards had been provoked to enter a protest on behalf of their nation in this matter by the reference to it in the American memorandum of November 21 and in President McKinley's message to Congress in December (*ibid.*, pp. 259-60).

CHAPTER X

MUTUAL DISTRUST

THE fate of the Philippine Islands was not, however, to be settled entirely at Paris. Just when Spanish power had everywhere given way of its own decrepitude before the untried and not too powerful blows of the Filipinos, and when the vision of a nationality of their own was every day becoming more complete to their imaginations, the masterful American presumed to control, in distant Paris, the surrender into his hands not only of that territory which he had in battle wrested from Spain, but also of all the greater extent of territory which Spain had dropped in fright and panic. Looking upon themselves, in their period of inflated military glory, as real conquerors of all this territory, the Filipinos were not inclined to pause to consider the formalities and technicalities of international law, but thought that they should have most to say about the disposition of the archipelago.¹

The moral right of the Filipinos to have a voice in the making of any programme affecting their future must at once be conceded by every American (except such as think gov-

¹ A jokelet in *La Independencia* of November 22, 1898, when news had been received by cable that Spain would probably yield at Paris, is typical of Filipino feeling at the time: "They say Spain has ceded to America all her colonies." — "Well, then, I make you a present of St. Joseph's Hospital with all its inmates." In *ibid.*, November 30, 1898, is quoted with approval the reported declaration of Felipe Agoncillo at Paris: "The Filipinos will not permit themselves or their homes to be bought or sold like merchandise; they will be prepared to resist to the utmost in defense of their rights." This newspaper (then largely under control of General Luna) goes on to outline the possibility of war, admits that "America has aided us indirectly by the blockade of Manila," but concludes: "People are not to be bought and sold like horses and houses. If the aim has been to abolish the traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale of persons, why is there still maintained [in international law] the sale of countries with inhabitants free to be unwilling to form part of a[nother] nation"? In the same number, uncommented upon, were quotations from President McKinley's speech at Chicago about "Duty begetting Destiny."

ernment by the "consent of the governed" is only for white men). This may be conceded, however, without at all implying that the self-appointed spokesmen of the Filipinos should be fully recognized as their people's guides and mentors by the new sovereign, which had declared before the world that it insisted on controlling the destinies of the Philippines out of a sense of duty to their inhabitants. The more sober-minded Filipinos who were most closely in touch with the situation saw and admitted the force of the contention that the United States was charged with responsibility before the world for at least the maintenance of order in the archipelago, and that it must assume the initiative and possess the final authority in all matters affecting the exterior relations of the archipelago, which might imply also very extensive interference with internal conditions. Moreover, these men were still more sure than were the American authorities (to whom, in fact, they had communicated their views) that the radical Filipinos who actually had control at Malolos and over the divisions of the new native army outside were not the best leaders of their people in such a crisis, if at any time. In still less degree, for a long time, did Americans comprehend that the great mass of the people were wholly negligible so far as having real opinions of their own was concerned, while yet their natural racial sympathies, stirred by the events of three years past, and aroused more than ever by the terrible colors in which the Americans had been painted to them by their radical (mostly, their more ignorant) leaders, now put them at the command less of their one-time caciques (mostly, men of property) than of leaders of a positive, sometimes a vindictive, type, whatever might be their origin and former record. Furthermore, this same half-frenzy was, as some Americans never would see, capable of being aroused not only among the Tagalogs, but also among the masses in other provinces, who, indeed, in the extreme north and south of Luzon and in the central islands, were more easily led than were the Tagalogs. Between the

natural conservatives and the nondescript horde with their radical and reckless leaders, there were halting perhaps most of the men of property and education throughout the islands, with all shades of opinions, mostly of no very positive opinions at all, really waiting for a long time almost leaderless, their interests crying for peace and quiet upon any acceptable basis, their sympathies urging them into alignment with the campaign for an independent Filipino nation and the realization all at once of the dreams Rizal and his fellow-propagandists had held before them, — just how they knew not, but somehow, — some of them the most shallow superficiais and dishonest tricksters, others with a reasonable degree of character and solidity. Without them, the Malolos absolutism, which had steadily become less and less ephemeral since its first organization in Cavite, could not hope to keep the masses in line throughout the country in general; it was significant that some of the idols of this element had been absorbed into the new organization as military leaders or trusted advisers, and were heart and soul with the movement. Property interests, natural cautiousness, and a quite general desire to be on the winning side were arguments waiting to be urged with this class in behalf of a recognition of the sovereignty of the United States. That they should suspend judgment until they could see whether the United States would deal fairly with Filipino interests and Filipino aspirations was all that country's representatives could expect.¹ But something positive in the

¹ In a personal letter to the writer in March, 1904 (quoted in the *New York Evening Post* of May 17, 1904), one of the foremost Filipinos, for experience, legal attainments, and a character universally recognized as of the highest, said : —

“In my judgment, the Americans who held the first conferences with some of the Filipinos in 1898, in the United States, in Hongkong, and in Singapore, ought to have been persons of high standing, duly authorized by their Government, and they ought to have spoken plainly and set forth concretely what was in the thought of the McKinley Government. It is plain that whoever was to represent and interpret the desires and proposals of the American Government ought to be a man of great culture, of well-defined policy, a statesman. Those definite and concrete proposals ought to have been expressed without ambiguities nor doubts, but with absolute plainness and blunt frankness. If the McKinley Government entertained the

way of a programme, if not of actual performance, was necessary to secure the support of this rather heterogeneous but highly important class of at first half-decided Filipinos. The radicals at Malolos had a positive programme, and one which appealed to all the sympathies of the men whose support they sought. Clearly, the conditions cried for Filipino leadership of the best-informed and coolest-headed sort, and for Ameri-

plan of establishing its control and protectorate in the Philippines, it should have been so set forth from the beginning, as also the governmental régime should have been outlined upon strict principles of progressive autonomy, according to the conditions and needs of the country, without any promise whatever of independence at that time.

"It appears as though certain Americans, and even military and naval officers, allowed to outline itself in perspective the future absolute independence of the country, a promise more or less undecisive, or at any rate lacking formality, asked and re-asked afterward by the Democrats during the presidential campaign; all which did much damage and deceived the people of only moderate education, and still more the ignorant, who to this day believe that independence is the panacea of the ills and backwardness of the country.

"Loving the Philippines, as no one does more, it is clear that it would have satisfied me that my country should enjoy complete independence, as many not thoroughly informed of the conditions desire. With all that, you know that from the first moment I put myself, with other Filipinos who thought the same as I, by the side of the American authorities, convinced that the country was not yet — as it is not to-day, either — prepared to be independent. Under the difficult conditions through which we passed in 1899 and 1900, I, on various occasions, stated to the authorities and to the president of the first commission, Mr. Schurman, as also to Mr. Worcester, that those addicted to the Americans and opposed to independence were few, but that I was confident that our opinion would predominate in time if the American Government would establish a government according to a frankly autonomous system.

"The Filipinos in general had suffered very greatly for more than three hundred years under the Spanish-friar, or theocratic, régime, and it seems clear to me that, because of emerging from that afflicted state, the Filipinos would have accepted American protection and control under an autonomous régime, without any promise at all of independence; but it was essential that the intention of the Government at Washington should then be definite and concrete, and that the one to establish and conduct the negotiation and the agreement should be a statesman like Mr. Taft, or some able man of public affairs, and not adventurers who had nothing to lose; and it was necessary also that the Democrats should not have supported the desires for independence of many Filipinos. To the latter there were said and promised many things which could not be carried out, especially independence, by Americans who were speaking and acting according to their own judgment; and the result was what we have already seen, more than three years of war, and at this time, in spite of peace, we still have trouble-brewers abroad, or partisans of independence who really are devoting themselves to the robbery of the Filipinos."

can statesmanship which would disregard formalities and incidentals and strike down to essentials.

The control of the small clique of radical leaders over the situation at Malolos was not shaken, and only once did it come near to being openly disputed — near enough to cause a rupture in the councils of government and to say plainly of the intentions of those who remained: "We are for war." This was in December, 1898, when, after the treaty at Paris had been signed and the radicals at Malolos wished to clear the decks for the fight they expected, it was proposed to add to the constitution (which had occupied the Assembly thus far practically to the exclusion of everything else, and which was now ready for conclusion) certain provisional clauses, among others Article 99, giving the President power to issue decrees in virtually an absolute manner "during the time the country may have to struggle for its independence." This was opposed by the conservatives who were still nominally members of the Cabinet and of the Congress; but the war element was in the saddle, and the others now either formally severed their connections with the Revolutionary Government and henceforth remained in Manila (some of them quite fearful of personal violence) or subsided into acquiescence with the war party.¹

¹ The inner circle of Aguinaldo's advisers, some of whom were in the Cabinet as it already stood, had him send back to the Assembly with his approval the constitution as it had been adopted about December 15, adding, however, the above provisional article and others as to the postponement of the elections of President and Representatives. The committee which the Assembly thereupon appointed to consider these recommendations of Aguinaldo reported that they ought to be rejected (see testimony of T. H. Pardo de Tavera, *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. II, pp. 392-93). That was the direct cause of the break. (Yet Article 69 and other loosely drawn provisions as to the executive power already gave the President plenty of room to indulge in absolutism and call it constitutional.) The distinctive conservatives in the Cabinet had long before ceased to attempt to direct the policy, and Señor Arellano had ceased to go to Malolos at all, though arguing, like the others, for a peaceful adjustment with the Americans when the time should come. It was now recognized that the disposition of the war party was such that the conservatives had no place in the Cabinet, and they resigned. Mabini now for the first time became the nominal, as well as actual, head of the Government, but it took him nearly a month to re-form the Cabinet. The more significant changes were those of Mabini for Arellano as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and

Aguinaldo betrayed uneasiness over the effect it might have upon the people to see that some of the Filipinos most conspicuous for attainments could no longer be advertised as of his party, and the more conservative of the men who still remained at Malolos viewed the turn of events with more or less open discontent; but there were no scruples of indecision or feelings of regret on the part of the real civilian chief, Mabini, or of the foremost military commander, Luna, who had consistently been planning on war. Mabini was an enthusiast over Filipino regeneration, which he seemed to feel confident was being wrought overnight. Luna felt himself a giant among puny men of war, and, in the conceit of youth, was itching to try his powers in a world-arena. Aguinaldo, swept along by forces which he knew not how to guide, even if he could any longer do so, yet had had his experience of disappointments in 1896 and 1897, and was by nature cautious; moreover, the broad scope which affairs had taken bewildered the yet ungraduated villager, and he sometimes seemed to halt curiously between the counsels of peace and caution and those of war and glory. In the end, however, his name (really the important part of him at this time) was always at the disposal of the radicals; they had the positive programme.¹

the naming of Sandiko as Secretary of the Interior; the new Cabinet was entirely radical in its membership, and included also the military commanders who had before composed part of it.

¹ A mysterious document of this period, hardly ever noticed, is of great interest as bearing on the question of Aguinaldo's character, yet is open to various interpretations. It is his letter to the Filipino people in December, 1898, asking them to give him as his Christmas-gift (his *aguinaldo*, as the Spanish word is) liberty to retire, and to put some abler man in his place. (See the full text, translated from a copy secured by the American Secret Service, in *Rept. Phil. Comm.*, 1900, vol. II, pp. 327-31.) Oscar K. Davis (*Everybody's Magazine*, August, 1901, pp. 143-44) takes Aguinaldo at his word, and finds an evidence of his ability to comprehend the seriousness of the situation, and of his patriotism, in such sentences as this: "I am aware of the fact that one of my humble station does not deserve to be exalted to so high a magistracy . . .; but as the Congress of Representatives chooses me anew to rule the destinies of our people, it has seemed proper to me to come to my compatriots asking as a Christmas-gift that they study and consider some better man to take my place. . . ." The document is open to this interpretation, and there were rumors at the time that Aguinaldo had sug-

It was essential to the Revolutionary Government's plans, if it were to assert any claim at all to represent the entire population of Christian Filipinos, that it should be recognized

gested Arellano for President, and that Mabini caused this Christmas letter to the Filipinos to be suppressed. The latter, considered in connection with the events of the time, is open also to a very different interpretation, namely, that Aguinaldo was disturbed over the defection of the conservatives, and wished to make an appeal to the middle and lower classes, among whom he counted his only real supporters and personal admirers. The document is well calculated, almost cunningly, it seems, to appeal to the feeling of poor Filipinos as a class, and to their pride in a leader not from among the wealthy. Whoever is to be made President, says Aguinaldo, "his antecedents should be followed step by step. . . . It is not enough that he be wise, for there are wise men unwilling to cast in their lot with their native land while it is in peril. . . . It is not enough that he be rich, for there are rich men who, although they see their native land threatened by a new slavery, are unwilling to aid her with their wealth. . . . Many have given no more than the thousandth part of their total wealth. . . . In the majority of revolutions to obtain independence . . . the rich have led . . . ; here the poor have led. . . . There are those who aspire to high places, and cannot consent to pass through the inferior grades. What do they wish first of all? Ah! Their own well-being, and not that of the people. . . . The second motive for my dismissal I find in the pain it gives me to see still among our military companions chiefs who . . . seek to enrich themselves by taking bribes, . . . even among the prisoners, and that there are others, especially among the agents of the Government, who still mishandle the pay, small in itself, of the soldiers. . . . Some of our friends who fill civil positions . . . sacrifice the public weal to their private advantage, . . . even to make money out of gambling. Where is the police? Perhaps it also is bribed? . . . And I am proud of the poor above all others . . . who know how to suffer that the country may not be newly enslaved, and especially of those who lend their forces to its defense without any personal interest. . . . To those [native priests behaving as did the friars] I wish to recommend that they forget the accumulation of private wealth and cease exacting excessive parochial dues. . . . Some members of the clergy are still much given to the evil habit of forming factions [referring to those who organized the 'Guards of Honor,'] availing themselves of their sacred ministry especially among the women who confess to them, by means of whom they insinuate themselves among their respective husbands and sons." This document is unmistakably in Aguinaldo's own style, and is one of the few which he himself wrote of the many issued over his name; if Mabini suppressed it, he did so partly at least because of the damaging admissions it contained about the workings of the Filipino Government. Aguinaldo speaks of his "reëlection" as President; he well knew that this was only a part of the programme whereby the radicals were about to force into the constitution the provisions they desired. One of these was that the "President of the Revolutionary Government" should now become "President of the Republic" and should hold office until the "Constituent Assembly" should meet to elect definitely; but there was no provision in the constitution for such a Constituent Assembly. Another provision continued the Congress already in existence (with members, as seen, at the dictation of the Bakoor clique) for four years from April 15, 1899. These provisions were forced through

by the Bisayan leaders. It was touch and go for some time between caution and race sentiment with these men. The Bisayas had virtually no representation at Malolos; their more radical leaders, already in arms, had resented the arrival of young, inexperienced Tagalogs from Aguinaldo's camp who undertook to dictate military operations in Panai; their more conservative and influential leaders (men of wealth all, planters and lawyers), who did not openly turn against Spain until her troops had left Iloilo, had little feeling in common with the men of greatest prominence in Malolos; in fact, looked down upon certain of them. Efforts were made by the latter to conciliate the Bisayan leaders, though there was nothing like a comprehensive plan to give them a fair representation in the new Government. In November, immediately after the Spaniards capitulated to Juan Araneta in Negros, the Malolos authorities named the latter "Politico-Military Governor of Negros," after the Spanish fashion in the central islands;¹ but the provisional Filipino Government at Bakolod had already sent an emissary to Captain Glass, of the Charleston, asking for the establishment of American authority in that island and their recognition under it. A "Delegate of the Committee of the Bisayas" established himself at Malolos, where he ostensibly represented the views and wishes of the central islanders with the Revolutionary Government, but he did not represent the chief leaders of Bisayan opinion.² Just before the Span-when the constitution was finally adopted on January 20, 1899, the radicals having full control at Malolos.

There have been many magazine estimates of Aguinaldo; aside from this of Mr. Davis, the reader may find interest in "The Real Aguinaldo," by James A. LeRoy, in the *Independent*, July 11, 1901, and "Letters on Aguinaldo," by Sixto Lopez and J. A. LeRoy, *ibid.*, July 10, 1902.

¹ *La Independencia*, November 16, 1898, announces this appointment, and protests that the rumors of disagreement between the Malolos Government and the Bisayans are false.

² A good deal about this "delegate," Francisco Villanueva, may be learned from his letter in *La Independencia*, a "Manifesto to the Spaniards in Iloilo," wherein he discusses the possibility of war with the United States; says "an angel has appeared in the form of Aguinaldo to announce to his people their long-sought liberty"; also that Providence will furnish the Filipinos "conditions of

iards evacuated Iloilo, a committee of representative Bisayans from Panai and Negros visited Manila and Malolos (though General Otis did not know at the time of their visit to the latter place). Subsequent events would indicate that they were better satisfied with the assurances they received at Malolos than with what was said to them at Manila. At any rate, when the first American troops arrived in the harbor at Iloilo, finding that the Spaniards had left and the Bisayans were in control of the town, the latter declared that they could not admit the entrance of the Americans or turn the place over to them without receiving word to do so from Malolos. The Bisayan leaders had apparently made their choice; but it always has remained very much in doubt whether they would not have become acquiescent toward a show of determination on the part of the Americans; would not have been glad, in fact, to have the latter take off their hands the burden of deciding for them.

The Iloilo episode brought out more clearly than did any-

the field and inclemencies of weather" to overcome all "powerful engines of war"; and then expands his idea that the Spaniards in the Bisayas should unite with the Filipinos (though failing to point out just how this would be possible). The same harebrained proposal is contained in a letter signed in cipher at Malolos on October 25, 1898, and addressed to the Spanish commander at Iloilo, Diego Rios, urging him to turn that city over to the Filipinos and "proclaim the federation of the Filipino Republic with the Spanish Republic." The inducements held out are: "There will be hurrahs for Spain and the Philippines united as a federal republic . . . you will be promoted to be a lieutenant general. . . . The flags of Spain and the Philippines will float side by side . . . we shall fight the Americans together . . . liberty for all the 9000 Spanish prisoners in our hands." It is solemnly asserted: "Your transfer to our side does not really involve treason to Spain, since the moment sovereignty passes to the Americans you are free to transfer your allegiance." This bears the earmarks of Villanueva, or shows that he had consulted with its author before writing the above manifesto. It is a captured insurgent document, read in the United States Senate by Senator Spooner on May 29, 1900, and ascribed by him to Aguinaldo. It was reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, pp. 4-5, and in the *Republican Campaign Textbook*, 1900, p. 339, and, because it is written on paper headed "Office of the President, Revolutionary Government," and signed 1-1-9-6-1-M (Aguinaldo's cipher being "Miong"), it is in the latter document positively ascribed to Aguinaldo. The internal evidence points to some other author, though it is quite in Aguinaldo's style of composition; it is certainly not proved that he wrote it.

thing else the lack of policy at Washington at the time, or rather, if we assume the lack of policy at Washington to have been an unavoidable accompaniment of the form of government, the confusion of American aims at the time in the Philippines. How far the cheerful optimism that prevailed in the testimony before the Peace Commission at Paris regarding the ease with which the Philippines and the Filipinos could be managed by the Americans induced a belief at Washington that a policy of "drift" for the time being offered no dangers, cannot be said. It may perhaps be assumed that the optimistic tone of General Otis's dispatches from the islands was influential in this respect. To be sure, he informed Washington on November 13 that he would need all the troops that could come to him, whereas he had in September said he did not need reinforcements, and his dispatches thereafter contained hints of possible trouble, where before they had scarcely admitted such a contingency; but a message the least bit discouraging was hastily pursued by one that indicated that the commanding general's complacency, at least, had been restored with the succeeding morning's sunrise; and the general tenor of his whole correspondence till some time after the signing of the treaty of peace was such as to minimize the danger of Filipino opposition to whatever programme the United States might, in its own good time, announce.

The War Department, which replied to his November dispatch that six regiments of regular troops were being held to send to him, if necessary, had already sent away from the Pacific Coast and from Honolulu, between October 17 and November 10, nine transports loaded with troops, all volunteers except the battalions of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third infantry regiments of regulars which were needed to complete those organizations in the Philippines.¹ It was not

¹ These expeditions carried, all told, somewhat over 5000 troops, making the total of arrivals up to the outbreak of hostilities with the Filipinos over 22,000, including the recruits transported during the months of August and September,

altogether plain, however, that these regiments were sent so much because it was feared at Washington that they might be needed as because some of the volunteers confined in Manila were clamoring to return home, there were sick men to replace, and the states which had raised volunteer regiments too late for them to land upon foreign soil during the brief war were eager to see their men given at least garrison duty in the new possessions, preferring peaceful and near-by Porto Rico and Hawaii to no chance at all. General Otis, indeed, started a movement of volunteers homeward after the conclusion of the treaty at Paris, sending first the Astor Battery, and a few days later one third of the Nebraska volunteers.¹ He had just assured the President (December 8) that "conditions were improving and there were signs of revolutionary disintegration"; and, in response to a disturbed query about the newspaper reports as to the disorderly conduct of American troops in Manila, had answered that the "conduct of the troops was good; most favorably commented upon by citizens," and he believed that the "city was never more quiet"; in short, he had implied that, outside of the trouble made by the Spanish prisoners and Oriental riffraff then seeking entrance to Manila, the city was very much like a Sunday school and that the newspaper stories were inspired by "animus."

Just then came the break in the Cabinet at Malolos, followed by the hostile attitude of the supposedly acquiescent

when the protocol was held to forbid the sending of new organizations to the Philippines. (It will be noted that this was disregarded when the expeditions of October and November were sent out.) Of the total, upwards of 16,000 were volunteers, nearly all from Western States. The volunteers who went out in October-November included an infantry regiment each from Washington, Kansas, Tennessee, and Iowa, two more batteries of California artillery (on foot), a battery of Wyoming artillery, and a detachment of Nevada cavalry. For the data on these expeditions see *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, p. 3 (also chronological summary by War Department of events in Philippine Islands, published in the same volume).

¹ He dispatched the Astor Battery in response to definite instructions sent to him on December 7, but he was told to send back other volunteers only if he thought he could spare them (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 851).

Bisayans; no more volunteers were sent home, and soon the arrival of the regular regiments that had been promised was being anxiously awaited.¹

¹ For General Otis's official account of military conditions from September to December inclusive, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 39-44. This should be followed in connection with his cablegrams to Washington during that period (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 786 *et seq.*). No such dispatch is found in the latter as is mentioned in his *Report* (p. 41) as being sent on September 17, in which he said "prudence dictates increased force"; probably, by some error in dates, he refers to the dispatch sent, in an edited form, on November 13. Certainly, after the alarm of early September regarding the evacuation of Manila by the insurgents, when at one time he feared he might have to use force, he was consistently most cheerful over the situation (assuming that we have in *Corr. Rel. War* all his dispatches); indeed, on September 16 (*ibid.*, p. 791), he cabled "no further force required." On October 19 (*ibid.*, p. 827), he cabled that the Filipinos of education and property were gaining the ascendancy; that he did not anticipate trouble with the Malolos organization; that it was not recognized by the Filipinos in the central islands, who would welcome the rule of the United States. He also emphasized the dissensions among the Filipinos in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army on October 25 (*ibid.*, p. 843). On October 30, he cabled that relations with the insurgents, strained by the trouble of that month over the Manila suburbs, were "now apparently friendly" (*ibid.*, p. 831). His request for more troops on November 13 modified the opinion that the Bisayans would not act with the Malolos Government. When questioned, on November 25, how many troops would be necessary if the whole archipelago was taken over, he replied, in a very rambling message (p. 840): "Should Aguinaldo succeed in arousing decided opposition to United States authority generally, 25,000 men will be required here, as campaign must be made, although in southern islands do not now apprehend serious difficulty." He urged the hurrying forward of regular troops, but added: "Hope to report more favorable indications soon, and may succeed in destroying much of Aguinaldo's authority." We are again indebted to the hearings in 1902 before the Senate Committee on the Philippines for some autobiographical revelations. Said General Otis (*Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 772): "Until . . . possibly the middle of November, I had more influence in Aguinaldo's Cabinet than he had himself" (referring to the fact that the conservatives whom Aguinaldo wished to have in his Cabinet, but whose advice was not followed, came regularly to tell him what was going on at Malolos). Again, speaking of the Filipinos encircling Manila and planning to drive the Americans out, he gives some explanation of his unwillingness to the very last to believe the situation was dangerous: "I did not think they would attempt anything so suicidal to their own benefit" (*ibid.*, p. 802). In his letter to Washington on January 12, telling of the rupture in Aguinaldo's Cabinet, he gives the impression that all the conservative Filipinos are with him and have abandoned the Malolos Government, and apparently he thought so. (See *Otis's Rept., 1899*, p. 356.) Correspondent John F. Bass, writing in 1901 a review of the Insurgent Government for the Philippine Information Society (vol. 1, no. 3, of their series *Facts about the Filipinos*, pp. 70-83), says: "Of what was going on at Malolos our military in Manila knew little, except through Majors Bourns and Bell, who went there only on specific missions. Other officers who went to

On December 14, General Otis reported that foreign business interests were urging the occupation of Iloilo by the Americans, and asked if he should send there troops he had ready, as he had before recommended.¹ The President and the Secretary of War were at the time absent from Washington, on a trip through the southern part of the United States, and it was more than a week before they instructed General Otis to "send necessary troops to Iloilo to preserve the peace and protect life and property."² Receiving this authority on December 23, the latter at once issued orders for General Marcus P. Miller to take the recently arrived Iowa volunteers, the Eighteenth Infantry and a battery of the Sixth Artillery and proceed with them to Iloilo. He also immediately dispatched a message to General Rios at Iloilo, informing him of the coming of this force. But the cable company returned the message the next morning

Malolos stole away like boys from school, fearing that their whereabouts would be detected at headquarters." "The commanding generals [of the American army], schooled to unintelligent obedience of a two-company post, were unwilling to take the responsibility for any energetic or firm action. . . . They did not keep the home Government informed of the critical state of the situation. The result was very general and non-committal orders from Washington, supported by a strict conformity . . . in the Philippines." General Otis's disagreement with the statements of the American newspaper correspondents, which was to become so marked in 1899, began quite early, but at first had less to do with the attitude of the Filipinos than with the state of health of the army. He insisted, in repeated dispatches to Washington, that the correspondents exaggerated, but his own reports at one time showed a sick list of twenty per cent in some regiments. Those volunteer regiments which were less strictly disciplined and managed, of course showed the worst conditions. After the idea of a convalescent hospital near the bay and within Aguinaldo's lines was abandoned in October, one was established on Corregidor Island, with beneficial results.

¹ On December 8, he had reported that he and Dewey agreed that it was very necessary to occupy Iloilo and Sebú as soon as possible, and later on the chief ports of Luzon. This was in response to instructions that he and Dewey should confer together and should keep the President informed as to military and other necessities (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 850-51).

² The message continued: "It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm." The date of this message (given in *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 857) is December 21, the same as the date of the President's formal instructions to proclaim American sovereignty and extend American military authority over the entire archipelago, which instructions were not cabled to Otis until December 27. The Iloilo dispatch did not reach Manila till December 23 (see *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, p. 55).

with the word that it was impossible to deliver it and that all the Spanish forces would leave Iloilo during the day. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles L. Potter was before night dispatched in a coasting-vessel to reach the Spaniards before their departure if possible, and on the 26th the expedition under Miller set sail; they encountered Colonel Potter on his way back and found that the Spaniards had, indeed, departed on the 24th, virtually, though not formally, turning over the town to the Filipino armed authorities. The latter had assumed full control, under the superior direction of the civilian "Committee of the Bisayas," when the cruiser Baltimore and the captured gunboat Callao escorted the three transport-loads of American troops and one transport-load of discharged native soldiers of Spain into the Straits of Iloilo on the morning of the 28th.¹

¹ Even before it became certain that the United States had secured the cession of the Philippines at Paris, General Rios had asked that the Americans send their own troops to relieve him at Iloilo, his request for the use of 2000 of the Spanish prisoners at Manila having first been refused (testimony of General Otis, *Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 759). His telegram to General Otis (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, p. 56) indicates that, after the treaty was signed, the Government at Madrid ordered him to evacuate the Bisayas, in the face of their refusal at Paris to provide in the treaty that the United States should maintain order in the archipelago pending ratification. (This proposal seems to have originated with the American commissioners alone; at least, there is no evidence to show that Washington suggested it, or that General Otis ever urged the importance of such authority being conferred on the United States pending ratification.) There is every indication that, after receiving from Madrid orders to evacuate, General Rios came to terms informally with the Bisayan leaders whose forces were besieging him in Iloilo, or, at any rate, with their spokesmen inside the city. Of course, he could not meet their request formally to commit the city to their keeping; but he left it in the hands of the mayor, who, being a Spaniard (though married in the country), promptly notified the Bisayans that he was ready to turn over his authority to them, under a guaranty of property interests. The Bisayans outside had suspended all hostilities while the Spaniards were preparing for departure, and they marched into the city and formally took possession the day following (December 25). There was also something suspicious about the failure of General Otis's message to General Rios on December 23 to reach the latter. It was cabled to Kapis, on the north shore of Panai, with which communication was maintained with Iloilo by boat, the land line across Panai being in the possession of the Filipinos. The operator returned word to Manila the next morning that General Otis's dispatch had reached him at 5.50 P.M., but that at 5.35 P.M. a Spanish gunboat had left Kapis with all dispatches for Iloilo. He said also that General Rios was going to take his troops to Mindanao, but would himself

Had General Miller simply been under general instructions to act as he thought best after investigating the situation at Iloilo, bearing in mind that the purpose of the expedition was the maintenance of order and the furtherance, so far as possible, of good relations between Americans and Filipinos, Iloilo would almost surely have been occupied by him immediately upon his arrival; and it is a matter of notoriety that there would have been no resistance at the time. Had he, even under the general and rather conflicting instructions at first given to him, and as supplemented in the same semi-contradictory fashion for a few days thereafter, taken the reins in his own hands, there might have been a peaceful, or practically peaceful, landing of his troops at any time during the first few days that followed his arrival.¹

soon come to Manila; Rios did not on this occasion formally communicate to Otis his intention to evacuate, but sent a dispatch to Kapis by another gunboat, after he had actually evacuated.

¹ Otis had instructed Miller at great length, both verbally and in writing, before his departure from Manila (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 57-59), reiterating the President's command: "No conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm." If he found Iloilo already occupied by the insurgents, Miller was to "proceed with great caution, avoiding all manifestation of meditated forcible action and undue display of force." He was to land, if possible to do so by negotiating with the representative people and making them understand that the United States intended to establish "an efficient government" which should protect their interests fully, "in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increasing and abundant prosperity." If he could not succeed in this, he was to "avoid a conflict or the use of force except in defense." He was to tell the people that he brought so large a force to Iloilo (about 2500) only with the intention of proceeding from there to occupy other points in the central and southern islands. When Colonel Potter had reported to Otis the departure of the Spaniards, he was at once dispatched with further instructions to Miller, saying it was necessary to occupy Iloilo and the manner of it was left to him: "By firmness and conciliatory action, it is believed that you will be able to land your force without conflict, but you will make as strong a display of the same as possible, landing them and taking possession of the city forcibly, if more pacific measures are without avail." Here at last was the specific authority for which Miller was looking; but, in a postscript, Otis said he had just heard of the break in the Cabinet at Malolos, and that the radicals there were desirous of seeing the Americans begin the trouble at Iloilo, hence it was still "quite necessary to avoid force, if you can do so and succeed." Moreover, in a note to the messenger, Colonel Potter, after closing the foregoing letter, Otis added that Admiral Dewey thought a fight was now necessary to take Iloilo, hence it was best to withdraw; that he (Otis) did not think best to withdraw entirely, but would leave a war-vessel and small force in front of Iloilo and take the

General Otis had, indeed, in the first letter dispatched to Iloilo, given Miller authority to use force to occupy the place, if that should be necessary, though half-revoking this authority in postscripts. On the strength of this, General Miller prepared his troops to land on December 30, but desisted then and sent for further instructions when the foreign business houses, upon whose petition in the first place the expedition had been sent, asked him to stay his hand, for fear his landing of troops would result in the burning of Iloilo by the Filipino authorities.¹ But, the next day after authorizing force, Otis had sent him these orders by a British man-of-war: "Do not be in haste. It will not do to bombard the city, nor will it do to let the natives loot and burn it. Foreigners have large possessions there."² At the same time, the commanding-general's cablegrams to Washington began to take on a new tone of worry and possible danger. This drew from the President, on Janu-

rest of the troops to other ports, yet Dewey's attitude enforced the desirability of using "every possible means of conciliation"; that Miller should be "governed by these views as nearly as possible," and he would try to send "further information" the next day; and, notwithstanding all this, he still held to his view that "Iloilo must be taken." As he read this batch of instructions (*ibid.*, pp. 60-61), General Miller, an old Indian fighter, must have smiled at this sentence: "No further instructions can be given you, and there is no disposition to limit your discretionary action."

¹ *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 63-64. The British and German vice-consuls informed the American vice-consul in Iloilo that the natives intended to fire the town. In their note to General Miller, the foreign merchants did not assign this as their reason, but the probability that the landing of Americans would bring on a conflict with the natives, which "would seriously prejudice and harm the trade of these islands for years to come." Therefore, they asked him to "consider the orders they [the Bisayans] had received from their chief, Aguinaldo, of Malolos." Nevertheless, Miller for several days held his forces all ready to disembark according to a plan of occupation he had prepared. The commander of the Baltimore informed him that Admiral Dewey's instructions to him were to act only in the defense of the army; hence he would not begin an attack on the city (*ut supra*).

² *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, p. 65. General Otis, according to his own explanations, seems to have heard of the overthrow of the conservatives at Malolos with a sudden shock. He speaks of the "situation in Luzon which had been so quickly developed." He had ordered the embarkation of the California volunteers, intending to send them also to occupy southern Philippine ports, but instead made them disembark in a few days, and began cabling Washington that the situation was very delicate and that his forces in Manila must not be widely scattered at present. (*Ibid.*, p. 61.)

ary 1, the message: "It is of first importance that a conflict brought on by you be avoided at this time, if possible." In the United States, the treaty of peace loomed largest in public discussion, and it was already evident that there was danger of a failure to secure its ratification in the Senate. In strict technicality, the United States had no rights in the Philippines outside of Manila Bay, and the Executive was not ready to assume the responsibility of a possible conflict in the Bisayas, whether fearing its effect on the treaty or anxious to avoid criticism. Events moved on rapidly in the Philippines also, the weakness of the American attitude leading the Filipinos now in full control to be so much the more assertive in stating their position. On January 8, General Otis, in reporting the attitude of the Malolos leaders and the fact that the Bisayans were now virtually allied with them, said: "Conflict at Iloilo or any other southern port means war in all the islands." President McKinley immediately replied, in a joint message to Dewey and Otis:—

Am most desirous that conflict be avoided. Your statement [to the effect above stated] increases that desire. Such conflict most unfortunate, considering the present, and might have results unfavorable affecting the future. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring on a conflict. Time given the insurgents cannot hurt us and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we can give their people good government our sovereignty must be complete and unquestioned. . . . You are masters of the situation there and must not relax your power or vigilance. Hope good counsels will prevail among the inhabitants and that you will find means to save bloodshed and restore tranquillity to that unhappy island.¹

¹ There is only scant reference to the cablegrams of late December and of January in *Otis's Report*. They will be found on pp. 862-88 of *Corr. Rel. War*. President McKinley's message of January 1 had been preceded by one from Secretary Alger, instructing Otis to "proceed with great prudence" and to "be kind and tactful, taking time if necessary to accomplish results desired by peaceful means." The message of January 1 was drawn forth by Otis's report regarding Miller's status at Iloilo, saying he was awaiting orders whether to use force, and adding: "Insurgents active. Cannot weaken force here very much." On January 2, he relapsed again into optimism: "Insurgent Government becoming weak and unable

So General Miller never received the formal authorization to occupy Iloilo forcibly, for which authorization he pressed at various times, until after the outbreak of armed trouble around Manila had removed the danger of aggression in Iloilo serving as an excuse for an uprising in Luzon; also the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate had removed the ground for criticism on that score. Force was needed in the end, as it had been plain that it would be at any time after the first few days following the arrival of the American troops. Filipino sentiment in Iloilo, which had been halting and uncertain, crystallized very rapidly; the possession of the city itself was sufficient to strengthen the disposition in favor of control without outside interference. The Bisayan masses had never been stirred by talk of independence to any such extent as had the Tagalogs; their radical leaders, mostly now in arms, which they had taken up against Spain, were quite inclined to give respectful consideration to the advice of their men of property and education, and were, as already stated, somewhat jealous of the Tagalog military leaders whom Aguinaldo was sending down to them; the more conservative men themselves had, as we have seen, found greater virtue in the positive programme of the Malolos Government for the realization of ideals quite common to all the educated Filipinos than in the negative assurances of the unknown Americans, but were at heart not altogether pleased with the character of the self-appointed dictators at Malolos, and were, above all, anxious to avert warfare and the consequent loss of crops. The committee which they had sent up to Luzon was brought back on the same steamer with General Miller, and General Otis had

to hold representative men. . . . Believe that it is possible to avoid conflict." Meanwhile, Washington was hearing, through consuls in Japan, of Filipino purchases of arms there (*ibid.*, p. 867). On January 8, in reporting that trouble at Iloilo meant a general war, Otis said also: "Leading insurgents here [Manila] fear, and beg that we temporize at Iloilo." On January 11, the President authorized the recall of Miller's troops from Iloilo, if it was felt they were needed at Manila.

naïvely expected them to go on shore and tell their people how good and kind and benevolent the Americans were and what a blessing their occupation would be. They bore, however, messages from the Filipinos at Malolos that, if the Spaniards had already turned the city over to the people, it must not be delivered to the Americans unless with a formal protest that this was done in submission to force, or unless word came from Aguinaldo that the United States had properly recognized Filipino independence.¹ The drift of sentiment in Iloilo steadily set toward alliance with their brethren in Malolos, and the members of this committee never returned to carry on further negotiations with General Miller after they were once set on shore at Iloilo. As an "object-lesson" of American generosity and benevolence, General Otis sent down with the expedition some 200 Bisayans, recently discharged soldiers of Spain, with their families; they were promptly seized on and enrolled in the Filipino army outside of Iloilo.²

¹ That this was, in effect, the message from Malolos, is known from private sources. Two dispatches from Mabini to Aguinaldo (spending Christmas in Old Cavite), outlining the message sent to Iloilo, practically confirm this (*Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 34-35). They also reveal that Mabini did not feel at all sure of the attitude of the Bisayans who had come up to Manila. General Otis's implication (*Rept.*, 1899, pp. 59-60) that the Bisayan delegation deliberately played him false, is therefore probably unfair. They did not feel sure, as quite certainly their people at home did not feel sure for some few days after their return, as to just what should be their attitude if forced to a choice between the Americans and the Malolos Government. Generals Otis and Miller understood from the interviews at Manila that they were to work among their own people in behalf of receiving the Americans without opposition. The Bisayans seem to have understood that the Americans promised not to land troops until the "Committee of the Bisayas" had passed on the question and an agreement was reached between the two parties. Mabini evidently understood from the commissioners that any agreement reached at Iloilo was to be reported to Malolos for ratification (the Americans sending a warship for that purpose), but he did not altogether trust the commissioners nor the conservatives in control of the civilian "Committee of the Bisayas," for he sent word through the interpreter direct to the military commanders outside of Iloilo. See also *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, pp. 6-8, for the childish instructions to the Bisayan committee prepared by some one (presumably the author of the similar letter to General Rios in November) in Aguinaldo's office, and for some minutes on the conference of the Bisayans with Otis.

² On January 21, General Otis sent down to Iloilo 600 more Bisayan troops, trained and disciplined under Spanish officers (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, p. 87). The

At first, the Iloiloans with whom General Miller communicated upon his arrival had not been willing to say that they would resist his occupation of the town, even when he came around to asking them this as a direct question. They notified him, on December 30, of their determination "not to consent to any interference" without express orders from the Malolos Government, "with which we are one in ideas." The Bisayans' choice had finally been made. Nevertheless, it is a matter of knowledge that not even yet were they fully decided to oppose force to an American landing.¹ A day or two more, they were ready to go that length also, had their troops stationed about the town, and were preparing defenses and barricading the streets. Conferences of various kinds were held, on shore and on the American ships, and outwardly the best of relations were maintained between the two parties. This was not all formality, either, for the relations of Panai and Negros were close; various planters in Negros were outspoken for the

Malolos Government had also hurried off more Tagalog troops to Panai, on hearing of the Miller expedition; they arrived on that island on December 29.

¹ Indeed, they at the same time made the equivocal statement to General Miller that, if the American troops landed without arms, they would use their troops to endeavor to restrain the people; if the Americans landed with arms, they "would not answer" for the attitude either of their troops or of the people. For the full record of Miller's negotiations with them, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 61-68, 85-87, and General R. P. Hughes's later report to Otis on the Bisayas (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 325-33). Colonel Potter had reported to Miller on the way down that only a show of force was needed, and this was, in effect, Miller's first conclusion, as reported to Otis on December 28. How quick the Iloiloans were to take the cue and assume the positive attitude the Americans had declined to assume is well described in a letter of John F. Bass, written from Iloilo on January 5, 1899, and reproduced in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 74-77. Mr. Bass had been in Iloilo in October, and, coming down with Miller's expedition, spent five days in the town before it was felt to be unsafe for Americans to stay there. He says: "I went on shore and found only a few soldiers in the town. The old fort was unoccupied. Nearly all the insurgent troops were two miles distant, across the river at Jaro. The insurgent flag was down, and the insurgents evidently expected us to land. . . . No mistake is so grave, in a situation like the present, as the mistake of indecision. . . . With every communication we sent, with every evidence of hesitation we showed, the insurgents gained confidence. . . . At first, they made no preparations for resistance, but gradually they took heart and began to fortify the town. . . . When I left Iloilo for the Newport, there were 2000 armed men in town, who patrolled the place constantly. The streets were being barricaded. . . ."

acceptance of American sovereignty and government, and there was more or less of the same feeling throughout the Bisayas. While the Bisayans on Panai had taken their stand with the Malolos Government, and were now prepared to resort to arms rather than deliver Iloilo without the orders of that Government, yet they were still not over-eager for war (barring certain radicals and military leaders), were somewhat divided in their feelings and opinions, and would have welcomed, as indeed they continued to expect, some arrangement between Americans and Filipinos which would release them from their promises to Malolos. No such arrangement was, however, any longer possible of conclusion at Iloilo itself; hence the conferences and negotiations during January were fruitless.¹

¹ See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 927-28, for a letter of Colonel Potter showing the superficially friendly relations of Americans and Bisayans during January. The further into the background passed the original opportunity to take the city, the more General Miller chafed under the restraint of instructions that continued to bind him to inaction until after fighting had begun around Manila. On January 6, he reported "the insurgents call us cowards"; they had supposed the Americans would undoubtedly land, with their greatly superior force, the largest ever seen off Iloilo. On January 8, reporting that a landing of the Iowa troops on Guimaras, a little island facing Iloilo, would have been resisted if continued as attempted, he again urged forcible action in order to save American prestige. On this date and subsequently, even down to February 3, he pressed the question, especially the matter of cutting the insurgents off from the customs dues they were collecting from foreign vessels, by blockading the port, if seizure was not to be permitted. On January 19, President McKinley had given instructions that he desired "no forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs duties at Iloilo." The Iowa troops were finally sent back to Manila on January 29, the Tennessee volunteers taking their place, as the Iowans had been on board ship about ninety days since leaving San Francisco.

CHAPTER XI

MILITARY DIPLOMACY

THE Iloilo episode was interwoven with another which, while hardly to be regarded in any fair sense as an active cause of the warfare that followed, was yet in some degree provocative of the trouble. This episode, less a vital factor in the final outcome of events than an interesting sidelight upon conditions, centered about the issuance by President McKinley of a declaration of American sovereignty over the Philippine archipelago. Early in December, Admiral Dewey had recommended the issuance of a proclamation declaring to the Filipinos what were the intentions of the United States. Upon his return to Washington from the South, President McKinley had written a letter of instructions to the Secretary of War which was less a statement to the Filipinos of American purposes than a proclamation to the people of those islands and of the world in general of an intention to begin at once the extension of American control over the entire archipelago. The document began by reasserting President McKinley's claim that the victory of Dewey's fleet and the capture of Manila "practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein," and stated further that the recent confirmation of that conquest by Spain's formal cession at Paris made it necessary that the authority of the United States be "extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory." The intention to respect private property, to continue for the present the existing municipal laws, and to open the islands to the commerce of friendly nations, was expressed in paragraphs which implied, though not so stating in explicit terms, that a government of military occupation along the lines followed in

Manila since August would simply be made general throughout the archipelago "until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide." The essential clauses of the proclamation as a declaration of American attitude toward the people were these: —

. . . It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or as conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or honest submission, coöperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as may be possible. . . .

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

This document was started to General Otis by mail on December 21, but one week later its full text was cabled to him from Washington; hence, he received it after the break at Malolos had given the war party full swing, and when the news from Iloilo was critical and he was ordering General Miller to stay his hand. The conservative Filipinos had been lamenting among themselves the lack of any definite statement of programme or of aims on the part of the United States; but they assured General Otis, when called into consultation upon the President's instructions, that a comprehensive decla-

ration of sovereignty at that time, at least unless accompanied by a very liberal programme of semi-autonomous government, quite specifically outlined, would simply strengthen the hands of the war party at Malolos and would be a strong incentive to a rupture. So the commanding general, at last fully alarmed over the situation, thought best to omit altogether certain words and passages of the President's instructions from the proclamation which the President required him to issue, and to expand somewhat, upon his own authority, the assurances to the Filipinos that they would be considerably treated. He omitted entirely the passages proclaiming the right of the United States to the archipelago both by conquest and cession and the intention immediately to extend its authority to the other important points besides Manila, avoiding especially all such words as "sovereignty," "cession," etc. The clauses regarding the continuance of municipal laws and courts, and administration generally, he expanded by a more nearly definite promise of native participation; and, to the paragraphs above cited, promising the Filipinos justice and benevolence in general, which he quoted, he added his own assurances that it was the intention of his Government "to appoint the representative men now forming the controlling element of the Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility," to organize the natives themselves into a military force to preserve order, and, finally, to establish "a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world."¹

¹ The text of the President's instructions and of General Otis's proclamation may be seen side by side in *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 776-78. A facsimile of the proclamation itself, in English, Spanish, and Tagalog parallel columns, is given in *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, opp. p. 359. In *ibid.*, pp. 66-67, he explains his reasons for making the changes in wording, and he in 1902 testified at length before the Senate Com-

The President's instructions had been sent to General Miller, immediately after their receipt, by a British cruiser going to Iloilo, without directions as to their issuance or non-

mittee regarding this episode (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 764-78). He did not think "that the President of the United States understood the situation." This was also what he said at the time of the affair to Admiral Dewey, when the latter informed him that he himself had advised the issuance of a proclamation "defining the policy of the United States" and "showing the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the islands" and that "as soon as they developed their capability for self-government, their powers and privileges will be increased." (These are extracts from Dewey's message cited by Otis in his *Rept.*, 1899, pp. 67, 82; its text is not to be found in any Navy Department document.) In part, the bad feeling between Otis and Dewey, which later came to a head, may be traced to friction at this time. Dewey thought the proclamation should be published just as received. The whole episode must be studied in the light of the cablegrams exchanged during several weeks preceding and a week following the message containing the President's instructions of December 21. (See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 858, *ante. et seq.* Note also, *ibid.*, p. 927, that on January 23, Otis wrote to Washington that he should have occupied Iloilo without waiting for authority from Washington, had not Dewey opposed.) On December 4, the President had instructed Dewey and Otis to confer and send not only information as to the military preparations necessary for holding the Philippines, but also suggestions "as to the government of the islands, which of necessity must be by the army and the navy for some time to come." It was in response to this message that Dewey sent the dispatch alluded to by Otis. The latter, replying to Washington on December 8, mentioned the ports and strategic points that should first be occupied, then proceeded to make detailed recommendations as to the temporary government (*ibid.*, p. 852): He would restore, apparently, the old provincial governments in Luzon, under charge of Filipinos, and in the Bisayas continue the former military governments until a simple form of civil control could be worked out; above all, he thought it urgent to restore the judicial system on the former basis, with the supreme court presided over by a "distinguished Filipino lawyer [Cayetano S. Arellano]." The conservative Filipinos were urging this speedy reorganization of government as the most effective means of showing American intentions, and, above all, they regarded the reestablishment of the judicial system, which had been overthrown by the Malolos party in favor of executive-legislative control of the courts, this being already the cause of many arbitrarities, as the most effective means of drawing the propertied classes together in favor of a more stable government. But when the President's instructions came, they contained no reference to the rather specific proposals Otis had made, limiting themselves to the more general declarations Dewey had felt most important at the time, "until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide." On December 29, the day Otis received these instructions, the President again urged on him the importance of occupying "all strategic points possible" before the insurgents could do so; this upon the suggestion of Professor Dean C. Worcester, then about to be named a member of the civil commission to be sent to the islands, who may have had information about the seriousness of the situation from Dr. Frank S. Bourns, his former associate, then in the islands. Otis's reply indicates that he

issuance. Miller immediately transmitted them to the Bisayan committee, as indicating from an authoritative source the claims the United States had to a peaceful occupation of that territory. A public meeting was at once held to discuss them, and therein for the first time the intention to resist the United States in warfare, if need be, was openly expressed. Subsequent conferences only drew from the Iloiloans reiterated assertions that the international rights claimed by the United States were not founded on justice, that the assurances of the President were only too general, while his claims were all too specific, and that they would stand upon the result of negotiations with the Government at Malolos.¹

General Otis issued his proclamation on January 4, and very soon thereafter the Filipinos at Malolos received from Iloilo

considered this a sort of reflection on his own prevision and his information about the situation. These dispatches give a hint as to the ideas at work at the time in the President's mind, in connection with the sudden decision to send a commission to the islands: the prime consideration in the proclamation when it was prepared on December 21 had been the extension of American authority; but this purpose was very quickly changed when it became evident that such extension would bring on trouble in advance of the ratification of the treaty.

¹ John F. Bass (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 75) describes the meeting held at Iloilo to discuss the unaltered proclamation: "After the reading was over, an insurgent officer arose and said: 'This town was officially handed over to us by the Spaniards, after we had besieged it for several months and lost many men. We are tasting the sweets of liberty for the first time, and now we are asked to give up the town to a strange people, who will not tell us what they intend to do after they are the masters. Shall we give up Iloilo?' The answering shout of 'No!' might have been heard half a mile away." Still, it was not until January 9 that the committee made formal answer to Miller's statement in transmitting the proclamation on January 1: "The people of Panai owe obedience to the political authority of the United States, and grave responsibilities will be incurred, if, after deliberation, it is decided to resist that authority." In reply, they said they were confronted by a conflict of authority over them; that of the Americans, the latter themselves claimed as beginning only with the signing of the treaty, while "the authority of the central Government at Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifice, etc." General Miller could in reply only press upon them the formal precepts of international law as providing for sovereignty and allegiance. See *Rept. War Dept.*, 1899, vol. I, part 5, pp. 328-33, for this correspondence and the futile conference of January 11 (wherein General Miller was represented by an "acting assistant surgeon"), in which the Iloiloans only reiterated their determination to wait on the Malolos authorities and complained that Otis's promise that they should have a boat with which to communicate with Malolos had not been kept.

the full text of the President's instructions. They had already, however, issued a counter-proclamation, over Aguinaldo's name, protesting "one and a thousand times, with all the energy of his soul," against the authority General Otis had assumed in calling himself "Military Governor of the Philippine Islands"; declaring that the mention of the instructions of President McKinley caused him to "protest solemnly in the name of God, root and source of all justice and right, who had visibly acceded him the power to direct his dear brethren in the difficult task of their regeneration, against this intrusion of the United States Government in the administration of these islands"; and proclaiming that "liberty and absolute independence" was their ambition, and by it they would stand. This proclamation was more cautious in tone and less explicit in its assertions than one prepared and printed at Malolos at almost the same time, but which the authorities there sought to recall. The latter began as a statement to the "civilized powers" of the causes compelling the Malolos Government to "the rupture of its amicable relations with the Army of the United States"; made a flat declaration that representatives of the United States had promised the Filipinos independence; and announced a readiness "to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Bisayan islands."¹ When the President's cablegram itself was received

¹ General Otis informed Washington, in forwarding the text of both these proclamations (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 357, 359-62), that they were of the same date, January 5, but the more rabid document was withdrawn and the other substituted for it. The facsimiles of the two documents, however (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 60, 101), show that the more rabid document was issued on January 8. The history of the documents is not clear, but it is well known that the virtual declaration of war was promptly withdrawn from circulation so far as possible. Mabini probably wrote the first, as it is in his style and represents well the attitude he took at the time. The stronger terms of the second may have been occasioned by the supposition of some of the leaders at Malolos that Otis had declined to treat at all with the commissioners whom they were appointing at the time to visit Manila; but the day after its issuance (January 9) an arrangement was made whereby these commissioners and American commissioners could meet, as will appear below. At any rate, Mabini, who had on January 5 instructed these Filipinos that Aguinaldo had made no compact at all with the Americans which could bind the Filipinos,

from Iloilo, and it was discovered that in issuing it General Otis had veiled its plain declarations of an intention to assert complete sovereignty over the archipelago and had also made various promises as to the future government apparently upon his sole responsibility, there was so much the more excitement at Malolos and in Manila, where the newspapers published the texts of the two documents and their columns bristled with insinuation and hostile comment as to American bad faith and lack of candor.¹

could hardly countenance the assertions in the proclamation of January 8 that a definite agreement had been made between the two parties. It is interesting to see how different the two proclamations are on this point: the proclamation that was withdrawn asserted that Consul-General Pratt had promised them independence, and that the American military men, in spite of their subsequent unfriendly acts, had virtually ratified this promise. The formal and official proclamation of January 5 asserted instead (significantly, in the light of Mabini's secret instructions at the time) that Aguinaldo never, "either at Singapore or at Hongkong or here in the Philippines," incurred "any verbal or written obligation for the recognition of American sovereignty over this cherished soil," and it asserted merely that the acts and proclamations of Dewey, Merritt, and Otis had virtually constituted a recognition of the belligerency of the Philippine Government and the American authorities had verbally "promised him their active support and efficacious coöperation."

¹ Apparently it was not the discovery of the Filipinos that Otis had changed the President's proclamation which led to the sudden outbreak of Filipino hostility as evinced in the counter-proclamations. At any rate, neither proclamation makes a handle of the alteration of the President's cablegram by Otis, as the Spanish and Filipino papers promptly did when they knew of it. *La Independencia*, under Luna's instigation, was especially violent. The Spanish press of Manila and Iloilo (especially two or three papers edited by discredited adventurers of the old régime) fairly reveled in this opportunity to breed trouble between the Filipinos and Americans. General Otis appeared to be much nettled when he found out that Miller had published the message upon its receipt; but Miller could point out that nothing was said to him about not publishing it, either when it was sent down or when it was followed by the President's further cablegram of January 1, which message, moreover, plainly indicated that Washington desired to have the proclamation published at Iloilo. On January 15, Otis told Miller the proclamation was sent to him only for his "information," and that, as soon as he had had time to consider it, he had cabled Washington that it was not opportune to publish it. General Otis was hardly candid here; he cabled Washington on January 2 that the proclamation was "not issued here yet, as time not opportune; will be in two or three days." On January 4, he informed Washington of its issuance, but said nothing of changing the terms of the proclamation; nor did he, in reporting, on January 8, that he had "issued a conservative proclamation," state that he had omitted the important declarations of the President as to the right of sovereignty. During the week intervening between the receipt of the cablegram and the issu-

The President's proclamation, though following rather tardily the final assurance that Philippine sovereignty was to be transferred at Paris, implied, if followed out logically, a straightforward, positive course of action, namely, the extension of American authority throughout the archipelago, the setting-up of temporary military government elsewhere as in Manila, reference to Congress of all questions regarding permanent government, and virtual disregard of the Malolos Government, while yet the coöperation of the Filipinos in the temporary military administration should be invited. But, aside from questions of internal policy in the United States, there was in the islands a practical obstacle to any such "thorough policy," namely, the fact that there were not troops enough on hand to back it, either as a show of force or in the event of actual warfare resulting. A foreseeing eye, directed toward such a policy, might, of course, have obviated this difficulty; but partly in default of such provision, the proclamation itself did not appear until the United States had already, by shrinking back at Iloilo, belied its own declaration of intentions. The time for the success of this policy had now passed by.

The other logical course open to the United States Government was to endeavor to arrange with the Filipinos a mutual adjustment of at least temporary duration, a sort of *modus vivendi*. (Of course, the United States could blindly stagger along, lament that its hands were tied by the threefold division of its governmental powers, and optimistically trust to luck; but such a course of procedure cannot here be treated as a "policy"

ance of his proclamation, he made no mention whatever of the importance of changing its terms, nor did he ask authority to do so, though in daily communication with Washington. He accompanied his virtual reprimand of Miller with another "special emissary" to Iloilo, Major Mallory, who was to give Miller full information as to the "policy" pursued at Manila. Further along, he explained this policy as being "to keep as quiet as possible, permitting the insurgent authorities to work out their own protection, if possible," whatever that might mean (*Rept. War Dept., 1899, vol. I, part 5, p. 333*). For General Miller's defense of himself against the implication by Senator Hoar that he circulated the President's proclamation in order to bring on a fight, see *Cong. Record, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6026*.

with reference to the Philippines.) How far it would have been necessary, in order to secure a *modus vivendi*, to recognize the Malolos Government, including objectionable institutions and personages as well as those properly representative of the people, was a practical question of no small moment. Whether, indeed, there was ever a time, after the radicals among them had openly and completely secured control, when there was any chance for peace with them, short of such a recognition of their own powers and an abdication by the United States of practically all the control which it had judged necessary and had tenaciously insisted at Paris upon having, is very much in doubt. That, before this, the chances for mutual adjustment were very good had been the opinion of those Filipinos whose preferences, as between control by the United States and a government by their own radical and military pretenders, were with the United States; and the point for us to note at this stage of the situation is that these men, or some of them at least, still clung to the *hope* of a peaceable adjustment. This hope was predicated, however, upon the giving, as well as the taking, by the United States of concessions. Legal refinements as to the division of governmental powers in the United States necessitating a postponement of the question of Philippine government could not now find sympathetic listeners in these men, who had been waiting only for the close of the negotiations at Paris to hear definite proposals from the United States; and they knew only too well with what impatience their more radical brethren would regard such arguments as mere pretexts to cover ulterior purposes.

An effort at diplomatic adjustment of the situation was made at this stage of affairs. Though it failed to affect seriously the course of events, it deserves examination somewhat in detail. First of all, we note that it was mainly inspired and carried on by the Filipino peace party we have mentioned; that the American representatives on the ground, while promptly acceding to the request for a negotiation, were only less luke-

warm toward it than the Filipinos who held the reins at Malolos; and that Washington scarcely heeded it at all, indeed, knew little about it until it was all over. It did, however, shed much light upon the aims entertained at Malolos at the time, and it brought into sharper relief the Washington policy of "drift."

The proposals for this conference antedated by some little time the publication of the President's proclamation. The plan was interfered with, not so much by the appearance of this document and of the counter-proclamations at Malolos as by Mabini's inevitable effort to obtain from Otis, by inadvertence or otherwise, something that should appear as a "recognition" of the Filipino Government. He sent to Otis, on January 5, two commissioners "with the aim of reaching an agreement upon questions affecting the relations between the Americans and the Filipinos," in the name of Aguinaldo, as "President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines." Otis declined to recognize these men, and said he could only appoint officers representing him as "commanding general of the United States Army in the Philippines," to "confer with" Filipinos nominated by "General Aguinaldo, commanding general of the revolutionary forces"; and at last, on January 9, Mabini yielded, under the pressure of his own representatives, who were waiting at Manila, and the first conference was held on that day.¹

¹ Scant data as to these conferences are given in the unsatisfactory accounts by Otis (*Rept.*, 1899, pp. 80-84) and Aguinaldo (*Reseña verídica*). In *Sen. Doc. 331* (57th Cong., 1st Sess.), pp. 2709-51, are the official minutes of the six meetings held, both English and Spanish texts. The same document contains also statements about the conferences in the testimony of Generals Otis and Hughes. The writer has seen the private correspondence between Mabini and the Filipino commissioners on this occasion, and has had private information regarding this episode from two of these commissioners. The letters of Aguinaldo and Otis on January 9 (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 80-81) were only formal expressions on the matter of a recognition of the Filipino Government, exchanged after the matter was settled and Mabini, having failed in his renewed effort to secure a useless paper "recognition" of the Malolos Government from Otis, had yielded the point. See also *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6183, for a telegram to Aguinaldo from Otis's go-between, an American who had suddenly acquired prominence as a contractor in the wake of the army.

The American commissioners were Brigadier-General Robert P. Hughes, provost-marshal-general of Manila; Colonel James F. Smith, a civilian attorney having command of the California volunteer infantry; and Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, judge-advocate. The Filipinos were Florentino Torres, a Tagalog lawyer of first rank, a man of high character, and an official of the Solicitor-General's department under Spain; Ambrosio Flores, a middle-class Tagalog, once officer of the native troops of Spain, later a prominent organizer of Filipino Masonry, at this time a general in the revolutionary army, afterward to succeed Luna as nominal Director of War; and Manuel Argüelles, a middle-class Tagalog from Batangas, an honest, sturdy specimen of his race, one of Aguinaldo's military aides with the rank of colonel.¹

¹ Señor Torres, who became under the American military government Attorney-General of the Islands, and is now one of the justices of the Supreme Court, was the prime mover in bringing about these conferences. He had come up from Sebú just before the break at Malolos occurred in December. He at once perceived the gravity of the situation, and became for the time the active spokesman of the peace party, its more prominent members in Manila virtually having ceased to make representations at Malolos. Perhaps we may give Aguinaldo the credit for this last effort to recognize the conservatives and have them work with him. Mabini, however, held the commissioners closely confined by instructions, and, after his failure to win formal recognition of his government from Otis, he added to the original commission of two, Torres and Argüelles, the military commander Flores. Mabini had been suspicious of Torres from the first, and this enlargement of the commission when they were given new instructions on January 9 as representatives of Aguinaldo, "chief of the revolutionary army," followed a telegram from Torres at Manila to Mabini at Malolos on January 8, which also sheds some light on the "war" proclamation of that date. Torres said: "A member of Congress assures me that a certain person has brought from Malolos some proclamations of the Honorable President, declaring relations broken off and hostilities begun with Americans, and that such documents will be circulated. Is that true? If so, I am surprised that since last night they have not communicated it to us, at least to maintain seriousness and loyalty in relations with us." Mabini answered: "The news is not exact. The President has said he is prepared to open hostilities if they insist upon occupying by force a part of the territory subject to his jurisdiction." Judge Torres has stated his own position and that of the conservative party at the time as follows: "As the absolute independence of the country was impossible, owing to its peculiarities and those of its inhabitants, on account of its situation and the dangers to which it was exposed by the conflicting interests of the foreign powers and the ulterior designs they might have . . . these people [the propertied, educated class of Manila and some adjoining provinces] thought

The Filipino representatives were commissioned by Aguinaldo, "as General-in-Chief of the Filipino Army," to "treat as to the bases of a provisional agreement which may assure peace and amity between the said forces [American] and the Filipino people, until the establishment of a definite and permanent agreement between the Governments of both nations." The instructions drawn by Mabini on January 4 were to be their guide. From that document, it at once becomes apparent that the thing of immediate importance in Mabini's eyes was that the Americans should be made to desist from their project of occupying Iloilo; the maintenance of the *status quo ante* he intimated was an absolute essential of the "provisional treaty," which being secured, commissioners would meet to negotiate the "formal convention" between the two Governments. He hinted that at that time the Filipino Government would recognize the "necessity for the protection" of the American people, but all else but the demand for a halt at Iloilo was blissfully vague and general.¹ In this first meeting,

this was the best thing that could be done [to accept the new sovereignty]. . . . They were few in number, but they worked in good faith, being convinced that, as there had never been any hope that Spain would willingly eliminate from the administration of the archipelago the harmful monastic element . . . or that she would consent to liberal reforms, . . . the only possible way of saving these islands from anarchy in the interior, from the ambitions of certain powers, or from some other colonial system similar to that of Spain, . . . was the frank and loyal acceptance of the sovereignty of America. . . . These individuals were violently opposed by the great mass of the people, who were decidedly in favor of independence, and even of war to secure it, and also by a certain class of foreigners [he means the Spaniards], and received the nickname of 'Americanistas.'" (*Rept. War Dept., 1901, vol. I, part 4, p. 120.*)

¹ A comparison of the preamble of January 4 instructions with the letter commissioning the Filipinos on January 9 will be of interest. The thing chiefly notable about the Mabini document of January 4 is this explicit statement: "The Chief of the Filipino people has not made any contract with the Government of the United States, but, inspired by the same ideal of destroying the sovereignty of Spain in these islands, they have mutually assisted each other." Just below, complaining of the exclusion of the Filipinos from Manila, Mabini is careful in calling them allies, to say "though only *de facto*." Plainly, having taken this official position, Mabini could not countenance the proclamation of January 8, formally reasserting that there had been an official promise of independence. Mabini was not direct in his mental processes, nor in his methods, but he was mentally honest, and, having now taken full control, he may have thought it time to do away with

the Filipinos stated as their specific grievances also the failure to share the occupation of Manila, the extension of the American territory outside of the city's boundaries, the seizure of their vessels on the bay and elsewhere, and the interference with the flying of their flag; but they put forward the present attempt upon Iloilo as the immediate and most serious cause of friction.¹ They declared their aim to be "absolute independence," yet indicated, when questioned further, that they meant by that to include protection by the United States in their foreign relations; not being authorized to enter into details upon this point, they promised to obtain instructions upon it for the next meeting. But when the next session was held on January 14, at the call of the Filipinos, they could only present the following signed statement: "That the aspiration of the Filipino people is independence, with the limitations resulting from the conditions which the Government shall agree upon with the American Government, when the latter consents officially to recognize the former." This was an even more indefinite statement of the desires of the Malolos Government than had been made informally by the commissioners Torres and Argüelles when they first presented themselves with credentials at Manila. But it appeared, as they were pressed for concrete answers, that their instructions now were to demand a recognition of Philippine independence as a *sine qua non* to even the *discussion* of the terms of a "pro-

this fiction of an alliance with the United States. At any rate, it had, from his point of view, more than served its purpose, and he now wished to be in position to disown any counterclaim to Filipino gratitude which the Americans might put forward on the basis of their help to Aguinaldo in May and June.

¹ Mabini's preoccupation over the Iloilo matter is indicated in his telegram of January 5 to the two commissioners first appointed, rehearsing a rumor he had heard that the Americans had "forged the signature and seal of Aguinaldo in an order addressed to the Iloiloans, commanding them to surrender that place." Mabini was much excited over this tale (which seems to have started with two Spanish ship-captains), and wished every step taken to head off the false order at Iloilo and to tell the people there, "We are preparing to help them if our adversaries resort to war." He added: "I am convinced that, if the Americans do not gain their object, we have traveled half the road toward the concession of our ideals."

tectorate," and that, without such recognition, they could only discuss some *modus vivendi* to avert immediate trouble. They put it on record that the desire for a protectorate of some sort arose not "from the lack of capacity to govern, but from lack of ability to maintain their independence"; and they did go so far as to say that, if the Filipino Government should attempt to make treaties, declare war, etc., with foreign powers, without consultation with the United States as protecting power, the latter "ought to be considered absolved from the obligation of interceding in their behalf." But nothing more definite could be obtained from them as to the nature of the protectorate desired.¹ The Americans insisted that these points ought frankly and specifically to be set forth, in order that they might lay them before their Government; already, they said, the Filipinos had a sufficient guaranty that the United States would not disturb the present peace upon its own initiative, in the instructions from the President to General Otis that there must be no conflict with the Filipinos unless they initiated it themselves.²

¹ The rest of the meeting was devoted to generalities, the Filipinos setting forth their desire never again to be subjected to a "colonial régime"; the Americans replying that they could rely for justice upon the character and traditions of the American Government and people. Mabini had in the interim tied the Filipino commissioners down with more restricted instructions, after hearing the report of the first conference, laying down recognition of the Filipino Government as a *sine qua non* to even the formulation by the latter Government of its wishes and aims. He also instructed them to recall the recognition of the "necessity of American protection" expressed in his instructions of January 4, to state that it was a mere private expression of opinion, or, at any rate, to interpret it as meaning only "aid, support, or assistance." He also wished to have them threaten the Americans with foreign intervention if they became involved in a war with the Filipinos. Nevertheless, he showed some fear lest his refusal to let them discuss the vital questions underlying the threatened disagreement and his re-insistence upon a recognition of the Malolos Government should cause the Americans to break off the conference abruptly, in which event "our case would be much prejudiced."

² Otis had communicated the fact that he was under such orders in his letter of January 9 to Aguinaldo. One of the Filipino junta at Hongkong confirmed this news to Aguinaldo in a letter of January 26 (*Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6106). The insurgent agents at Manila had the news before that, one notifying Aguinaldo on January 10 that Otis was ordered not to open hostilities, supposedly because he was "awaiting 15,000 regular troops and congressional action on peace

Beyond this point the two commissions never got, though the longest and most interesting of their sessions (which were held at night, after the American officers had done their day's work) was the third, on January 17. The most definite answer the Filipinos could then make, as a commission, to the objection that the United States was asked to recognize their Government but remain entirely in the dark as to the nature of the protectorate it was to maintain over them, was that, the Filipino people being the weaker of the two and desiring a protectorate "both for convenience and as a matter of gratitude," it might be expected to "propose the most reasonable terms," but they would not desire "a protectorate over them in the same manner as over savages." Individually, when further closely pressed, they hazarded various general opinions: Argüelles, that the Filipinos, being a weak people, "would be in perfect accord with the United States in all foreign relations and would never enter into any alliance inimical to them"; Flores, that foreign relations should be left to the United States and internal affairs entirely to the Filipinos, and that some way of compensating the United States for the expense of maintaining a protectorate should be found; Torres, admitting that the administration of internal affairs might give rise to foreign difficulties, thought that the protecting power, having given its guaranty to the world, should be allowed "at least great moral interference" in the administration of the archipelago, and that the Filipino people, "understanding as they did the need of protection, would do almost anything required by the United States not inimical to their rights and interests."

The Filipinos then came back to their original complaints about the seizure of their vessels by Dewey and the interference with the flying of their flag, making definite requests "treaty," and another, on the same date, saying: "Otis has a cablegram from McKinley, which directs him to make the best possible bargain in the Philippines, but to avoid a conflict by every possible means; as a last resort, to grant independence under certain conditions." (See *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 40.)

now for the first time for restitution and non-interference, and also asking that no more American troops be sent to the islands; virtually, they asked that the United States perform no further acts of sovereignty in the islands, and that it cease to interfere with Filipino acts of sovereignty. This led to an exchange of views on sovereignty, the Americans fortifying themselves in the legally impregnable assertion of their rights under international law, the Filipinos taking the broader ground that "sovereignty is inalienable and issues directly from the people," and asserting the invalidity of the Treaty of Paris.¹

Two more conferences were held, mainly devoted to a discussion of the accusations brought by the Filipinos against the conduct of the American soldiers in Manila, and in a final session held on January 29, the commissions merely met to adjourn *sine die*, the Americans exchanging a final conciliatory letter from General Otis for a copy of the constitution formally adopted at Malolos the week before. At that time the "war party" had, by resolution, confirmed Aguinaldo in the presidency, and had finally put through the clauses which virtually placed it in his power to declare war as well as to make laws dictatorially. The chance for adjustment was past. Having failed to entrap the Americans in his childish snare and to secure a quasi-recognition of his Government, Mabini, who at heart desired little or no American "protection," and really believed it unnecessary, became convinced that the

¹ In the interim, Mabini had again drawn his lines closer about the commissioners, in the form of supplementary instructions of January 16. He now went so far as to make it a *sine qua non* for even the signing of a *modus vivendi* that the Americans should send no more troops, should return the Filipino boats, and should let them fly their flag, all which would be, under the circumstances, virtual recognition of Filipino sovereignty. Answering the American commissioners' queries as to how an independent Filipino Government would defend itself from foreign aggression, he said no power "had any right" to disembark forces while the Filipinos maintained order; the latter were "disposed never to permit it"; and finally, if they had the services of the American fleet, they could repulse any foreign invasion, anyway; one is reminded of the three defenses in the famous case of the man who borrowed the churn.

Americans were bent on aggression ; and, having carried his will at Malolos, he was now anxious to strike before American reinforcements arrived.¹

On the other hand, while the Americans had throughout displayed a willingness to discuss fairly and fully all the matters, great and small, which underlay the threatened hostility between the two peoples, they had not, it would appear, devoted any attention to a positive programme for mutual agreement. The attitude they assumed was that they must decline to recognize the existence of hostility between Americans and Filipinos—which was merely declining to recognize a fact. The theory upon which General Otis, and for him his commissioners, proceeded was that the future relations of Filipinos and Americans, and the nature of the government to be established over the archipelago, must be left to Congress—a very correct constitutional theory, but one which did not offer any immediate remedy for existing conditions.² Hence, though the American commissioners exhibited great diligence in drawing out the inconsistencies and the vagueness of the Filipino ideas

¹ The new tone, forbidding compromise, appeared in his instructions of January 16. Later, as on January 22, he wired that "the President waits with anxiety for you to end the conferences." Captured documents have shown that there was correspondence between the Malolos Government and its agents in Europe (almost certainly also in Washington) regarding the advisability of attacking the Americans in Manila before the regular troops then being sent from New York could arrive. One such document is given in *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6103. This was dated at London February 3, but the Malolos leaders had full knowledge of the reinforcements long before that, the Manila papers had occupied themselves with the matter, and the Filipino commissioners had broached it in the sessions. Aguinaldo himself still seems to have had some personal inclination to compromise and adjustment, but he was not the most influential man in his own camp.

² And which eventually was, in actual fact, belied, since, under the "war power," the President proceeded to construct the Philippine governmental system, while it was not until 1902 that Congress acted, and then only to ratify executive action. General Otis has testified (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 815) that he received "commission after commission" (probably not meaning literally what is stated) from the revolutionary camp, to whom he gave only the assurance that the government set up by the United States would be republican in form: "I told them I could make no promises. They asked some expression as to what the United States intended to do. I said that the question rested entirely with Congress." (See also *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 67-68.)

about a protectorate, it was done only with the negative purpose of showing them their lack of a logical governmental programme, not for the purpose of preparing the way for a definite proposition from the American side.¹

And the Filipinos waited in vain for any word from Washington making such a proposition or indicating that their own almost meaningless propositions had been received at the American capital. They were, indeed, told that they could not expect by cable an answer to the Mabini proposition of January 14 for "independence with limitations," since this was a matter for Congress. In his conciliatory letter at the close of the conference, General Otis, explaining that the Philippine Commission which was being sent out from Washington could directly represent the President and was coming with full instructions from him, while the army commissioners in Manila had no authority to grant concessions except by permission from Washington, said he had had no answer to his cablegram conveying this expression of Filipino "aspiration." After the approval of the constitution at Malolos, and when Mabini was ready to adopt a more positive tone, Aguinaldo and he addressed Otis asking him to convey to Washington their assurance that the Filipinos were "making superhuman efforts to reclaim their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers," and that, when the United States had officially recognized their Government, its desire was "to contribute, to the best of its scanty ability, to the establishment of a general peace."² No answer was received from Washington to this more formal statement of a demand for Filipino independence, a declaration which was,

¹ In the meeting of January 22, the Filipinos asked if the "grievances" they had submitted in the first meeting (thirteen days before) had yet been given a definite answer by General Otis; the Americans replied that they had not yet been formally submitted to him, only verbally having been told him. This was, of course, equivalent to a polite refusal to discuss them.

² See *Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 84-85, for this document, cabled in full to Washington on January 27.

under the circumstances, belligerent in tone.¹ At Washington, interest was centered primarily upon the action which the Senate was about to take upon the Treaty of Paris. From one side of the continent the three civilian members of the Philippine Commission were setting sail, while from the other side

¹ Otis did not, indeed, expect any answer to these messages (according to his testimony in *Sen. Doc. 331*). From the beginning to the end of the conferences, he sent no messages which indicated that he laid much stress upon them, nor which contained anything more than the most summary statement of the position assumed by the Filipinos. On January 8, he reported the efforts to bring about the conferences, said he would avoid recognition of the Malolos Government, and that "they desire protection of United States and independence; have no clear idea of meaning of these words, but think definite arrangements can be made by which United States will hold supervisory control and they conduct government, United States to assist when necessary. . . . Have told them they must await action of Congress." In ordering no conflict at Iloilo, the President replied to this simply: "Glad you are conferring with them in their unofficial capacity." On January 10, Otis reported: "Revolutionary Government anxious for conference and action on my part, to enable them to allay excitement, which they appear powerless to control." But at the same time he cabled that he thought Aguinaldo's revolutionary proclamation was "more the result of fear for personal safety [!] than determined hostility to American Government"; he said the city was "very quiet," though there was "great suppressed excitement" and families were leaving; also that a further conference would be held and "if peace kept for few days, immediate danger will have passed." This last bit of information he repeated the following day, though reporting that 30,000 citizens had left Manila within a week past. On the 14th, he cabled: "Conditions improving. Insurgent Government seeking further conference. . . . More intelligent members admit their dependence on United States assistance." In sending Mabini's "aspiration" for "independence with limitations," Otis said: "I understand insurgents wish qualified independence under United States protection." But he also said at the same time: "Conditions improving. Confidence. Citizens returning. Business active." At the time of the adoption of the constitution at Malolos, when the leaders of the radical party made delirious speeches about driving out the "invaders," Otis reported: "Insurgent radical element comfortable, in full possession, and with aid of Spaniards and circulation of falsehoods are intensifying sentiment against Americans. Conservative, educated Filipinos fear for personal safety should they resume prominence in affairs. . . . Insurgent Congress adopted constitution. . . . Aguinaldo proclaimed President. . . . Excitement at Malolos and threats to drive invader from soil." Finally, in sending Mabini's formal demand for recognition on January 27, Otis took the edge off its belligerency with this preface: "Conditions apparently improving. Less excitement prevailing. Conferences with insurgent representatives still held. More moderation in demands." (The two commissions had, the day before, virtually agreed to close the conferences on the 29th, having reached an end of their discussions.) This was his last report on Manila conditions until he told of the outbreak of fighting, except for the statements on February 1: "City quiet. No material change. Insurgents threaten; make no

reinforcements of regular troops were being dispatched to the Philippines by the Suez route.¹ Orders were repeated for the maintenance of the *status quo* at Iloilo, and Washington rested its hands and hoped — that the Commission might reach the islands in time to effect adjustment by the means of conciliation, but that, if fighting did begin, the regulars would be there in time.²

active demonstration in force." These messages are to be found in *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 872-91. If the record there is complete, no notice was ever taken at Washington of the peace conference at Manila beyond the President's commendation of the idea on January 8. Otis's notion that those in chief control at Malolos really wanted peace, and that they were afraid of the radicals [their own disciples] and of the people [whom they themselves had stirred up] was persistent with him; in his letter to General Miller on January 15, he said: "The Revolutionary Government is very anxious for peaceful relations, and knows the value of United States protection; but unfortunately some of their radical representatives have raised a flood of excitement which they cannot control. . . . Conditions are improving, and the Malolos Government is slowly disintegrating, I think." (*Rept. War Dept.*, 1899, vol. 1, part 5, p. 333.)

¹ Five regiments of regular infantry set sail from New York between January 19 and February 9, and one regiment of regular infantry from San Francisco on January 31.

² In forbidding the taking of Iloilo, by force, President McKinley had said, in his cable of January 8 to Otis and Dewey: "Will send commissioners, if you think desirable, to coöperate with you both in your delicate task." Upon conferring with Dewey, Otis says, he learned that about January 1 the admiral had recommended the sending of civilian commissioners, and, "desiring to be in accord" with Dewey, he cabled back: "We think commissioners of tact could do excellent work here." (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, p. 80.) There is a mild intimation here that Otis did not relish the appointment of the Commission, and he avoided connection with it so far as possible after its arrival. The President made both him and Admiral Dewey members; the chairman was Jacob G. Schurman, president of Cornell University, and the other civilian members were Charles Denby, ex-minister to China, and Dean C. Worcester, assistant professor of zoölogy in the University of Michigan, who had as a student made two trips to the Philippines in the interests of science. The President's instructions to this Commission under date of January 21, 1899 (*Rept. Phil. Comm.*, 1900, vol. 1, pp. 185-86), show that his appointment of this body was not intended to do away with the plan outlined in his proclamation of December 21, namely, the continuance of military government until Congress should legislate on the subject. The Commission was to "announce by a public proclamation" that, "while the military government already proclaimed is to be maintained and continued so long as necessity may require," yet there would be efforts "to alleviate the burden of taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity, and to provide for the safety of persons and property." The Commission was to study conditions and report, to confer with Filipino citizens, to make recommendations relative to temporary changes in governmental forms and methods as well as for the more permanent scheme

That the complaints of the Filipinos against the American soldiers had some justification was admitted by the American commissioners during these January conferences. The latter expressed a willingness to investigate all complaints with specifications, and indicated that disciplinary measures had been taken and others were being considered. The chief complaint of the Filipinos seemed to be against the searching of houses and the too free use of firearms by the American sentries ; but the American authorities declared that they could not consent to order that no soldier should use his weapon until violence had actually been used against him, and that they must exercise the right of military search, for the evidence of plots for revolt within the city, of the secretion of arms, etc., was constantly coming to light. The American commissioners, who were familiar not only with the repeated and strict disciplinary orders that were issued, but also with the attempts all the time being made to keep their soldiers within the spirit as well as the letter of these orders, would not concede that any downright abuses in the way of violence had been committed or that force had been resorted to otherwise than as circumstances demanded. They admitted the friction with the population over minor matters, particularly over a habit a minority of the American soldiers had acquired of using their uniform to compel tradesmen to supply their wants and then refusing to pay their debts.¹ The clashes on the outskirts of

which it was assumed Congress would enact, and to recommend natives for appointment to office. Hence they did not come, as General Otis supposed when he wrote his letter of January 25 to the Filipinos, "with full instructions from the President of the United States and empowered to act for him." The attitude of Luna and the military radicals is revealed by this sentence from *La Independencia* of January 17, 1899 : "The Filipinos are disillusioned and believe that the appointment of this Commission is only for the purpose of gaining time which will allow the arrival of more forces."

¹ General Otis issued orders on January 28, 1899, condemning the non-payment of debts of soldiers to native tradesmen as a "despicable species of robbery more dangerous than looting, because less open," and instructing company commanders to see that such debts were paid, collecting the amounts at the pay-table, if necessary (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 984).

the city and the small rows inside, which had resulted in the death of one or more Filipinos, they insisted were due to the constant disregard by the petty officers and men of the Filipino forces of the rules of the occupation.¹

Activities on the American side during January were mainly of a defensive character, calculated to guard against surprise

¹ In the last two conferences, the matter of the alleged abuses was the principal topic of discussion. A Filipino captain had been shot by an American sentry inside the city a few days before ; General Hughes, himself the provost-marshal-general, informed the Filipinos that he had carefully investigated the affair and found the Filipino had violated the rules by wearing a revolver into the city, and the American soldier had declared he fired only when the revolver had been drawn on him. (See also Hughes's further testimony in 1902, *Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 506.) In the *Reseña verídica*, Aguinaldo charges that the American soldiers killed a woman and child in the Arroceros market, saying it was done "only in play"; that an American sentry shot a seven-year-old child because he stole a banana from a Chinese; that the Americans repeated the abuses of the Spaniards in searching houses; and, finally charged the army of occupation with "shooting women and children for looking out of the balconies, leveling houses at midnight, breaking open boxes and drawers, and carrying away money, jewels, and whatever objects of value they found, and breaking chairs, tables, and looking-glasses which they could not carry off." That there was some looting, and that other incidents of a state of war existed in Manila, is undoubtedly true; but the more serious charges made above are gratuitous inventions, in the same spirit as Aguinaldo's assertion that, after the outbreak of hostilities, "Otis secretly shot many who would not sign the document asking for autonomy." John Foreman's charges, in the *Contemporary Review* for September, 1904, are apparently based only on this or similar authority. John F. Bass, who on various occasions bore testimony to the fact that the American soldier early in Manila adopted a contemptuous attitude toward the natives, wrote from Manila on January 23 (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 77): "The Tagalogs have grown impudent. They elbow our generals off the sidewalk. They openly threaten to cut all our throats. They laugh at us. . . . Each day brings some new story of insurgent plans to wipe the American forces in Manila out of existence. These plans are met each time with counter-preparations by our army. . . . Our sentries at night challenge and fire with little hesitation. Already two of our sentries have killed natives who were trying to steal upon them unawares to stab them and take their rifles." Dr. Frank S. Bourns, then health officer in Manila, who was on intimate terms with the Filipinos and virtually conducted an intelligence bureau at the time, says, in a personal letter: "I believe that the conduct of our troops had very little, if anything, to do with the bringing on of the trouble. No one who was not here preceding February 4 can appreciate the restraint that was placed upon our troops to avoid the bringing-on of the trouble. As an American acquainted with Oriental ways, I was so ashamed of myself the last month or two that I hated to leave the house. Our soldiers received and submitted to untold insults from the insurgent troops, and bore them patiently, all because of the most stringent orders from headquarters to avoid trouble, if possible, without actual sacrifice of dignity."

(especially by an outbreak in Manila), though the troops were constantly drilled on the outskirts (partly for effect), and the commands were placed as effectively as possible for the carrying-out of movements already decided upon when an advance beyond the city's lines should be ordered. The staff corps, especially the hospital corps, had their parts thoroughly assigned, and the first artillery movements had been studied out. The secret service was, however, the only aggressively active branch, and the wits of the American officers were constantly strained to tell who was Filipino friend and who Filipino foe, in the mass of rumors that were daily being sifted. On the 18th, an order was issued requiring all telegrams to or from Manila which contained political news to be submitted to a military censor.¹ On the 23d, the provost-marshal's forces seized the telegraph office which the Filipinos had been allowed to establish some months before at the end of the railway line in Manila.² Sharper attention was also given to the

¹ The first mention between Washington and Manila of a press censorship seems to have been the cablegram to Otis on January 13: "Secretary War directs you cause press dispatches to be censored at your end of the line." On January 17, Otis cabled: "No discrimination by press censor. Numerous baseless rumors circulated here, tending to excite outside world, stricken from proposed press cablegrams. Correspondents permitted to cable established facts." (See *Corr. Rel. War.*)

² The office was searched, its papers taken and several operators placed under arrest. By direction of Mabini, the Filipino commissioners in Manila asked the release of the men and the return of the property. General Hughes informed them that the seizure had been made because these men had established a system of spies upon American operations and had also opened a post-office without authority. (Probably the real reason was to cut off in some degree the constant communication between Malolos and its agents in Manila.) He turned over, unopened, correspondence for Aguinaldo found in the telegraph office. Mabini wrote to his commissioners: "The continued abuses which their forces are committing in Manila excite the feelings of the populace, which may revolt on that account, in spite of the advice and restraint of the Government." When the Filipinos presented this statement, really a quasi-threat, it gave the American commissioners opportunity to retort that "it would produce a very poor impression on the powers of the world if it was given out that the government which they claimed to have organized had so little of authority and respect that those who claimed to be its subjects could not be controlled by it while deliberations were being had looking to their future welfare and happiness." (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 2737.) Yet General Otis seemed always to ascribe great importance to the claim of the Malolos leaders that they could not control the populace they had aroused.

Spanish press of Manila, and one or two more newspapers were suspended.¹ The Spanish authorities were insistent upon disbanding their native troops in Manila, and, as it was well known that they would at once join the insurgent ranks (preliminary arrangements to that effect having already been made, with the more or less active connivance of at least some of the subordinate Spanish officers), they were first held prisoners in Manila, then an ineffectual attempt was made to scatter them in Luzon and the Bisayas. Practically all, except the Makabebes, eventually found their way into the insurgent ranks, where some of their discharged sergeants and corporals of Spanish blood were already enlisted.²

¹ General Hughes says he closed up three newspapers in all while acting as provost-marshal-general from September 4, 1898, to May 25, 1899. (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 557; see also p. 507, for his account of some of his means of securing information regarding plots against the peace in Manila.)

² Diego Rios, at the time serving nominally as Spanish governor-general of the archipelago, arrived at Manila early in January, and at once began pressing the work of discharging the Spanish soldiers and urging their return to Spain. He also wished to have committees of liquidation begin the work of listing the public property and settling upon its division between the two countries. As the treaty was not yet ratified, the American authorities would not consent to enter formally upon these matters as yet. General Rios ordered the cessation on January 31 of all the Spanish civil administrative departments in the archipelago. The Spanish Government was at the same time pressing the United States to secure the release of the friars and other prisoners held by the Filipinos. To a cablegram instructing him to use his utmost efforts in this direction, Otis replied, on January 22: "Do not believe Malolos Government will release [as was then promised], believing detention will involve Spain and the United States. Efforts to secure release of priests gives basis for charge that I am in sympathy with priests, and priests confirm rumor [desiring to have the people believe that the American Government would be at their beck and call, as the Spanish Government had been]. Do not think I can effect anything at present, as cannot recognize in correspondence Insurgent Government." Data regarding the native troops discharged by Rios will be found in Otis's daily correspondence with Dewey from January 16 to February 3 (*Otis's Rept.*, 1899, pp. 88-90), which also reveals the situation in the American headquarters at the time. On January 21, Otis sent 600 more Bisayan troops to Iloilo, where they joined the Filipino forces. Of the 276 natives of Luzon whom he sent to Mariveles, at the entrance of Manila Bay, 264 promptly went to Bataan in small boats and joined the Filipino forces there (*Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, p. 44). On January 21, the Filipino militia organizers in Manila reported that they had enlisted 400 of these native soldiers of Spain whom the Americans were keeping confined in the walled city. Aguinaldo replied: "Tell the Filipino soldiers in the walled city affiliated to our cause that they must keep on good terms with the

The complaint of the Filipino press (aided by the Spanish editors, who were improving every opportunity to make mischief between the two parties) that the Americans were simply prolonging the conferences in order to gain time for the arrival of reinforcements had considerable justification in fact.¹ General Otis's assurance to the Filipinos that the regulars were being sent out merely to take the place of the volunteers whom he was authorized to return was, therefore, not entirely ingenuous; but the American commander added that he would not return the volunteers "so long as threatened with active hostilities"; and his reiterated assurance that "no hostile act will be inaugurated by the United States troops" was an additional notice to the Filipinos that they, in large degree, held the question of peace or war in their own hands. We are not able to find any such definite statement of peaceful intent on the part of the Malolos authorities, who, on the contrary, indulged in some very belligerent declarations. Still, when two armies face each other in the attitude which these two had now assumed, the blame for trouble, when trouble comes, is to be found rather in the conditions existing between them than in the attitudes of the respective commanders or forces themselves. It was the business of the American superior officers, unless they would be grossly negligent of their duty, to prepare for war, since at any time some incident might bring

Americans, in order to deceive them and prevent their confining them, since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived." (*Ibid.*, p. 43.) Mabini had already instructed the Filipino commissioners to broach to the Americans the subject of the release of these men, and one of his commissioners wired back: "I think negotiation in behalf of these troops would have a bad effect, for it would confirm the Americans' suspicions that they have been spoken for to aid the revolutionary army."

¹ Said General R. P. Hughes (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 527): "We were very sorry, at least I was, to have the conferences stopped, because I was trying to prolong them until General Lawton's ship could get there with four battalions, which we needed very much. But we could not stretch it out any longer. The papers had begun to attack us, and stated absolutely in words that we were doing nothing but trying to gain time; and a telegram had been received from Agoncillo, in the United States, to make the attack before the reinforcements got there. And it came."

it on; being military men by profession, they prepared for war much more intelligently, effectively, and even zealously than they labored for peace. On the Filipino side, as we have seen, the prospect of fighting the Americans had been held in view from the very first movement in reorganizing the revolution, and preparations for such warfare had been carried on more or less consistently since before the fall of Manila. One side was waiting, with trigger drawn and aim taken, only for the other to convert bluster into action. Their opponents, less restrained by discipline, and excited by the belief in an easy victory over men they were being trained to hate as white barbarians, might at any time disregard the word from above, which was still the cautious "It is not yet the time." Peace must now be obtained by an effort; war would come of itself.

END OF VOLUME I



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